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Abstract
*
This thesis considers the fragmentation of international law as it affects the international 
human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law regimes. It 
does this by examining the approaches of the three regimes to specific violations of the 
regimes’ law. These are torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence and the destruction 
of property. By this approach it is possible to see that while fragmentation is a very real 
phenomenon, the operation of the individual regimes is not impeded as some commentators 
have suggested. One way this is achieved is by each regime making a conscious effort to use 
legal rules particular to that regime in a formalised fashion. This seemingly restricts the 
operation of a policy-orientated approach to rule ascertainment, leading to a stronger and 
more cohesive body of international law.
Acknowledgements
*
Though writing a PhD thesis is largely thought of as a solitary endeavour, I have had the 
support of several individuals to whom I wish to express my sincere gratitude. Firstly, my 
supervisors Professor David Sugarman and Dr. Agata Fijalkowski have both been there to 
guide and counsel me throughout my time at Lancaster University. Second, to my examiners 
Professor Dino Kritsiotis and Dr. James Summers for a stimulating viva voce examination. 
Third, the support of my friends and fellow PhD students has been most appreciated: Ernest 
Owusu-Dapaa, John Pearson, Rodrigo Cespedes Proto and Sanaa Soroghli. Fourthly, to Dr. 
Richard Austen-Baker for a much needed distraction from writing my thesis and his sound 
advice. And lastly, to my family, in particular Sarah Hogg who has provided incalculable 







Table of Instruments Cited..............................................................................................................x
Abbreviations................................................................................................................................xiv
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
The hypothesis and its contribution to knowledge............................................................ 3
Methodology............................................................................................  6
A brief history of the fragmentation of international law................................................7
An introduction to the three regimes................................................................................11
The structure of the thesis................................................................................................ 13
Chapter One.................................................................................................................................... 16
1.1.1 Part one: Defining fragmentation........................................................................... 17
1.1.2 A comparison of Tadic and Nicaragua..................................................................34
1.1.3 Fragmentation and the three regimes.....................................................................44
1.1.3(a) IHRL as a regime of international law...................................................   45
1.1.3(b) IHL as a regime of international law................................................................ 46
1.1.3(c) ICL as a regime of international law................................................................. 48
1.1.4 The merging of the three regimes..................  51
1.1.5 The doctrine of lex specialis and the three regimes..............................................54
1.1.6 Does a conflict exist?..............................................................................................57
1.1.7 Do the regimes exist in a hierarchy?..................................................................... 61
1.1.8 Is lex specialis appropriate?...................................................................................62
1.1.9 Conclusion to part one........................................................................................... 64
1.2.1 Part two: Mitigating fragmentation........................................................................65
1.2.2 Conclusion to part two........................................................................................... 78
Conclusion to Chapter One............................................................................................. 78
Chapter Two - Torture...................................................................................................................81
2.1 Torture in the IHRL regime....................................................................................... 83
2.1.1 Torture in the UN human rights system................................................................ 85
2.1.2 Torture and the ECHR........................................................................................... 92
2.1.3 Torture and the Inter-American system................................................................. 97
2.1.4 Conclusion on torture and the IHRL regimes.....................................................100
2.2 Torture in the IHL regime..................................................................................... 102
2.2.1 Customary IHL and torture.................................................................................. 103
2.2.2 IHL treaty and case law relating to torture.......................................................... 105
2.2.3 Conclusion on torture within the IHL regime.....................................................117
2.3 Torture in the ICL regime................................................................................ ......119
iii
2.3.1 ICL treaty law and torture.....................................................................................120
2.3.2 ICL case law and torture....................................................................................... 123
2.3.2(a) Torture at Nuremberg and Tokyo.................................................................... 123
2.3.2(b) Torture at the ICTY and ICTR........................................................................ 126
2.3.2(c) Torture as genocide at the ICTY and ICTR.................................................... 133
2.3.3 Conclusions on torture within the ICL regime.................................................... 136
Conclusion to Chapter Two............................................................................................ 137
Chapter Three - Enforced Disappearance..................................................................................141
3.1 Enforced disappearance and IHRL...................................................................... ,..143
3.1.1 The UN regime and enforced disappearance...................................................... 144
3.1.2 The Inter-American System and enforced disappearance.................................. 147
3.1.3 Enforced disappearance and the ECHR...............................................................156
3.1.4 Conclusion on enforced disappearance within the IHRL regime........................167
3.2 Enforced disappearance and IHL............................................................................ 168
3.2.1 Customary IHL and enforced disappearance...........................   169
3.2.2 IHL treaty law and enforced disappearance........................................................ 169
3.2.3 IHL case law and enforced disappearance...........................................................172
3.2.4 Conclusion on IHL and enforced disappearance.................................................177
3.3 Enforced disappearance and ICL............................................................................ 178
3.3.1 ICL treaty law and enforced disappearance........................................................ 179
3.3.2 ICL case law and enforced disappearance.......................................................... 183
3.3.2(a) Enforced disappearance at the ICTY...............................................................184
3.3.2(b) Enforced disappearance at the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber.....................188
3.3.3 Conclusion on the ICL regime and enforced disappearance.............................. 192
Conclusion to Chapter Three..........................................................................................194
Chapter Four - Sexual Violence................................................................................................. 197
4.1 Sexual violence and IHRL...................................................................................... 200
4.1.1 Sexual violence and the UN system.................................................................... 202
4.1.2 Sexual violence and the ECHR............................................................................204
4.1.3 Sexual violence and the Inter-American system.................................................208
4.1.4 Conclusion on sexual violence within the IHRL regime...................................211
4.2 Sexual violence and IHL....................................................................................... 213
4.2.1 Customary IHL and sexual violence................................................................... 215
4.2.2 IHL treaty law and sexual violence..................................................................... 217
4.2.3 IHL case law and sexual violence....................................................................... 221
4.2.4 Conclusion on sexual violence and IHL............................................................. 222
4.3 Sexual violence and ICL....................... 224
4.3.1 ICL treaty law and sexual violence..................................................................... 225
4.3.2 ICL case law of sexual violence...........................................................................228
4.3.3 Conclusion on ICL and sexual violence.............................................................. 245
Conclusion to Chapter Four.......................................................................................... 248
iv
Chapter Five - Destruction of Property......................................................................................251
5.1 Destruction of property and IHRL.......................................................................... 256
5.1.1 Destruction of property and the UN system............................................257
5.1.2 Destruction of property and the ECHR system...................................... 259
5.1.3 Destruction of property and the Inter-American system........................263
5.1.4 Conclusion on the destruction of property in IHRL............................................265
5.2 Destruction of property and IHL...........................................................................267
5.2.1 Customary IHL and the destruction of property ........................................ 268
5.2.2 IHL treaty law and the destruction of property...................................................271
5.2.3 IHL case law and the destruction of property.....................................................274
5.2.4 Pillage, plunder and looting under IHL at the ICTY......................................... 283
5.2.5 Conclusion on IHL and the destruction of property........................................... 285
5.3 Destruction of Property and the ICL regime........................................................ 286
5.3.1 ICL treaty law and the destruction of property...................................................287
5.3.2 ICL case law the destruction of property............................................................ 288
5.3.3 Conclusion on ICL and the destruction of property........................................... 289
Conclusion to Chapter Five............................................................................................289
Conclusion....................................................................................................................................292
The thesis in summary.................................................................................................... 293
Implications for the fragmentation of international law.............................................302
Alternative approaches to a formal approach to international law..............................305
The role of a formal approach to international law and fragmentation........................307
The future of fragmentation........................................... ..............................................309
Bibliography................................................................................................................................ 311
v
List o f Cases Cited
*
ICTY
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1) TC, Judgment, 25 June 1999 
Prosecutor v. Babic (IT-03-72-S) TC, Sentencing Judgment, 29 June 2004 
Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic (IT-02-60) TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (IT-95-14) TC, Judgment, 3 March 2002 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (IT-95-14) AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004 
Prosecutor v. Brdanin (IT-99-36) TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004 
Prosecutor v. Brdanin (IT-99-36) AC, Judgment, 3 April 2007 
Prosecutor v. Delalic (IT-96-21-T) TC, Judgment, 16 November 1998 
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (IT-96-22) TC, Sentencing Judgment, 29 November 1996 
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (IT-96-22) TC, Judgment, 5 March 1998 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1) TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1) AC, Judgment, 21 July 2000 
Prosecutor v. Galic (IT-98-29) TC, Judgment, 5 December 2003 
Prosecutor v. Galic (IT-98-29) AC, Judgment, 30 November 2006
Prosecutor v. Hadzihasonovic & Kubura (IT-01-47) AC, Decision on Joint Defence 
Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber Decision on Rule 98bis Motions for Acquittal, 11 
March 2005
Prosecutor v. Hadzihasonovic & Kubura (IT-01-47) TC, Judgment, 15 March 2006 
Prosecutor v. Halilovic (IT-01-48-T) TC, Judgment, 16 November 2005 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic (IT-95-10-T) TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999 
Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez (IT-95-14/2) TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001 
Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez (IT-95-14/2) AC, Judgment, 17 December 2004
vi
Prosecutor v. Krstic (IT-98-33) TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001 
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac (IT-97-25) TC, Judgment, 15 March 2002 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al (IT-96-23 & 23/1) TC, Judgment, 22 February 2001 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al (IT-96-23 & 23/1) AC, Judgment, 12 June 2002 
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic (IT-95-16-T) TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000 
Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al (IT-98-30/1) TC, Judgment, 2 November 2001 
Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al (IT-98-30/1) AC, Judgment, 28 February 2005 
Prosecutor v. Limaj (IT-03-66-T) TC, Judgment, 30 November 2005 
Prosecutor v. Lukic (IT-98-32/1-T) TC, Judgment, 20 July 2009 
Prosecutor v. Martic (IT-95-11-T) TC Judgment, 12 June 2007 
Prosecutor v. Mrksic et a l (IT-95-13/1) TC, Judgment, 27 September 2007 
Prosecutor v. Mucic et al (IT-96-21) TC, Judgment, 9 October 2001 
Prosecutor v. Oric (IT-03-68) TC, Judgment, 30 June 2006 
Prosecutor v. Perisic (IT-04-81) TC, Judgment, 6 September 2011 
Prosecutor v. Popovic (IT-05-88) TC, Judgment, 10 June 2010 
Prosecutor v. Rajic (IT-95-12) TC, Judgment, 8 May 2006 
Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic (IT-95-9) TC, Judgment, 17 October 2003 
Prosecutor v. Stakic (IT-97-24) TC, Judgment, 31 Jul 2003 
Prosecutor v. Stakic (IT-97-24) AC, Judgment, 22 March 2006 
Prosecutor v. Strugar (IT-01-40) TC, Judgment, 31 January 2005
Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1) AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995
Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1-T) TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997 
Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1-A) AC, Judgment, 15 July 1999 
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic (IT-98-32-T) TC, Judgment, 29 November 2002
ICTR
Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4) TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998 
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (ICTR-95-1A) TC, Judgment, 7 June 2001 
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi (ICTR-2001-64) TC, Judgment, 7 July 2006 
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44) TC, Judgment, 1 December 2003 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1) TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999 
Prosecutor v. Musema (ICTR-96-13) TC, Judgment, 27 January 2000 
Prosecutor v. Semanza (ICTR-97-20) TC, Judgment, 15 May 2003 
Prosecutor v. Seromba (ICTR-2001-66) AC, Judgment, 12 March 2008
UN Human Rights Committee
Grille Motta v. Uruguay (11/77) 25 April 1977, UN Doc A/35/40 
Muteba v. Zaire (124/82) 25 March 1982, UN Doc A/39/40
Dragan Dimitrijevic v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication No. 207/2002, UN Doc. 
UN CAT/C/3 3/D/207/2002 (2004)
Jovica Dimitrov v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication No. 171/2000, UN Doc. 
UNCAT/C/34/D/171/2000 (2005)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Neira Alegria et al v. Peru, Judgment of January 19 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 20
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Judgment of September 26 2006, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) 
No. 154 (2006)
Bamaca-Velasquez v. Guatemala, Judgment of November 25 2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. 
C) No. 70 (2000)
Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of January 24 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser, C) No. 36 (1998)
La Cantuta Case v. Peru, Judgment of November 29 2006, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
162 (2006)
Anzualdo Castro v. Peru (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Judgment 
of 22 September 2009, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 202 (2009)
viii
Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Judgment of December 8, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(Ser. C) No. 22 (1995).
Durand y Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment of 16 August 2000 (Ser. C) No. 68 (2000)
Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia, Judgment of November 27 2008, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
191 (2008)
Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(Ser. C) No. 6 (1989).
Godinez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 5 (1989)
Goiburu et al. v. Paraguay, Judgment of September 22 2006, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
153 (2006)
Gomez-Palomino Case v. Peru, Judgment of November 22 2005, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) 
No. 136 (2005)
Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Judgment of August 12 2008, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) 
No. 186 (2008)
Kawas-Fernandez v. Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Judgment of 3 April 2009, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 196 (2009)
The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2001, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001)
Case o f the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Judgment 
of 25 November 2006, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) No. 160 (2006)
Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Judgment of June 15, 2005, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
145 (2005)
Villagran Morales et al. Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of November 19 1999, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 63 (1999)
Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of January 21, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 16 
(1994)
Dianna Ortiz v. Guatemala, Judgment of October 16 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.31 
(1996)
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29 1988, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 
(1988)
Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador, Judgment of 12 November 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
35 (1997)
Juan Humberto Sanchez Case, Judgment of June 7 2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 99 
(2003)
Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, Judgment of November 26 2008, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) No. 
190 (2008)
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community o f the Enxet-Lengua People v. Paraguay, Case 12.313, 
Report No. 2/02, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R., Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 387 (2002)
European Court of Human Rights
Akdeniz v. Turkey (Application no. 25165/94) Judgment, 31 May 2005
Akhiyadova v. Russia (Application no. 32059/02) Judgment, 3 July 2008
Akhmadova and Akhmadov v. Russia (Application no. 20755/04) Judgment, 25 September 
2008
Alikhadzhiyeva v. Russia (Application no. 37193/08) Judgment, 24 May 2011 
Aydin v. Turkey (57/1996/676/866) Judgment, 25 September 1997 
Baysayeva v. Russia (Application no.74237/01) Judgment, 5 April 2007 
Bazorkina v. Russia (Application no. 69481/01) Judgment, 27 July 2006 
Belilos v. Switzerland (Application no. 10328/83) Judgment, 29 April 1988 
Betayev and Betayeva v. Russia (Application no. 37315/03) Judgment, 29 May 2008 
Bilgin v. Turkey (Application no. 23819) Judgment, 16 November 2000 
Bramelid v. Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 249
Cacan v. Turkey (Application no. 33646/96) Judgment, 26 October 2004 
Cakici v. Turkey (Application no. 23697/94) Judgment, 8 July 1999 
Celikbilek v. Turkey (Application no. 27693/95)
Elmurzayev v. Russia (Application no. 3019/04) Judgment, 12 June 2008 
Ghigo v. Malta (Application no. 31122/05) Judgment, 26 September 2006 
Ibragimov v. Russia (Application no. 34561/03) Judgment, 29 May 2008 
Imakayeva v. Russia (Application no. 7615/02) Judgment, 9 November 2006 
Ipek v. Turkey (Application no. 25760/94) Judgment, 17 February 2004
Ireland v. UK (Application no. 5310/71) Judgment, 18 January 1978
Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (Application nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00) 
Judgment, 24 February 2005
Janowice and others v. Russia (Application nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09) ECHR Judgment, 
16 April 2012
Kay a v. Turkey (Application no. 22729/93) Judgment, 19 February 1998
Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia (Application no. 57945/00) Judgment, 24 February 2005
Koku v. Turkey (Application no. 27305/95) Judgment, 31 May 2005
Kurt v. Turkey (Application no. 24276/94) Judgment, 22 January 1998
Loizidou v. Turkey (Application no. 15318/89) Judgment, 18 December 1998
Luluyev and others v. Russia (Application no. 69480/01) Judgment, 9 November 2006
Lyanova and Aliyeva v. Russia (Application nos. 12713/02 & 28440/03) Judgment, 2 October 
2008
McCann v. UK (Application no.18984/91) Grand Chamber Judgment, 27 September 1995
Mentese v. Turkey (Application no. 36217/97) Judgment, 18 January 2005
Musayeva and others v. Russia (Application no 74239/01) Judgment, 26 July 2007
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria (Application nos. 43577/98 & 43579/00) Judgment, 6 July 
2005
Nuray Sen v. Turkey (Application no. 41478/98) Judgment, 17 June 2003
Orhan v. Turkey (Application no. 25656/94) Judgment, 18 June 2002
Osmanoglu v. Turkey (Application no. 48804/99) Judgment, 24 January 2008
Paeffgen GmbH v. Germany (Application nos. 25379/02, 21688/05, 21722/05, 21770/05) 
Judgment, 18 September 2007
Sadykov v. Russia (Application no. 41840/02) Judgment, 7 October 2010 
Salman v. Turkey (Application no. 21986/93) Judgment, 27 June 2000 
Sangariyeva and others v. Russia (Application no. 1839/04) Judgment, 29 May 2008 
Seker v. Turkey (Application no. 52390/99) Judgment, 21 February 2006
Selmouni v. France (Application no. 25803/94) Judgment, 28 July 1999,
Sirin Yilmaz v. Turkey (Application no. 35875/97) Judgment, 29 July 2004
Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (Application nos. 33985/96 & 33986/9 27 September 
1999
Smith Kline and French Laboratories v. Netherlands (Application no. 12633/87) Judgment, 
4 October 1990
Soylu v. Turkey (Application no. 43854/98) Judgment, 15 February 2007
Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden (Application nos. 7151/75 and 7152/75) Judgment, 23 
September 1982
Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (Application no. 26307/95) Judgment, 8 April 2004 
Tanis and others v. Turkey (Application no. 65899/01) Judgment, 2 August 2005 
Tas v. Turkey (Application no. 24396/94) Judgment, 14 November 2000 
Timurtas v. Turkey (Application no. 23531/94) Judgment, 13 June 2000 
Togcu v. Turkey (Application no. 27601/95) Judgment, 31 May 2005 
Tyrer v. UK (Application no. 5856/77) Judgment, 25 April 1978 
Umarov v. Russia (Application no. 12712/02) Judgment, 3 July 2008
International Court of Justice (Judgments and Advisory Opinions)
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States o f 
America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 392 (27 June)
North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic o f Germany v. Denmark; Federal 
Republic o f Germany v. Netherlands) Judgment, 20 February 1969, ICJ Rep 1969, p.3
Case Concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory o f the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) 
Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005
The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime of 
Genocide (.Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment, ICJ General List 
No. 91
Legality o f the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 19961.C.J. Rep 1996, 
p. 226. The Arrest Warrant Case DRC v. Belgium
Arbitral Award o f 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53
xii
Legal Consequences of the Construction o f a Wall (Advisory Opinion) 2004, General List 
No. 131, ICJ Rep 2004
Domestic Courts
R v. Bartle and the Commissioner o f Police for the Metropolis and Others, ex parte Pinochet 
[1999] UKHL 17
R v. Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 
Bosnian War Crimes Chamber
Prosecutor v. Bastah (No. X-KR-05/122) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 4 February 2010
Prosecutor v. Damjanovic (No. X-KR-05/51) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 15 December 2006
Prosecutor v. Mandic (No. X-KRZ-05/58) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 1 September 2009
Prosecutor v. Perkovic (No. X-KR-09/662) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 24 December 2009
Prosecutor v. Pincic (No.X-KR-08/502) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 28 November 2008
Prosecutor v. Savic (No. X-KR-07/478) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 3 July 2009
Prosecutor v. Stevanovic (No. X-KR-05/24-2) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 29 July 2008
Cases before the Nuremberg Tribunal (and subsequent trials)
Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946 (1947) 41 AJIL 172
US v. Pohl et al, Judgment of 3 November 1947, vol. V (United States Government Printing 
Office: Washington) 976
US v. Altstoetter et al. ‘The Justice Case', Judgment of 3-4 December 1947, Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. Ill, (United States Government 
Printing Office: Washington)
US v. Greifelt et al, ‘The RuSHA Case', Judgment of 10 March 1948, Trials of War Criminals 
before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. V (United States Government Printing Office)
xiii
US v. Leeh et al *The High Command Case', Judgment of 27-28 October 1948, vol. X 
(United States Government Printing Office: Washington) 39
US v. Weizsaecker et al, ‘The Ministries Case\  Judgment of 14 April 1949, Trials of War 





UN Security Council Resolutions
UNSC Res 770 (13 A ugust 1992) UN Doc S/RES/770 
UNSC Res 771 (13 A ugust 1992) UN Doc S/RES/771 
UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827 
UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955 
UNSC Res 1034, 21 December 1995, UN Doc S/RES/1034 
UNSC Res 1315, 14 August 2000, UN Doc S/RES/1315 
UNSC Res 1493. 28 July 2003, UN Doc S/RES/1493 
UNSC Res 1539. 22 April 2004, UN Doc S/RES/1539 
UNSC Res 1743, 15 February 2007, UN Doc S/RES/1743 
UN General Assembly Resolutions
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Numberg 
Tribunal, UN GA Res 95 (I) (11 Dec 1946) UN Doc A/Res/1/95
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A(III); UN Doc A/810 91, UN 
General Assembly, 1948
UNGA Res 2547 (XXIV) (11 Dec 1969) UN Doc A/Res/24/2547 
UNGA Res 3452 (XXX) (9 Dec 1975) UN Doc A/Res/30/3452 
UNGA Res 173 (XXXIII) (20 Dec 1978) UN Doc A/RES/33/173.
UNGA Res 133 (XLVII) (18 Dec 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/133.
UNGA Res 48/104 (20 Dec 1993) UN Doc A/Res48/104 
Treaties
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 1907) 36 Stat 
2277; 1 Bevans 631; 205 Consol TS 2773; Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 461, entered into 
force 26 January 1910
xv
Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919
Statute of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945) 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat 1055; TS 
No 993, entered into force 24 October 1945
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 
78 UNTS 227, entered into force 12 January 1951
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 35, entered into force 21 October 
1950
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 81, entered into 
force 21 October 1950
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 
135, entered into force 21 October 1950
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August
1949) 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November
1950) 213 UNTS 222; 312 ETS 5, entered into force 3 September 1953
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951) 189 UNTS 137, entered into 
force 22 April 1954
American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) 1144 UNTS 123, entered into 
force 18 July 1978
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 
(1969); 63 AJIL 875 (1969), entered into force 27 January 1980
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977) 1125 
UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1979
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (8 June 1977) 1125 
UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 1979
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (18 December 1979) 1249 
UNTS 13, entered into force 3 September 1981
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, OAS Treaty Series, No. 67, 9 
December 1985, entered into force 28 February 1987
xvi
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (9 May 1992) 1771 UNTS 107.
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 9 June 1994
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women (‘Convention of Belem do Para’), 9 June 1994, entered into force 5 March 
1995, ILM 33 (1994)
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/9, 
entered into force 1 July 2002
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 20 
December 2006, UN Doc.A/61/488
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210
Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 59 Stat 1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153, entered 
into force 24 October 1945
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 




AJIL -  American Journal o f International Law
AP I - Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977) 1125 
UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1979
AP II - Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (8 June 1977) 1125 
UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 1979
BWCC -  Bosnian War Crimes Chamber
CEDAW - Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (18 December 
1979) 1249 UNTS 13, entered into force 3 September 1981
CUP -  Cambridge University Press
ECHR -  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
November 1950) 213 UNTS 222; 312 ETS 5, entered into force 3 September 1953ECtHR -  
European Court of Human Rights
EJIL -  European Journal o f International Law
GC I - Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 35, entered into force 21 October 
1950
GC II - Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 81, entered into 
force 21 October 1950
GC III - Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 
75 UNTS 135, entered into force 21 October 1950
GC IV - Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 
August 1949) 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950
IACHR -  Inter-American Convention on Human Rights
ICC -  International Criminal Court
xviii
ICCPED - International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, 20 December 2006, UN Doc.A/61/488
ICCPR -  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171
ICESCR -  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 
1966) 993 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976
ICL -  International Criminal Law
ICLQ -  International and Comparative Law Quarterly
ICRC -  International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR -  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY -  International Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia
IHL -  International Humanitarian Law
IHRL -  International Human Rights Law
IMT -  International Military Tribunal
JICJ -  Journal o f International Criminal Justice
JCSL -  Journal o f Conflict and Security Law
LJIL — Leiden Journal o f International Law
MLR -  Modern Law Review
OUP -  Oxford University Press
SCSL -  Special Court for Sierra Leone
UDHR -  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 
217 A(III)
UN -  United Nations
UNCAT -  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85, entered into force 26 June 1987
UNGA -  UN General Assembly





The fragmentation of international law is one of the key areas of international legal 
debate in the early 21st Century.1 It has generated a voluminous amount of literature,2 
a study by the International Law Commission (ILC)3 and comment from members of 
the international judiciary.4 Fragmentation touches many aspects of international law 
from human rights to trade, environmental law to criminal law. Given such a 
proliferation of international law it is perhaps unsurprising that the different areas 
appear to touch and interact with one another. In turn this has inspired much debate as 
to the desirability of fragmentation and its potential to cause uncertainty and confusion 
between and within the different areas.
Fragmentation can be defined by its causes and effects, the impact it has on the 
operation of international law and how international actors respond to it. The 
international legal order has become more specialised than it once was due to the 
‘creation of special regimes of knowledge and expertise’ such as trade, human rights 
and international criminal law.5 This has led to the emergence of a diverse number of
1 Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in Jan Klabbers et al, The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(OUP 2011) 1. Here fragmentation is listed alongside ‘constitutionalization’ and ‘verticalization’ as 
being the ‘Holy Trinity’ of debate.
2 See for example Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks’ (1999) 
31 Journal o f International Law and Politics 919; Martti Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation 
of International Law? Post-modern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 LJIL 553; Christian Leathley, ‘An Institutional 
Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?’ 
(2007) 40 New York University Journal o f International Law & Politics 259; Shane Spelliscy, ‘The 
Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the Armor’ 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 143 (2001).
3 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682.
4 See the remarks of HE Judge Guillaume. Available at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&pl=l&p2=3&p3=l> last accessed 21st April 
2013; and of HE Judge Schwebel. Available at:
<http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=87&pt=3&pl=l&p2=3&p3-l> last accessed 21st April 
2013.
5 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law 20 Years Later’ (2009) 20 EJIL 7, 9.
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legal regimes within the international legal system. Each of these regimes has its own 
norms and rules that seek to regulate the behaviour of their subjects.6 In some instances 
multiple regimes prohibit similar fact conduct but how this conduct is legally defined 
varies between the regimes. For example, torture is prohibited by IHRL, IHL, and ICL 
but its definition differs across the three regimes because of their functional differences. 
Such divergence in approaches could potentially compromise legal certainty and lead 
to a weakening of international law.7
The thesis compares and contrasts four violations - torture, enforced 
disappearance, sexual violence and the wanton destruction of property - in relation to 
the operation of the international human rights law (IHRL), international humanitarian 
law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL). The thesis demonstrates that with 
respect to these violations and regimes the notion that international law is fragmented 
and is in danger of being rendered incoherent is misconceived. Instead, the thesis 
emphasises the relative autonomy of IHRL, IHL and ICL with respect to torture, 
enforced disappearance, sexual violence and the wanton destruction of property.
The introduction is structured so as to provide the reader with an outline of the 
hypothesis employed in this thesis and an understanding of the principal issues to be 
examined. As such, it presents an overview of the fragmentation of international law, 
introduces and justifies the subject area of the thesis and highlights the key areas of 
concern and debate. It also provides a brief historical account of post-Second World 
War developments in international law and how these have contributed to the 
fragmentation of international law.
6 For example, as evidenced by the creation of treaties specific to the regimes.
7 On some of the challenges posed by fragmentation see Gerhard Hafner, ‘Pros and Cons Ensuing from 
Fragmentation of International Law’ (2003) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 849, 856-860; 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and 




The hypothesis and its contribution to knowledge
The IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes prohibit torture, the enforced disappearance of 
individuals, sexual violence and wanton destruction of property. The definition of these 
acts varies across the three regimes. For example, torture as a violation of IHRL 
requires a physical act (e.g. the pulling of fingernails) coupled with the involvement of 
state officials (directly or indirectly).8 As a violation of IHL the physical act must occur 
within the context of an armed conflict (international or non-international). For ICL, 
the act must either be a war crime, crime against humanity or act of genocide. These 
factors can be seen as integral to the definition of the violation as the occurrence of the 
physical act itself. Consequently, an examination of the three regimes’ definitions 
reveals both a shared bond and divergence.
Fragmentation cannot be viewed as a binary issue in which there is either unity 
or discord. There are many positives to come from the phenomenon. For example, the 
way in which the three regimes define the physical act of torture helps to underscore 
the collective revulsion to the commission of such acts. The aim of this thesis is to 
highlight some of these shared bonds while also emphasising the differences between 
the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes. Such differences are largely functional in nature 
meaning that they assist the operation of the definition in the regime. For example, the 
requirement that an armed conflict exists can be seen as a functional element of the 
definition of torture in the IHL regime; the involvement of State agents is often required 
for the commission of a human rights violation.
The existence of three different legal definitions relating to the same physical 
act has resulted in commentators raising concerns as to whether this causes legal
8 E.g. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 




uncertainty and conflict between the three regimes.9 For example, an act of enforced 
disappearance committed in the context of Chechnya could potentially amount to a 
violation of IHRL, IHL and ICL. However, the next stage would be to identify which 
of the three regimes could operate in practice. For ICL to take effect it would have to 
be shown that the act was a war crime and thus requiring a connection to an armed 
conflict, part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, or an 
act of genocide. The operation of IHL would again require proof of the existence of an 
armed conflict. IHRL would require that the acts were committed by State agents or 
individuals operating, by some means, with the consent or acquiescence of the State. In 
the case of enforced disappearances in Chechnya the families of victims have made 
applications to the ECtHR for violations of the ECHR, a human rights Convention. 
Academic opinion on this subject is, however, divided. One school of thought claims 
IHRL is universal and is thus breached when IHL is violated.10 Another approach is 
that IHL acts as the lex specialis (i.e. the special law) of IHRL in such instances and 
thus it is IHL which is violated.11 This divergence results in uncertainty as to which 
regime is applicable in a given scenario, potentially resulting in damage to the 
international legal order.12
9 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 
Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?’ (2008) 19 EJIL 161; Anthony E. Cassimatis, 
‘International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and Fragmentation of International 
law’ (2007) 5 6 ICLQ 623.
10 Theodor Meron has argued that the two systems of IHRL and IHL could converge: Theodor Meron, 
‘On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument’ 
(1983) 77 AJIL 589. For an analysis of the arguments see Noam Lubell, ‘Parallel Application of 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the Debate’ 
(2007) 40 Israel Law Review 648.
11 S et Legal Consequences of the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion [2004] ICJ Reports 136, para. 106; William Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The 
Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad 
Bellum’ (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 592, 597.
12 See Hafner (n 7); Dupuy (n 7).
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This thesis approaches the issue of fragmentation from a different perspective. 
Instead of adhering to the view that the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes are in conflict with 
ope another, it argues the purposes for which the regimes exist are different and each is 
governed by its own distinctive characteristics. The IHRL regime exists to safeguard 
individual rights against the State (although it is recognised that this is becoming a 
contested view with the advent of human rights obligations of non-State actors);13 the 
IHL regime seeks to protect and indeed restrain combatants in times of armed conflict 
whether or not they are affiliated with the State;14 and the ICL regime seeks to curb 
impunity and protect individuals from war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide.15 This divergence necessarily results in three separate definitions of torture, 
enforced disappearance, sexual violence and wanton destruction of property. This 
perspective on fragmentation concerns itself with the law in operation. Such a ‘bottom 
up’ viewpoint has been chosen because it offers a fresher perspective on the 
fragmentation phenomenon which is often concerned with the effects fragmentation 
has on the systemic operation of international law.
In approaching the analysis of the relevant definitions, the thesis adopts an 
approach that distinguishes between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ approaches to the 
ascertainment of legal rules.16 The legal definition of similar fact conduct peculiar to 
one regime cannot be transplanted from one regime to the other because the definition 
incorporates elements specific only to the regime in question. Each regime’s existence 
becomes independent from the other regimes. Therefore there is potential for the
13 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006); Andrew Clapham, 
‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 88 ICRC 491 522-523.
14 Annyssa Belial et al, ‘International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan’ (2011) 93 ICRC 
47.
15 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9, entered 
into force 1 July 2002, arts 6-8
16 See Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (OUP 2011).
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problems associated with fragmentation to be mitigated by the demarcation of the 
regimes’ boundaries. This would increase the ability of the law to be more certain with 
the possibility of strengthening the operation of the three regimes.
Methodology
The present enquiry focuses on the emergence of discrete definitions in each of the 
three regimes studied. It draws upon a range of sources and material but is primarily 
focused on the jurisprudence of international tribunals, notably the ICTY, ICTR, 
ECtHR and Inter-American Court. The initial identification of the rules to be examined 
namely, torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence and destruction of property is 
based on the shared condemnation of such acts by each of the three regimes. By 
choosing to examine issues with prima facie similarities it is anticipated that deeper 
and more subtle differences between the regimes’ approaches will emerge. This will 
lend support to the argument advanced by the thesis that the regimes, while sharing 
certain bonds, can now function independently of one another. In turn, this lends greater 
support for the increased use of formally ascertainable rules of law which underpin the 
operation of the three regimes.
Fragmentation is analysed from a formal, rule-bound perspective rather than 
perceived from the position of a policy-orientated approach to international law. A 
formal approach has been adopted because it best recognises the boundaries between 
the three regimes and permits them to be viewed as separate legal entities. This 
approach has the potential to improve legal certainty and also to generate greater clarity 
as to which legal regime is to apply in any given scenario. Thus there exists the 
possibility to mitigate the effects of fragmentation on the international legal system. It 
also recognises that there is the potential for separate legal systems to co-exist at the 
international level while minimising the effects of overlap and conflict between them.
Introduction
A brief history of the fragmentation of international law
It was apparent to the Allied Powers (Britain, France, the USA and the USSR) during 
the Second World War that in order to prevent such wars occurring in future the 
international community needed strong institutions underpinned by widespread respect 
for international law. One way in which they sought to achieve this was by holding 
individuals responsible for violations of international law at the Nuremberg Trial. In 
addition to finding individuals guilty for the crime of aggression it was also tasked with 
bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In its 
final judgment the IMT held that ‘Crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.’17 Thus, the 1946 judgment 
represents a fundamental shift in international law. Prior to Nuremberg only states 
could be liable for violations of international law and, because enforcement was weak, 
they were able to act with impunity. For the historian Richard Overy ‘the central 
purpose of the Tribunal was not to conform to existing principles in international law 
but to establish new rules of international conduct and agreed boundaries in the 
violation of human rights.’18 As such, the indictment of the Nazi leadership was 
‘accepted as a necessary underpinning for the construction of a new moral and political 
order.’19 Nuremberg made it possible to hold individuals liable for violations of 
international law, and could help to curb impunity.
17 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, The Trial o f German Major War Criminals: 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, vol.22, London, 
1950,447.
18 Richard Overy, ‘The Nuremberg trials: international law in the making’ in Philippe Sands (ed) From 




The Second World War also led to the creation of the United Nations in 1945,20 
a substantially improved incarnation of the League of Nations.21 The UN Charter is 
considered to be one of the foundations of modem international law.22 Article 1 of the 
Charter establishes that the purpose of the UN is to ‘maintain international peace and 
security’ and to bring about ‘by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles 
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace’.23 This builds on the aims of the 
League,24 but provides a more effective enforcement method through the creation of 
the UN Security Council, which acts as a coordinating and executive body for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.25 Article 1 provides for the promotion 
of ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion’.26 Article 1 of the UN Charter can be seen as one 
of the first signs of the fragmenting legal system in that it charges the UN with a range 
of functions not limited to ensuring international comity.
The creation of the UN system however was not an immediate success, nor did 
it appear that the liberal institutionalism espoused by the UN system had triumphed 
finally over the realist school of international relations. From 1945 onwards, tensions 
rose between the USSR in the East and the other Allied-Powers in the West.27 
Following the Allied victory, the international system was effectively split between 
communist and capitalist, East and West. It seemed that the Thucydidean conception
20 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 59 Stat 1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 
24 October 1945 ( ‘UN Charter’).
21 See the Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919.
22 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community’ 
(1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, 532.
23 UN Charter, art 1(1).
24 Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919, Preamble and arts 8-13.
25 UN Charter, art 23.
26 UN Charter, art 1(3).
27 See John L. Gaddis, The Cold War (Penguin 2007); Jeremy Isaacs & Taylor Downing, Cold War: For 
Forty Five Years the World Held its Breath (Abacus 2008).
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of hegemony prevailed over the ideals of the United Nations.28 However, despite the 
fighting of proxy wars around the globe, for example in Indo-China (c. 1955-1975), and 
Central and Southern America (c. 1965-1990), a head-to-head conflict between East and 
West was averted.
Throughout the Cold War several international treaties and instruments were 
adopted which aimed to protect human dignity and to promote human rights. The first 
such instrument was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the UN 
General Assembly in 1948.29 The UDHR is sometimes viewed as the foundation of 
modem human rights protection.30 This was followed by the Genocide Convention 
1948 criminalising acts of genocide.31 There were also the Geneva Conventions which, 
while they built upon pre-war treaties regarding international humanitarian law, seemed 
to find renewed vigour and acceptance post-Nuremberg.32 In Europe, the Council of 
Europe created the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).33 This was the 
first comprehensive treaty organisation aimed at actively promoting human rights. 
Although the ECHR does not explicitly refer to the protection of human dignity an
28 See Robert Gilpin, ‘The Theory of Hegemonic War’ in Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (W.W. 
Norton 1998).
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A(III); UN Doc A/810 91, UN General 
Assembly, 1948.
30 Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, ‘International Human Rights’ (OUP 2013) 142.
31 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78 UNTS 
227, entered into force 12 January 1951.
32 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 35, entered into force 21 October 1950; Geneva Convention for  
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 81, entered into force 21 October 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 135, entered into force 21 October 1950; 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949) 75 
UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950 (Known respectively as Geneva Convention I, II, III and 
IV).
33 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 213 
UNTS 222; 312 ETS 5, entered into force 3 September 1953.
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examination of the provisions of the treaty and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR reveals 
that the protection of human dignity is an important feature of the ECHR regime.34
The end of the Cold War in 1991 and the dissolution of the USSR was a major 
change for the international geopolitical system.35 The immediate period following the 
Cold War did not, however, usher in a new era of peace and stability. Indeed, the 
opposite was true with conflicts raging in the Balkans following the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus.36 These conflicts again placed pressure upon 
international law which many regarded as being ineffective in both stemming conflicts 
and protecting human dignity. This led to calls that international law be used to further 
the protection of individuals affected by conflict. As a result, two international criminal 
tribunals were created in 199337 and 199438 for specific outrages committed in the 
former-Yugoslavia (the ICTY) and in Rwanda (the ICTR). After nearly 50 years, 
international criminal tribunals had been established for the prosecution of individuals 
accused of grave violations of international law. Subsequently, there was a growth in 
the number of tribunals established to prosecute individuals suspected of violating 
international law. This was followed by calls for the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court similar to the permanence of the UN’s International Court 
of Justice.
34 S.W. v United Kingdom (Application no. 20166/92) Judgment 22 November 1995, para.44. Here the 
Court notes of that the very essence of the Convention is ‘respect for human dignity and human freedom.
35 Jeremy Isaacs & Taylor Downing, Cold War: For Forty Five Years the World Held its Breath (Abacus 
2008).
36 On the Balkans see Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 
(Granta 2000); On Chechnya see Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War 
(Pan 1997).
37 Statute o f the International Criminal Tribunal fo r  the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc S/RES/827, UN 
Security Council, 1994.




At the same time international law continued to expand. Abi-Saab has noted 
that this expansion into new areas has led, inevitably, to increased specialisation.39 The 
European Union has become the best example of the power and ability of international 
law to create a stable supranational organisation aimed ultimately at ensuring regional 
peace and cooperation.40 Environmental concerns have led to the creation of a 
multifaceted international treaty system aimed variously at curbing the pollution of the 
environment and the reduction of carbon emissions.41 International trade has likewise 
spurred on the creation of highly sophisticated developments of international law.42 The 
World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary fund all 
have specific roles to play in coordinating international development, international 
trade and international finance.43
An Introduction to the Three Regimes
The three regimes of IHRL, IHL and ICL were chosen because they each prohibit acts 
which are factually identical. Torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence 
(including rape and sexual assault) and the wanton destruction of property are all 
prohibited by the three regimes. Therefore, each physical act has three legal definitions 
respective to the regime in which it is located. This evidently leads to a proliferation of 
definitions, instead of there just being four (one for each physical act) there are twelve 
(three for each physical act). The distinctions between the regimes’ approaches to 
immunity (both State and individual) could have been studied but this is a procedural 
issue rather than a substantive violation of the law.
39 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks’ (1999) 31 Journal of  
International Law and Politics 919, 923.
40 See Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law (OUP 2011).
41 See Philippe Sands et al, Principles of International Environmental Law (CUP 2012); Daniel 
Bodansky et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2008).
42 Daniel L Bethlehem et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law (OUP 2009).
43 Mitsuo Matsushita et al, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy (OUP 2006).
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A further reason for the selection of the three regimes and a comparative study 
is their shared purpose of protecting human dignity. Despite such a shared purpose, 
each regime differs as to how this shared purpose is attained. IHRL aims to protect 
individual human rights by curtailing the power of the State vis-a-vis the individual. As 
a result, the primary subjects of IHRL are frequently States rather than individuals.44 
The operation of IHL is dependent on the existence of an armed conflict.45 This can be 
either an international or non-international armed conflict.46 The subjects of IHL can 
be States47 or individuals from either States or non-State groups. ICL criminalises 
certain specific acts as war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or a crime 
of aggression.48 Though not considered in this thesis, terrorism and piracy are included 
in some account of ICL.49 Individuals are the principal subjects of ICL as the 
Nuremberg judgment made clear with its comment that ‘crimes against international 
law are committed by men not by abstract entities’.50 There is however scope for 
holding States liable for acts such as genocide,51 however this does not amount to 
individual criminal liability reflected, for example, in the ICC Statute.52
In writing this thesis it has been necessary to make an arbitrary distinction 
between IHL and ICL because while some breaches of IHL amount to a violation of 
ICL (this is the case for the subjects studied), not all offences against ICL are breaches
44 This can be seen in the operation and procedure of the ECHR, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and UN Human Rights Council, all of which focus on the failing of States.
45 See Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 1949: ‘the present Convention shall apply to all 
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict’.
46 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 1949 applies to non-international armed conflicts.
47 Marco Sassoli, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2002) 84 
ICRC 401, 401.
48 See ICC Statute, arts 6-8.
49 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2008) 162.
50 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, in The Trial o f German Major War Criminals: 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, vol.22, London, 
1950, 447.
51 e.g. The Application o f the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] Judgment, ICJ General List No. 91.
52 ICC Statute, art 25.
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of IHL. This is because ICL is broader and prohibits acts of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and crimes of aggression in addition to war crimes. However, war crimes 
necessarily have to be committed in the context of an armed conflict (international or 
non-international) and consequently share a link to the IHL regime. In contrast, 
genocide and crimes against humanity require no such connection and can be 
committed in times of peace.53
The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is organised into five chapters. The first of these is divided into two parts. In 
Part One the issue of fragmentation is examined in detail. It charts the emergence of 
fragmentation as a burning issue in international law and discusses allied scholarship. 
The principal concerns about, and issues arising from, fragmentation are examined 
alongside an analysis of the rulings of the ICJ in Nicaragua and of the ICTY in Tadic. 
These have been chosen to illustrate some of the ways in which the fragmentation of 
international law has been misunderstood. Part One also considers fragmentation as it 
directly relates to the operation of the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes. The second part of 
Chapter One assesses and develops the adopted analytical approach.
The remaining chapters each consider a substantive violation of the law and are 
grouped according to underlying similarities of the physical acts. Each chapter presents 
an analysis of the legal definitions as they are found in the three regimes. The IHRL 
sections contain subsections relating to the definitions as they are found in the UN, 
European and Inter-American human rights systems. The IHL sections focus on 
customary international humanitarian law, treaty law (notably the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977) and the case law of the international
53 Articles 6 and 8 of the ICC Statute make no reference to the need for acts of genocide or crimes against 
humanity to occur in the context of an armed conflict.
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tribunals as it specifically relates to the commission of violations of IHL. The ICL 
sections draw from the historical background of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the 
international criminal tribunals’ jurisprudence relating to crimes against humanity and 
genocide.
The second chapter focuses on the prohibition of acts of torture and how the 
IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes have responded to torturous acts. It highlights the shared 
aspects of torture such as the universally condemned physical acts. On this matter there 
is very little, if any, difference between the three regimes. Divergence comes when the 
regimes consider the perpetrator of the physical acts. The IHRL regime requires the 
involvement of the State either in the commission of torturous acts or because the State 
has failed to afford adequate protection to the victims from private citizens and non- 
State actors. In contrast, the IHL and ICL regimes now no longer require such a 
connection, torture can be committed by State and non-State actors alike. Vital to the 
definition of torture under IHL is that the acts be committed in the context of an 
international or non-international armed conflict. This is not a requirement of the IHRL 
or ICL regimes.
Enforced disappearance is the subject of Chapter Three with the different 
approaches to the offence being considered. As with torture, there is broad agreement 
across the regimes as to how the physical aspect of enforced disappearance is defined. 
It includes acts such as abducting and then causing an individual to be removed from 
the protection of the law. Often such acts result in the torture and death of the victim. 
Differences emerge when the responses of the regimes are considered. For example, 
the IHRL regime has been willing to find that the rights of victims’ relatives have been 
violated, an issue that the IHL and ICL regimes are seemingly unable to acknowledge. 
Enforced disappearance as a violation of ICL must occur in the context of either
14
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genocide or a crime against humanity, while IHRL casts a wider net and operates in a 
range of circumstances not covered by IHL or ICL.
The fourth chapter concerns the emotive subject of sexual violence and 
particularly the issue rape. The elements of the IHRL regime studied in this thesis, such 
as the ECHR, lack specific prohibitions against sexual violence and instead rely upon 
categorising such acts as torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Consideration of 
such acts in IHRL has been limited when compared to IHL and ICL. Both of these latter 
regimes have given extensive room in their jurisprudence to acts of rape and sexual 
violence. The definition of rape used by ICL has been the subject of much debate both 
in academic discussion and in the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals. 
This chapter examines the differences between the regimes and between the various 
courts.
The final chapter in this thesis considers the destruction of property and how 
such acts are prohibited under the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes. As with the other 
regimes, the destruction of property is prohibited by each of the regimes. However, 
unlike torture, enforced disappearance and sexual violence, the prohibition is qualified. 
The IHRL and IHL regimes both permit the destruction of property in certain 
circumstances. These regimes are both governed by proportionality tests and the IHL 
regime also includes a military necessity consideration. Unlike the other three offences, 
the ICL regime as it relates to genocide and crimes against humanity provides relatively 
weak protection of property.
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Chapter One -  Fragmentation
*
Introduction
Fragmentation has been described as the establishment of new institutions created to 
‘manage particular problem areas...by reference to interests and preferences that 
differ from those represented in the institutions of general law.’1 In turn, these have 
produced ‘firm exceptions’ to the general law with the potential to ‘pit particular 
regimes against each other’.2 Such a multiplication of international legal regimes has 
led to concern that the international legal system is being weakened.3 However, the 
occurrence of fragmentation is often the response to ‘unacceptable features of the 
general law.’4 Such a term refers to the apparent inadequacy of general international 
law to respond to mass atrocities and other serious violations of international norms.5 
This deficiency led, in part, to the development of the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes 
studied in this thesis.
Fragmentation leads to the emergence of diverse regimes which can 
sometimes have divergent approaches or definitions relating to matters which are 
prima facie similar.6 The purpose of this thesis is to challenge this underlying 
presumption by examining the regimes independently of one another. By doing this, a 
picture of a complex international legal system emerges. On the one hand there are 
several functionally differentiated legal regimes such as IHRL, IHL and ICL. On the 
other, there are similar factual scenarios such as torture, enforced disappearance,
1 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 197, 205.
2 ibid.
3 Gerhard Hafner, ‘Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’ (2003) 25 
Michigan Journal of International Law 849, 856.
4 Koskenniemi (n 1) 206.
5 For an overview see Christopher Greenwood ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law -  Conflict or 
Convergence’ (2010) 43 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 491.
6 For example, the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes’ approaches to torture, enforced disappearance, sexual 
violence and the destruction of property.
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sexual violence and the wanton destruction of property. It can therefore be suggested 
that there is harmony with respect to the factual conduct as each of the regimes 
prohibit the acts; but how these acts are prohibited varies from regime to regime. 
Thus, the result is the same but a sharp distinction in how these acts are prohibited is 
discernible.
The present chapter is divided into two parts. Part One introduces the concept 
of fragmentation and offers an analysis of the literature relating to the phenomenon. 
This will provide a foundation to the thesis by establishing what is meant by key 
terms such as ‘fragmentation’ and ‘regime’ alongside an exposition of fragmentation 
‘in action’ in the form of an analysis of the Nicaragua and Tadic judgments. The 
second element of Part One locates the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes within the 
fragmentation debate. Part Two suggests one potential method of mitigating the 
effects of fragmentation and relates it to the regimes of IHRL, IHL and ICL.
1.1- Part One: The fragmentation of international law
1.1.1- Defining Fragmentation
One starting point to the modem debate on fragmentation can be found in Jenks’ 
article ‘The Conflict of Law Making Treaties’.7 In this it was noted that different 
treaties were developing a number of ‘historical, functional and regional groups’ 
separate from one another.8 He argued that such treaties ‘react upon each other’ in a 
situation described as ‘the conflict of law-making treaties’.9 Such an eventuality 
might lead to the creation of constitutionalised norms in order to deal with the conflict 
between the various treaty regimes.10 However, Jenks drew a distinction between
7 Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 BYIL 401.
8 ibid 403.
9 ibid 403.




‘reaction’ and ‘divergence’ noting that the ‘divergence between treaty provisions 
dealing with the same subject...does not in itself constitute a conflict.’11 This can be 
evidenced in the different approaches taken to similar fact conduct such as the areas 
examined later in this thesis. In these cases it is apparent that there is divergence in 
legal response even though there might be a harmonisation of subject matter.
More importantly, the existence of two or more such treaties with common 
parties could address the same subject but from a different perspective.12 Indeed, he 
believed that conflict ‘in the strict sense of direct incompatibility’ would only occur 
when one party to the common treaties would not be able to ‘simultaneously comply 
with its obligations under both treaties.’13 Applying Jenks’ analysis, it could be said 
that the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes do not conflict because of their differing aims 
and purposes even though they frequently prohibit similar fact conduct, for example 
torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence and wanton destruction of property. 
Thus, there could be divergence and perhaps competition14 without the existence of a 
conflict between the three regimes. Since Jenks published his article, fragmentation 
has become one of the key issues in contemporary international law but there remains, 
as will be seen, uncertainty as to whether it is a matter of conflict or diversification 
and competition.
Fragmentation is not a precise term and lacks a strict legal definition. As such, 
it is sometimes regarded not as a legal concept but a political idea.15 It is most often 
analysed through either its causes or consequences. This was the approach taken by 
the authors of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (the ‘ILC Report’), written in
11 Jenks (n 7) 425.
12 ibid 426.
13 ibid.
14 Jean d’Aspremont and Elodie Tranchez, ‘The quest for a non-conflictual coexistence of international 
human rights law and humanitarian law: which role for the lex specialis principle?’ (December 17, 
2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195331 (Accessed 22 March 2014).
15 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law -  20 Years Later’ (2009) 20 EJIL 7, 9.
18
Chapter One
response to the increasing expression of concern over fragmentation and its effects on 
international law. The ILC Report is wide-ranging and covers several issues relating 
to fragmentation, not all of which are relevant for the purposes of the present work. It 
addresses lex specialis, ‘self-contained’ regimes, regionalism, conflicts between 
successive norms, the role played by Article 103 of the UN Charter, ius cogens and 
systematic integration. The ILC Report has been described as ‘modest, contextual and 
heterogeneous’.16 It does not focus on the ‘institutional aspects of fragmentation’ 
meaning that it does not analyse the relations between international institutions.17 
Instead, it focuses on fragmentation from the perspective of ‘general’ international 
law. Under this analysis, the ILC Report, while important, does not constitute a 
universal analysis of the fragmentation phenomenon and as such does not provide a 
definition which is similarly universal. It is, however, a prominent document in the 
literature on fragmentation and consequently deserves comment and analysis.
The ILC Report begins by delimiting the scope of the inquiry and laying out 
the substance of fragmentation. It notes ‘general’ international law has become 
divided into specialist systems, and even refers to ‘exotic’ systems such as investment 
law or refugee law.18 The problem with such fragmentation is, the report states, that 
the emergence of specialised law-making institutions ‘takes place with relative 
ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining fields and of the 
general principles and practices of international law.’19 The result of such processes is 
‘conflict’ between ‘rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and,
16 Margaret A. Young, ‘Introduction: the productive friction between regimes’ in Margaret A. Young 
(ed), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (CUP 2012) 3.
17 ibid. 4.
18 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by Martti 




possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law.’20 These concerns can 
therefore be divided into two broad categories. The first is that the specialist systems 
are creating an atomised international legal system wherein the regimes are separating 
from each other. The second is the purported alienation of the specialised regimes 
from ‘general’ international law. These two ideas will now be discussed in more detail 
with reference to the ILC Report, the first receiving additional attention throughout 
the remainder of the chapter.
One reason given for the idea of an atomised international legal system is what 
has been described as the ‘slicing up’ of international into separate ‘institutional 
projects’.21 As a result, the various institutions or ‘specialist regimes’ begin to 
develop their own rules, procedures and eventually case law peculiar to the regime in 
which it is found. This leads to the emergence of atomised regimes that can begin to 
operate independently of the others and deviate from the general law. According to 
the ILC Report, the deviation from the general law can cause the unity of the law to 
suffer.22 One manifestation of this is the ‘reappearance of specific terms in multiple 
regimes’,23 for instance multiple definitions of torture. In turn, this has been said to 
undermine the ‘normative integrity of international law’,24 and consequently viewed 
as a ‘serious problem’ to be addressed by the international community.25
Linked to the idea of an atomised international legal is the supposed alienation 
of these regimes from general international law. This is most apparent with so-called 
‘self-contained regimes’. This term was used by the ICJ in Hostages where it was
20 ibid.
21 Koskenniemi (n 15) 9.
22 ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 18), para. 15.
23 Stephen Humphreys, ‘Structural ambiguity: technology transfer in three regimes’ in Margaret A. 
Young, Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (CUP 2012) 176.
24 Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the 




used to describe diplomatic law.26 This regime establishes the receiving State’s 
obligations relating inter alia to privileges and immunities in addition to the duties of 
the sending State.27 In similar fashion, the ICJ in Nicaragua referred to human rights 
law as a regime possessing its own system of accountability provided by the relevant 
international human rights conventions.28 Likewise, the ICTY has held in 
‘international law...every tribunal is a self-contained system (unless otherwise 
provided).’29 The idea that regimes are ‘self-contained’ has been criticised because of 
the implication that the regimes are divorced from general principles of international 
law.30 Even regimes with their own well-developed legal rules can resort to general 
international law if their rules prove to be inadequate.
The ILC Report concludes globalisation is ‘the emergence of technically 
specialized cooperation networks with global scope.’31 Networks develop their own 
rules and rule-systems, sometimes informally, sometimes through the harmonisation 
of national and regional laws.32 Additional rules and rule-systems emerge through the 
creation of intergovernmental organisations.33 These rules and systems are tailored to 
the needs and interests of the networks, rarely taking into account the outside world.34 
In essence, the lack of relationships between the regimes is the root of concern over 
fragmentation, where answers to legal questions depend on the regime in which the
26 Case concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran ( United States of  
America v. Iran) I.C.J. Reports 1980 p. 41, para.86.
27 ibid..
28 Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
UnitedStates of America) (Merits) [1986] I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, paras.267-268.
29 Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1) AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para.l 1.
30 Daniel H. Joyner and Marco Roscini, ‘Introduction’ in Daniel H. Joyner and Marco Roscini (eds) 
Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime (CUP 2012) 1-2.






question was originally asked.35 International law therefore becomes subjective, 
varying from regime to regime having shed its previous (supposed) universal nature.36
According to the ILC Report, conflict between norms is endemic to 
international law due to its decentralised nature.37 By now it has become routine for 
courts and tribunals to resolve conflicts between overlapping laws by reference to a 
diverse range of legal material.38 The ILC Report calls for ‘substantive emptiness’ 
where legal technique is to replace ‘legal-political’ preferences.39 This is termed 
‘formalism’ by the Report but notes that this approach is not without its own agenda, 
an attempt to ‘canvass a coherent legal-professional technique on a fragmented world’ 
expressing ‘the conviction that conflicts between specialized regimes may be 
overcome by law’.40 In effect, the very effort of depoliticising international law 
becomes a policy preference albeit one closely tied to a ‘formal’ conception of law.41
The emergence of specialist regimes leading to ‘deviations’ from general law 
should not be construed as ‘legal-technical “mistakes’” but are viewed instead as 
indicators of a pluralistic global society reflecting different ‘pursuits and 
perspectives’.42 In this sense, international law again becomes political where a 
choice has to be made between the pursuits and perspectives. Politics also plays a 
factor when deciding if fragmentation is a vice or virtue, with ‘fragmentation’ and 
‘coherence’ not being ‘aspects of the world’ but lying in the ‘eye of the beholder’.43 
Thus, the causes and consequences of fragmentation become politicised. Despite this, 
the functional specialisation of regimes provides the international legal system with
35 ibid. para.483.
36 See Mario Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law (Hart 2012) 69.




41 ibid; see also Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (CUP 2002) 496.




tools with which to address rules that pull in different directions, which suggests to 
the authors of the Report, the fragmentation of international law ‘are of relatively 
minor significance to the operation of legal reasoning.’44
The ILC Report on Fragmentation defines a ‘self-contained’45 regime as being 
a regime which has ‘a special set of secondary rules that determine the consequences 
of a breach of certain primary rules (including the procedure of such determination)’ 
and ‘any inter-related cluster (set, regime, subsystem) of rules on a limited problem 
together with the rules for the creation, interpretation, application, modification, or 
termination [i.e. the administration]’ of primary rules.46
Further clarification of the term ‘specialist regime’ can be found in a range of 
public international law literature. Simma in his influential article ‘Self-contained 
Regimes’ defined such a regime as designating a ‘certain category of subsystems’ that 
embrace ‘a full (exhaustive and definite) set of secondary rules’.47 In defining such 
regimes as he does, Simma drew from the Hostages ruling which described 
diplomatic law as operating as a ‘self-contained regime’.48 This was because it 
establishes the receiving State’s obligations relating inter alia to privileges and 
immunities in addition to the duties of the sending State.49 In similar fashion, the ICJ 
in Nicaragua referred to human rights law as a regime possessing its own system of 
accountability provided by the relevant international human rights conventions.50
44 ibid.
45 ‘Self-contained’ as a term is criticised by the ILC Report as being ‘misleading’ instead it proposes 
the term ‘special regime’: ILC Report on Fragmentation, para. 152(5); For further commentary on this 
distinction see Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained 
Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 483: a self-contained regime is one which totally 
excludes the application of general international law (at 495) while a special regime remain 
conceptually related to general international law (at 500).
46 ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 18) para. 152( 1).
47 Bruno Simma, ‘Self-contained regimes’ (1985) 16 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 111, 
117.
48 Case concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (n 26) para.86.
49 ibid.
50 Nicaragua (n 28) paras.267-268.
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Likewise, the ICTY held that in ‘international law...every tribunal is a self-contained 
system (unless otherwise provided).’51
Other definitions of a ‘special regime’ have been given by Krasner and Ratner. 
The former notes that a special regime contains ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.’52 Ratner, meanwhile, defines a 
regime as a ‘self-identified field of international law comprising norms to regulate a 
certain type of conduct and institutions to make decisions within it.’53 The aims and 
purposes of a regime in conjunction with its structures and procedures ‘shape and 
control the judicial functions of international courts belonging to that regime to a 
considerable degree.’54 These definitions confirm the idea that special regimes can be 
governed by a range of secondary rules.
Specialised regimes with secondary rules can be viewed as ‘enhancing the 
effectiveness of international law at large’.55 Wellens questions whether the 
emergence of special regimes can lead to international law being viewed as 
‘compartmentalized’.56 For Dworkin, the ‘compartmentalization’ of law is a sign of 
‘competent interpretation’, meaning that regimes become more effective in 
interpreting the law.57 The process of compartmentalising the law aids interpretation 
by the removal of redundant or unnecessary interpretations. The relative autonomy of 
special regimes permits the use of secondary rules to promote and guarantee the
51 Tadic (n 29) para. 11.
52 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables’ (1982) 36 International Organization 185, 186.
53 Steven R. Ratner, ‘Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented 
International Law’ (2008) 102 AJIL 475,485.
54 Yuval Shany, ‘One Law to Rule Them All: Should International Courts Be Viewed as Guardians of 
Procedural Order and Legal Uniformity?’ in Ole Fauchald and Andre Nollkaemper (eds) The Practice 
of International and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Hart 2012) 20.
55 K.C. Wellens, ‘Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some Reflections 
on Current Trends’ (1994) 25 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3, 8.
56 ibid 28.
57 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart 1998) 251.
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primary rules of international law.58 Secondly, such regimes can ‘co-exist’ with 
general international law which ‘provides every opportunity for [creating] a powerful 
tool towards an overall increase in the effectiveness of primary rules’ and, implicitly, 
the overall effectiveness of international law.59 Thus it is possible to conclude that 
specialised regimes are an ‘integral’ element of international law.60
The apparent reason for the proliferation of specialised regimes has been 
attributed to a number of factors by various authors. Critics such as Eric Posner write 
that fragmentation is the result of a ‘collision between the ambitions of global 
legalism and the realities of politics.’61 For Posner, the most plausible explanation of 
the proliferation of courts is that states become unhappy with an existing international 
court and work around it by establishing a new court.62 Posner’s concerns are echoed 
by Benvenisti and Downs who believe that the fragmentation of international law 
allows powerful States to create legal orders from which they benefit,63 in part 
because it gives them a great degree of ‘flexibility’.64
In contrast to this position is that taken by Worster who has written of the 
benefits of competition between the various tribunals.65 He notes that fragmentation 
might ‘not be a problem to be solved’ but instead ‘a sign that the international legal 
system needs to consider a variety of legal norms.’66 Rather than reflecting the needs 
of powerful States, Worster believes that fragmentation might actually create a 
‘bottom-up, vigorous system where different legal actors compete for the best
58 K.C. Wellens, ‘Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some Reflections 
on Current Trends’ (1994) 25 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3, 28.
59 ibid.
60 ibid.
61 Eric Posner, The Perils o f Global Legalism (University of Chicago Press 2009) 151.
62 ibid 167.
63 Benvenisti (n24) 597-598.
64 ibid. 627.
65 W.T. Worster, ‘Competition and Comity in the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2008) 34 




realization of justice.’67 Whilst fragmentation has the potential to create a system for 
powerful States to advance their own best interests, it also offers the possibility of 
more numerous fora and regimes in which violations of international law can be 
addressed as Rao notes: the ‘ultimate justification for the existence of a diversity of 
international tribunals is to achieve unity of the international legal system...dedicated 
to justice and equity in international relations.’68
Koskenniemi was responsible for finalising the ILC Report which reflects 
many of his own views on fragmentation. New regimes emerge in response to 
unacceptable features of general international law.69 The ‘general’ law is unable to 
provide a remedy to particular issues. Examples include the absence of measures to 
protect the environment or to address mass atrocities. The new regimes seek to 
respond to new ‘challenges’ not by replacing the old rules but by creating 
exceptions.70 These exceptions become ‘institutionalised’ into general law by 
different functional regimes.71 This leads to the reversal of traditional established 
legal hierarchies ‘in favour of the structural bias in the relevant functional 
expertise.’72
The emergence of functional regimes affects Koskenniemi’s conception of the 
interpretation of law. For instance, they have led to departures from the ‘normal’ 
interpretation of treaties under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
to an interpretation ‘justified by the “object and purpose” of [human rights] treaties of 
their effet utile over the strict formalism of traditional law.’73 The emergence of the
67 ibid 149.
68 Pemmaraju Rao, ‘Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of 
International Law or its Fragmentation?’ (2003) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 929, 961.
69 Koskenniemi (n 1) 205.
70 Koskenniemi (n 15) 10; see also Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of International Law. Between 
Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 MLR 1,4.
71 Koskenniemi (n 1) 205; see also Simma (n 45).
72 Koskenniemi (n 70) 4.
73 Koskenniemi (n 71), 205.
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‘object and purpose test’ permit the ‘creation of a systemic bias in favour of the 
protected individuals that could be difficult to justify under traditional law.’74 As a 
consequence, there emerges what Koskenniemi terms ‘contextual ad hocism’.75
The very application of law, therefore, requires recognition of a secondary, 
interpretative, rule. Article 31, in particular, has been described as a tool which 
permits the harmonisation of the law,76 and is important because interpretation 
occupies a ‘prime position on the crossroads between law and politics’.77 Thus it is an 
instrument for measuring the coherence of the law.78 Article 31 provides in the first 
instance a treaty is to be interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object 
and purpose.’ Further elements of Article 31 permit the use of the context (including 
the preamble and annexes).79 Article 31 favours a textual approach to treaty 
interpretation;80 a point firmly underscored by the ICJ in Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal 
where it was held that only if words are ambiguous or a textual interpretation would 
lead to an unreasonable result would the textual approach be abandoned.81 This is 
based in part of Article 32 which provides an ‘escape clause’ permitting 
supplementary means of interpretation.82
Political factors loom large in international law, a point recognised by 
Koskenniemi who tends towards viewing much of the fragmentation debate as
74 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What is International Law For?’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed) International Law 
(OUP 2006) 76.
75 Koskenniemi (n 70) 9.
76 Jean-Marc Sorel and Valerie Bore-Eveno, ‘art 31 (1969)’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein, The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 807.
77 ibid.
78 Serge Sur, L'interpretation en droit international public (LGDJ 1974) 237; cited ibid. 807.
79 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331, art 31(2).
80 Sorel (n 76) 818.
81 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, para.48.
82 VCLT (n79, art 32.
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‘politics’.83 This is evidenced in the language of fragmentation articulating nostalgia 
and a ‘sense of loss of the secure ground of tradition’, at a time where ‘everything still 
seemed somehow coherent’.84 Such nostalgia for a unified international legal system 
(even if one never truly existed) leads to hegemonic struggle in which a representation 
of universality is claimed by various subjects and values.85 This struggle manifests 
itself where regimes attempt to ‘occupy the space of the whole’.86 The multiplicity of 
regimes forces actors to ‘struggle’ over the ‘description and re-description’ of rules so 
they fall under the jurisdiction of a particular institution.87 Conflict will therefore be a 
matter of a clash of jurisdiction.
Other commentators have similarly drawn attention to the idea of 
fragmentation being a political concept. For instance, Young describes the wrangling 
between different fisheries regimes as ‘political’, suggesting that the debate has taken 
on an extra-legal character.88 Such political tension between the regimes presents the 
‘danger’ of reducing regimes to a single set of characteristics.89 This reductionism is 
apparent in the fields studied in this thesis, particularly when considering the IHRL 
and IHL fields where a union between the two is frequently advocated, thereby 
ignoring factors which make each regime unique.90 In a balanced piece outlining the 
positive and negative aspects of fragmentation, Hafner comments that fragmentation 
has led to the emergence of specialised systems that best fit the problem.91 In the case
83 Koskenniemi (n 15) 9.
84 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters. International Relations as a New Natural Law’ (2009) 
15 European Journal o f International Relations 395, 404.
85 Martti Koskenniemi (n 74) 75.
86 ibid 77.
87 Martti Koskenniemi (n 70) 7.
88 Margaret Young, ‘New Voices I: Global Health, Trade, and Common Resource Regimes’ (2011) 105 
ASILProc 107, 108.
89 ibid.
90 See below § 1.1.4, 51.
91 Hafner (n 3) 859.
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of IHRL, IHL and ICL, such an approach can be used to ensure that individuals 
receive access to justice in a range of different circumstances.92
One method of mitigating the effects of fragmentation is for the greater or 
total constitutionalisation of international law.93 The international system, it is said, 
could be ‘defragmented’ by greater constitutionalisation94 because there is a broad 
consensus that every legal order including the international should be as ‘coherent and 
unified as possible.’95 Questions remain as to what extent such coherence and unity is 
achievable across separate legal regimes. Other writers note that the introduction of 
universal law, i.e. a constitution, would ‘settle the debate on fragmentation’ and grant 
perspective to the law.96 However, attempts to create a constitutionalised form of 
international law could be seen as an essentially a political project,97 departing from 
the core competencies of international lawyers, i.e. the analysis and application of 
legal rules.98 In turn, this potentially leads to a loss of clarity and certainty of the 
scope of international law.99 Many solutions are focused on restoring unity or 
bringing unity to the international legal system through greater federation and
92 This can be seen in the approaches of the different regimes to torture, enforced disappearance, sexual 
violence and the destruction of property in the following chapters.
93 Anne-Charlotte Martineau, ‘The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law’ 
(2009) 22 U IL  1, 25.
94 Anna van Aaken, ‘Defragmentation of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A 
Methodological Proposal’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483, 485 & 487.
95 ibid 485.
96 Christine Schwobel, ‘The Appeal of the Project of Global Constitutionalism to Public International 
Lawyers’ (2012) 13 German Law Journal 1,9-10.
97 see Anne Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal o f Global 
Legal Studies 397, 398.
98 Hedley Bull commented ‘if international lawyers become so preoccupied with the sociology, the 
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constitutionalisation.100 Those who promote regional or specialised regimes are 
‘denounced for pushing aside universal mechanisms’ and ‘jeopardising the federating 
project.’101
Koskenniemi views attempts to constitutionalise the international legal system 
with scepticism. He believes that such attempts aim to ‘depoliticise’ the law by 
moving away from either the ‘politics of sovereignty’ or the ‘politics of functional 
diversification’.102 Neither of these, to him, appears possible. Constitutionalism at the 
international level requires a definition of the ‘common good’ that is lacking except 
for the language of diplomacy and the positive law, but it was these that led to 
fragmentation in the first place.103 Thus, constitutionalisation becomes a matter of 
selecting values when it is impossible to determine which values are most important, 
leading to the situation where each of the functional regimes promotes its own values 
ahead of the others. The project of global constitutionalism lacks a response to 
fragmentation which has often been the result of a ‘conscious challenge to the 
unacceptable features of general law’ such as the lack of protection of human 
rights.104 A return to a general unified legal system will not necessarily be able to 
address matters as effectively as can the functional regimes. One example of this 
would be the definition of torture. Does the definition include only State actors as in 
the case of IHRL or non-State actors as in the case of IHL and ICL? If the definition 
only includes the substantive conduct, e.g. the pulling of fingernails, does this not 
render the definition too wide to be effectively applied by any regime?
100 See for example Fassbender (n 10); Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, ‘A Functional 
Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds) 
Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 4.
101 Martineau (n93) 8-9.
102 Koskenniemi (n 70) 15.
103 ibid 16.
104 Koskenniemi (n 1) 206.
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Constitutionalism leads the debate back to the question of jurisdiction. To 
decide which regime operates in situations where there is a multiplicity of choices, a 
‘regime of regimes’ would be needed in order to provide regulation of the various 
regimes. However no such regime exists causing regimes to ‘continue to deal with 
whatever they can lay their hands on.’105 In such a scenario, the ‘winning’ regime will 
be the regime whose application of the law cannot be challenged.106 Such an outcome 
has been highlighted by Sands who notes that the future poses greater problems for 
the unity of international law.107 However, as will be seen in the later chapters, the 
existence of a genuine choice between IHRL, IHL and ICL is often illusory. For 
instance in Chechnya, no choice could be made between IHRL, IHL and ICL even 
though acts could in theory fall under the jurisdiction of each regime. This choice 
between regimes can become a choice of vocabulary providing the ‘basis for the 
application of a particular kind of law and legal expertise.’108 However, the 
appearance of choice does not recognise the fact that the regimes will apply the law 
differently even if the application relates to similar factual scenarios.109 This is what 
Koskenniemi terms the ‘context sensitive’ professional technique of law.110 Under 
this approach to international law the definition of each act differs between the 
functional regimes because they incorporate aspects of law peculiar to each regime.
The fragmentation phenomenon has also prompted responses from members 
of the international judiciary. For example, HE Judge Guillaume gave a speech in
105 Koskenniemi (n 84) 407.
106 ibid.
107 For example in cases of forum shopping: see Philippe Sands, ‘Torturers and Turtles: The 
Transformation of International Law’ (2001) 33 New York Journal of International Law and Politics 
527,549 & 555.
108 Martti Koskenniemi (nl5) 11.
109 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) ITLOS, Request for Provisional Measures, Order, 3 
December 2001, para.51.
110 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline for a Theory of International as 
Practice’ in Collection of Essays by Legal Advisers of States, Legal Advisers of International 
Organizations and Practitioners in the Field of International Law (United Nations 1999) cited in Martti 
Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart 2011).
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which he said ‘the proliferation of courts presents us with risks, the seriousness of 
which it would be unwise to underestimate’.111 A remedy for this would be to 
examine the position of the various regimes in the international legal system and 
establish connections between them.112 This is essential, Guillaume reasons, if ‘the 
law is to remain coherent, and to continue to operate to the benefit of all members of 
the international community’.113 Similar concerns are shared by HE Judge Schwebel 
who has suggested there might be ‘be virtue in enabling other international tribunals 
to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on issues of 
international law that arise in cases before’ tribunals of specialised regimes where 
questions of importance to the unity of international law are raised.114 This approach 
would ‘minimize such possibility as may occur of significant conflicting 
interpretations of international law’.115 This approach would however, signal that the 
ICJ rests at the apex of the international legal system, a view that would be strongly 
contested. Not all members of the international judiciary are as sceptical as Judges 
Guillaume and Schwebel. For instance, HE Judge Patrick Robinson calls forjudges to 
exercise ‘mutual respect’ and ‘good faith’, while noting that an eventual merger on 
certain grounds, such as matters considered ius cogens, may be desirable.116
Fragmentation has also been referred to as ‘regime complexity’ which, by its 
very nature, ‘reduces the clarity of legal obligation’ by the introduction of overlapping 
rules and jurisdictions governing an issue.117 Consequently, this leads to ‘rule
111 Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&pl=l&p2=3&p3=l> last 
accessed 11 May 2013.
112 ibid.
113 ibid.
114 Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=87&pt=3&pl=l&p2=3&p3=l> last 
accessed 11 May 2013.
115 ibid.
116 Available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/851247E2-0E9A-4CB3-B81B- 
F72482E26E3B/0/30012009PresidentRobinsonSeminar_eng_.pdf> last accessed 11 May 2013.
117 Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunir, ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’ (2009) 7 
Perspectives on Politics 13, 16.
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ambiguity’ further increasing the fragmentation of international law.118 It also 
increases the scope for ‘unintentional reverberations’ where changes in one institution 
have effects in parallel domains.119 Concern over fragmentation is encapsulated by 
Michaels and Pauwelyn who have noted that there is a widespread normative 
preference for ‘coherence over fragmentation, order over disorder.’120
A further concern of fragmentation is how and whether international law will 
deal with fragmentation. Cogan has noted that ‘sophisticated’ legal systems frequently 
resolve issues of fragmentation, and in such systems it poses little danger to what can 
be considered ‘unity’.121 Koskenniemi has written of the ‘centre’ of international law 
‘collapsing’ leading to the emergence of a number of specialised bodies.122 
Elsewhere, however, he has questioned whether the international legal system was 
ever unified, noting that the ‘ICJ never stood at the apex of some universal judicial 
hierarchy’.123 This is linked to the notion that the ‘general’ is being replaced by the 
‘special’: what was ‘once regulated by public international law is now governed by 
specialist systems’ including IHRL, IHL and ICL.124 However, reconciling such a 
viewpoint with the reality of the international legal system appears difficult. For 
instance, statements such as public international law once ‘regulated’ matters of 
human rights and IHL are questionable. IHRL emerged after the Second World War 
at about the same time fragmentation first became noticeable. Similarly, IHL has long 
co-existed with public international law as opposed to issues of armed conflict being
118 ibid.
119 ibid.
120 Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques 
in the Fragmentation of Public International Law’ (2012) 22 Duke Journal o f Comparative and 
International Law 349, 350.
121 Jacob Cogan, ‘Fragmentation of International Legal Orders and International Law: Ways Forward?’ 
(2011) 105 ASILProc 123, 123.
122 Martti Koskenniemi (n 15) 10.
123 Martti Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Post-modern Anxieties’ 
(2002) 15 LJIL 553, 576.
124 Joyner (n 30) 1.
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‘regulated’ by public international law. Therefore, the postulated ‘collapse’ can be 
viewed instead as an expansion of law seeking to address and correct deficiencies in 
general public international law.
1.1.2 - A comparison of the Nicaragua and Tadic judgments
The two cases of Nicaragua125 and Tadic126 are found in the fragmentation literature 
as a leading example of fragmentation in action and how international law is 
endangered.127 The two cases serve as good examples because they are both 
ostensibly concerned with the definition of ‘control’ for the purposes of attributing to 
a State certain acts committed by armed groups supported by that State. In Nicaragua, 
the ICJ found that the definition was that of ‘effective control’; while the ICTY in 
Tadic adopted the looser ‘overall control’ test. It is not difficult to understand how 
such a divergence in judicial opinion comes to be cited as evidence as fragmentation 
in action. However, as this section will explain, the ‘fragmentation’ evidenced in the 
jurisprudence of these cases is more imagined than real, and based on a fundamental 
misconception of the international legal system. This section begins by outlining the 
principles set forth in Nicaragua and Tadic before considering whether they can truly 
be considered evidence of a fragmenting legal system. It links to the overall theme of 
the thesis by establishing a foundation for demonstrating that although regimes may 
consider identical factual issues, the legal response can and does vary from regime to 
regime.
The factual basis of Nicaragua lies in the support given by the US to the 
contra rebels opposed to the socialist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. It is therefore
125 Nicaragua (n 28).
126 Tadic (n 29).
127 e.g. Prost (n 36); Harlan G. Cohen, ‘The Global Impact and Implementation of Human Rights 
Norms’ (2012) 25 Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal 381; ILC Report 
on Fragmentation (n 18), para.49.
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linked to the Iran-Contra affair128 and the wider strategic activities of the US in 
opposing leftwing governments in Central and Southern America.129 Between 1981 
and 1984 the US Government provided funds for the military and paramilitary 
activities of the contras. After this period the funding was termed ‘humanitarian 
assistance’.130 The Court heard from witnesses as to how the contras received training 
from the CIA on topics such as guerrilla warfare, sabotage and communications, in 
addition to the CIA providing them with intelligence.131 Furthermore, while contra 
operations did not ‘at every stage’ of the conflict reflect the strategy and tactics 
devised by the US, CIA advisers did contribute to the planning of some operations.132 
As a result of these actions the ICJ had to consider whether, as a matter of public 
international law, the US could be held liable for the actions of the contras.
In light of the evidence, the Court found that although the contras had been 
reliant, at least in the early stages of their campaign, on the US for funding and 
advice, it could not be said the US exercised ‘effective control’ over the contras}33 
Consequently, violations of international humanitarian law could not be attributed to 
the US.134 Such a test amounts to a high standard of control, a point made more 
apparent when one considers the fact that the contras could not have conducted 
crucial and significant military or paramilitary actions ‘without the multi-faceted 
support’ of the US.135 The effective control standard was directly challenged in the 
Tadic case at the ICTY.
128 Ann Wroe, Lives, Lies and the Iran-Contra Affair (I.B. Tauris 1991); Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: 
The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up (W.W. Norton 1997).
129 For an overview of US involvement in Latin America see Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger 
(Penguin 2008); Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in the 80s and 
90s: Issues and Controversies from Reagan to Bush (New York University Press 1992),
130 Nicaragua (n 28) para.99.
131 ibid para.101.
132 ibid para. 106.
133 ibid para.l 15.




Tadic was a seminal case for the ICTY in many respects. The decision in the 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction established that the ICTY was legally 
founded,136 had primacy over domestic courts137 and had sufficient ratione materiae 
jurisdiction.138 In addition to these contributions to international law, the judgment of 
the Appeal Chamber provided a definition of control that ostensibly placed the ICTY 
at variance with the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment. The ICTY Trial Chamber had found 
that the conflict in Bosnia was an internal armed conflict which meant that certain 
provisions relating to the protection of victims in an international armed conflict could 
not be said to apply.139 The acts were committed by Republika Srpska forces (Bosnian 
Serbs) in a non-international armed conflict; and thus any charges which were 
dependent on the existence of an international armed conflict could not be sustained. 
Accordingly, Dusko Tadic was acquitted on charges relating to those offences. The 
Prosecutor appealed, arguing that the conflict was indeed international in nature 
because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exercised 
overall control of Republika Srpska forces. Thus, the latter’s actions could be imputed 
to the former. If this was the case, the conflict was international in nature and Tadic 
could be found guilty of crimes committed in an international armed conflict.140
The Appeals Chamber held that in order to find a State responsible for the acts 
of a military or paramilitary group it was necessary to establish that the State had 
equipped and financed the group, in addition to coordinating and helping it to plan its 
military activity.141 However, in order for liability to be attributed, it was not
136 Tadic -  interlocutory appeal (n 29), para.64.
137 ibid para.60.
138 ibid 142.
139 Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1-T) TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997.
140 On the issue of distinguishing between international and non-international armed conflicts and the 
significance o f this matter see Dino Kritsiotis, ‘The Tremors of Tadid’ (2010) 43 Israel Law Review 
262, 274.
141 Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1 - A) AC, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 131.
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necessary for the Court to determine if the State had issued specific orders to the 
group to commit violations of international law.142 This latter point differs from the 
findings set down in Nicaragua by the ICJ where it was held that liability for 
violations of IHL by the contras could only be attributed to the US if the latter had 
ordered that such acts be conducted.143 Accordingly, the standard in Tadic was of 
‘overall control’. The result of the Tadic judgment therefore appears to put the ICTY 
and ICJ at variance over the definition of ‘control’, thereby fuelling fears over the 
fragmentation and its effects on international law.
Despite the apparent similarities of Tadic and Nicaragua in respect of control, 
there exist some fundamental differences which lead to the two cases being readily 
distinguishable. Most obvious is the difference in judicial setting. Nicaragua was 
heard by the ICJ while Tadic was heard by the ICTY Appeals Chamber. Another 
fundamental distinction is the purpose of the two judgments. Nicaragua was brought 
by one State in order to impute liability on another, and to hold the latter accountable 
(in the civil law) for IHL violations. Tadic was concerned with establishing the 
criminal liability of an individual for violations of international criminal law (which in 
this case incorporated violations of international humanitarian law).
Koskenniemi speculates that the Tadic decision was a ‘perhaps failed’ attempt 
to change international law in support of the fight against impunity.144 Evidence of 
this failure can be seen in the ICJ’s judgment in the case of Bosnia v Serbia145 
concerning the application of the Genocide Convention 1948.146 It began by outlining
142 ibid para. 131.
143 Nicaragua (n 28) para.l 16.
144 Koskenniemi (n 15) 9.
145 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43.
146 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78 
UNTS 227, entered into force 12 January 1951.
37
Chapter One
the position taken in Nicaragua and by the ICTY in Tadic.141 The Court then turned 
to the specific points made by Appeals Chamber in Tadic, noting the ICTY was not 
called on to rule on questions of State responsibility because ‘its jurisdiction is 
criminal and extends over persons only.’148 In respect of criminal liability the ICJ 
noted that it attached the ‘utmost importance’ to the ICTY’s findings, but stressed that 
questions of general international law ‘do not lie within the specific purview of its 
jurisdiction’.149
Furthermore, the ICJ found that the ‘overall control’ test, advocated by the 
ICTY, in respect of State responsibility broadened its scope ‘well beyond’ the 
fundamental principle governing State responsibility that a State is only to be held 
liable for its own conduct and those acting on its behalf. Responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts can only be attributed to a State under customary 
international law, and here the Court relied on the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.150 If the State gave instructions or directed that those acting on its 
behalf commit such an internationally wrongful act, then liability can be imputed to 
the State.151 Consequently, the ‘overall control’ test in Tadic is unsuitable because it 
stretches too far the connection that must be present between a State and its agents for 
the State to be held responsible for the actions of the latter.152 Prior to the ruling in 
Bosnia v. Serbia, it had been remarked by Joost Pauwelyn that the divergence 
between Nicaragua and Tadic might have been explained by seeing the latter test as
147 Bosnia v. Serbia (n 145) paras.399-402.
148 ibid para.403.
149 ibid para.403.
150 Draft Articles on Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, (UN 
Doc A/56/10); See James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP 2002).




evidence of developments in international law.153 Evidently, the rejection by the ICJ 
of the Tadic approach towards State responsibility is strong evidence that, insofar as 
the ICJ was concerned, the definition of control for the attribution of State 
responsibility in general public international law was fixed as being the ‘effective 
control’ test.
When considered in such a fashion, it is possible to conclude that the 
Nicaragua and Tadic tests provide evidence of a conflict between norms of 
international law. By examining the two judgments in light of the Bosnia v. Serbia 
ruling it would appear that the appropriate test would depend on the particular 
jurisdiction of the court in question, in addition to the subject matter of the particular 
case. The jurisdiction of the ICTY is limited to the criminal prosecution of individuals 
for acts committed since 1991 in the territory of the former-Yugoslavia.154 Similar 
criminal jurisdiction can be found in the Statutes of the ICTR155 and the ICC.156 The 
jurisdiction of the ICJ is limited to inter-State complaints157 and the issuing of 
advisory opinions,158 in the expectation that disputes between States might be settled 
peacefully without recourse to hostile action. By examining the functions of each 
court it is apparent that their purposes are, and were intended to be, completely 
separate. The Tadic and Nicaragua judgments present an example of how the 
fragmentation debate has been framed. One approach to control is viewed as being 
correct while the other is seen as wrong. There is no scope for viewing both as being
153 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law - How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules o f International Law (CUP 2003) 124.
154 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY Statute’), UN Doc 
S/RES/827, UN Security Council, 1994, art 1.
155 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ( ‘ICTR Statute’), UN Doc S/RES/955, 
UN Security Council, 1994, art 1.
156 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ( ‘ICC Statute ) (17 July 1998) UN Doc 
A/CONF. 183/9, entered into force 1 July 2002, art 1.
157 Statute of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945) 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat 1055; TS No 
993, entered into force 24 October 1945, art 34(1).
158 ibid arts 65-69.
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correct. However, by examining the question of jurisdiction in even superficial detail, 
it can be seen that how a particular concept is defined is highly dependent on the 
particular jurisdiction of an international court.
The differences between the Nicaragua and Tadic judgments provide an 
excellent opportunity to assess how divergent court rulings are viewed by scholars 
considering the fragmentation of international law. It also affords an analysis of how 
fragmentation is sometimes seen as perilous to the functioning of the international 
legal system. Understanding the criticisms of those who see the Nicaragua and Tadic 
judgments as conflicting is important to understanding how the criticisms of the 
divergence between the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes come to be seen as problematic. 
Koskenniemi states the difference between the ICJ and ICTY judgments as stemming 
from the desire of the latter court to increase accountability ‘in pursuit of the struggle 
against “impunity”’.159 An additional consequence of the Tadic decision was that the 
accountability of States was ‘enhanced’, again potentially posing a conflict with the 
ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua.160 However, these differences can be seen as possible 
evidence for the functional differentiation of the two regimes (in this case the 
‘special’ regime of the ICTY and the ‘general’ regime of the ICJ).
The apparent conflict existing between Nicaragua and Tadic has been 
described as an example of ‘fragmentation par excellence’,161 with the inference being 
that fragmentation leads to conflict, in turn threatening to compromise the unity of 
international law.162 Prost continues to analyse the two judgments, and concludes that 
they do indeed allow for a ‘margin of compatibility’.163 The Nicaragua test is to apply 
in situations where prohibited acts are committed by individuals operating alone, and
159 Koskenniemi (n 1) 205.
160 Koskenniemi (n 74).





the Tadic test is to apply where acts are perpetrated by organised groups.164 He 
reasons this interpretation of the two tests results in ‘both tests [being] valid and 
applicable simultaneously’ and therefore not mutually exclusive.165 Prost then asserts 
that a conflict exists when ‘two norms get in each other’s way’, and given such a 
perspective he concludes that ‘there is little doubt that a conflict exists between Tadic 
and Nicaragua’.166 The two decisions work at ‘cross-purposes’ with the Tadic 
decision seeking to undo the position that the Nicaragua decision seeks to sustain.167
Such arguments advanced by Prost fail to take into account the different 
jurisdictional basis of the two courts. The ICJ is primarily, if not solely, concerned 
with inter-State claims, while the ICTY is concerned with imposing criminal sanction 
on those alleged to have committed serious violations of international law during the 
conflict in the former-Yugoslavia. Prost seemingly fails to appreciate the difference 
between the two regimes. Rosalyn Higgins has described this as ‘different relevant 
contexts’ meaning that the contextual basis of each of the two tests is different,168 
highlighting the differences between the jurisdictions.
Delving further into Prost’s analysis it can be seen that he makes a number of 
assumptions which when viewed from the position taken by Higgins are revealed to 
be false. For example, his idea that there exists a ‘margin of compatibility’ between 
the ICJ and ICTY is evidence of a desire to reconcile the two cases.169 Such desire to 
remove the conflict is based on the idea that there exists a conflict between the two in 





168 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 791, 
795.
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simultaneously’170 is in itself true. The two tests are indeed valid and applicable 
simultaneously but the validity and applicability is dependent on the context of the 
regime in which they operate, the so-called ‘different relevant contexts’ highlighted 
by Higgins.171
The final criticism of the Nicaragua and Tadic judgments levelled by Prost is 
that the former seeks to uphold a ‘Westphalian logic’ centred upon the sovereign 
autonomy of States. 172 Tadic meanwhile pursues a ‘post-Westphalian logic’ aimed at 
maximising accountability for international crimes.173 In itself, none of this is 
remarkable. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is founded upon the notion of Westphalian 
logic, as does the whole system of public international law where States are seen as 
the primary actors.174 In contrast the jurisdictional remit of the ICTY is to hold 
individuals accountable for their crimes, a line of reasoning followed from Nuremberg 
where individuals were made subject to international law. However, Prost interprets 
such differences as being evidence of a conflict per se rather than a contextual 
difference between the regimes of international criminal law and public international 
law. His very use of the term ‘post-Westphalian logic’ is founded on the assumption 
that international law has moved beyond the traditional Westphalian notions of State 
sovereignty and autonomy. While there have undoubtedly been developments in 
international law so that individuals now have greater standing,175 the jurisdiction of
170 ibid.
171 Higgins (n 168) 795.
172 Prost (n 36) 198.
173 ibid.
174 See any public international law textbook e.g. James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles o f Public 
International Law (OUP 2012) 12; Although for a counterpoint see A. Claire Cutler, ‘Critical 
Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of 
Legitimacy’ (2001) 27 Review of International Studies 133.
175 For instance, individuals now have the right to bring cases before international human rights courts 
such as the ECHR.
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the ICJ remains firmly situated in the Westphalian international legal system176 as it 
remains a forum for States with individuals having no standing.177
Other critics of the divergence between the Nicaragua and Tadic judgments 
have written about the ICTY ‘overruling’ the ICJ.178 However, such an interpretation 
of the two judgments rests on a misunderstanding of the international legal system. 
The ICTY Appeal Chamber in Tadic had no power to ‘overrule’ the ICJ, its power to 
overrule was limited in application to the Trial Chamber of the ICTY.179 This 
misunderstanding is based on a misreading of the Appeal Chamber’s judgment and a 
simultaneous confusion as to how courts interact. It is true that the Appeal Chamber 
refers to the Nicaragua test as being potentially ‘unpersuasive’180 but this must be 
taken as meaning ‘unpersuasive’ within the framework of the ICTY Appeal 
Chamber’s own jurisdictional competence and not within the framework of public 
international law. Indeed, given the jurisdictional context of the ICTY as a whole,181 
any attempt to alter the rules established by the ICJ as they relate to general public 
international law could be seen as ultra vires because it lies well outside the 
competence of the ICTY as established by UN Security Council resolution 827.182
In its final report on the issue of fragmentation the International Law 
Commission (ILC) noted that the conflict between Nicaragua and Tadic is an 
example of a normative conflict between an earlier and later rule on international 
law.183 It also highlights the fact that in Tadic the ICTY did not suggest that the two 
tests of control were to co-exist but that it sought to replace the Nicaragua test
176 ICJ Statute (n 157), art 34(1).
177 ibid.
178 Shane Spelliscy, ‘The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the Armor’ (2001) 40 
Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 143, 164.
179 ICTY Statute (n 154), art 25.
180 Tadic (n 141) para. 124.
181 ICTY Statute (n 154), art 1.
182 UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827.
183 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 18), para.50.
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altogether.184 This reflects the view that the regimes are engaged in a conflict with 
one another, and in order to gain hegemony each ‘seeks to makes its special 
rationality govern the whole’ by transforming ‘its preference into the general 
preference’.185 However, Koskenniemi has expressed the view that regimes seek to 
avoid conflict with one another by introducing exceptions to the general rule.186 One 
possible interpretation of Tadic is that the ICTY did replace the Nicaragua test 
altogether but only in the context of ICL. This would create an exception to the 
general rule outlined by Koskenniemi, with the general rule of international law 
remaining that which was established by the ICJ in Nicaragua and confirmed in 
Bosnia v. Serbia.187
The NicaraguaJTadic issue gives rise to the appearance of a choice that has to 
be made between two conflicting definitions stemming from two different regimes. 
However, on closer examination this choice, and the conflict that is said to result from 
it, appears to be a false choice between two definitions that arise from two 
functionally different legal regimes. In this regard, there is no ‘choice’ between the 
overall and effective control tests as each is peculiar to the legal regime in which it is 
found. This is illustrative of the subjects examined in later chapters. The following 
section examines the idea of conflict in more detail.
1.1.3 Fragmentation and the three regimes
The broad focus of this thesis is the operation of the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes 
within the context of fragmentation. The following section highlights the similarities 
and differences between the three regimes. It argues that although each is located 
within the international legal system they remain functionally separate from one
184 ibid.
185 Koskenniemi (n 70) 23.
186 ibid 18.
187 Bosnia v. Serbia (n 145) para.406.
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another. Evidence of this can be found in subsequent chapters. In contrast to this 
position are those who believe that either the regimes have merged or that they should 
merge into a ‘super regime’.188 This section begins by providing an overview of the 
regimes’ functional differences. It then proceeds to examine the idea that the three 
regimes have or should merge, before considering the concept of lex specialis as it 
relates to the three regimes.
1.1.3(a) - IHRL as a regime of international law
Human rights have been described as emanating from the period immediately after the 
Second World War.189 Other commentators, such as Bowring, believe that any story 
concerning international human rights can only begin with the French and American 
revolutions in the late 18th Century.190 Indeed, Bowring believes that ‘IHRL did not 
exist in any form before the eighteenth century, in the declaration and bills of the 
French and American Revolutions.’191 He does not explain his reasoning for this 
assertion which is unfortunate because there is no clear differentiation made between 
the American and French declarations, and the English Bill of Rights. The latter of 
which predates both of these events by nearly a century, and is a source from which 
American constitutional rights are drawn.192 These bills of rights, while proclaiming 
universal rights, cannot really be said to be ‘international human rights law’ as they 
focus primarily on the rights of citizens living within the state in question, and do not 
create any form of law binding on the State within in the international community i.e. 
on the international plane.
188 See section below § 1.1.4, 51.
189 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 21 EJIL 15, 16.
190 Bill Bowring, ‘Fragmentation, Lex Specialis and the Tensions in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2009) 13 JCSL 1,5.
191 ibid.
192 See Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (Vintage Books 1991) 13-14, 
where Wood outlines the liberties of Englishmen, liberties evident in the US Bill of Rights.
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Raz believes the human rights discourse has acquired the status of an ethical 
lingua franca, or in other words it is a discourse that cuts across national borders and 
is widely understood by many people who do not share the same legal or cultural 
background.193 This position is much more credible if one has regard to international 
law as it is found in treaties and other international instruments. The UN Charter 
states the purpose of the UN is both to ensure international peace and security and to 
encourage respect for human rights,194 creating a framework within which respect for 
human rights could be formulated at an international level.
While the IHRL regime can be considered a ‘special regime’, it is apparent 
that it is itself fragmenting into several universal and regional human rights 
regimes.195 This is particularly noticeable when considering the functional and 
jurisdictional differences that exist, for example, between the ECHR and Inter- 
American human rights regimes (for the sake of clarity these are termed ‘sub- 
regimes’). Each of the sub-regimes has its own rules of adjudication and interpretative 
methods. They also have their own judicial or, in the case of the UNHRC, quasi­
judicial organs responsible for the interpretation of the law. Importantly, there is a 
link to a treaty which gives rise to state responsibility and demands the application of 
the principle pacta sunt servanda in order for the regime to remain effective.
1.1.3(b) - IHL as a regime of international law
International humanitarian law is perhaps the oldest of the legal regimes under 
examination in this thesis, at least insofar as there are rules pertaining to combat and 
the conduct of hostilities. A degree of restraint in combat has been accepted since
193 Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, (eds) 
The Philosophy of international law (OUP 2010) 321.
194 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 59 Stat 1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153, entered into 
force 24 October 1945, art 1(1) and (3).
195 Cohen (n 127) 383.
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ancient times.196 This developed into chivalrous conduct between knights, although 
such a code was not applicable between commoners or between commoners and 
knights.197 From the mid- 19th Century, States became preoccupied with the conduct of 
hostilities and there was a renewed effort to minimise suffering. For example, the St 
Petersburg Declaration 1868198 prohibited the use of exploding munitions which 
weighed less than 400g in addition to what would now be classed as hollow point or 
expanding rounds of ammunition. However, this Declaration only applied to the Great 
Powers and did not prevent the use of such munitions against those who were 
sometimes derisively called ‘savages’.199 IHL did gradually become more inclusive 
with the signing of the Hague Conventions in the early 20th Century. These were 
followed after the Second World War by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which, 
along with their Additional Protocols (1977), stand as the most comprehensive set of 
laws regulating armed conflict.
IHL achieves ‘special regime’ status in a way that is not as immediately 
obvious as the IHRL regime. While IHL does have at its core a number of treaties 
(primarily the Geneva Conventions) a substantial body of the relevant law is to be 
found in customary international humanitarian law as evidenced through State 
practice, military manuals etc. The means of enforcement is also different with much 
of it occurring at the domestic level through military legal systems. Such diffusion 
vis-a-vis enforcement does not make the IHL less special than the other regimes




BAF088A50F61C 12563CD002D663B/FULLTEXT/IHL-6-EN.pdf (Accessed 16 March 2014).
199 Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait o f the World before the War, 1890-1914 
(Ballantine 1996) 261-262. This was also the case with chemical weapons after World War I where 
their use was limited to what was termed ‘uncivilised’ quarters of the world (i.e. not in warfare between 
‘European’ States). For example, Spiers states that gas was proposed, if not used, against ‘recalcitrant 
Arabs’ in Egypt and Mesopotamia. See Edward M. Spiers, A History’ of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons (Reaktion Books 2010) 70-71.
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studied. A State’s primary obligations are still engaged, leading to State responsibility 
for the violation IHL200 and thus secondary rules are required to give effect to the law.
1.1.3(c) - ICL as a regime of international law
International criminal law focuses on holding those who commit serious violations of 
international law criminally responsible for their acts. The Nuremberg IMT after the 
Second World War saw the prosecution of major Nazi war criminals for crimes 
deemed to be offences against international law. It marks the beginning of 
international criminal law as it is understood today. The IMT took as its starting point 
the idea that individuals can be criminally responsible for violations of international 
law. It held that ‘Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.’201 This cornerstone of international 
criminal law removed the protection of immunity from government officials, 
ministers and those serving in the armed forces, thereby confirming that immunity 
was no longer available to shield individuals from prosecution.202
Modem international criminal law is enforced through a mixture of 
international and domestic courts and tribunals. For example the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were created in the early 1990s by the UN Security 
Council203 as ad hoc courts in response to specific violations of international law. 
Such proliferation of tribunals at the international level gave fresh impetus to the
200 Nicaragua (n 28).
201 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, in The Trial o f German Major War Criminals: 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, vol.22, London, 
1950,447.
202 This continues today see ICC Statute (n 156), art 27.




creation of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in which those suspected 
of ICL violations can be prosecuted. The ICC operates under the complementarity 
principle meaning that the enforcement of the ICC Statute and the prosecution of 
individuals lie primarily with the States Parties. The ICC will only act if a state party 
is unable or unwilling to prosecute,204 although there are mechanisms to permit the 
ICC Prosecutor to undertake his own investigations,205 and to allow the UN Security 
Council to refer situations to the ICC.206 International criminal law has therefore 
become an important and distinct element of international law since the creation of 
the ICTY in 1993. There are some however who believe that international criminal 
tribunals will always be subject to politics. Meemik comments that they will ‘never 
escape the political interests which lead to their creation’.207 This view accords with 
the idea that the entire body of international law is subject to political considerations 
and, most importantly, that international law is a tool, in the realist mould,208 for 
states to further their own interests at the expense of others.
The history of international criminal law’s growth has meant that it has had ‘to 
develop like a parasitic plant, by seizing on all opportunities and latching onto 
anything that gives it the possibility of moving upwards towards the light’.209 Whilst 
this is a rather stark assessment of international criminal law, it does appear to be 
reflective of how the regime has developed from the creation of the ICTY to the ICC. 
Indeed, the conduct covered by ICL ‘involves both [IHL] and [IHRL]; the once-clear
204 ICC Statute (n 156), art 17(l)(b).
205 ibid art 15.
206 ibid art 13(b).
207 James Meernik, ‘Victor’s Justice or the Law: Judging and Punishing at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2003) 47 Journal of Conflict Resolution 140, 145.
208 Realist is used here in the sense of international relations theory, not jurisprudence.
209 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks’ (1999) 31 
International Law and Politics 919, 921.
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boundaries between the two have faded over the decades.’210 This becomes even more 
apparent when one considers how the tribunals have approached the law as 
highlighted in their case law and procedures which will be discussed in more detail 
below. It remains to be said that ICL has been variously defined in the past,211 
however with the development of the doctrine in the 1990s and 2000s it is clear that it 
has moved beyond simply criminalising acts of piracy212 and terrorism.213
As with IHRL and IHL, ICL has its own secondary rules relating to the 
enforcement of primary obligations. The ICL regime is heavily driven by the 
prominent role played by its treaties.214 One possible reason for this is the modem 
demand for ‘careful coordination’ of technical issues.215 In particular is the 
requirement that the criminal be certain enough to avoid miscarriages of justice. This 
is apparent with the ICC Statute (a treaty) and the Statutes of the UN international 
criminal tribunals (created by UN Security Council resolutions). The ICL regime has 
led to a well-developed body of secondary rules relating to interpretation, procedure 
and jurisdiction.216 Given this, ICL could be poised to become a ‘strong’ special 
regime which has to rely less on general principles of international law because of its 
well-developed secondary rules.217
210 Henry J. Steiner, ‘International Protection of Human Rights’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed) 
International Law (OUP 2006) 766.
211 See George Schwarzenberger, ‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law’ (1953) 3 Current 
Legal Problems 263; M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History o f the International Criminal Court 
(Kluwer 2005); Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2008) 4-10.
212 Gehard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law (Macmillan 
1981)287.
213 ibid 297.
214 Jonathan Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL 529, 550.
215 ibid.
216 As evidenced by the volume of case law and interlocutory appeals.
217 This is similar to the development of European Union law which has been recognised as ‘strong’ 
special regime. See Joyner (n 30).
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1.1.4 - The merging of the three regimes
Some scholars write of a ‘shared purpose’ of the IHRL and IHL regimes. For 
example, Kleffner and Zegveld state that the two regimes ‘share the same purpose’, 
namely the ‘protection of individuals and human dignity, and there is [consequently] a 
substantial material overlap between the two systems.’218 Doswald-Beck describes 
conceptual similarities between the IHL and IHRL, most notably the respect due to 
each human being without discrimination.219 Hampson and Salama, in a report to the 
UN, state that the regimes ‘emanate from the same basic concern: ensuring respect for 
human dignity in all times, places and circumstances.’220 These are just some 
examples from the literature that are illustrative of a desire to merge, partially or 
totally, the two regimes of IHRL and IHL
The idea that IHRL and IHL have now merged together to form a ‘super­
regime’ is one that is, prima facie, quite appealing. If, as the argument goes, IHRL 
and IHL share the same goals why should the international system recognise a 
difference? Expressed another way, should shared ends give rise to shared means? 
Indeed, Rene Provost has written that the ‘human interests which humanitarian law 
seeks to protect are largely similar to those safeguarded by human rights law.’221 For 
example, it has been claimed that the ECtHR has applied, obliquely, IHL in its 
judgments relating to Russia and Turkey. Orakhelashvili comments that the Court’s 
approach ‘should be based, as it mostly is, on the implicit application of the standards 
of humanitarian law, albeit cloaked in the [ECHR]-specific categories of legitimacy,
218 Jann Kleffner and Liesbeth Zegveld, ‘Establishing an Individual Complaints Procedure for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
384, 385-386.
219 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘International Humanitarian Law: A Means of Protecting Human Rights in 
Time of Armed Conflict’ (1989) 1 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 595, 603.
220 Francoise Hampson and Ibrahim Salama (2005) ‘Working paper by Ms Hampson and Mr Salama on 
the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law’ UN Doc: 
E/CN.4/sub.2/2005/14, para.3.
221 Rene Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (CUP 2002) 26.
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necessity and proportionality.’222 This approach, he argues, permits the Court to 
‘secure the legal outcomes required under both human rights law and humanitarian 
law.’223 He describes this earlier in his article as the ‘interchangeability’ of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law.224 Such a view is 
however at variance with the principle that the ECtHR only has jurisdiction to 
examine violations of IHRL, and more specifically the IHRL contained in the ECHR. 
An examination of the ECHR reveals that the Court does not have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate matters of IHL.225 Furthermore, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, 
IHL and IHRL, not to mention ICL, are far from ‘interchangeable’ concepts.
Hampson and Salama write that those ‘defenders of the solemn promise of 
“never again” can and should support the increasing tendency for the two traditions, 
[IHRL] and IHL, to converge in a technically sound and practically useful and 
feasible manner.’226 It has been argued that the ECtHR should simply apply the rules 
and principles of IHL ‘when deciding whether a particular instance of deprivation of 
life in the context of an armed conflict resulted from a “lawful act of war”, or was 
instead a violation of the right to life.’227 Likewise, Abresch asks, in an article 
concerning the Chechen cases before the ECtHR, whether the Court made a mistake 
‘in disregarding humanitarian law’.228 However, any application of IHL by the Court
222 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 
Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?’ (2008) 19 EJIL 161, 174.
223 ibid.
224 ibid 169.
225 Bowring (n 190).
226 Hampson (n 220) para.31 .
227 Giulia Pinzauti, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Incidental Application of International 
Criminal Law and Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 6 JICJ 1043, 1059.
228 William Abresch, ‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of 
Human Rights in Chechnya’ (2005) 16 EJIL 741, 746.
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would in all likelihood be ultra vires if one views the ECtHR’s jurisdiction as limited 
to assessing violations of the ECHR.229
A move towards a unified body of international law would inevitably lead to a 
lack of specificity in the application of the law. For instance, would such a ‘new’ 
body of law apply to only states or to individuals, or to both? If it applied to only 
individuals could states be ordered to pay reparations for the acts of its agents? If it 
applied to only states would this not be violating the principles of individual 
responsibility set down at Nuremberg?230 Other questions relate to how specific 
violations are defined, for example how should torture be defined in this unified 
system, as a violation of citizen’s rights by a state (traditional IHRL), or as a violation 
of an individual’s rights by the enemy (traditional IHL)?
Several criticisms can be levelled at the ‘super-regime’ theory. The first as 
advanced by Bowring is that the systems have different histories231 although he fails 
to mention how this prevents the two systems from merging in the present. The 
second argument, also advanced by Bowring is that IHL and IHRL have different 
normative structures. IHL is very conservative in its application while IHRL is, he 
believes, more liberal in its application.232 However, perhaps the strongest argument 
that can be levelled at the super-regime theory is that its proponents have confused the 
aims of the IHRL and IHL regimes with their processes and substantive law. As the 
European Union’s Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law state quite categorically IHL and IHRL ‘are distinct bodies of law
229 An analogous example is given by Akehurst when discussing the application of equity and general 
principles of international law. He reasons that parties may believe courts that apply such principles act 
ultra vires because they have no legal competence (in the sense that they do not form part of the 
relevant treaty). Michael Akehurst, ‘Equity and General Principles of Law (1976) 25 ICLQ 801, 811.
23^  Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Numberg 
Tribunal, UN GA Res 95 (I) (11 Dec 1946) UN Doc A/Res/1/95.




and, while both are principally aimed at protecting individuals, there are important 
differences between them.’233 Those who advocate such a ‘super-regime’ appear to be 
ignoring the legal realities surrounding these areas of law, ignorance which is 
ultimately harmful to international law because it would inevitably lead to the blurring 
of what are now distinctly demarcated legal boundaries.
There is also the issue of IHRL being aimed at restricting states rather than 
sanctioning the conduct of individuals. Ratner et al note that regional human rights 
courts ‘are not for determining individual accountability for international crimes’ as 
they have neither criminal nor penal sanction nor jurisdiction over individuals.234 This 
is a common feature of the IHRL regime because it binds states vis-a-vis their 
citizens, not their citizens vis-a-vis other citizens.235 Further explanation on this can 
be found in the report of the ILC on fragmentation which notes that “‘Human rights 
law” aims to protect the interests of individuals while “international criminal law” 
gives legal expression to the “fight against impunity”.’236 The simple idea that the 
three regimes should be, or have been, fused cannot overcome the immense functional 
differences that exist between the regimes, a point to which this thesis returns in later 
chapters.
1.1.5 - The doctrine of lex specialis and the three regimes
The legal maxim lex specialis derogat generali holds that the specific law will prevail 
over the general law if both could be applied to the same scenario.237 Lex specialis has 
been referred to by the ICJ to illustrate the operation of the doctrine in international
233 European Union Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law 
(2009) 15th December 2009, c 303/12, para. 12.
234 Steven Ratner et al, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the 
Nuremberg Legacy (OUP 2009) 256.
235 Although, especially in the ECHR, there is much discussion as to the ‘horizontal application’ of 
human rights norms see Gavin Phillipson and Alexander Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the 
Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74 MLR 878 for a discussion on this matter.
236 ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 18) 15.
237 Simma (n 45) 488.
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law. In the Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons 
in 1996,238 the court faced the problem of reconciling IHRL and IHL. The Court’s 
response was to resort to the principle of lex specialis. It determined that the 
protection afforded under the ICCPR did not cease in times war (except for derogable 
provisions under Article 4). It noted that in principle the right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of life applies during hostilities.239 However, the definition of ‘arbitrary’ 
was to be determined by reference to the law of armed conflict which operates as lex 
specialis ‘designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.’240 Thus, it would appear, the 
‘special’ law of armed conflict was to be used to interpret IHRL. The ICJ revisited the 
lex specialis IHRL/IHL issue in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences o f 
the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.241 The Court 
considered the issues and determined that human rights protection does not cease in 
times of armed conflict.242
Other purported examples of the operation of the lex specialis doctrine can be 
found in the jurisprudence of the ECHR in regard to several cases relating to the 
situation in the Russian Republic of Chechnya. Abresch notes that while the Court has 
not ‘openly relied on humanitarian law in its decisions it has long been possible to 
argue that the lex specialis approach was being followed.’243 Despite such a bold 
statement, there is no evidence to suggest that the ECHR has adopted a lex specialis 
approach in its judgments. Bowring has noted that raising IHL before the Court was 
discussed by lawyers representing claimants but a decision was taken not to do so
238 Legality o f the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 1996 I.C.J. Rep 1996, p. 226.
239 ibid para.25.
240 ibid para.25.
241 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (Advisory Opinion) 2004, General List No. 131, 
ICJ Rep 2004.
242 ibid para. 106.
243 Abresch (n 228) 742.
55
Chapter One
because the Court only has jurisdiction over matters relating to human rights law as 
specified in the ECHR.244
It is also possible that prohibited conduct under one legal regime is also 
prohibited under another. With regard to the problems outlined above regarding lex 
specialis and parallelism, Schabas believes that 'lex specialis is not invoked if both 
bodies of law are applicable.’245 For example, the use of torture is prohibited under 
international humanitarian law via the Geneva Conventions and customary 
international law, and under international human rights law through, for example, the 
UDHR, the ICCPR, and (where relevant) the ECHR. This is in addition to it being 
prohibited under public international law as a peremptory norm. As such, according to 
Schabas, the doctrine of lex specialis would not apply and the norms would apply in 
parallel. This was displayed in the Uganda case at the ICJ where the Court held that 
Uganda had violated both international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law with regard to the same conduct.246 This is significant to 
Orakhelashvili because it constitutes ‘a warning that even if the protection in one of 
the fields is found to be less than in the other field, the applicability of the latter will 
not thus be prevented.’247
The interaction of IHRL and IHL is frequently viewed through the prism of 
lex specialis. However, questions remain as to whether or not lex specialis is an 
appropriate methodology for resolving the apparent conflict between the two regimes. 
First, if lex specialis is a method of resolving a conflict between two regimes does this 
presuppose a conflict exists? Second, does the operation of IHL as the lex specialis to
244 Bowring (n 190).
245 William Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights 
Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum’ (2007) 40 Israel Law 
Review 592, 597.
246 Case Concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) Judgment, 
19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005.
247 Orakhelashvili (n 222) 163.
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IHRL imply a hierarchical relationship between the two and if so when was this 
hierarchy created? Third, is the use of lex specialis an appropriate doctrine when the 
three regimes can be considered functionally separate? These three questions form a 
framework around which the remainder of this section is built.
1.1.6 - Does a conflict exist?
If lex specialis is a method of resolving conflicts between regimes it stands to reason 
that a conflict must first be said to exist. This subsection begins by examining what is 
meant by ‘conflict’. It begins by examining the theory behind conflicts of norms (and 
by extension their regimes) before progressing to an analysis of how these theories 
coincide with contemporary thinking of conflict between norms and regimes in 
international law. The nature of conflict between norms is a very broad concept.248 
Examples include ‘logical contradiction’,249 lack of consistency,250 the validity or 
invalidity of norms,251 ‘soundness’252 and coherence or incoherence,253 to name just a 
handful. The position taken in the present analysis is that of functional conflict as 
identified by H. Hamner Hill.254 This is where a conflict rests on the ‘goals or 
purposes which underlie norms’,255 with the additional requirement that a particular 
norm is valid only within the legal regime in which it is found.
One example of a conflict offered by Hill is when two permissory norms 
designed to implement a particular policy are either opposed to one another or where 
‘availing oneself of one of the permissions makes it impossible to avail oneself of the
248 H. Hamner Hill, ‘A Functional Taxonomy of Normative Conflict’ (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 
227, 239.
249 Stephen Munzer, ‘Validity and Legal Conflicts’ 82 Yale Law Journal 1140, 1140.
250 Jaap Haag, ‘Rule Consistency’ (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 369, 371-372.
251 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State (The Lawbook Exchange 1999) 410.
252 Roger Shiner, Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought (Clarendon 1992) 192.
253 Ole Fauchald and Andre Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ in Ole Fauchald and Andre Nollkaemper 
(eds), The Practice o f International and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International 
Law (Hart 2012) 8.




other permission.’256 The example given is that of a norm which states that one must 
open a window and simultaneously close a window: it is impossible to do one without 
violating the other.257 In essence, the position outlined by Hill and Kelsen can be 
described as norms ‘getting in each other’s way’258 leading to ‘contradiction, 
collision, and competition’.259 The parallels between this idea and that of the 
fragmentation of international law are readily apparent. Different norms and, in 
particular, normative regimes in international law pull the same concept in different 
directions leading to the inevitable and damaging fragmentation of international 
law.260
Rule consistency, therefore, is of practical interest in the development of any 
legal system, with a corollary being the idea of normative compatibility.261 Haag 
believes that such compatibility ‘is always relative to some background of 
constraints.’262 He uses the idea that it is impossible for a person to both be a thief and 
not a thief, noting that there exists an incompatibility if the ideas simultaneously exist 
because, as a matter of logic, such a state of affairs cannot exist.263 This is termed the 
‘conceptual impossibility’ constraint.264 Stephen Munzer illustrates this further 
writing that joint conformity to two rules (or norms) is logically impossible.265 He 
also notes that while talk of collision and conflict is merely metaphorical, it ‘suggests 





260 This was discussed in more detail above in respect of Nicaragua and Tadic, and the IHRL/IHL/ICL 
regimes in general: § 1.1.2, 34.
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“conflict.”’266 Such disagreements lead to a ‘quandary’ in which those who are 
subject to the norms, ‘norm-subjects’, are placed by rules that require or allow 
‘incompatible courses of behaviour’.267
Incompatible courses of behaviour, according to Munzer, result in a clash or 
collision only if any act by a norm-subject violates a duty-imposing rule.268 Despite 
such a definition, the various regimes studied in subsequent chapters do not give rise 
to a ‘permissory conflict’ as none of the regimes permits torture, enforced 
disappearance or rape, with the destruction of property being permissible in only 
certain circumstances. The norms of each regime are equally valid in the sense that 
they ‘may not legally be ignored or overthrown’; that is to do so would be to violate a 
legal duty or obligation to conform to the rule.269 Should a conflict exist then it 
follows that a judge deciding a case cannot conform to both rules and therefore needs 
to resolve the conflict before issuing a judgment.270 Ultimately, guidance cannot be 
sought from both applicable norms and a decision is to be made as to which is to be 
deemed valid in a given set of circumstances.271
However, where the legal system lacks the doctrine of stare decisis, (as is 
sometimes said to be the case with international law272) ‘nothing logically prevents 
both [conflicting] rules from continuing to be valid, with their range of application 
unaltered.’273 This point is also highlighted by Romano who has written that due to 







272 Gilbert Guillaume, ‘The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators’ 2 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 5, 8-9.
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bound by the jurisprudence of another court.’274 He also suggests one reason 
international courts develop jurisprudence independently of one another is because, in 
addition to being ‘self-contained legal islands’,275 there is a sense of judicial pride 
which prevents judges from paying too much deference to the benches of other 
courts.276
The views of Munzer are a development of Hans Kelsen’s own ideas about 
normative conflict. For Kelsen, if two norms exist that are contradictory, then one is 
true and the other is false.277 Without such a concept his vision of law as a system of 
non-contradictory norms breaks down.278 Kelsen also defined conflict as existing 
where norm is contrary to norm,279 a point he explained further when he noted ‘one 
cannot claim that two norms whose content is, logically speaking, mutually exclusive 
are valid at the same time.’280 The differentiation between true and false norms is a
symptom of any given norm’s validity which should not be confused with whether or 
not a norm is in itself effective.281
The efficacy of a norm and its validity are linked, with the former being 
dependent on the latter but not vice versa.2*2 For Kelsen a norm ‘is not valid because 
it is efficacious; it is valid if the order to which it belongs is, on the whole, 
efficacious.’283 Kelsen’s doctrine of validity is also contingent upon an existence in a 
certain time and a certain space.284 In other words, a norm’s validity, and thus its
274 Cesare P.R. Romano, ‘Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue’ 
(2008) 41 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 755, 758.
275 ibid.
276 ibid.
277 Hans Kelsen, ‘What is the Pure Theory of Law?’ (1959) 34 Tulane Law Review 269, 270.
278 ibid.
279 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory [The Pure Theory of Law or Reine 
Rechtslehre] (Clarendon Press 1992)71.
280 ibid 112.
281 Kelsen (n 277) 272.





efficacy, is finite and subject to boundaries, a concept which is readily identifiable in 
the international sphere if one considers, for example, the subject-matter jurisdiction 
of the ICJ which is to settle disputes between States.285
If lex specialis can be seen as a method for resolving conflicts, it stands that 
there must firstly be a conflict to resolve. The preceding section has considered how 
conflicts could be construed as illusory with regard to the operation of the IHRL, IHL 
and ICL regimes. This is of particular note in the case of torture, enforced 
disappearance, sexual violence and the wanton destruction of property. In these 
instances, each regime prohibits identical physical acts but the legal methods differ on 
account of the functional differences between the regimes.
1.1.7 - Do the regimes exist in a hierarchy?
If lex specialis is to be used to reconcile the three regimes this could imply the 
emergence of a hierarchy of regimes in international law. For instance, if IHL (or 
ICL) is a ‘special’ regime of IHRL it could be implied that IHRL exists as a higher 
form of law. The general existence of hierarchies in international law has been 
doubted in the case of both States286 and legal regimes.287 A limited hierarchy is 
recognised in relation to peremptory norms of general international law.288 However, 
these are limited in scope and their contents highly contested. Without such a 
hierarchy one regime does not (and cannot) take precedence over the others.
Perhaps the only exception to this rule, and thus the only hierarchy that exists, 
in the international legal system, is that between the ‘general’ law (of which
285 ICJ Statute (n 157) art 34(1) provides that ‘Only States may be parties in cases before the Court.’
286 The ‘traditional’ Westphalian notion of sovereignty precludes a legal hierarchy of States. This of 
course, does not exclude the possibility of a political hierarchy. See A. Claire Cutler, ‘Critical 
Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of 
Legitimacy’ (2001) 27 Review of International Studies 133.
287 d’Aspremont (n 14).
288 VCLT, art 53.
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peremptory norms are to be considered a part289) and the ‘special’ regimes. This 
relationship could be bilateral in nature. For example, the general would have a 
relationship with IHRL, IHL or ICL on an individual basis. However, the special 
regimes would not have a relationship with each other, except for the possibility of an 
indirect relationship with one another through the general law. The continual presence 
of the general law would be essential for the operation of the international legal 
system. It provides a ‘fall back’ set of legal principles should the law of the special 
regime fail.290
One problem that results from viewing IHL as lex specialis of IHRL is what 
happens if the IHL regime fails and has to fall back on a set of legal principles? If IHL 
is the lex specialis of IHRL, this implies the first method of resolving the problem 
would be to defer to the ‘general’ rules of IHRL. Only if the rules of the IHRL regime 
failed as well would recourse be made to the general rules of international law. Such a 
scenario is potentially troubling given the functional differentiation between the two 
regimes.
1.1.8 - Is lex specialis appropriate?
Lastly, this section turns to the question of whether the lex specialis doctrine is 
appropriate in the context of functionally separate regimes? One perspective on the 
separateness of the regimes is that they have always been separate and therefore 
fragmentation does not apply because there was never unity in the first place.291 
Comparing the two is like comparing chalk with cheese according to Bowring who 
notes that often the two are mixed together with disastrous results: ‘chalky cheese is 
horribly indigestible, while cheesy chalk is no good at all for writing on
289 ibid.
290 ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 18) para.82.
291 Bowring (n 190) 2.
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blackboards.’292 While this outlines a strict separateness of the regimes it also denies 
the existence of fragmentation by stating that there was no unity between the IHRL 
and IHL regimes.
As has been seen with the Nicaragua and Tadic cases, it is clear that 
superficial similarities may exist between the two, it is also apparent on closer 
inspection that the two cases relate to entirely separate legal regimes namely the 
regime established by the ICJ and the regime established by the ICTY. This approach 
can be followed when considering the application of IHL, ICL and IHRL. If the case 
falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC or a State exercising its powers under the 
complementarity provisions of the ICC Statute then the legal regime and the 
consequent body of rules governing it would be either ICL or national law. On the 
other hand should the matter be brought before the ECHR, for example, the legal rules 
governing this case will be those that are found in the ECHR and the subsequent 
interpretative jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In this fashion, clearly demarcated lines 
are established between the legal regimes, and normative conflict can be thus avoided 
by reliance on the formal distinctions that already exist between the two, or more, 
regimes. For Hans Kelsen ‘normative conflict’ is ‘as senseless as a logical 
contradiction because neither can exist.’293 There needs to be ‘logical consistency’.294 
However, within the individual regimes of IHRL, IHL and ICL, there is a trend 
towards consistency as will be shown in the following chapters. Within the differing 
legal regimes, there is ‘logical consistency’, or at the very least an understanding that 
such consistency is vital for the effective operation of the regime. In turn this compels 
actors within the individual systems to strive towards consistency.
292 ibid.
293 Jorg Kammerhofer, ‘Kelsen -  Which Kelsen? A Reapplication of the Pure Theory to International 




1.1.9 - Conclusion to Part One
The purpose of the preceding sections has been to introduce the concept of 
fragmentation and to outline some of the main trends and themes within the literature. 
It began by considering the definition of fragmentation, noting that the term is 
essentially political in nature. Linked to this was the idea that fragmentation has come 
to be seen in the literature as a threat to international law which can be reversed by 
greater constitutionalisation. It was argued that this would not be appropriate given 
the functional differences between the regimes that exist in the international legal 
system. To illustrate this, the Nicaragua and Tadic cases before the ICJ and ICTY 
were studied. This was followed by an examination of the concept in relation to the 
IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes and how each possesses a separate function to the others. 
Lastly, the doctrine of lex specialis was considered in relation to the IHRL, IHL and 
ICL regimes. The fragmentation of international law, however that is defined, has 
lead to a profound change in the operation of international law. Instead of legal 
‘power’ being held by one or two institutions e.g. the ICJ, the ability to adjudicate 
issues has been granted to several judicial institutions. Each of these institutions has 
the ability to appoint judges and issue judgments on subjects within its jurisdiction. 




1.2.1 - Part Two: Mitigating fragmentation -  a role for a formal approach to law?
The validity of a particular legal norm has been said to be reliant upon whether or not 
that norm meets the formal criteria of identification of norms peculiar to that 
particular legal system.295 If it does then the norm can be said to be legally valid, if 
not then it is invalid. For Gaustini, this requires the existence of rules which permit 
norms to be described as constituting a source of law.296 As a consequence, this 
necessitates the existence of a distinction between ‘law’ and ‘non-law’, legal and 
extra-legal norms. This raises questions as to whether, in the context of the present 
international legal system, a policy-orientated approach to law is appropriate or 
achievable. In the wide definition, the policy-orientated approach views all 
institutional pronouncements as ‘law’, putting them on equal footing with treaties. 
However, according to D’Amato ‘law is not everything’ and a policy-orientated 
approach, by its very nature, contains the possibility of including contradictory 
positions weakening the validity of legal rules.297 Such a point is also linked to the 
content of the law which depends on ‘the interpretation of formally established 
sources.’298 Under this position, interpretation can only occur if there is something 
concrete to interpret.
The policy-orientated approach was principally advocated by Myres 
McDougal and others in several works spanning the second-half of the 20th 
Century.299 The work of these scholars has been influential in several fields of
295 Riccardo Guastini, ‘Normativism or the Normative Theory of Legal Science: Some Epistemological 
Problems’ in Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds), Normativity and Norms: 
Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (Clarendon 1998) 329.
296 ibid.
297 Anthony D ’Amato, ‘Is International Law Really “Law”?’ (1984) 79 North Western University Law 
Review 1293, 1302.
298 Ota Weinburger, ‘Formalism or Anti-formalism’ in Werner Krawietz et al (eds), Prescriptive 
Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems (Dunker and Humbolt 1994) 690.
299 e.g. Myres S. McDougal et al, The Interpretation of International Agreements and World Public 
Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (Martinus Nijhoff 1994); Myres S. McDougal and Harold 
D. Lass well, ‘The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order’ (1959) 53 AJIL 1;
65
Chapter One
international law.300 Such an approach aims to guide decision-makers and affords 
them the opportunity to relate ‘the decisions that they make to the basic goal values of 
preferred public order.’301 An appeal to goals and the authority of ‘universal values’ 
implicit in the term ‘preferred public order’ can be said to be the hallmark of the 
policy-orientated approach to international law.302 McDougal et al remark the public 
order they envisage is founded on the notion of ‘human dignity’,303 a notion 
undermined by ‘arbitrary formalism’.304
The formal, traditional approach to international law, namely treaties and their 
interpretation by courts, has been described as the ‘least flexible’ and least sensitive to 
the ‘political and economic reality of law-making’.305 It is from the ‘shackles of 
traditionalism’ that the policy-orientated approach seeks to free international law.306 
To this latter approach, international agreements are best understood ‘not as mere 
texts’ but as ‘continuous processes of communication and collaboration in a larger 
community context’, with the text of any given treaty merely being one outcome of 
such processes.307 However, a positivistic approach to international law prevents 
jeopardising the neutrality inherent in international law which ultimately regulates 
relations between sovereign entities.308
The policy-orientated approach contrasts sharply with traditional methods of 
law-ascertainment and validity. When carried to its extreme the policy-orientated
Myres S. McDougal, ‘The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea’ (1955) 49 AJIL 
356.
300 An overview of the operation of the New Haven School and its influence on international law can be 
found in Iain Scobbie, ‘Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law’ in 
Malcolm D. Evans (ed) International Law (OUP 2006) 83.
301 McDougal (n 299) xi.
302 Nigel Purvis, ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law’ (1991) 32 Harvard Journal of 
International Law 81, 85.
303 McDougal and Lass well (n 299) 1.
304 McDougal (n 299) xvii.
305 Douglas M. Johnston, The International Law o f Fisheries (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) lxv.
306 ibid. xxv.
307 McDougal (n 299) xxix.
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approach permits the existence of contradictory ‘laws’ regarded as impossible by 
writers such as Kelsen. Fitzmaurice has described the policy-orientated approach as 
being a plea for an ‘open-ended’ technique of interpretation.309 This point was 
conceded earlier by McDougal who wrote that the prescriptions and technical terms of 
the law are not to be seen as ‘absolute inelastic dogmas but rather flexible policy 
preferences, permitting decisioh-makers a very broad discretion.. .for promoting 
major policies.’310
The policy approach leads to a situation where judges (or ‘decision makers’ as 
they are known in the language of the policy-orientated approach) have considerable 
latitude as to how they interpret the law. For Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius 
in Federalist 78, it was crucial to avoid such exercising of arbitrary discretion by the 
judiciary. Accordingly, he wrote ‘it is indispensable that they [judges] should be 
bound down by strict rules and precedents’.311 Such rules and precedents would serve 
to ‘define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them’.312
The policy-orientated approach has been described as the denial of the 
normative quality of legal rules and as deciding questions of legality ‘by primary 
reference to extra-legal sources’.313 Anderson used the example of the legality of the 
atomic bomb tests as analysed by McDougal314 as an example of the policy-orientated 
approach to international law. McDougal had described the tests as a means of 
ensuring world peace, and thus the legality of such tests became ‘a factor of end and 
efficacy’.315 To Anderson this was clearly ‘extra-legal’ and most importantly could be
309 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our Interpretation of it?’ 
(1971)65 AJIL 358, 367.
3,0 McDougal, ‘The Hydrogen Bomb Tests.. .’ (n 299) 358-359.
311 Federalist 78, in James Madison et al, The Federalist Papers (Penguin 1987 [1788]) at 442.
312 ibid.
313 Stanley V. Anderson, ‘A Critique of Professor Myres S. McDougal’s Doctrine of Interpretation by 
Major Purposes’ (1963) 57 AJIL 378, 378.
314 McDougal, ‘The Hydrogen Bomb Tests.. . ’ (n 299).
315 Anderson (n 313) 380.
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‘easily applied...without reference to the legal system they originally set out to 
interpret.’316 Once this happens the law ceases to exist as a normative order.317 As a 
consequence, the analysis of the law becomes detached from the legal system, and 
questions of legality are not answered by reference to law.318
The policy-orientated approach has been criticised by Fitzmaurice who wrote 
there exists an ‘overriding preponderance...to certain notions of a very general, wide 
and far-reaching character’ namely notions of public order founded on human 
dignity.319 This permits the ‘indiscriminate’ application of a collection of statements 
not adequately related to weight or precedence.320 Indeed, the very notion of ‘human 
dignity’ was viewed by Fitzmaurice as being vague and ‘too subjective to be of 
practical value to the adjudicator’.321 He ultimately dismissed the nebulous and open 
nature of the policy-orientated approach, concluding while it aimed ‘at order and 
liberality, its concepts, by their very breadth, open the door to anarchy and abuse.’322 
Philip Allott has also criticised the open nature of the policy-orientated 
approach, noting that if it lies open to each State to define legal terms as it wishes 
while an opposing State demonstrates that its own interpretation is equally valid, ‘the 
specifically legal character of the law would have ceased to exist’ and all law would 
simply become a matter of politics.323 Should international law become dependent on 
the perception of its subjects for its own validity it would ‘evaporate into pure 
subjectivism’.324 The policy-orientated approach has been described as 












as international law, leading to uncertainty, and in turn, causing a loss of 
accountability.325
According to the policy-orientated approach, the decision-maker is necessarily 
empowered to supplement the binding law applicable to, and agreed upon by, the 
parties (for example treaties) with wider, extra-legal concepts founded upon the ‘basic 
constitutive policies of the larger community’.326 However, this assumes that either 
the ‘basic constitutive policies of the larger community’ are readily apparent to the 
adjudicator, or that the adjudicator is free to define and determine what these policies 
and values are to be.327 Indeed, at a fundamental level, the policy-orientated approach 
relies on the agreement between the author and the reader on fundamental issues of 
international law and to the ‘corrective relative weights to be given to the conflicting 
interests of the States involved.’328 Expressed another way, the policy-orientated 
approach knows the answer before it has done the working out, what remains is to 
make the law fit the policy goal. Such a viewpoint turns the idea of law on its head, 
instead of guiding policy law is directed by it.
For McDougal et al, international law is a means to ensure ‘the eventual 
organization of security and freedom in a peaceful and abundant world community’ 
with the only other choice being ‘indignity’ and possible ‘human annihilation’.329 
However, as Allott makes clear, the policy-orientated approach is an absolutist and 
idealistic approach to international law, unashamedly and intentionally value-laden, 
and heavily reliant on subjective terms such as ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’, ‘right’ as well as
325 Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (OUP 2012) 108.
326 Fitzmaurice (n 309) 372.
327 Allott (n 323) 125.
328 ibid 80.
329 Myres S. McDougal, ‘Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy Orientated Approach to Legal Study’ 
(1956) 1 Natural Law Forum 53, 72.
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the trinity of ‘ought’, ‘should’ and ‘may’.330 Consequently, there is an implicit, and 
often explicit, claim by scholars who adhere to the policy-orientated approach that not 
only is their approach to international law one of several possible interpretations but 
that it is only approach to international law worth considering. McDougal reveals his 
position on this matter noting there is a choice between human dignity, guaranteed by 
the policy-orientated approach, and human indignity which will occur should such an 
approach to international law not be taken.331
The reliance of the policy-orientated approach on extra-legal sources for its 
validity raises questions as to what is and what is not to be considered law. Reisman 
notes that the policy-orientated approach focuses on a range of centralised and 
decentralised settings in which decisions are made.332 This distinguishes the approach 
from ‘conventional’ legal analyses that focus on texts that are characterised solely as 
‘legal’ and ‘the events to which the rules draw attention.’333 Here the analysis returns 
to the criticisms levelled against McDougal by Anderson who described the former’s 
analysis of the law as being ‘not legalistic’,334 an analysis in which the word ‘law’ is 
used only in an ‘honorific sense’.335 If this is the case then there is little to separate 
law from non-law, law from politics and, as Fitzmaurice has noted, order and 
anarchy.336
For any given norm or rule to be legally valid it must be possible to discern 
what is and what is not law, which is not possible with the policy-orientated approach
330 Allott (n 323) 123.
331 see McDougal’s comment on the role of international lawyers where he writes of the ‘social role 
and responsibility’ of the legal scholars which is essentially to bring their skills and resources ‘to bear 
upon clarification and recommendation of the policies and procedure’ that will lead to a utopian vision 
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to international law. For McDougal, law is viewed as being not merely about texts and 
treaties but instead as a ‘process of decision’337 where lawyers, legal scholars and 
adjudicators weigh up not only the law but also policy choices and their own 
individual social roles and responsibilities.338 d’Aspremont condemns this, writing 
that policy-orientated approach tends towards the idea that international law is a form 
of ‘social engineering’ in order to achieve certain societal goals.339
There is a tendency towards instrumentalism where international law is to be 
regarded not as a defined set of rules and obligations, but ‘a comprehensive process of 
decision-making’.340 Such a view is possible because of the notion that international 
law is a product of a social process rather than a ruled-based system.341 However, 
such an approach necessarily replaces the ‘is’ of law with the ‘ought’ of politics as 
highlighted by Allott,342 with what is law being derived from the formula ‘fact x 
policy = law’.343 Thus it relies on constructing law rather than establishing law by a 
deductive process in the sense of moving from premise to premise to a conclusion.344 
The policy-orientated approach also downplays the traditional legitimacy of 
international law as a legal system which has been said to rest ‘largely on the viability 
of treaties as a source of law.’345
Identifying ‘law’ from ‘non-law’ has become more difficult over time.346 
d’Aspremont has written that law ‘constitutes a set of rules which, at times, and for
337 McDougal (n 329) 56. ^
338 ibid 72; see also McDougal and Lass well (n 299) 28.
339 d’Aspremont (n 325) 105.
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multiple purposes, need to be ascertained.’347 He attributes the decline in sensitivity 
‘to the necessity of rigorously distinguishing law from non-law’.348 For Koskenniemi 
the identification of international law has become merely a matter of ‘more or less’.349 
Indeed, according to Koskenniemi, the anti-formalists have dressed their doctrine in a 
‘culture of dynamism’ in which questions such as ‘why bother with rules and forms’ 
are asked,350 reminiscent of the ‘openness and liberality’ that the policy-orientated 
approach apparently tends towards.351 The appearance of liberty permits the use of 
several ‘looser law identification criteria’352 meaning international law has moved 
away from the identification of legal rules ‘by virtue of the formal sources from which 
they emanate’.353
The changes in law-ascertainment have led, d’Aspremont believes, to 
‘uncertainty regarding the existence of legal rules’ that in turn prevents such rules 
from providing meaningful commands.354 Furthermore, a failure to distinguish 
between law and non-law strips international law of its normative character355 that 
ultimately undermines the authority of international law.356 The deformalisation of 
international law has led to the belief that there is a grey area where it is impossible to 
distinguish law from non-law. For d’Aspremont, this leads many to conclude that all 
international law is ‘soft’.357 Deformalisation also leads to the potential for regime 
conflict in the fragmented international legal system. If all laws (however they are 
defined) apply equally everywhere then there is no possibility to escape conflict.
347 d’Aspremont (n 325) 1.
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In a positivistic understanding of international law, the law is limited to legal 
texts, judgments and other documents which posit the law as objectively given fact.358 
Weil has defined ‘hard law’ as being the statement of precise legal rights and 
obligations.359 If provisions of hard law lack precision they can be made precise by 
adjudication or the ‘issuance of detailed regulations’.360 Compare this to the difficulty 
in defining ‘soft law’ given by Blutman who identified two definitions of the term.361 
These are either ‘laws’ that do not appear in a form of a legal source identified by 
international law or are unenforceable due to a lack of specifity, their vague normative 
content or their subjective nature.362 An additional means of distinguishing between 
hard and soft law is offered by Shelton who notes that legal consequences flow from 
the violation of the former while violating the latter leads to political consequences.363
Examples of soft law include declarations, directives and General Assembly 
resolutions.364 Blutman argues that due to the difficulties in even defining soft law its 
use may not be justified and cannot hope to withstand Ockham’s razor.365 The 
distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law acts as a line of demarcation between, for 
example, treaties and General Assembly resolutions. Without such a distinction, 
Blutman concludes, it is impossible for a court to know what is and is not legal, 
thereby hindering the determination of legal disputes in light of established legal 
rules.366 Boyle and Chinkin provide a definition of ‘soft law’ as being distinct from
358 Ulrich Fastenrath, ‘Relative Normativity in International Law’ (1993) 4 EJIL 305,306-7.
359 Weil (n 308)414-415.
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‘hard law’ because the former, along with UN Security Council Resolutions, are 
binding on States Parties.367
Despite the uncertainty surrounding soft law, Blutman recognises that it might 
be of use in determining the content of customary international law or opinio iuris.m  
Reisman offers a further analysis of the benefits of soft law, noting that it can be of 
use for scholars and students who seek to ‘understand and manipulate’ the processes 
of international law making and for NGOs seeking to draft new laws.369 However, he 
cautions that for those who apply the law it is ‘not a useful notion’370 due to its 
indeterminacy and potentially subjective nature.371 Boyle also notes the benefits of 
soft law especially in the field of international environmental law,372 and his analysis 
of the distinctions between hard and soft law revolve around the binding nature of the 
former.373 Another interpretation of the hard and soft law distinction is provided by 
d’Aspremont who notes that in the field of environmental law so-called framework 
treaties, for example the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,374 require 
complementary instruments for their scope to be fully defined and therefore are not 
deemed ‘self-sufficient’.375
Soft law leads to the blurring of the ‘normative threshold’ between law and 
non-law,376 yet the validity of a legal rule (or norm) rests upon it being formally 
ascertainable according to set of objective standards.377 This is reminiscent of Hart’s 
view that law’s function is to guide and control the behaviour of its subjects by setting
367 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007) 213.
368 ibid.
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out certain standards and rules of conduct.378 The validity of a rule or norm is also 
important for the avoidance of regime conflict.
Similar depictions of the certainty requirement can be found in the work of 
F.A. Hayek who wrote the ‘life of man in society...is made possible by the 
individuals acting according to certain rules.’379 In order for this to be so, laws must 
be known and certain. Indeed, so vital was this requirement for the functioning of a 
free society, he commented that its importance ‘can hardly be exaggerated’.380 Hayek, 
like Tamanaha,381 recognised that the law could never be entirely certain, but argued 
that the tendency to over-emphasise the uncertain nature of law was part of the 
‘campaign against the rule of law’.382 In a footnote, he added that if the law was as 
‘uncertain’ as many legal commentators would have the reader believe there would be 
no legal science ‘whatsoever’.383 A point which can be applied as readily to 
international law as it can to domestic law.
A rule or norm can be valid in a given system only if it conforms to the 
method that that particular system uses to identify rules or norms. If it fails to conform 
to that method then it cannot be said to be valid in the context of the respective legal 
system. Therefore, a conflict can only be said occur where two or more rules or norms 
are simultaneously valid within the same legal system. For instance, if legal system A 
says that rule x is valid, and legal system B says that rule y is valid, it does not 
necessarily follow that rule y is valid in legal system A and vice versa. If rule x  is 
valid in legal system A but invalid in legal system B then there can be no conflict
378 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f Law (OUP 1997) 27.
379 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge 1990) 148.
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between rule x and y because one is valid while the other is invalid. In this sense, the 
validity of a given rule is dependent on, and confined to, the regime in which it is 
found.
One situation approximately analogous to the fragmentation of public 
international law is that which is found in private international law (also known as the 
conflict of laws). Pauwelyn and Michaels have noted that viewing fragmentation 
through this lens could offer a vital insight as to how its effects could be mitigated.384 
Despite this, the use of private international law techniques in this field remains an 
under-explored area,385 and deserves a brief discussion. Of particular relevance to this 
thesis is what have been termed ‘true and false conflicts’.386 In deciding which 
jurisdiction’s laws are to be applied to a given case, there is an assumption made that 
there are in fact two or more jurisdictions with competing claims. This is referred to 
as a ‘true conflict’.387 A ‘false conflict’ occurs where, although there might appear to 
multiple jurisdictions with equal claim, only one jurisdiction is legally competent to 
hear the claim and as a result no conflict exists.388
Some parallels to the fragmentation of public international law can be seen 
even from this brief exposition. The first issue to resolve where fragmentation appears 
to lead to conflict is which of the two (or more) regimes is competent to adjudicate. 
This can be further divided into de iure (i.e. what is technically possible) and de facto 
(i.e. what is feasible) jurisdiction. Take for example, the matter of human rights 
violations committed in Chechnya. If the relevant threshold was crossed then the 
situation in Chechnya could amount to a non-international armed conflict which
384 Michaels (n 120).
385 ibid.






would engage the protections afforded by common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.389 This could amount to de iure jurisdiction for the IHL regime. 
However, if there was no competent body able to adjudicate the issue, de facto 
jurisdiction would be lacking. However, faced with this scenario, the victims (or their 
families) still have the option of issuing proceedings against Russia at the ECtHR. 
The ECtHR possesses both de facto and de iure jurisdiction but only over human 
rights matters to the exclusion of IHL. Thus, the prima facie conflict between IHL and 
IHRL could be revealed as being analogous to a ‘false conflict’ under private 
international law.
Autopoiesis theory can also shed some light on the fragmentation of 
international law. In brief, autopoiesis (as it relates to law) is the idea that a legal 
system is closed to external influences.390 In turn this gives rise to the idea that an 
autopoietic legal system is ‘autonomous’ and thus able to act without reference to 
external factors.391 Applying such a definition (albeit brief) to the situation that is 
presented by the international legal system, it is apparent that neither the international 
legal system nor its regimes can be regarded as autopoietic. The former is informed 
by concerns other than law in much the same way the domestic legal system is 
informed by matters other than law (e.g. environmental issues). As for the regimes, 
they rely on principles of general international law in case of failure. They also make 
reference to each other’s judgments by making use of persuasive precedents. Both of 
these factors can be construed as denying that the regimes are themselves autopoietic 
systems. Consequently, an autopoietic approach to analysing the problems identified 
in this thesis would not be particularly enlightening.
389 Common Art 3 to the Geneva Conventions 1948.
390 Adrian James, ‘An Open or Shut Case? Law as an Autopoietic System’ (1992) 19 Journal o f Law 
and Society 275.
391 Michael King, ‘The “Truth” About Autopoiesis’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 218, 219.
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1.2.2 - Conclusion to Part Two
Part two has examined the need for a formal approach to rule ascertainment in the 
international legal system. ‘Formal’ in this context was taken to be contrasted with the 
policy-orientated approach to international law. The policy-orientated approach, it 
was argued, is insufficient when it comes to demarcating the boundaries of the 
regimes studied. Such a methodology fails to distinguish between the IHRL, IHL and 
ICL regimes, leaving those who might apply or interpret the law uncertain as to which 
law is in fact applicable. This, it is suggested, is not appropriate when attempting to 
define violations that are peculiar to functionally different regimes. Recognition of the 
benefits a formal approach to rule ascertainment can bring to the field of 
fragmentation is perhaps one method of mitigating the associated risks and concerns 
over conflict.
Conclusion to Chapter One
Martti Koskenniemi has commented there is no longer a single hegemonic answer to 
the question ‘what is international law?’392 This is due to the emergence of several 
specialised regimes such as IHRL, ICL, international trade law etc. Each of these 
regimes has its own secondary rules which are used to interpret the primary rules of 
international law. Such a phenomenon is frequently referred to as the ‘fragmentation’ 
of international law. Fragmentation is often characterised in a negative light especially 
because of its apparent potential to cause conflict and disunity within the international 
legal system. The converse of such a position is the emergence of several separate 
regimes each with the purpose of correcting the deficiencies of the general 
international law. With such a multiplicity of regimes focusing on the shortcomings of
392 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘A History of International Law Histories’ in Bardo Fassbender et al (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2012) 970.
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the law, a stronger and, perhaps ironically, more coherent framework of international 
law could be said to have emerged.
Each regime has a specific, functional purpose. If a regime had no purpose it 
would not exist. Regimes are created to solve a particular problem. This could be the 
problem of excessive State power (IHRL), the need to protect combatants and non- 
combatants alike from unnecessary suffering in times of armed conflict (IHL) or to 
curb impunity and to ensure that those who commit mass atrocities or war crimes are 
held accountable for their actions (ICL). In brief, these are the basic functional 
purposes of the three regimes studied in this thesis. From this a picture emerges of an 
international legal system that is comprised not of one set of rules (i.e. the ‘general’ 
rules) but a multiplicity of rules and regimes. Managing this ‘fragmentation’ into a 
coherent whole is likely to be impossible with the current institutional framework of 
international law. Instead, what is required is to recognise that several regimes exist to 
perform different functions, in much the same way that different types of hammers 
exist to hammer different objects. Each hammer has the same overarching purpose (to 
hit things) but this does not mean that they are identical and should (or could) be 
replaced by a single multifunctional hammer. So too with the international legal 
system.
At the same time as the phenomenon of fragmentation has been developing, a 
growing trend in international law has been the shift away from formally ascertainable 
legal rules to a softer policy-focused conception of rule ascertainment. This causes 
problems in a fragmented international legal system because the exact scope and 
competence of any given functional regime depends on the formal rules by which it
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was created.393 By adopting flexible policy-orientated approaches to international law 
where the formal rules governing the demarcation of regime boundaries can be freely 
dispensed, the very functionality created by the various regimes could be imperilled. 
By recognising the benefits that a formal rule ascertainment could bring to the 
identification of regime boundaries, the concerns of those such as HE Judge 
Guillaume could be assuaged, particularly in the fields studied in this thesis.
The following chapters of this thesis will show how the IHRL, IHL and ICL 
regimes each define a particular violation (torture, enforced disappearance, sexual 
violence and the destruction of property). It will be demonstrated that despite each 
regime being concerned with the same violation, each has its own particular definition 
that cannot be transplanted into the other regimes. This is because of the functional 
separation of the three regimes caused by the emergence of three (or more) discretely 
identifiable bodies of secondary rules.
393 Philippe Sands, ‘Article 39 (1969)’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein, The Vienna Conventions on 
the Law o f Treaties: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 975.
Chapter Two
Chapter Two — Torture
*
Introduction
The prohibition of torture is one of the few norms widely considered to have attained 
peremptory status.1 It is also one most nations have accepted as law.2 The prohibition 
of the commission of acts of torture is common to all regimes studied in this chapter. 
The definition of the physical acts constituting torture is common to each of the three 
regimes. For instance, the physical administration of electric shocks would be 
sufficient to constitute a physical act of torture under the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes. 
The regimes differ in how they define the other elements necessary for determining 
whether the physical amounts to torture in each regime. In IHRL, for example, the 
widely accepted definition of torture requires the involvement of a State official,3 
whilst neither the IHL nor ICL regime requires the involvement of a State official for 
any purpose.4 Despite this, a concrete and clear definition of torture has eluded the 
international community, leaving the term open-ended.5
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight both the common bonds between 
the three regimes and their differences. By approaching the subject in such a fashion, 
this thesis seeks to demonstrate that the effects of fragmentation can potentially be 
mitigated. One method of achieving this is by recognising the formal distinctions 
between the regimes and realising how such a distinction can help to differentiate
1 Erika de Wet, ‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its Implication 
for National and Customary Law’ (2004) 15 EJIL 97, 97; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: 
“Jus Cogens” and “Obligatio Erga Omnes”’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Legal Problems 63, 68.
2 David Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, ‘Defining Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading 
Treatment’ (2011) 29 Law and Inequality 343, 347.
3 UNCAT, art 1; this has been criticised by some writers and is discussed in more detail below. See 
Alice Edwards, ‘The “Feminizing” of Torture under International Human Rights Law’ (2006) 19 U lL  
349, 349-350.
4 e.g. Prosecutor v. Mucic et al (IT-96-21) TC, Judgment, 9 October 2001, para. 1268; torture was 
administered in this case for sadistic pleasure.




between them. In contrast, a policy-orientated approach in which ‘everything is law’ 
might not be an appropriate method for establishing the regimes’ boundaries. This 
latter approach could, due to the lack of distinction between the different functional 
regimes, exaggerate to a greater extent the effects of fragmentation than might the 
more formal approach.
The functionality of each regime is important to the central arguments of this 
thesis. As will be seen in this chapter, the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes continue to 
function despite their existence in a fragmented international legal system. 
Consequently, even if there is conflict between the regimes as some have suggested,6 
the regimes’ judicial organs do manage, to a greater or lesser extent, to deliver rulings 
and judgments on matters arising as a result of the violation of their regime’s legal 
rules. As will be seen, the regimes may draw from the rulings and law of other 
regimes but, importantly, they do not consider themselves to be bound by their 
counterparts in the other regimes. There is therefore an additional dimension to this 
thesis, namely that, although the risk of conflict can never be wholly removed, the 
regimes remain functionally separate from one another.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first considers the 
position of the IHRL regimes with regard to torture. It examines torture as it is 
defined under the UN regime, notably the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), 
the ECHR system and the Inter-American system. It will be seen that each regime 
approaches the definition of torture differently but ultimately there are several 
similarities. The second section looks at the definition of torture under the IHL 
regime. Due to the nature of this regime, customary law forms part of the analysis, 
followed by the definitions provided by IHL treaties such as the Geneva Conventions,
6 See Chapter One: § 1.1.6, 57
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and lastly the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals as they relate to the 
definition of torture as a war crime. The third section is concerned with the definition 
of torture under ICL, principally genocide and crimes against humanity. It draws on 
the Statutes and jurisprudence of the ICTY/R and ICC, in addition to the judgments of 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.
2.1- Defining torture in the IHRL regime
Torture is prohibited by all the IHRL systems studied in this chapter. The state-centric 
nature of human rights law ensures that for the purposes of the present enquiry State 
actors must be involved, directly or indirectly, in the administration of torture. Some 
commentators have called for non-State actors to be held accountable for violations of 
human rights that would, if they had been perpetrated by State agents, constitute 
torture.7 This is in accordance with the mounting call that non-State actors, ranging 
from corporate bodies to insurgent or terrorist groups, should be bound by human 
rights obligations.8 However, despite such mounting concern over such lack of 
accountability, IHRL appears to remain largely rooted in the state-centric model of 
international justice.9
The restriction of human rights law to State actors has also been criticised by 
some feminist writers.10 Their argument is that men are predominantly affected by
7 Chris Jochnick, ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of 
Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 56, 79; Robert McCorquodale and Rebecca La 
Forgia ‘Taking Off the Blindfolds: Torture by Non-State Actors’ (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 
189,217.
8 Jan A. Hessbruegge, ‘Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors’ (2005) 11 
Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 21, 88; Andrew Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 88 IRRC 491. 523.
9 This can be seen from the State-centric operation of many IHRL regimes such as the ECHR, Inter- 
American system and the UN Human Rights Council, all of which focus on the liability of States and 
not individuals.
10 For an overview see Edwards (n 3); Catherine MacKinnon, ‘On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on 
Human Rights’, in Kathleen. E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds) Human Rights in the Twenty-First 
Century: A Global Challenge (Martinus Nijhoff 1993); Rhonda Copelon, ‘Recognising the Egregious 
in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture’, (1994) 25 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 291.
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State conducted torture, while women are mostly affected by private acts of ‘torture’, 
for example domestic violence in the household.11 While the ultimate aim of such 
writers is laudable, the methods they advance fail to take into account a number of 
factors. First, on the subject of public/private torture, no evidence is offered to support 
the assertion that men are disproportionately affected by State-backed human rights 
violations. Women have been targeted by regimes across the world from Chile and 
Argentina to Burma, and during atrocities such as in Rwanda they were actively 
targeted because they were women.12
Second, private abuse would (or should) be criminalised under criminal law as 
domestic violence. As will be seen, the involvement of a State official is an integral 
element of the definition of torture, extending to include acts by private citizens 
destroys this aspect of the offence. Third, feminist writers have noted that because the 
UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) uses only male pronouns, a situation is 
created wherein a ‘man is sure that he is included; a woman is uncertain’.13 However, 
such writers fail to acknowledge that the purpose of human rights is that they are 
supposed to be universal, applicable to all individuals but not necessarily in all 
situations. The policy-orientated approach, wherein formal distinctions of the law can 
be simply discarded, conforms to the desire to found a legal order based on ‘human 
dignity’14 shielded from notions of ‘arbitrary formalism’.15 However, as this section
11 Edwards (n 3) 353.
12 Lisa Sharlach, ‘Gender and genocide in Rwanda: Women as agents and objects of Genocide’ (1999) 
1 Journal o f Genocide Research 387.
13 Edwards (n 310) 354 citing Helen B. Holmes, ‘A Feminist Analysis of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’, in C. Gould (ed) Beyond Domination: New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy 
(Rowman and Allanheld 1983) 250.
14 Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems 
of Public Order’ (1959) 53 AJIL 1,1.
15 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, James C. Miller, The Interpretation of International 




will show, ‘arbitrary formalism’ can strengthen the application and enforceability of 
the law.
2.1.1 - Torture in the UN human rights system
The use of torture has been widely condemned in the UN system by both the Security 
Council16 and the General Assembly,17 in addition to several UN specialised bodies.18 
Any discussion of the UN system’s definition of torture should begin with Article 5 of 
the UDHR: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.’ The wording of this provision has formed the basis for 
several international human rights treaties such as the ECHR, the IACHR, and the 
ICCPR. Hannum notes that while it would be ‘misleading to conclude that there is 
agreement as to the precise extent of any legal obligations that might flow from the 
Declaration’,19 the literature he surveys indicates some of the provisions of the UDHR 
constitute an element of customary international law. The UDHR arguably has 
contributed to the customary international law of IHRL,20 and that in the absence of 
universal subscription to human rights treaties it is to the UDHR ‘that most people 
will look to find the minimum rights to which they are entitled.’21
The preamble of UNGA Resolution 3452 (XXX) of 1975 (known as the 
‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’) highlights ‘the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family’. It also notes States have an obligation under the UN Charter ‘to Promote
16 e.g. UNSC Res 770 (13 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/770; UNSC Res 771 (12 August 1992) UN 
Doc S/RES/771 both of which described ‘abuses’ committed against individuals.
17 UNGA Res 2547 (XXIV) (11 Dec 1969) UN Doc A/RES/24/2547.
18 e.g. the UN Committee Against Torture.
19 Hurst Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law’ 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1995-1996) 287, 329.




universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ 
Annexed to the Declaration are a series of Articles which formed the basis of 
UNCAT.22 These declarations have been criticised on the basis that such declarations 
assist the ‘emergence of international law rules, but do nothing to enforce them.’23 
Thus they help to guide the development of international law but leave the 
enforcement of that law to one side.
Article 1 provides that ‘torture means any act [including] severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental’ when it is ‘intentionally inflicted by or at the 
instigation of a public official on a person’ in order to obtain from him (or her) or a 
third party ‘information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or 
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons.’ Furthermore, 
it is affirmed torture ‘constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.’24 Article 2 is formulated:
Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the 
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.
This goes further than the UDHR on two counts. Firstly, Article 1(2) specifies the 
threshold at which inhuman and degrading treatment constitutes torture. Whilst 
Article 1(2) does not define ‘aggravated and deliberate’ it is clear from the wording 
that torture stands above inhuman and degrading treatment in terms of its seriousness. 
Secondly, Article 2 affirms the principle that one of the purposes of the UN and its 
Charter is the protection of human rights. This lends considerable weight to claims 
torture is prohibited under the law of the UN Charter and by customary international
22 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 
August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) which notes that while the resolution is ‘without binding force of 
law, [it] nevertheless [had] a real moral value.’ 873, fn.18.
23 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (Penguin 2006) 265.
24 UNGA Res 3452 (XXX) (9 Dec 1975) U N  Doc A /R es/3 0 /3 4 5 2  art 1(2).
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law. Concern for human dignity appears to be at the heart of the prohibition of 
torture.
Two hearings from the UN Committee Against Torture illustrate the threshold 
of torture as opposed to inhuman or degrading treatment. The first is that of 
Dimitrijevic25 where the applicant was detained by Serbian security forces in 1999. 
He was subjected to severe beatings with truncheons and metal bars which left him 
bedridden for several days.26 The Committee found that the treatment the 
complainant suffered is ‘characterized as severe pain or suffering intentionally 
inflicted by public officials’ while investigating a crime. This constituted torture.27 
The second is of Dimitrov and follows a similar pattern. In this case the applicant was 
illegally detained and beaten with a baseball bat and steel cable in addition to 
repeatedly being punched and kicked.28 The applicant was left bedridden for over a 
week. The Committee found as it had in Dimitrijevic that the ‘severe pain or suffering 
intentionally inflicted by public officials in the context of the investigation of a crime’ 
constituted torture for the purposes of UNCAT.29
Acts of torture and inhumane treatment need not themselves cause permanent 
severe physical or mental harm. For example, beatings leading to severe bruising 
could constitute torture although the long-term harmful effects of such treatment 
might be minimal.30 Similarly the use of electric shocks31 or sound to torture an 
individual might have no permanent physical or mental effect. Indeed, the US




28 Jovica Dimitrov v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication No. 171/2000, UN Doc. 
UNCAT/C/34/D/171/2000 (2005) para.2.1.
29 ibid para.7.1.
30 Dimitrijevic (n 25) para.2.1.
31 Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 
in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, Mr Nigel Rodley, 14 January 1998, E/CN.4/1998/38/Add.2, para.20.
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Government, in the now infamous ‘torture memos’, was advised by its own lawyers 
that providing specified acts and courses of treatment did not lead to ‘organ failure or 
death’, such acts would not constitute torture.32 These memos have been widely 
discussed in the literature and have drawn much criticism.33
Further support for the prohibition of torture in IHRL can be found in the 
development of ius cogens. One of the leading cases on the peremptory status of 
torture is the ICTY case Furundzija.34 The judgment draws heavily from the 
peremptory status of torture as part of IHRL.35 Of particular relevance to this section 
is the ICTY’s reference to UNCAT. The Trial Chamber noted the definition given in 
UNCAT explicitly provides that it is only for the ‘purposes of this Convention’ i.e. 
UNCAT. In order to apply the definition the ICTY made reference to the ‘extra- 
conventional effect...[which] codifies, or contributes to developing or crystallising 
customary international law.’36 Further reference is made to the ‘broad convergence 
of...international instruments and international jurisprudence’ demonstrating ‘that 
there is...general acceptance of the main elements contained in the definition set out
32 This was the case in the now infamous torture memos produced by lawyers for George Bush, then 
US President. In one, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, writes that ‘for an act to constitute torture 
[as defined under US law] it must inflict pain which is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to 
torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ 
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.’ Mental pain can only be considered torture if it 
is conducted over a period of months or even years. Cited in Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel 
(eds), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (CUP 2005) 172; For further analysis see Philippe 
Sands, Lawless World (Penguin 2005) 205-240.
33 See for example Kai Ambos, ‘Prosecuting Guantanamo in Europe: Can and Shall the Masterminds of 
the Torture Memos Be Held Criminally Responsible on the Basis of Universal Jurisdiction.’ (2009) 42 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 405, 406; Cassandra B. Robertson, ‘Beyond the 
Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and Partisan Identity’ (2009) 42 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 389, 389-390; Jonathan Canfield, ‘Torture Memos: The 
Conflict between a Shift in US Policy towards a Condemnation of Human Rights and International 
Prohibitions against the Use of Torture’ (2004) 33 Hofstra Law Review 1049, 1089-1090.
34 Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1) TC Judgment, 10 December 1998.




in Article 1 of the Torture Convention.’37 The judgment in Furundzija recognises the 
similarities in the material aspect of torturous acts.
Following General Assembly resolution 3452 (XXX), efforts were made by 
the international community to codify the customary prohibition of torture. This led to 
UNCAT which opened for signatures in 1984 and entered into force in 1987. UNCAT 
required States Parties to ‘take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction’;38 and to 
ensure that ‘all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.’39 The penalties for 
torture shall ‘take into account...[the] grave nature’ of the offences.40 The purpose of 
this is to ensure that individuals could not escape liability for acts of torture they 
either committed or ordered to be committed. Article 5 provides that each ‘State Party 
shall...take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such 
offences [of torture] in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory 
under its jurisdiction’ and does not extradite him.41 This is a treaty obligation to either 
extradite or punish (aut dedere aut punire) those alleged to have committed acts of 
torture, thus codifying universal jurisdiction with respect to torture.42
The most significant provisions of UNCAT for the purpose of this thesis are 
contained in Article 1 which provides a working definition of torture. The first 
element is that ‘the term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person.’ The definition of 
torture was kept purposefully wide during the drafting process in order to ensure that
37 ibid para. 161.
38 UNCAT, art 2(1).
39 UNCAT, art 4(1).
40 UNCAT, art 4(2).
41 UNCAT, art 5(2).
42 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Universal jurisdiction for international crimes: historical perspectives and 
contemporary practice’ (2001) 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 81, 115; Katherine 
Gallagher, ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Practice Efforts to Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other High-level 
United States Officials Accountable for Torture’ (2009) 7 JICJ 1087, 1099-1100.
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it would prohibit as many different acts of torture as possible. Despite this Panama 
‘expressed dissatisfaction with the definition of torture, arguing that the language 
limited the definition’.43 The UK delegation argued the definition ‘should be made 
more consistent with the definition in the jurispmdence of the [ECtHR] and to this 
end suggested that the word “extreme” should be substituted for the word “severe”.44 
This suggests an awareness of the need to harmonise definitions across the IHRL 
regimes.
The second operative part of Article 1 specifies torture can be committed ‘for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind’. The wording of this part makes it clear not only are 
certain acts prohibited but also that torture cannot be committed in order to achieve 
particular ends, be they to extract information or to punish an individual.
The third requirement is that an act inflicts ‘such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity’. This means private citizens who do not act 
under the instruction of a public official or ‘other person acting in an official capacity’ 
cannot be said to have committed acts of torture. The purpose of this requirement is 
that the most egregious instances of torture are most often committed by states and 
consequently it is states that should bear the greatest liability for their officials and 
agents. It is worthwhile also highlighting that UNCAT is a human rights instrument. It 
therefore seeks to bind states vis-a-vis other States Parties to the treaty in order to 
respect the rights of their citizens. This has been criticised, as noted in the
43 Manfred Novak and Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A 




introduction to this section, by some feminist writers who believe that torture should 
extend to acts committed in the ‘private sphere’.45
Several other international human rights treaties prohibit acts of torture. 
Notably this includes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and, indirectly, provisions of the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (the ‘Refugee Convention’). The ICCPR echoes the UDHR: ‘No one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’46 
The Refugee Convention,47 although not explicitly prohibiting acts of torture, 
contains an important provision underscoring the international community’s revulsion 
to acts of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 33 of the 
Convention specifies that ‘No Contracting Party shall expel, or return (“refouler”) a 
refugee...to...territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.’ It has been 
suggested by Jean Allain that the non-refoulement principle is part of ius cogens.4S In 
particular he notes that the ius cogens nature of non-refoulement can act as a ‘trump’ 
card ‘which places the individualized right of non-refoulement above all other 
considerations not meeting the threshold of ius cogens’ meaning that ‘individuals can 
challenge the actions of States and hold them accountable.’49 Indeed, Article 33 ‘is of 
a fundamentally norm-creating character’, i.e. it has created a norm of international 
law, ‘in the sense in which that phrase’ has been used by the ICJ.50 The principle of
45 Edwards (n 3) 353.
46 ICCPR, art 7.
47 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951) 189 UNTS 137, entered into force 22 
April 1954.
48 Jean Allain, ‘The ius cogens nature of non-refoulement’ (2001) IS International Journal o f Refugee 
Law 533, 538-541.
49 ibid 557; see also Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP 2008) 
55.
50 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Clarendon Press 1996) 168; the ICJ case 
referred to here is the North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; 




non-refoulement can also be seen at the ECtHR in a number of cases pertaining to 
potential breaches of Article 3.51
2.1.2 - Torture and the ECHR
Article 3 of the ECHR provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, an absolute ban on the use of torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment. The precise definition of ‘torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment’ is not found in the ECHR itself but developed through the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Development of formally recognised law by the judiciary is 
recognised as permissible in order to clarify both the intent and the meaning of the 
drafters of the ECHR.52 Given the broad definition provided under Article 3, it is 
unsurprising that the definition has expanded to include corporal punishment53 and 
poor prison conditions.54
The ECtHR has had to deal with several scenarios involving human rights 
violations in the context of either an armed conflict or in the face of combating 
terrorism, whence some of the most egregious violations stem. This section therefore 
considers the response of the Court to such violations beginning with the interstate 
case of Ireland v. UK.55 Ireland brought its claim before the ECtHR in response to 
allegations of the torture of Irish citizens at the hands of British security services 
operating in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. Amongst the methods used during
51 Soering v. United Kingdom (Application no. 14038/88) Judgment, 7 July 1989; Chahal v. United 
Kingdom (Application no. 22414/93) Grand Chamber Judgment, 15 November 1996.
52 This is implicit in the establishment of the ECtHR.
53 Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom (Application nos. 7511/76 & 7743/76) Judgment, 25 
February 1982; Although this case did not concern the application of corporal punishment but rather 
the threat of such treatment the ECtHR did hold such threats could in themselves constitute inhuman 
treatment, (para.26).
54 Kalashnikov v. Russia (Application no. 47095/99) Judgment, 15 July 2002.
55 Ireland v. United Kingdom (Application no. 5310/71) Judgment, 18 January 1978; see David 
Bonner, ‘Ireland v. United Kingdom'’ (1978) 27 ICLQ 897; Colm Campbell, ‘“Wars on Terror” and 




in interrogations were the ‘five techniques’ consisting of wall-standing, hooding, 
subjection to noise, sleep deprivation and deprivation of food and drink.56 The 
Commission determined the five techniques did constitute torture.57 However, the 
British government disputed this, stressing the value of such techniques in the fight 
against terrorism. Indeed, the Court did recognise the apparent intelligence value of 
the techniques noting that interrogation by ‘means of the five techniques led to the 
obtaining of a considerable quantity of intelligence information, including the 
identification of 700 members of both IRA factions and the discovery of individual 
responsibility for about 85 previously unexplained criminal incidents.’58 Nonetheless 
this would not justify violating Article 3.
The Court began by explaining there existed a difference between torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment, commenting that the ‘distinction derives 
principally from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted’.59 In its 
determination the Court also placed reliance upon Resolution 3452 (XXX).60 In light 
of this, the Court held that although the five techniques ‘undoubtedly amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of 
confessions, the naming of others and/or information and although they were used 
systematically’ the techniques ‘did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity 
and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.’61
The two separate opinions of Judge Fitzmaurice and Judge Evrigenis offer 
interesting, and opposing, perspectives on the matter of torture and how the Court 
approached the matter. Judge Fitzmaurice warned against the ‘watering down’ of the
56 ibid para.96.
57 ibid para. 165.
58 ibid para.98.





definitions of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and ‘by enlarging them so as 
to include concepts and notions that lie outside their just and normal scope’ the 
Convention would become discredited.62 In contrast is the more expansive definition 
given by Judge Evrigenis who dissented noting the ‘notion of torture which emerges 
from the judgment is in fact too limited.’ His analysis stems from the apparent desires 
of the ECHR drafters who ‘wished...to [prohibit] other categories of acts causing 
intolerable suffering to individuals or affecting their dignity rather than to exclude 
from the traditional notion of torture certain apparently less serious forms of torture 
and to place them in the category of inhuman treatment which carries less of a 
“stigma”’.63 In a powerfully worded passage Judge Evrigenis comments:
Torture no longer presupposes violence, a notion to which the judgment refers 
expressly and generically. Torture can be practised - and indeed is practised - by 
using subtle techniques developed in multidisciplinary laboratories which claim to be 
scientific. By means of new forms of suffering that have little in common with the 
physical pain caused by conventional torture it aims to bring about, even if only 
temporarily, the disintegration of an individual's personality, the shattering of his 
mental and psychological equilibrium and the crushing of his will.64
The ECtHR returned to the question of defining torture in Selmouni.65 This 
case followed the entry into force of UNCAT and so the Court was able to make 
reference to the definition of torture offered in Article 1 of UNCAT.66 The acts in 
question, beatings by police officers, caused Selmouni to feel ‘fear, anguish and 
inferiority’ potentially humiliating and debasing him to break his ‘physical and moral 
resistance.’ Consequently the Court found that the acts amounted to inhuman or 
degrading treatment.67 The Court then turned to whether the pain and suffering
62 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, para.36 attached to Ireland v. United Kingdom (n 55).
63 Separate Opinion of Judge Evrigenis attached to Ireland v. United Kingdom (n 55)
64 ibid; This can be linked to the dehumanisation of individuals that ‘allows the perpetrator to go 
beyond hatred and anger, and commit atrocious acts as if they were part of everyday life.’ Michael 
Grodin and George Annas, ‘Physicians and Torture: Lessons from the Nazi Doctors’ (2007) 89 IRRC 
635, 640.





amounted to ‘severe’ treatment within the meaning of Article 1 UNCAT.68 In 
assessing whether the treatment of the applicant amounted to torture the Court held 
that it was necessary to take the treatment of the applicant as a whole and the repeated 
and sustained assaults committed against him. It was found therefore that the abuse 
amounted to torture.69
The Selmouni decision affirms the principle established in Tyrer70 that the 
ECHR is a ‘living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions’, and as a consequence acts previously categorised as inhuman or 
degrading could today be classed as torture.71 Such a position goes beyond the 
positivistic outlook of Judge Fitzmaurice in his Ireland v. UK dissent and 
acknowledges that the law has to develop and change in light of new circumstances.72 
Alastair Mowbray has noted that the ECtHR ‘eschews abstract theorising’ of rights 
and ‘favours the incremental evolution of its principles.’73 Despite this he believes the 
doctrine is ‘the basis of considerable judicial creativity.’74 Mowbray concludes noting 
‘[cjhanging ethical standards, regarding, inter alia, judicial punishments and 
torture...have resulted in not only the evolution of societies, but also the creation of 
new types of problems for the Court to resolve.’75
Further examples of the ECtHR’s evolutionary approach to defining torture 
are to be found in three cases concerning Turkey. In Ay din16 the female applicant was 
detained by Turkish security services operating in the predominantly Kurdish region
68 ibid para. 100.
69 ibid para. 105.
70 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (Application no.5856/72) Judgment, 25 April 1978.
71 Selmouni (n 65) para. 101.
72 Nigel S. Rodley and Matt Pollard, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (OUP 2009) 
105. They note that the decision in Selmouni represents a departure from the judgment in Ireland v. 
UK.
73 Alistair Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 Human Rights 
Law Review 57, 61.
74 ibid.
75 ibid 79.
76 Aydin v. Turkey (57/1996/676/866) Judgment, 25 September 1997.
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of Turkey. Whilst in detention the applicant was raped and sexually humiliated by an 
unknown official. This was held by the ECtHR to constitute torture, with the Court 
noting that the ‘[r]ape of a detainee by an official of the State must be considered to 
be an especially grave and abhorrent form of ill-treatment given the ease with which 
the offender can exploit the vulnerability and weakened resistance of his victim.’ The 
Court also highlighted the extreme psychological suffering caused to the victim by 
rape and other abuses of a sexual nature.77 This will be considered in greater detail in 
Chapter Four.
In Aydin, the Court noted that the applicant must have been detained because 
the security situation in Eastern Turkey warranted ‘the need of the security forces to 
elicit information’ and as such the suffering inflicted ‘must also be seen as calculated 
to serve the same or related purposes’.78 Thus, there was a purpose for inflicting the 
suffering, reflecting the purposive element of torture required by UNCAT. This point 
was expanded by the Court in Salman. It was held that the purposive element of 
torture was now a requirement for finding that acts constituted torture.79 Lastly, in 
Kurt the Court considered whether the treatment of the applicant could amount to a 
violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.80 This action was brought by the mother of an 
individual who had disappeared. The ECHR found that she was ‘the victim of the 
authorities’ complacency in the face of her anguish and distress’.81
The approach taken by the ECtHR has been criticised for being ‘too narrow’ 
and the definition ought to be expanded.82 For Cullen, the threshold for torture 
established under Ireland v. UK is too high and leads to a denial of justice in certain
77 ibid para.83.
78 ibid para.85.
79 Salman v. Turkey (Application no. 21986/93) Judgment, 27 June 2000, para. 114.
80 Kurt v. Turkey (15/1997/799/1002 ) Judgment, 25 May 1998.
81 ibid para. 134. The decision in Kurt is examined in more detail in Chapter Three, 156.
82 Anthony Cullen, ‘Defining Torture in International Law: A Critique of the Concept Employed by the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 34 Californian International Law Journal 29, 29.
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cases where the treatment of the victims fails to meet the minimum level for it to be 
classified as torture.83 Such a view does not take into account the growing trend of 
classifying a range of acts as ‘inhuman or degrading’ thereby widening the protection 
afforded to individuals while maintaining the high threshold for torture. Its approach 
reserves the label of torture of particularly egregious instances in much the same way 
that maintaining a narrow definition of genocide reserves that label for the worst of 
atrocities.84 Others such as Bo wring note that the definition of torture is more than 
just ‘legal’ and can be ‘found at deeper levels of social and psychological reality’.85 
He justifies this position by calling for an understanding of torture that takes into 
account a set of ‘social conditions’ required to facilitate such acts.86 The approach 
advocated by Bowring on its own admission departs from a legal understanding of 
torture. This could, as Judge Fitzmaurice feared in Ireland, lead to the ECHR 
becoming discredited by watering down the definition of torture.
2.1.3 - Torture and the IACHR
Article 5 of the IACHR contains more than just the outright prohibition of torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment. It begins ‘Every person has the right to. have his 
physical, mental, and moral integrity respected’. Article 5(2) echoes Article 3 of the 
ECHR: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
punishment or treatment.’
83 ibid 45.
84 Peter Quayle, ‘Unimaginable Evil: The Legislative of the Genocide Convention’ (2005) 5 
International Criminal Law Review 363; Alexander Murray, ‘Does International Criminal Law Still 
Require a “Crime of Crimes”? A Comparative Review of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity’
(2011) 3 Gottingen Journal of International Law 589.
85 Bill Bowring, ‘What Reparation does a Torture Survivor Obtain from International





In addition to the IACHR there is also the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture.87 This entered into force in February 1987, and has been 
ratified to-date by 18 OAS member states. The preamble of the Convention reads:
all acts of torture or any other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment 
constitute an offense against human dignity and a denial of the principles set forth in 
the Charter of the Organization of American States and in the Charter of the United 
Nations and are violations of the fundamental human rights and freedoms proclaimed 
in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
Article 2 provides that for the purposes of the Convention ‘torture shall be understood 
to be any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is 
inflicted on a person’ as part of a criminal investigation, to intimidate, to punish, ‘or 
for any other purpose.’ Of particular note is the affirmation that torture ‘shall also be 
understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the 
personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they 
do not cause physical pain or mental anguish.’ Article 5 ensures that torture is 
prohibited in all circumstances including during wars, emergencies, the suspension of 
constitutional guarantees and domestic political instability, as such it is a non­
derogable, absolute right.
The case of Ortiz before the Inter-American Commission concerns the 
detention and torture of an American nun who worked for the Catholic Church 
throughout the 1980s during the military dictatorship then governing Guatemala. The 
Commission held that her abduction and torture occurred ‘presumably to punish and 
intimidate her as a result of her participation in certain activities and her association 
with certain persons and groups.’88 Furthermore, the torture inflicted ‘also closely fits
87 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, OAS Treaty Series, No. 67, 9 December 
1985, entered into force 28 February 1987.
88 Dianna Ortiz v. Guatemala Case, 10.526, Report No. 31/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R.,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 
Doc. 7 rev. at 332 (1997) para. 108.
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the description of methods used “to obliterate the personality of the victim.’” 89 These 
indirect effects of torture feature prominently in the Inter-American system.
Torture has also been an issue before the Inter-American Court. In Juan 
Humberto Sanchez,90 the victim was detained in July 1992 by Honduran security 
forces for his alleged involvement with El Salvadorian rebels, his body was found in a 
river over a week after his detention ‘in a state of decay.. .with a rope around the neck 
that crossed his chest and tied his hands toward the back and there were signs of 
torture.’91 The case was brought before the Court by the victim’s relatives who 
claimed that, in addition to the violation of the victim’s right to life, Article 5 of the 
IACHR had also been violated and it was alleged by the family that the victim had 
been mutilated before being executed.92
The Court condemned the clandestine nature of the victim’s detention noting 
the peril an unlawfully detained person faces such as the risk that other rights will be 
violated.93 Interestingly, the Court also referred to the illegality of detention as 
constituting inhuman treatment because a ‘brief period of detention is enough for it to 
constitute an infringement of his mental and moral integrity according’ to IHRL 
standards.94 Furthermore, even in the absence of evidence an inference could be 
drawn that the treatment experienced by the victim was inhuman and degrading.95 
Lastly, the Court found that the condition of the victim’s body was enough to 
constitute a violation of Article 5.96 In effect, the Court is developing a principle of 
res ipsa loquitur in relation to matters of torture. As with the cases of Kurt and
89 ibid.







96 ibid para. 100.
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Bazorkina before the ECHR, the Court also noted that the relatives of victims of 
disappearances and other state crimes97 might themselves be victims of inhuman and 
degrading treatment, an issue to be examined in Chapter Three.
Tibi tacitly affirms the principle established in Tyrer regarding the evolution 
of international human rights law.98 The Court held that it was required to take into 
account the ‘system’ of which the treaty is a part noting that it is ‘especially important 
for [IHRL], which has moved forward substantially by means of an evolutive 
interpretation of the international protection instruments.’99 The aim of the acts, the 
Court continued, visited upon the victim by agents of the state ‘was to diminish his 
physical and mental abilities and annul his personality for him to plead guilty of a 
crime.’100 Having determined that such treatment constitutes torture the Court turned 
to the conditions in the victim’s prison during his incarceration. The Court cited the 
case of Kudlam  before the ECtHR to support its assertion that the lack of, or poor, 
medical treatment whilst incarcerated constituted a violation of the victim’s right to 
humane treatment.102 The Court further affirmed the principle that the family of 
victims could also suffer degrading or inhuman treatment.103
2.1.4 - Conclusion on torture and the IHRL regimes
Torture can be defined under IHRL by reference to a number of cases and treaties. 
From these multiple sources it is possible to formulate a broad definition of torture. 
Central to any definition of torture is the infliction of treatment capable of amounting 
to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. UNCAT sets the threshold for torture
97 ibid para. 101.
98 Tibi v. Ecuador, Judgment of September 7, 2004, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C.) No. 114 (2004).
99 ibid para. 144.
100 ibid para. 149.
101 Kudla v. Poland (Application No. 30210/96) Judgment, 26 October 2000, para.93-94.
102 Tibi (n 98) para. 157.
103 ibid para. 160.
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relatively high- It requires the infliction of ‘severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental’.104 This definition has been followed in a number of cases at both the 
ECtHR and Inter-American Court. In Selmouni the victim was subjected to repeated 
beatings by police officers, acts which were held to meet the threshold of torture 
under Article 3 of the ECHR.105 In Aydin the victim was raped, treatment held to 
amount to torture.106 Both of these instances were deemed serious enough to amount 
to ‘severe pain or suffering’.
In the earlier case of Ireland, the ECtHR refused to categorise the five 
techniques as torture, insisting rather they were inhuman or degrading treatment.107 
However, in light of the Selmouni judgment it is likely the protection of human rights 
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the 
fundamental values of democratic societies.’108 This corresponds to the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Evrigenis and his belief that torture represents ‘the disintegration of 
an individual's personality, the shattering of his mental and psychological equilibrium 
and the crushing of his will.’109 The Inter-American system has followed the approach 
of Judge Evrigenis noting that torture has been used to ‘obliterate the personality of 
the victim’.110
The other element that renders an act torture under IHRL is the involvement of 
a State official. This is seen in several cases that have emerged from the ECtHR and 
Inter-American Court. This effectively prevents torture, for the purposes of IHRL, 
from being perpetrated by non-State actors. This introduces an important distinction 
between the definition of torture under IHRL vis-a-vis the definition of torture under
104 UNCAT, art 1.
105 Selmouni (n 65) para. 105.
106 Aydin (n 76).
107 Ireland v. UK (n 55).
108 Selmouni (n 65) para. 101.
109 Separate Opinion of Judge Evrigenis attached to Ireland v. United Kingdom (n 55).
110 Dianna Ortiz (n 88) para. 108.
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IHL and ICL. The latter two regimes, as will be seen in remainder of the present 
chapter, have dispensed with this requirement so that torture can be committed by 
private or non-State actors. One of the key elements of this thesis is that formal 
distinctions between the regimes can help mitigate the effects of fragmentation.
The approach of the IHRL to torture can be viewed in the greater context of 
the fragmentation of international law. It is possible to view the IHRL regime as 
having created readily identifiable distinctions between it and the IHL and ICL 
regimes. There are similarities particularly with regard to the physical element of 
torture but there are also many differences as will be seen. However, while such 
differences might create the appearance of conflict, the actual operation of the law 
appears to be largely unaffected by fragmentation.
2.2 - Defining torture in the IHL regime
Torture is prohibited under IHL and the substantive definition of the physical acts 
considered torture, for example beating, the administration of electric shocks etc are 
identical to the definitions given under IHRL and ICL. As will be seen, cross- 
referencing between the three regimes is relatively common. However, the regimes 
diverge when IHL introduces the requirement that the acts occur within the context of 
an armed conflict. This can be in either an international or non-international armed 
conflict. For torture, the distinction between the two forms of conflict would appear to 
be irrelevant. The basic criterion would be whether the armed conflict met the 
threshold test outlined in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.111
111 AP II to the Geneva Conventions 1949, art 1(2). Although AP II does not receive the same level of 
recognition afforded to the Geneva Conventions or AP I, the threshold test itself does receive wide 
support from some academic writers on the subject Dieter Fleck, ‘The Law of Non-International 




It would, therefore, be necessary to establish whether the actions amounted to 
more than ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature’ which are not classified as 
constituting ‘armed conflict’.112 The nature of the conflict however is irrelevant for 
the determination of whether an act constitutes torture; all that is required is the 
conflict’s existence. Primarily, this can be attributed to the fact that torture receives 
universal condemnation and can occur in both international and non-intemational 
armed conflicts. However, at another level it could also be attributed to the growing 
convergence between IHL as it relates to international and non-intemational conflict, 
particularly regarding fundamental protections.113 The following section outlines the 
way in which torture in the IHL regime can be viewed as being distinct from the 
IHRL and ICL regimes.
2.2.1 - Customary IHL
Custom forms the basis of much of the IHL regime as is evidenced by the voluminous 
ICRC study of customary IHL (referred to as ‘the Study’). According to its authors, it 
demonstrates ‘how [IHL] and human rights law reinforce each other, not only to 
reaffirm rules applicable in times of armed conflict, but in all situations.’114 Despite 
this, the two regimes remain functionally separate. Further examples of customary 
IHL are found in military manuals of nations, ius cogens and the training offered to 
military personnel. Torture, inhuman or degrading treatment are also closely allied to 
the concept of treating civilians and persons hors de combat humanely, this section 
will therefore review the rules surrounding each.
112 AP II, art 1(2).
113 The argument for fusing the two is advanced in Emily Crawford, ‘Unequal Before the Law: The 
Case for the Elimination of the Distinction Between International and Non-International Armed 
Conflict’ (2007) 20 U IL  441.
114 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(vol 1 CUP 2005) 306.
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Military manuals are a principal source of custom for the Study. These serve 
as an indicator of State practice and how they incorporate certain prohibitions into 
their operational law. Several military manuals contain an explicit and absolute 
prohibition against torture. For example, the Canadian military manual provides ‘that 
torture is an act against humanity’ and that ‘torture and inhumane treatment along 
with wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked’ amounts to a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.115 Hungary’s 
military manual offers a similar definition, noting that ‘torture, inhumane treatment, 
acts causing great suffering or serious injury and degrading and inhumane practices’ 
are likewise grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.116 The French military 
manual on the law of armed conflict references UNCAT noting that torture is ‘any act 
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes’ as to obtain a confession, punish, intimidate 
‘or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.’117 The ‘instructor’s guide’ 
from the US explains “beating a prisoner or applying electric shocks, dunking his 
head into a barrel of water, and putting a plastic bag over his head to make him talk’ 
amounts to torture and inhumane treatment.118
Of primary importance is the reference to ‘severe pain or suffering’ and to 
‘acts causing great suffering’ both of which are identical to definitions of torture 
offered by the IHRL regime. The position of customary IHL could be seen in similar 
terms to IHRL treaties in that they largely delimit and confirm that certain practices 
are prohibited. The Study highlights this:
115 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck (eds) Customary International Humanitarian Law 






[a] negations of torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, whether in international or non­
international armed conflicts, have invariably been condemned by the UN Security 
Council, UN General Assembly and UN Commission on Human Rights, as well as 
by regional organizations and International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent.
This universal condemnation by several UN and NGO bodies gives the prohibition of 
torture under both the IHRL and IHL considerable weight, and permits judicial 
organs to interpret certain practices as torture and some as inhuman or degrading 
treatment.
On the allied matter of humane treatment, the Study notes the actual meaning 
of the term is not spelled out but could refer to respecting a person’s dignity or 
prohibiting ill-treatment.119 Humane treatment is seen as an overarching concept with 
IHRL and IHL giving expression to its meaning.120 Respect for human dignity is one 
of the pillars on which the entire UN system is based.121 Furthermore, the Study notes 
that ‘these rules do not necessarily express the full meaning of what is meant by 
humane treatment, as this notion develops over time under the influence of changes in 
society.’122 This appears to be a tacit endorsement of the ‘living instrument’ position 
set out in Tyrer about the ECHR adapting as society evolves.123
2.2.2 - IHL treaty law and case law
Treaties in the IHL regime play a vital function in codifying principles of customary 
international humanitarian law and demarcating the obligations of states. However,
119 Henckaerts (n 114) 307.
120 ibid 307-308.
121 This can be seen in the UDHR and art 1(3) of the UN Charter: ‘To achieve international co­
operation... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’.
122 Henckaerts (n 114) 308.
123 See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1730, 1739;The issue is 
analysed in detail in George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legitimacy’ in 
Andreas Fpllesdale et al (eds) Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a 
National, European and Global Context (CUP 2013).
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unlike IHRL, IHL has fewer ‘substantive’ treaties and lacks the dedicated courts 
found in the IHRL and ICL regimes. As such, the primary sources of law are the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, although reference will be made 
to the criminalisation of IHL breaches in the statutes of international criminal 
tribunals.
Prior to the Geneva Conventions (1949) several efforts were made to ensure 
that individuals who were not connected to hostilities or those rendered hors de 
combat were to be treated humanely and with dignity. For example, Article 44 of the 
Lieber Code 1863124 stipulates that all ‘wanton violence committed against persons in 
the invaded country... all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are 
prohibited under the penalty of death’.125 Whilst not explicitly prohibiting torture the 
Lieber Code offers a framework, namely that the idea of IHL is, ultimately, to 
preserve the dignity of individuals unconnected to, but affected by, the armed conflict.
After the Second World War efforts were made to prosecute individuals for 
war crimes. The Nuremberg Charter specified that those suspected to have committed 
such crimes were to be prosecuted and that the Tribunal was to have jurisdiction over 
acts amounting to ‘violations of the laws or customs of war.’126 Furthermore, such 
violations were to include ‘but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or 
deportation.’127 Although vaguely defined, ill-treatment was held to include torture 
and other outrages against personal dignity. Norman Birkett, one of the two British 
judges at Nuremberg, wrote ‘war crimes’ were ‘offences against the Geneva and 
Hague Conventions [of 1929 and 1907 respectfully]’ and were not aimed at outlawing
124 Available at
http://www.icrc.Org/aDplic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/QpenAttachment/aDPlic/ihl/ihl.nsf/A25A 
A5 871A04919BC12563CD002D65C5/FULLTEXT/IHL-L-Code-EN.pdf (Accessed 16th March 2014).
125 Lieber Code, art 44.
126IMT Statute.
127 IMT Statute, art 6(b).
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war but to ‘mitigate its hardships and severities.’128 Both of the Hague Regulations 
1907129 and the Geneva Conventions 1929 specify that prisoners of war are to be 
humanely treated with Article 2 of the latter specifying that Prisoners of War (PoWs) 
shall ‘at all times be humanely treated.’ As with the wording of the IMT Statute, any 
definition of torture would exclude it from categorisation as ‘humane treatment.’
The Geneva Conventions 1949 created new ‘conventional law’ and reflected 
customary law.130 All four Conventions contain common elements such as the 
Martens Clause and Common Article 3.131 The provisions of Common Article 3, the 
grave breaches regime132 and the fundamental guarantees contained within the 
Additional Protocols 1977 have been said by the ICTY to represent customary 
international law.133 This is particularly so when one regards the prohibition of torture 
which is prohibited under each of these elements, in addition to constituting a 
peremptory norm of general public international law.134 The ICJ has confirmed 
Common Article 3 has now has crystallised into customary law because its standards 
establish ‘elementary considerations of humanity’.135 The ICTY has subsequently 
supported the ICJ noting Common Article 3 protects values ‘so fundamental...they 
are regarded as governing both internal and international conflicts.’136 It offers an 
absolute minimum level of protection in non-international armed conflict. It provides 
that civilians and those deemed hors de combat ‘shall in all circumstances be treated
128 Norman Birkett, ‘International Legal Theories Evolved at Nuremberg’ in Guenael Mettraux (ed), 
Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (OUP 2008) 301.
129 Hague Regulations, art 4 concerning PoWs notes simply that ‘[t]hey must be humanely treated.’
130 Theodor Meron, ‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law’ (1987) 81 AJIL 348, 364.
131 ibid 364-365.
132 Discussed below, 108.
133 See Furundzija (n 34) fn.156.
134 The ICTY in Furundzija makes exactly this point where it notes that ‘these treaty provisions have 
ripened into customary rules is evinced by various factors.’ (n34) at para. 138 and 153-157 where the 
Court discusses the peremptory status of the prohibition of torture. See also Prosecutor v. Blagojevic 
andJokic (IT-02-60) TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para.587.
135 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of  
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 1986, p.l 14, para.218.
136 Prosecutor v. Oric (IT-03-68) TC, Judgment, 30 June 2006, para.261.
107
Chapter Two
humanely.’137 Common Article 3 prohibits ‘violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture’138 and ‘outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’.139 This reflects 
the absolute prohibition found in the IHRL regime and underscores revulsion to 
torture within both the IHL regime and more generally in international law.
The Geneva Conventions contain several provisions prohibiting torture and 
inhumane treatment. These include the prohibition of torture in the interrogation of 
PoWs,140 and for punishing PoWs for violations of prison camp rules (‘any form of 
torture or cruelty...are forbidden’).141 The Fourth Geneva Convention notes that the 
‘High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from 
taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or 
extermination of protected persons in their hands.’142 This applies to ‘torture, corporal 
punishments, mutilation’ in addition ‘to any other measures of brutality whether 
applied by civilian or military agents.’143
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions serve to reinforce the prohibition 
of offences that constitute a serious breach of the Conventions.144 The concept of 
‘grave breaches’ has been described as ‘the most serious violations of the law of 
armed conflict’ in that they reflect ‘the painful recollection of crimes committed’ in 
the Second World War.145 Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention elevates acts
137 Common art 3(1).
138 Common art 3( 1 )(a).
139 Common art 3(1 )(c).
140 GC III, art 17.
141 GC III, art 87.
142 GC IV, art 32.
143 GC IV, art 32.
144 In contradistinction to grave breaches, for example, Sandoz notes that civilian internees not being 
unable to buy tobacco would not give rise to a prosecution for a war crime even though civilian 
internees have a right to do this (Article 87 of GC IV). Such a restriction would not amount to a ‘grave 
breach’ and the associated stigma. Yves Sandoz, ‘History of the Grave Breaches Regime 7 JICJ 657, 
674.
145 Gary Solis and Fred Borch, Geneva Conventions (Kaplan 2010) 70.
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including ‘torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health’ to the status of a grave 
breach.146 Protection to civilians and other protected persons is provided by the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.147 The purpose of the grave breaches regime is to
ensure that certain fundamental guarantees are afforded to persons protected by the 
Conventions.148
Following the ratification and implementation of the Geneva Conventions the 
international community revisited the protections in the form of the Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. The first of these, known as 
Additional Protocol I (AP I), is to be applied in times of international armed conflict. 
The second, Additional Protocol II (AP II), offers certain protections in armed 
conflicts of a non-intemational character. They both include important Articles 
concerning the prohibition of torture. In both Protocols there are ‘Fundamental 
Guarantees’ which aim to provide a minimum standard of protection. Article 75 of 
Additional Protocol I prohibits ‘violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well­
being of persons, in particular’ acts of ‘torture of all kinds, whether physical or 
mental’.149 It also prohibits ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment’.150 The fundamental guarantees of Additional Protocol I ‘are 
directly inspired by the text of Common Article 3’ of the Geneva Conventions,151 and 
‘very similar’ to the fundamental guarantees found in AP II.152 It applies only in non- 
intemational armed conflicts and has fewer States Parties than AP I. Its aim is to
146 GC III, art 130.
147 GC IV, art 147.
148 GC IV, art 51.
149 AP I, art 75(2)(a)(ii).
150 ibid art 75(2)(b).
151 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 




establish an absolute minimum standard of treatment. Accordingly, it ‘prohibits 
violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular 
murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal 
punishment.’153 Although AP II has received fewer signatures it has been seen as 
declarative of certain customary norms of IHL.154
Lastly, this section turns to the prohibition of torture by international criminal 
tribunals such as the ICTY and ICC. As in the other sections of this chapter care has 
been taken to separate the IHL elements of the ICL regime. Article 2 of the ICTY 
Statute criminalises the grave breaches regime and extends the Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
to such offences. This includes the prohibition of torture.155 In similar fashion the 
ICTR criminalises breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions noting 
that ‘[vjiolence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of 
corporal punishment’ are prohibited.156
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute criminalises violations of the laws and customs 
of war and is framed in broad terms. It establishes the Court’s jurisdiction and lists 
several violations, which are not intended to be exhaustive but merely indicative of 
the types of offences over which the Court can exercise its jurisdiction. This was 
explained in Furundzija where it was held that Article 3 has a ‘very broad scope’157 as 
previously established in Tadic. 158 According to Furundzija, Article 3 includes any 
‘serious violation of a rule of customary [IHL] entailing, under international
153 AP n, art 4(2)(a).
154 Theodor Meron, ‘The continuing role of custom in the formation of international humanitarian law’ 
(1996) 90 AJIL 238, 244; For an overview of the history of AP II see Sylvie Junod, ‘Additional 
Protocol II: History and Scope’ (1983) 33 American University Law Review 29.
155 ICTY Statute, art 2(b).
156 ICTR Statute, art 4(a).
157 Furundzija (n 34) para. 132.
158Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1) AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para.69; see also generally Christopher Greenwood, ‘International 
Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 EJIL 265.
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customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person 
breaching the rule.’159 In short, it is an ‘umbrella rule’160 akin to the inclusion of 
‘other inhuman acts’ in the definition of crimes against humanity.161
The ICC Statute162 largely mirrors the protections guaranteed by the ICTY, 
ICTR and the Geneva Conventions.163 Article 8(2) criminalises the grave breaches 
regime.164 Other serious violations are prohibited by Article 8(2) in the context of an 
international armed conflict. Notably this is to be done ‘within the established 
framework of international law’.165 In particular this approach could be used to define 
‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’.166 
The Statute then arrives at the prohibition of torture in the context of a non- 
intemational armed conflict in Article 8(2)(c). This prohibits ‘[violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cmel treatment and torture’, 
closely mirroring provisions found within the IHL regime.
Further evidence to support this point can be found in the ICC Elements of 
Crimes (‘the Elements’). These offer guidance as to how the crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction should be constmed, but are however non-binding on the ICC.167 For 
example, in relation to the ‘war crime’ of torture prohibited under by Article 
8(2)(a)(ii) torture is defined as ‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering’.168 The 
Elements for Article 8(2)(a)(iii), wilfully causing great suffering, also requires that
159 Furundzija (n 34) para. 132.
160 ibid para. 133.
161 ICTY Statute, art 5(i); ICC Statute, art 7(1 )(k).
162 On the provisions of the ICC Statute on war crimes see Michael Bothe ‘War Crimes’ in Antonio
Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute o f the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary> (vol 1 OUP 2002).
163 Knut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal 
Court (CUP 2002) 47.
164 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(a)(ii).
165 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(b).
166 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(b)(xxi).
167 ICC Statute, art 9; Markus Wagner, ‘The ICC and its Jurisdiction -  Myths, Misperceptions and
Realities’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 409, 415-419.
168 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 8(2)(a)(ii).
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‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering’ be inflicted on an individual or 
individuals.169 Article 8(2)(c)(i), torture committed in the context of a non- 
intemational armed conflict, similarly describes torture as being the infliction of 
‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering’ on one or more persons.170
The Elements to Article 8(2)(c)(ii), examine the commission of outrages upon 
personal dignity including humiliating and degrading treatment. This states that the 
perpetrator ‘humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more 
persons’ and, crucially, that the ‘severity of the humiliation, degradation or other 
violation was of such degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon 
personal dignity [emphasis added]’.171 That the IHL treaty regime is vague as to the 
definition of torture and associated treatment should come as no surprise. The IHRL 
regime is likewise similarly vague. However, in respect to both areas this should be 
seen as a considerable boon. This matter was considered in Aleksovski with the ICTY 
outlining the fact that the Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention notes that 
the Diplomatic Conference 1949 ‘sought to adopt wording that allowed for flexibility, 
but, at the same time, was sufficiently precise without going into too much detail.’172 
It continued that in relation to the Geneva Conventions ‘the general guarantee of 
humane treatment is not elaborated, except for the guiding principle underlying the 
Convention, that its object is the humanitarian one of protecting the individual qua 
human being and, therefore, it must safeguard the entitlements which flow 
therefrom.’173
169 ibid art 8(2)(a)(iii).
170 ibid art 8(2)(c)(i).
171 ibid art 8(2)(c)(ii).




The ICTY has drawn from a range of international instruments including UNCAT and 
the ECHR. For example, the Trial Chamber in Furundzija held that ‘broad 
convergence of the aforementioned international instruments and international 
jurisprudence’ demonstrates that there is now general acceptance of the main 
elements contained in the definition set out in Article 1 o f  UNCAT.174 However, in 
addition to reliance on UNCAT the ICTY has made significant contributions to the 
development of the definitions of torture and ‘cruel treatment’ within the IHL regime.
In Aleksovski175 the Trial Chamber engaged in a reading of Common Article 3 
to the Geneva Conventions. It was held that it ‘prescribes humane treatment without 
distinction’ as its purpose is ‘to uphold and protect the inherent human dignity of the 
individual.’176 Rather than define humane treatment, States Parties prohibited 
‘particularly odious forms of mistreatment that are without question incompatible 
with humane treatment.’177 Examples of such mistreatment can be found throughout 
the jurisprudence of the ICTY178 and in state practice.179 The Trial Chamber held 
‘The general proscription in Common Article 3 is against inhuman treatment’.180 The 
jurisprudence of the ECHR was examined drawing from the case of Ireland v. UK. It 
noted that the ECtHR was the only human rights body to date to define ‘ill-treatment’ 
as being ‘the level of suffering endured by the victim.’181
174 Furundzija (n 34) para. 161.
175 Aleksovski (n 172) para.49.
176 The Trial Chamber in Furundzija held that common Article 3 did include the criminalisation of 
torture, Furundzija (n 34) para. 158.
177 Aleksovski (n 172) para.49.
178 Prosecutor v. Babic (IT-03-72-S) TC, Sentencing Judgment, 29 June 2004, para.26 where 
mistreatment is dealt with in general terms; see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al (IT-96-23 & 23/1) TC, 
Judgment, 22 February 2001, para.505.
179 Australia’s Military Manual cited in Henckaerts (n 115) 2151; France’s LOAC Manual cited ibid 
2152; US Instructor’s Guide cited ibid 2152.
180 Aleksovski (n 1722) para.51; Kelly Askin, ‘Judgments Rendered in 1999 by the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda: Tadic (App. Ch.); Aleksovski (ICTY); 
Jelisic (ICTY); Ruzindana & (and) Kayishema (ICTR); Serushago (ICTR); Rutaganda (ICTR)’ (1999) 
6 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 485, 495.
mAleksovski (n 172) para.53.
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Continuing its analysis, the Trial Chamber engaged in a discussion as to the 
value of the preservation of human dignity noting that it ‘is unquestionable that the 
prohibition of acts constituting outrages upon personal dignity safeguards an 
important value.’182 This was tied to the ‘respect for the human personality’ and noted 
that ‘the entire edifice of international human rights law, and of the evolution of 
international humanitarian law, rests on this founding principle.’183 The Court 
reinforced its point thus:
An outrage upon personal dignity is an act which is animated by contempt for the 
human dignity of another person. The corollary is that the act must cause serious 
humiliation or degradation to the victim. It is not necessary for the act to directly 
harm the physical or mental well-being of the victim. It is enough that the act 
causes real and lasting suffering to the individual arising from the humiliation or 
ridicule.184
From the above passage it can be seen the Court had in mind the principle that human 
dignity, even in times of armed conflict, is inviolable and any acts causing ‘real and 
lasting suffering’ arising from humiliation or ridicule constitute a violation of 
dignity.185 The Court supported its position by reference to IHRL. In addition to 
UNCAT the Court noted that the freedom from inhuman treatment is a basic principle 
of the UDHR and several other international human rights instruments including 
UNCAT.186 Furthermore, reference was made to the test as to whether a particular 
course of conduct constituted cruel treatment established by the ECtHR in 
Selmouni.187 In essence the test is subjective and relative to the impact the treatment 






187 Selmouni (n 65) para. 103.
188 Aleksovski (n 172) para.56.
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military pilot and a 70 year old ‘grandmother with diabetes, asthma, and a heart 
condition’.189
In Furundzija the ICTY examined the definition of torture by reference to 
UNCAT, and noted IHL had no established definition of torture.190 It defended its 
stance by stating that the ICTR in Akayesu had followed a similar line of reasoning.191 
A caveat was added when the Court highlighted that in order to be considered a ‘war 
crime’, or part of the IHL element of ICL, a nexus was required between the act of 
torture and the existence of an armed conflict, international or non-intemational.192 In 
this fashion the definition of torture under the IHL regime differs from the definition 
provided by the IHRL regime which obviously requires no such connection to an 
armed conflict.193 However, there is no suggestion made by the Trial Chamber that 
the substantive definition differs otherwise between the IHRL and IHL regimes, a 
point that is underscored where it explained that ‘the primary purpose of this body of 
law is to safeguard human dignity.’194 Again, the link to human dignity is apparent in 
the courts’ jurisprudence.
Further divergence from the IHRL definition can be found in Kunarac. The 
Trial Chamber concluded that ‘the definition of torture under [IHL] does not comprise 
the same elements as the definition of torture generally applied under human rights 
law.’195 In particular the requirement of the involvement of a State agent was 
dropped,196 representing a significant shift away from the IHRL definition of
189 Gary Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (CUP 2010) 441.
190 Furundzija (n 34) para. 159.
191 ibid para. 160.
192 ibid para. 162.
193 ibid.
194 ibid.




torture.197 However, despite this definitional change the Court concluded that the 
infliction of ‘severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental’ is essential to 
defining torture.198 The removal of the requirement of the presence or instigation of a 
state official is a largely pragmatic response given that often those who commit war 
crimes could be classed as non-state actors or paramilitaries who are not affiliated 
with a state power.199
The ICTY has also been called upon to offer definition and clarity to the law 
surrounding ‘cruel treatment’. Blaskic held that such treatment could include an order 
compelling protected persons, such as civilians, to prepare military fortifications or 
installations for use against their own forces.200 The Appeals Chamber found this to 
be a serious attack on human dignity causing serious mental and potentially physical 
suffering.201 Forcing protected persons to act contrary to their feelings or consciences 
would thus amount to cruel treatment. One explanation is that it reinforces their sense 
of helplessness in the face of their captor’s power.202
Perhaps the simplest definition of ‘cruel treatment’ is to be found in Mrskic et 
al where the Trial Chamber defined such treatment as ‘an intentional act or omission 
causing serious mental or physical suffering or injury to, or constituting a serious 
attack on human dignity upon, a person taking no active part in the hostilities.’203 
Consequently, failure to provide adequate medical treatment could amount to ‘cruel 
treatment’ providing that it caused ‘serious mental or physical suffering’ and was 
linked to an armed conflict.204 As with other examples of inhuman or cruel treatment,
197 Jill Marshall, ‘Torture Committed by Non-State Actors: The Developing Jurisprudence from the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals’ (2005) 5 Non-State Actors and International Law 171, 177.
198 Kunarac (n 178) para.496.
199 Paolo Gaeta, ‘State Officials a Requirement for the Crime of Torture?’ (2008) 6 JICJ 183, 186.
200 Prosecutor v. Blaskic (IT-95-14) AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para.597.
201 ibid.
202 Sussman (n 5) 227.




the criminalisation of such behaviour further highlights concern with the protection of 
human dignity. A further distinction between torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment is suggested by Lord Hope who notes that the distinction between torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment could be one of severity, or the purpose for 
which torture is used. The latter, purposive, account would render as torture any 
inhuman and degrading treatment administered for the purposes of extracting 
information or a confession from an individual.205
2.2.3 - Conclusions on torture within the IHL regime
The complete prohibition of torture, and other cruel treatment, is apparent from the 
above survey. Of particular note is the fact that there are no circumstances under 
which torture is actually to be either permitted or condoned. This was summed up by 
the ICTY in Furundzija:
The existence of this corpus of general and treaty rules proscribing torture shows 
that the international community, aware of the importance of outlawing this 
heinous phenomenon, has decided to suppress any manifestation of torture by 
operating both at the interstate level and at the level of individuals. No legal 
loopholes have been left.206
The Court also noted ‘torture in time of armed conflict is prohibited by a general rule
of international law.’207 Thus, in times of armed conflict, the rule against torture can
be applied as part as both customary law and treaty law, ‘the content of the
prohibition being the same.’ 208 According to the ICTY the custom and treaty law
have merged, meaning torture is absolutely prohibited in all situations.
Despite such a widespread prohibition of torture it is important to highlight
the requirement that acts of torture must be committed within the context of an armed
conflict (international or non-intemational) for such acts to be considered a violation
205 David Hope, ‘Torture’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 807, 826.
206 Furundzija (n 34) para. 146.




of IHL. In this respect, it is a sine qua non of the requirement -  much akin to the 
requirement under IHRL that the State be involved (directly or indirectly) in the 
physical act of torture.209 As with IHRL, the inclusion of such a contextual element is 
a vital component of the definition. Despite the differing definitions of torture, it is 
suggested that there is nothing that would prevent their application in practice.210
The definition of treatment amounting to torture is similar, if not identical, to 
that which is found in IHRL and ICL. In part this is because the Courts considering 
torture as a violation of IHL have drawn from UNCAT and the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR. 211 This also applies in instances of inhuman treatment where the ICTY 
considered the definition given in Ireland v. United Kingdom before the ECtHR.212 
There are therefore many shared similarities between the regimes as to the treatment 
that must be inflicted for a particular act to be considered torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment. Differences emerge however when the perpetrators of torture are 
considered. Under IHRL only State officials, or those acting with their support or 
acquiescence, can commit acts of torture. In Kunarac the ICTY held that this was not 
a requirement for defining torture under IHL. 213 This can be largely attributed to the 
idea that IHL is recognised as binding State and non-State actors alike.214 The 
removal of this requirement is significant departure from the IHRL definition, 
widening the applicable scope of torture to rebel groups as well as States.
As with the IHRL approach to torture, it is possible to discern a distinct 
approach to torture under the IHL regime. Despite this distinction there are 
similarities between the IHL, IHRL and ICL regimes. This is particularly so when
209 See above, 101.
210 Cordula Droege, ‘“In Truth the Leitmotiv”: The Prohibition of Torture and other Forms of Ill- 
treatment in International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 ICRC 515, 519.
211 Furundzija (n 344) para. 161.
2X2Aleksovski (n 1722) para.53.
213 Kunarac (n 178) para.496.
214 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 369, 394.
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examining the physical elements of torture, and less so when considering the 
contextual elements such as the requirement that the acts be committed during times 
of armed conflict. Perhaps due to history, the IHL regime shares many similarities 
with the ICL regime in regard to torture. However, it remains that there are a number 
of differences between the three regimes, differences which can be viewed in the 
wider context and trend towards greater fragmentation of international law. These 
differences do not, it appears, substantially affect the operation of the various regimes 
studied. This could suggest that fragmentation is not necessarily a wholly negative 
phenomenon.
2.3 - Torture and the ICL regime
Acts of torture are prohibited under international criminal law, as they are in under 
IHRL and IHL. However, as was seen with the distinction between IHRL and IHL, 
the definition of the violation differs. The prime distinction in the case of ICL comes 
when considering torture as either an act of genocide or a crime against humanity. 
Although war crimes are prosecuted before international criminal tribunals and courts, 
the legal basis for such prosecutions lies firmly in the field of IHL.215 Consequently, 
for an act of torture to be considered torture under the ICL it must conform to the 
basic requirements of the offences that compromise the regime. For instance, for 
torture to be considered a crime against humanity under the ICC and ICTR it must 
take place in the context of a ‘widespread or systematic’ attack against a civilian 
population.216
It is worth highlighting here the different approach of the ICTY Statute which 
stipulates that a crime against humanity must be committed in the context of an armed
215 For example, the offences are listed as ‘war crimes’ or ‘Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
both of which are terms used in IHL.
216 ICC Statute, art 7(1); ICTR Statute, art 3(1).
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conflict.217 However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has itself cast doubt on this 
requirement in a statement in Tadic,218 with such an approach reflecting what was 
perceived at the time to be the correct legal approach.219 For an act of torture to 
amount to an act of genocide it must be aimed at destroying in whole or in part a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.220
As in the IHL regime, the ‘contextual’ elements of the offences of crimes 
against humanity and genocide, i.e. the requirement that the acts occur in a 
widespread or systematic fashion, or conform to the elements of genocide, are as 
important as the definition as the physical acts of torture. Such a recognition grounds 
the definitions in a formally understood notion of the ICL regime, thereby 
contributing to the arguments advanced in Chapter One that the three regimes are 
indeed separate from one another in both substantive and formal terms. The structure 
of the following section is structured so as to draw attention to these differences 
thereby contributing to the overall purpose of the thesis.
2.3.1 - Treaty Law and ICL
Treaties provide much of the framework for modem ICL. This section begins by 
examining the provisions of the IMT Statute, followed by the ICTY/R and ICC 
Statutes. Article 6(c) of the IMT Statute specified that individuals could be prosecuted 
for ‘crimes against humanity’ these included acts such as ‘murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population’. The inclusion of ‘other inhumane acts’ copies the wording of Article 6(b) 
of the Statute in the context of war crimes. As with other treaties and international
217 ICTY Statute, art 5(1).
218 Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1-A) AC, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para.251.
219 Christopher Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 EJIL 265, 
269.
220 Convention on the Prevention and Prohibition of Genocide, 9 December 1948, A/RES/260 ( ‘the 
Genocide Convention’) art 1; ICC Statute, art 6; ICTY Statute, art 4(2); ICTR Statute, art 2(2).
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instruments, Article 6(b) did not offer a specific definition but rather enabled the IMT 
to prosecute individuals for ‘inhumane acts’ which, as again was the case with war 
crimes, cannot be said to exclude acts of torture which are by their very definition 
inhumane.
The Genocide Convention came into being after the Second World War. It 
criminalises acts committed with the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’.221 In addition to genocidal killing the 
Convention also prohibits acts causing ‘serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group’.222 In contrast to war crimes, and the Nuremberg definition of crimes 
against humanity,223 acts of genocide could be committed in peacetime. As there is no 
requirement of a connection to an armed conflict the Convention has been described 
by Schabas as ‘the quintessential human rights treaty.’224 Despite this, it has been 
included here as a violation of ICL because it has been principally interpreted not by 
human rights courts but by international criminal tribunals.225
Article 4 of the ICTY Statute established the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over acts 
of genocide including ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of [a 
protected] group’. Article 2 of the ICTR Statute contains a similar provision. Crimes 
against humanity also featured as indictable offences at the ICTY/R. The Statutes 
explicitly prohibit torture226 and ‘other inhumane acts’.227 The ICC Statute largely
221 Genocide Convention, art 2.
222 Genocide Convention, art 2(b).
223 This required the presence of an armed conflict and was included in the ICTY Statute (art 5) but not 
the ICTR Statute (art 3).
224 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court (CUP 2011) 100; see also Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1) TC, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para.88.
225 Thomas Margueritte, ‘International Criminal Law and Human Rights’ in William Schabas and 
Nadia Bemaz (eds) Routledge Handbook o f International Criminal Law (Routledge 2011) 436.
226 ICTY Statute, art 5(f); ICTR Statute, art 3(f).
227 ICTY Statute, art 5(i); ICTR Statute, art 3(i).
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echoes the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR.228 Genocide can be committed by causing 
‘serious bodily or mental harm to members of the [protected] group’,229 while torture 
remains a crime against humanity.230 The ‘other inhumane acts’ enumerated in the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes are replaced with a broader framed criminal act, namely 
‘Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.’231
Developments of the definition of torture under the ICC Statute include the 
definitions provided by both Article 7(2) and in the Elements of Crimes. Article 7(2) 
appends a definition of torture plainly derived from UNCAT:232 torture ‘means the 
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a 
person in the custody or under the control of the accused’. The Elements further 
emphasise the point that torture is the infliction of ‘severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering upon one or more persons.’233 In relation to the ‘other inhumane acts’ the 
Elements clarify that such acts can occur when the ‘perpetrator inflicted great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an 
inhumane act.’ The Elements also consider the commission of genocide by causing 
‘serious bodily or mental harm’.234
In order for an individual to be convicted for crimes against humanity under 
the ICC Statute it is necessary to prove the acts took place within the context of ‘a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’ and that an
228 However, William Schabas notes art 7 codifies the evolution of crimes against humanity before the 
ICTY/R; Schabas (n 224) 109.
229 ICC Statute, art 6(b); see also Antonio Cassese, ‘Genocide’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and 
John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (vol 1 
OUP 2002) -  Cassese notes that the ICC Elements of Crimes regarding genocide are ‘somewhat 
innovative’ and urges caution as to how one views them as reflecting customary international law, 348- 
350.
230 ICC Statute, art 7(1 )(f).
231 ICC Statute, art 7(1 )(k).
232 For a discussion see Cassese (n 229).
233 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 7(1 )(f).
234 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 6(b).
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accused individual had knowledge that it was an attack as such.235 This is a vital 
constituent to be considered when defining any crime against humanity because 
without the ‘widespread or systematic’ element it cannot be held, if one is to be
faithful to the principle of lex lata, a crime against humanity has occurred.
2.3.2 - ICL case law
There exists an ever-increasing corpus of case law emanating from the international 
criminal tribunals. Each of these has made a contribution towards the definition of 
torture. As with previous sections its primary focus is on the similarities between the 
ICL, IHRL and IHL regimes. Much of our modem understanding and appreciation of 
the law relating to the ICL regime has been developed by the ICTY and ICTR but
Nuremberg was the impetus for much of contemporary ICL.
2.3.2(a) - Torture at Nuremberg and Tokyo
Given the scale of the atrocities committed by the accused at Nuremberg and the 
subsequent tribunals, it is little surprise that torture was included as a crime. Amongst 
those prosecuted was Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the former chief of the RSHA 
(.Reichssicherheitshauptamt -  Reich Security Main Office).236 As head, Kaltenbrunner 
was also responsible for overseeing the SS Einsatzgruppen paramilitary death squads 
following regular German forces as they advanced across Eastern Europe. The 
Tribunal found that the SS, Gestapo and other elements under his command used 
‘methods which included the torture and confinement in concentration camps’237 of
235 ICC Statute, art 1.
236 This was the SS organisation responsible for the internal and external security of the Third Reich 
which included the Gestapo and SD which acted as the Nazi Party’s internal security force, IMT 




people and was personally ordered by Kaltenbrunner.238 The judgment also examines 
the torture of PoWs and establishes they were ill-treated and tortured contrary to 
international law and ‘in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of 
humanity’.239 Torture was also used as an instrument with which to persecute the 
Jews under Kaltenbrunner’s direction.240
Similar prosecutions followed in the subsequent trials of ‘lesser’ war 
criminals. These expanded the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’, explicitly 
referencing acts of torture as crimes against humanity.241 In Pohl,242 torture featured 
prominently in the indictments for war crimes243 and crimes against humanity.244 The 
judgment refers to, inter alia, the use of concentration camp detainees in ‘scientific’ 
experiments.245 The judgment outlines specific examples of torture used by the SS, 
for example where an ‘inmate could be fed salt herring without water until he went 
crazy, or...hanged head down.’246 The remainder of the judgment is littered with 
references to acts of torture committed by the Einsatzgruppen both in the course of 
‘military’ operations247 and in concentration camps.248
The Tokyo Tribunal also saw prosecutions for acts of torture. The Indictment 
read that the ‘Laws and Customs of War are established partly by the practice of 
civilised nations and partly by Conventions and assurances which are either directly 




241 Law No 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against 
Humanity, Allied Control Council for Germany, (1946) No 3 Official Gazette 50, 20 December 1945.
242 The Pohl Case, formally known as US v. Pohl and Others, Judgment in Trials o f War Criminals 





247 ibid e.g. 1139 and 1160.
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rules.’249 The specific elements of the Indictment made reference to acts of torture and 
‘cruel treatment’ committed against both PoWs and civilian internees.250 In its 
Judgment the Tribunal described several acts which it considered to be torture 
including ‘water treatment, burning, electric shocks, the knee spread, suspension, 
kneeling on sharp instruments and flogging.’251 It noted that the ‘[m]ethods of torture 
were employed in all areas uniformly as to indicate policy in both training and 
execution.’ Indeed, the Tribunal found that it was ‘a reasonable inference that the 
conduct of the Kempeitai [the Japanese military police] and camp guards reflected the 
policy of the War Ministry.’252 The Judgment then proceeds to outline and define 
several acts of torture mentioned above in addition to the use of mock executions253 
and the vivisection of live PoWs.254
In their analysis of the post-Second World War IMTs, Boister and Cryer 
explain that the ‘Nuremberg IMT...moved towards the view that the 1929 [Geneva] 
Conventions [were] customary.’255 They also make reference to the idea that the 
violations at Tokyo were seen by the Tribunal as violating basic rights.256 Such a 
finding demonstrates an understanding on the part of the Tribunal that the protection 
of ‘basic rights’ was fundamental to its purpose and the prosecution of individuals for 
such acts was not only in the interests of the victims but also of the international 
community. This was an awareness shared by the tribunals created nearly 50 years 
later.
249 Nicholas Boister and Robert Cryer (eds), Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: 











The ICTY and ICTR have both considered the definition of torture as a crime 
against humanity. In Perisic the Trial Chamber held that “‘Other inhumane acts” is a 
category of crimes against humanity recognised as forming part of customary 
international law. It functions as a residual category for serious crimes that are not 
otherwise enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute’.257 The Tribunal noted that the 
category of other inhumane acts has been included in the statutes of the IMT and 
Tokyo Tribunal.258 It further cited the Stakic Appeal Chamber judgment as referring 
to the ECHR and ICCPR as prohibiting certain forms of conduct.259 The Trial 
Chamber’s judgment in Perisic is supported by Mettraux who has written that ‘with a 
few noticeable exceptions, most of the law that was set out at Nuremberg is accepted 
as forming part of customary international criminal law.’ He continues by noting 
much ‘of that body of rules and principles may in turn be found in the statutes of 
modern-day international criminal tribunals and all through their jurisprudence.’260
2.3.2(b) - Torture at the ICTY and ICTR
One of the first judgments of the ICTY pertaining to inhuman treatment determined 
that crimes against humanity ‘are serious acts of violence which harm human beings 
by striking what is most essential to them: their life, liberty, physical welfare, health, 
and or dignity.’261 The emphasis on human dignity is reminiscent of the provisions of 
IHL treaties, in particular the absolute minimum standards established by common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Similar parallels are reflecting in the standards 
of the IHRL regime. This suggests that the protection of individual integrity is an
257 Prosecutor v. Perisic (IT-04-81) TC, Judgment, 6 September 2011, para.l 10.
258 ibid fh.220.
259 ibid fn.649; see also Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez (IT-95-14/2) AC, Judgment, 17 December 
2004, para. 117.
260 Guenael Mettraux, ‘Judicial Inheritance: The Value and Significance of the Nuremberg Trial to 
Contemporary War Crimes Tribunals’ in Guenael Mettraux (ed), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial 
(OUP 2008) 600.
261 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (IT-96-22) TC, Sentencing Judgment, 29 November 1996, para.28.
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overarching concern of all three legal regimes. The decision by the ICTY in 
Erdemovic frames and demarcates the whole field of crimes against humanity, and 
ultimately places at its core the protection of the individual.
In Kunarac, torture was said to be an act or an omission causing ‘severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental’ but with no specific and exhaustive elements 
of which acts constitute torture.262 Existing case law, both from the ICTY and from 
other international courts including those from the IHRL regime, had ‘not determined 
the absolute degree of pain required for an act to amount to torture.’263 Torture has 
been said to be ‘one of the most serious attacks upon a person’s mental or physical 
integrity’ with the ‘purpose and the seriousness of the attack upon the victim’ setting 
it apart from other mistreatment.264 This is reminiscent of the definition provided by 
international human rights law, especially the threshold established in Ireland v. UK. 
The Tribunal noted that ‘severe pain or suffering’ rules out acts which are not of 
sufficient gravity such as interrogations and ‘minor contempt for the physical integrity 
of the victim’.265 Lastly, in similar fashion to the dissent of Judge Fitzmaurice in 
Ireland, the Trial Chamber noted ‘Care must be taken to ensure that this specificity is 
not lost by broadening each of the crimes over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to 
the extent that the same facts come to constitute all or most of those crimes.’266 This 
marks a distinction between the IHRL and ICL regimes. This could be because, as de 
Frouville has noted, IHRL is not precise enough to serve as a foundation for a 
criminal offence owing to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.267
262 Kunarac (n 178) para. 149.
263 ibid.
264 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac (IT-97-25) TC, Judgment, 15 March 2000, para. 180.
265 ibid para. 181.
266 ibid.
267 Olivier de Frouville, ‘The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on 
International Criminal Law of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’ (2011) 9 JICJ 633, 642.
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The ‘severe pain and suffering’ requirement of torture as a crime against 
humanity has been found in several other cases before the ICTY and the ICTR. In 
Kvocka it was held torture ‘has been defined by the Tribunal jurisprudence as severe 
mental or physical suffering deliberately inflicted upon a person for a prohibited 
purpose’.268 In Akayesu torture was interpreted in accordance with that which is given 
in UNCAT.269 This is illustrative of the way in which the international criminal 
tribunals have drawn from IHRL for guidance, and while they are structurally 
different, remain connected to one another.270
The Kvocka Trial Chamber judgment is particularly useful because it noted 
that the interpretation of torture relating to the ‘severity of pain or suffering’ was held 
to be consistent with IHRL jurisprudence.271 The Tribunal went on to list some 
inhumane acts found by the UNHRC272 to constitute torture. These included the 
administration of electric shocks, mock executions, food and water deprivation and 
beatings.273 In Mucic the ICTY relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR,274 
in particular the cases of Aksoy275 and Aydin.216 It also referenced Ireland noting ‘ill- 
treatment’ lacked a precise definition. However, it concluded that ‘there were several 
examples of such treatment constituting torture, examples which were derived from
268 Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al (IT-98-30/1) TC, Judgment, 2 November 2001, para. 137.
269 Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4) TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para.681; Almost the exact 
same wording was used by the ICTR in Musema where torture was held to be ‘[i]ntentionally inflicting 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, or punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person or for any reason based on discrimination 
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.’ para.285.
270 de Frouville (n 267) 649.
271 Kvocka (n 268) para. 142.
272 Here the Tribunal relied upon several proceedings before the UNHRC including Muteba v. Zaire 
(124/82) 25 March 1982, UN Doc A/39/40 and Grille Motta v. Uruguay (11/77) 25 April 1977, UN 
Doc A/35/40; see Kvocka ibid fn.306 and fn.307.
273 Kvocka ibid para. 146.
274 Mucic (n 4) paras.465 and 466 respectively.
275 Aksoy v. Turkey (Application no. 21987/93) Judgment, 18 December 1996.
276 Aydin (n 766).
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the jurisprudence of human rights bodies and courts.’277 Indeed, in several cases the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been cited by the ICTY, a point de Frouville 
highlights as exemplifying the ‘common principle of respect for human dignity’ 
linking the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes.278 However, such a point does not alter the 
fact that the three regimes remain distinct, explaining why definitions of the IHRL 
regime are not automatically transposed into ICL or IHL.279
The so-called ‘purposive element’, by which is meant the purposes for which 
acts of torture are committed e.g. obtaining information from an individual, has been 
adapted by both the ICTY and the ICTR. In early cases the definition to which both 
tribunals adhered was the definition given in UNCAT. For example, in Musema the 
ICTR noted that torture could be committed only for certain purposes, the wording of 
which reflected the wording of UNCAT. It will be recalled that under UNCAT 
particular acts only constitute torture:
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person,
280or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
However, it was suggested in Kvocka the purposes set down in UNCAT ‘do not 
constitute an exhaustive list, and should be regarded as merely representative’ of the 
purposes for which torture can be committed in the context of ICL.281 Such a 
viewpoint highlights the structural differences between the IHRL and ICL regimes, 
illustrating the need for both regimes because neither on its own would be sufficient 
to cover all instances of torture or ill-treatment.
217 Mucic (n4) para.461.
278 de Frouville (n 2677) 648.
279 ibid.
280 UNCAT, art 1(1).
281 Kvocka (n 2688) para. 140.
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The ICTY has added further elements to the purposive requirement. Notably 
in Furundzija, the Trial Chamber concluded that humiliating the victim or a third 
person constitutes a prohibited purpose for torture under IHL. The Trial Chamber 
held: ‘among the possible purposes of torture one must also include that of 
humiliating the victim. This proposition is warranted by the general spirit of 
international humanitarian law.’ Furthermore, ‘the primary purpose of this body of 
law is to safeguard human dignity.’282 This was affirmed by the Trial Chamber in 
Kvocka where it was held the ‘intent to humiliate’ an individual could also constitute 
a motivation for torturing that individual.283
Alongside the ‘purposive’ element is the Krnojelac judgment where the Trial 
Chamber held that torture ‘as a criminal offence is not a gratuitous act of violence’.284 
This is because ‘it aims, through the infliction of severe mental or physical pain, to 
attain a certain result or purpose.’ 285 Even the infliction of very severe pain would 
not amount to torture as a war crime or crime against humanity.286 Schabas has 
developed this further by noting that torture ‘for purely private purposes...would fall 
outside the scope of the definition [of torture as a crime against humanity].’287
The final difference between the ICL and IHL on the one hand and IHRL on 
the other is the involvement of State officials. In early cases, as with the purposive 
element, the ICTY and ICTR followed the requirement set forth by UNCAT that a 
state official was necessary for particular acts to be considered ‘torture’. For example 
in Akayesu the ICTR held that torture was committed only when ‘pain or suffering is
282 Furundzija (n 344) para. 161.
283 Kvocka (n 268) para. 153.
284 Krnojelac (n 2644) para. 180.
285 ibid.
286 ibid.
287 William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals (CUP 2006) 207; see also Schabas (n 
224) 114: in order for a crime against humanity to be committed the perpetrator must know that the act 
is part of a ‘widespread or systematic’ attack.
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inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.’288 At the ICTY this viewpoint 
was similarly expressed in Furundzija by the Appeals Chamber.289 It should be noted 
that both Akayesu and Furundzija can be classified as ‘state officials’. At the material 
times of their offences Akayesu was a mayor,290 and Furundzija a commander of a 
special military unit.291
This requirement has since been dropped from the definition of torture in both 
IHL and ICL.292 In Krnojelac the ICTY Trial Chamber held that ‘when relying upon 
human rights law relating to torture, the Trial Chamber must take into account the 
structural differences which exist between that body of law and international 
humanitarian law, in particular the distinct role and function attributed to states and 
individuals in each regime.’293 In Kvocka the Court noted that ‘[differing views have 
been expressed in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal as to whether the suffering must 
be inflicted by a public agent or the representative of a public authority in order to 
meet the definition of torture.’294 This was examined further by the Appeals Chamber, 
which concluded that in light of the Furundzija and Kunarac judgments, such a 
requirement was ‘not a requirement under customary international law in relation to 
the criminal responsibility of an individual outside the framework of the Torture 
Convention.’295
288 Akayesu (n 269) para.681.
289 Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1) AC, Judgment, 21 July 2000, para.l 11.
290 Akayesu (n 26969) para. 1.
291 Furundzija (n 344) para.40.
292 At the preparatory conference for the ICC the majority of delegations took the view that the 
requirement of the involvement of persons acting in an official capacity ‘would create the unintended 
impression that non-state actors are not covered’ meaning that the war crime of torture could only be 
committed by state forces and exclude rebels, terrorists and other non-state actors. See Knut Dormann,
Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (CUP 2002)
46.
293 Krnojelac (n 26464) para. 181.
294 Kvocka (n 2688) para. 137.
295 Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al (IT-98-30/1) AC, Judgment, 28 February 2005, para.281.
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The issue was explored in depth in Kunarac. The Appeals Chamber explored 
the difference between the responsibility of States and individual criminal 
responsibility for torture. It concluded there is a split between the customary 
international law of torture as it relates to the former and the meaning of torture under 
international law in general terms.296 It concluded that that the Trial Chamber had 
been correct to remove the requirement that, for the purposes of international criminal 
law, acts of torture could only be committed by, or under the direction of, a public 
official.297 Lastly, the ICTY in Mrskic held that ‘it is now settled in the jurisprudence 
of the Tribunal that the perpetrator need not have acted in an official capacity.’298 
Here, there is evidence to suggest the ICL and IHL are different from IHRL as to how 
they approach the definition of torture a result of structural differences between the
299regimes.
The reason for the divergence from the IHRL definition was one of 
jurisdiction. Had the tribunals continued with the definition given by IHRL, and in 
particular UNCAT, certain individuals would have escaped justice on the grounds that 
they were non-state actors. This appears to be a sensible modification of the law 
relating to torture under both the ICL and IHL regimes. Such a distinction between 
IHRL, and IHL/ICL was held not to ‘preclude recourse to human rights law in respect 
of those aspects which are common to both regimes.’300 Such common elements 
would constitute the majority of what could be termed the actus reus of torture i.e. the 
physical acts associated with such inhumane treatment. The Trial Chamber 
acknowledged the ECtHR’s reasoning and criteria when assessing the gravity of
296 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al (IT-96-23 & 23/1) AC, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para.147.
297 ibid para. 148.
298 Prosecutor v. Mrksic et al (IT-95-13/1) TC, Judgment, 27 September 2007, para.514.
299 de Frouville (n 2677) 642.
300 Krnojelac (n 264) para. 181.
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torturous acts.301 It concluded that, despite the differences between the IHRL, IHL 
and ICL regimes, the ‘prohibition against torture applies at all times.’302
2.3.3(c) - Torture as genocide at the ICTY and ICTR
The final part of this section turns to the inclusion of acts of torture as genocide. The 
first case to consider the causing of serious bodily or mental harm was Akayesu. Here 
the Tribunal took ‘serious bodily or mental harm...to mean acts of torture, be they 
bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment’.303 The Court cited the Eichmann 
case in which the District Court of Jerusalem held that such acts were designed to 
‘cause their degradation, deprivation of their rights as human beings, and to suppress 
them and cause them inhumane suffering and torture.’304 Causing serious bodily or 
mental harm does not have to result in ‘permanent and irremediable’ harm.305 This 
reasoning follows the criterion set down in both IHRL and IHL wherein the 
‘permanence’ of serious bodily or mental harm is not required.
Serious mental or physical harm has been held to entail ‘more than minor 
impairment on mental or physical faculties.306 This means harm beyond ‘temporary 
unhappiness, embarrassment, or humiliation.’307 Furthermore, it ‘must be harm that 
results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to led [sic] a 
normal and constructive life.’308 It must, in other words, have more than a short-term 
or temporary effect on the victim.309 Evidence of suffering neednot be visible after the 
commission of the act.310
301 ibid.
302 ibid para. 182.
303 Akayesu (n 26969) para.504.
304 ibid para.503.
305 ibid para.502.
306 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (ICTR-95-1A) TC, Judgment, 7 June 2000, para.59.
307 Prosecutor v. Krstic (IT-98-33) TC, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para.342.
308 ibid.
309 Blagojevic (n 1344) para.586.
310 Prosecutor v. Brdanin (IT-99-36) TC, Judgment, 1 September 2004, para.484.
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After Akayesu both Tribunals undertook more detailed and thorough 
examinations of the necessary elements of this particular act of genocide. In 
Kayishema and Ruzindana it was held that the ‘phrase serious bodily harm should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, using a common sense approach.’311 The Trial 
Chamber continued: ‘causing serious bodily harm’ is self-explanatory. It could be 
construed as meaning any harm that causes serious injury to health, disfigurement or 
serious injury to organs or senses.312 The definition of bodily or mental harm should 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis.313
The exact threshold at which particular acts cause ‘serious bodily or mental 
harm’ has not been specifically referenced by either the ICTY or ICTR. In Brdanin 
the Trial Chamber noted that it was ‘understood to mean, inter alia, acts of torture, 
inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations 
combined with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes 
disfigurement or serious injury to members of the targeted national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group.’314 In the Seromba appeal it was determined that it did not ‘squarely 
[address] the definition of such harm. The quintessential examples of serious bodily 
harm are torture, rape, and non-fatal physical violence that causes disfigurement or 
serious injury to the external or internal organs.’315 In analysing these judgments it is 
particularly worthwhile to note that in order to constitute an act of genocide such 
‘serious bodily or mental harm’ must ‘be of such a serious nature as to threaten [a 
group’s] destruction in whole or in part.’316
311 Kayishema (n 224) para. 108.
312 ibid para. 109.
313 Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44) TC, Judgment, 1 December 2003, para.815; the ‘case-by- 
case’ approach was also seen in Krstic (n 307) para.510.
314 Brdanin (n 310) para.690.




‘Serious harm’ was further considered in Popovic. The detention of victims, 
Bosnian men, before the Srebrenica massacre, including the removal the victims’ 
identity papers caused ‘uncertainty as to their ultimate fate’ and eventually this turned 
to ‘fear and terror’.317 They were ‘detained in intolerable conditions of overcrowded 
facilities with no food, little if any water and abhorrent sanitary conditions’ and in 
‘many instances they were subjected to taunting and physical abuse.’318 Indeed, in 
Semanza the ICTR concluded that whilst the ‘term “serious bodily harm” is not 
defined in the Statute’ it ‘seeks to punish serious acts of physical violence, including 
sexual violence, falling short of killing.’319 As with other elements of torture and 
inhumane treatment under the ICL regime, this again highlights the concern the 
regime shares with IHRL and IHL for the preservation and protection of human 
dignity.
The ICTY described in Popovic the circumstances and acts which were said to 
have been committed by the accused. It found ‘that serious bodily and mental harm 
was caused to those who survived the killing operation. Those few who lived were 
often physically injured and all endured the extreme anguish and terror of a close 
encounter with violent death. Several were forced by circumstance to pretend to be 
dead and to hide under the cover of and surrounded by the bodies of those killed 
around them.’320 The Court continued that the survivors ‘then endured harrowing 
circumstances in order to escape’ and concluded that it had ‘no doubt as to the intense 
physical suffering and mental anguish endured by these survivors as a direct result of 
the implementation of the plan to murder.’321 The ICTR Appeals Chamber in 
Seromba held that ‘serious mental harm includes “more than minor or temporary
317 Prosecutor v. Popovic (IT-05-88) TC, Judgment, 10 June 2010, para.844.
318 ibid.
319 Prosecutor v. Semanza (ICTR-97-20) TC, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para.320.




impairment of mental faculties such as the infliction of strong fear or terror, 
intimidation or threat”.’322 Consequently, the definition of torture for the purposes of 
ICL could be that there has to be more than momentary panic or terror, suggesting a 
restrictive approach to how psychological torture can be inflicted, again perhaps 
because the ICL regime requires certainty and precision in order to conform to the 
principles of a fair trial for all parties.
2.3.3 - Conclusions on torture within the ICL regime
International criminal law has contributed greatly to the definition of torture with 
respect to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
As has been argued above, each specific physical act of torture has to be linked to 
either a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population or to occur with the 
intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. 
Without such a connection the physical act will not constitute a crime against 
humanity or genocide and thus not amount to a violation of international criminal law. 
Therefore, it appears any definition of torture for the purposes of international 
criminal law should also include a reference to the wider contextual acts of crimes 
against humanity or genocide. As with the IHRL and IHL regimes, the definition of 
torture includes more than the physical acts of torture. The emergence of a definition 
of torture under ICL consisting of more than the physical act of torture differentiates 
the ICL from the IHRL and IHL regimes. It serves to illustrate the functional 
differences existing between the regimes. In part this is due to the purpose of ICL in 
bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice thereby curbing impunity.
The conduct constituting torture under the ICL remains largely identical to 
that which is found under the IHRL and IHL regimes. The threshold remains ‘severe
322 Seromba (n 315) para.46.
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pain or suffering’ whether physical or mental.323 Like IHL, ICL has relied upon 
Ireland v. United Kingdom when defining this threshold.324 Unlike IHRL, particularly 
UNCAT, torture can be inflicted through an omission.325 This marks a departure from 
the definition of torture given under IHRL. Similarly, it now appears to be a settled 
aspect of ICL that torture need not be committed by State officials: non-State actors 
are equally culpable.326 The IHRL regime also has a relatively narrow conception of 
torture in the sense that there must be a purpose to its infliction on the victim, for 
example the obtaining of information or a confession.327 ICL has abandoned this 
requirement, allowing acts committed out of sadistic pleasure to amount to torture.328 
The final, and perhaps principal, distinction between torture under ICL and torture 
under IHRL and IHL is that the acts must take place either in the context of a 
‘widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population’ or ‘with the intent to 
destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’. 
Thus torture under ICL is restricted to the occurrence in either the context of a crime 
against humanity or genocide. However, despite these differences they do not 
preclude reference to the jurisprudence of the IHL and IHRL regime as and when
329necessary.
Conclusion to Chapter Two
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the multiple definitions of torture 
arising from the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes. As has been noted above, the definition 
of the physical acts of torture is identical across the three regimes, but this means that
323 Krnojelac (n 264) para. 180.
324 Kvocka (n 268) para. 142.
325 Kunarac (n 178) para. 149; UNCAT requires an ‘act by which severe pain or suffering’ is inflicted. 
This seemingly rules out the infliction of such pain or suffering by omission.
326 Mrskic (n 298) para.514.
327 UNCAT, art 1(1)
328 Mucic (n 4) para. 1268.
329 Krnojelac (n 266) para. 181.
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there are three identical definitions of the physical act of torture rather than one 
common definition shared between the three. Differences in the definition arise when 
considering the contextual elements of the definitions, as in IHRL where the 
involvement of a State official is required for an act to be considered torture. Such 
elements contextualise the violations with respect to a given regime. Without such a 
contextual element being present it makes no legal sense to then claim that a violation 
has occurred.
The approach taken also raises questions as to what the definition of torture 
under regimes other than IHRL, IHL and ICL would be. The prohibition of torture is 
widely regarded as one of the few ius cogens norms of public international law,330 but 
defining torture is not necessarily as easy. For instance, the three regimes undoubtedly 
share a common element when considering which acts constitute torture, with the IHL 
and ICL regimes drawing heavily from the definitions and jurisprudence of the IHRL 
regime.331 Differences emerge, as has been seen, when the other elements of the 
regimes’ definitions are considered. The IHRL regime requires the involvement, in 
some form, of state officials, while the IHL and ICL regimes have done away with 
this requirement permitting non-State actors to be prosecuted for acts of torture.332 
The ICL regime has also found that torture can be committed for purposes other than 
those permitted under IHRL, including acts of sadistic violence.333 This widens the 
definitional scope of torture compared to IHRL.
From the above chapter it can be argued that three different definitions of 
torture have emerged, each of which could be applicable to the same situation. This 
would appear to confirm the fears of those who have argued fragmentation can lead to
330 de Wet (n 1); Bassiouni (n 1).
331 This can be seen in Furundzija (n 34) fn.179 where the ICTY cited the definition given in Ireland v. 
United Kingdom (n 55).
332 This can be seen in Kunarac (n 278) para.496.
333 For example as in Mucic (n 4) para. 1268
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a loss of certainty and clarity of the law. The evidence cited above suggests the three 
regimes remain able to function without one another. This is despite the frequent 
citing of IHRL in IHL and ICL cases that the courts have used as a means of 
formulating regime specific definitions. Despite this, the growing autonomy of the 
ICL and IHL regimes from IHRL has been noted particularly post-2000 where the 
ICTY no longer makes clear and explicit references to ECtHR jurisprudence.334
The fragmentation of international law is a very real phenomenon. The 
approaches of the three regimes to torture are markedly different suggesting 
international law is indeed fragmenting. Each of the three regimes considered in this 
chapter suggests this is true. Fragmentation is frequently seen as posing a 
considerable challenge to the operation of international law.335 However, despite the 
often negative representation of fragmentation there is little evidence from practice 
that the phenomenon is negatively impacting on international law. A divergence of 
law does not necessarily and automatically mean that there is a conflict.336 Indeed, 
such divergence could be seen as evidence for Koskenniemi’s view that different 
institutional projects are being carved out of international law.337
Similarly, there is little evidence of deference of one regime’s courts or 
tribunals to those of another, a factor reminiscent of the ICTY’s refusal in Tadic to 
follow the definition of control established by the ICJ in Nicaragua. Crucially, the 
regimes appear able to function independently of one another. This is despite a shared 
use of the physical definition of torture. Such usage does not necessarily imply a close 
link between the three regimes. It could, for instance, be evidence that the various 
judicial organs saw no need to replicate definitions that had been developed
334 de Frouville (n 267) 644-646.
335 As seen in Chapter One , 31-34.
336 Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 BYIL 425, 425.
337 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law — 20 Years Later (2009) 20 EJIL 7, 9.
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elsewhere. This would not necessarily imply that the courts of each regime would 
have been unable to develop their own definition of the physical act of torture had this 
been required.
The way in which tribunals such as the ICTY have been willing to dispense 
with the strict IHRL definition, particularly with regard to the requirement that a State 
official be involved in the torture, can be seen as demonstrating the independence of 
the tribunals from the IHRL regime. This position also serves as a foundation to the 
approach taken in subsequent chapters where there is a shared sense of condemnation 
of particular acts, but how the acts are construed as amounting to violations of a 
regime’s law differs depending on the purpose of the regime. The following chapter 
on enforced disappearances of individuals is linked to torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment discussed in the present chapter. It will help to develop ideas discussed in 
this chapter and demonstrate the position advanced in the thesis.
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Chapter Three — Enforced Disappearances
*
Introduction
The enforced disappearance of individuals can amount to a violation of the IHRL, 
IHL and ICL regimes. However, despite the common prohibition of such acts there 
are several crucial differences as to how enforced disappearances are defined within 
each regime. Such differences could stem from the composite nature of the violation 
and the functional differences between the regimes, in addition to a lack of clear 
definitions of the act within each regime. The International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICCPED)1 established a 
comprehensive definition of enforced disappearances under IHRL. However, 
differences continue to exist between the ECHR and Inter-American system with the 
latter placing greater emphasis, for example, on the impact an individual’s 
disappearance has on ‘family dynamics’.2 This division between sub-regimes within 
the IHRL serves as one example as to how the regimes continue to evolve and can be 
differentiated from one another.
The IHL regime continues to lack a singular definition, instead relying upon 
an assortment of violations which taken together recognise that enforced 
disappearances committed in the context of an armed conflict (international or non- 
international) are to be prohibited. In recent history, the enforced disappearance of 
individuals has generally occurred on a widespread or systematic scale even when 
committed in the context of an armed conflict. This was the case in the Russian
1 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 20 
December 2006, UN Doc.A/61/488 (ICCPED).




Republic of Chechnya,3 in contemporary Syria4 and the quasi-armed conflict taking 
place in parts of Mexico.5 It is therefore more probable that future prosecutions of 
those responsible for enforced disappearances against civilians will be based in the 
law relating to a crime against humanity (that can occur whether or not an armed 
conflict exists).6 However, the wording of the ICC Statute makes it clear that a crime 
against humanity is defined as being an attack against a civilian population. This 
raises questions as to the level of protection from enforced disappearance combatants 
will receive from the protection of ICL.7
As will be seen in this chapter, defining enforced disappearances is not an easy 
task. Difficulties arise from the composite nature of the act. For instance, the act of 
causing an individual to disappear could amount to the criminal offence of kidnap and 
murder; or the human rights violation of torture, the denial of the right to a fair trial, 
incommunicado detention, and ultimately violation of the right to life. Violations can 
also occur in respect of the victims’ relatives. Thus each act of enforced 
disappearance comprises a number of subsidiary acts to the overarching act of 
enforced disappearance, each of which is capable of being considered a violation in its 
own right. At a fundamental level, such acts diminish an individual’s autonomy to an 
absolute minimum.8 Concomitant with this is the absence of any oversight of the
3 There are several Human Rights Watch reports on disappearances in Chechnya. E.g. ‘Who Will Tell 
Me What Happened to My Son?’ (September 2009) http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/09/28/who-will- 
tell-me-what-happened-my-son-O; ‘Worse Than a War’ (March 2005) 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/03/21/worse-war; ‘Last Seen...’ (April 2002) 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/04/15/last-seen-0; ‘Swept Under’ (February 2002) 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/02/02/swept-under-0 (all last accessed 23 March 2013).
4 See Human Rights Watch Report ‘Torture Archipelago’ (July 2012)
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/07/03/torture-archipelago-0 (last accessed 23 March 2013).
5 See Human Rights Watch Report ‘Mexico’s Disappeared’ (February 2013) 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/02/20/mexicos-disappeared (last accessed 23 March 2013).
6 ICC Statute, Article 7(1 )(i).
7 William J. Fenrick, ‘Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?’ (1999) 37 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 767.




detaining authority’s powers increasing the risk to the individual of torture and 
extrajudicial execution.9
Despite such clear prohibitions, the definition of enforced disappearance 
necessarily differs between the regimes studied in the chapter below. For example, a 
vital element for enforced disappearance under the IHRL regime is that the acts be 
perpetrated by agents of the State or with the State’s acquiescence. Without such an 
element present an act cannot be defined as a violation of the IHRL prohibition of 
enforced disappearance. In the IHL sphere there must be a link between the 
disappearance and the existence of an armed conflict. For the disappearance to 
amount to a crime against humanity the act must be located in a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population.10
The following chapter is structured so as to first provide an analysis of the 
definition of enforced disappearance under the IHRL regime, namely under the UN 
system, the Inter-American system and the ECHR. Following the IHRL section is a 
discussion of the IHL and ICL provisions relating to enforced disappearance. These 
latter sections will draw from the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunals, the 
ICTY and the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber. In doing this, the chapter seeks to 
emphasise the functional differences between the three regimes.
3.1 - Enforced disappearance and IHRL
The issue of enforced disappearances in IHRL has become an increasingly prominent 
topic in the international courts and in the international community as a whole. Much 
of the development in this area has been driven by the Inter-American Court and the
9 Marthe Lot Vermeulen, ‘“Living Beyond Death”: Torture or Other Ill-Treatment Claims in Enforced 
Disappearances Cases’ (2008) 1 Inter-American and European Human Rights Journal 159, 164; see 
also Matthew Lippman, ‘Disappearances: Towards a Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances’ (1988) 4 Connecticut Journal of International 
Law 121, 122.
10 ICC Statute, art 7(1).
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ECtHR. The Inter-American Court has been instrumental in developing this area of 
law. In part this is due to the widespread and systematic human rights abuses that 
occurred in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. The practice of enforced 
disappearance in these countries has been described as ‘a deliberate policy on the part 
of governments or their supporters.’11 What is apparent is that neither the ECHR nor 
IACHR has a specific violation relating to enforced disappearances. Instead, the 
courts have resorted to pre-existing rights, for example the right to life or liberty. This 
section begins by considering the law developed explicitly under the guidance of the 
UN.
3.1.1 - The UN human rights system and enforced disappearances 
The UN position relating to enforced disappearances and the IHRL regime can be 
drawn from numerous sources including UNGA resolutions or reports by constituent 
bodies of the UN. Enforced disappearances have been considered a human rights 
violation by the UN since Resolution 33/173 (1978).12 This resolution noted the 
composite nature of enforced disappearances, stressing such acts had the potential to 
violate, inter alia, the right to life, the right to liberty, freedom from torture and the 
right to a fair and public trial. It called upon governments to ‘devote appropriate 
resources to searching for [disappeared] persons and to undertake speedy and 
impartial investigations’.13 Article 1(b) called for law enforcement and security 
services to be fully accountable ‘especially in law’ for their actions, and Article 1(c) 
obliged members to ensure that the human rights of detained individuals were fully
11 J. Daniel Livermore and B.G. Ramcharan, ‘“Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances”: An 
Evaluation of a Decade of United Nations Action’ (1990) 6 Canadian Human Rights Year Book 217, 
218
12 UNGA Res 173 (XXXIII) (20 Dec 1978) UN Doc A/RES/33/173.
13 ibid art 1(a).
144
Chapter Three
respected. As with other resolutions of the UNGA, Resolution 33/173 is non-binding 
and indicative more of the political will to achieve an objective.
In 1992 resolution 47/133 was passed by the UNGA.14 Article 1 states ‘Any 
act of enforced disappearance is an offence to human dignity’15 because it removes 
that person outside the protection of the law ‘and inflicts severe suffering on them and 
their families.’16 Although non-binding, Article 4(1) of the resolution requires each 
State to criminalise acts of enforced disappearance. Acts of enforced disappearance 
are never justifiable under any circumstances, including times of war and public 
emergencies.17 This resolution formed the foundations for the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(ICCPED), first signed in December 2006 and entered into force in December 2010.18
The preamble of ICCPED recalls the provisions of several international human 
rights treaties including the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and ‘the other relevant international instruments in the fields of human rights, 
humanitarian law and international criminal law’. The purpose of the treaty is to 
prevent enforced disappearances and combat impunity.19 The preamble also considers 
it the ‘right of any person not to be subjected to enforced disappearance, the right of 
victims to justice and to reparation’ and affirms ‘the right of any victim to know the 
truth about the circumstances of an enforced disappearance and the fate of the
14 UNGA Res 133 (XLVII) (18 Dec 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/133.
15 ibid art 1(1).
16 ibid art 1(2).
17 ibid art 7.
18 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 20 
December 2006, UN Doc.A/61/488 (ICCPED); for a commentary on the Convention see Susan 
McCrory, ‘The International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 




disappeared person, and the right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
to this end’.
The substantive articles of the treaty follow a pattern similar to that of 
UNCAT. Article 1(1) states plainly ‘No one shall be subjected to enforced 
disappearance.’ This prohibition is not subject to any derogation even in ‘exceptional 
circumstances.’20 Article 2 of ICCPED defines ‘enforced disappearance’ and it is 
structured along similar lines to the definition of torture in UNCAT. The first of the 
elements is the physical act, namely the ‘arrest, detention, abduction or any other 
form of deprivation of liberty’. This is followed by the perpetrator requirement, 
necessitating the act be committed by ‘agents of the State or by persons or groups of 
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State’. This is 
followed by the purposive element which places ‘such a person outside the protection 
of the law’ by refusing ‘to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment 
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person.’
The Convention readily seeks to provide a working definition of enforced 
disappearance for the purposes of human rights protection and for criminal sanction 
against those who commit such acts. With regard to the latter it must be remembered 
that for the crime to be committed it is necessary to prove each individual element of 
the offence against an accused. As with CAT, the ICCPED obliges States Parties to 
investigate acts of disappearances21 and to ensure that enforced disappearance 
amounts to a criminal offence under domestic law.22 It also provides that the 
‘widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance constitutes a crime 
against humanity as defined in applicable international law and shall attract the
20 ICCPED, art 1(2).
21 ICCPED, art 3.
22 ICCPED, art 4.
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consequences provided for under such applicable international law.’23 Like CAT it 
also restricts liability for acts of enforced disappearance to individuals operating as 
state agents or under what can be loosely termed the ‘control’ of the state.24
3.1.2 - The Inter-American system and enforced disappearance 
South and Central America have a history of enforced disappearances and the 
punishment of those who perpetrated such acts. This led to the adoption in 1994, and 
entry into force in 1996, of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances 
of Persons (IACFDP).25 It is aimed at preventing and punishing those guilty of 
enforced disappearance. The preamble highlights the grave effect enforced 
disappearance has on the dignity of the human being. It reaffirms the idea that 
enforced disappearances can amount to a crime against humanity.
The main body of the treaty contains several articles which aim to prevent, 
protect and punish. The first article categorically prohibits enforced disappearances at 
all times even in a state of emergency. Punishment of offenders is covered in Article 1 
and Article 1(d) compels states to take legislative, administrative and judicial action 
to comply with the commitments undertaken in the Convention. As such Article 1, 
taken as a whole, establishes the framework of the Convention. The remainder of the 
treaty provides for the criminalisation of enforced disappearance;26 the extradition of 
those suspected of committing such offences;27 and the prohibition of enforced
23 ICCPED, art 5.
24 It is not suggested that the word ‘control’ reflects the definition given in either the Tadic 
interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction judgment or the ICJ Nicaragua judgment, although interpreting the 
definition of ‘authorization, support or acquiescence’ might require an analysis of the two cases; 
Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1) AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 
1986..
25 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 9 June 1994 (IACFDP).
26 ibid art 4.
27 ibid art 5.
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disappearance in situations of emergency or war.28 It is consequently a non-derogable 
obligation.
Article 2 of the IACFDP contains the definition of enforced disappearance:
For the purposes of this Convention, forced disappearance is considered to be the 
act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever way, 
perpetrated by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons acting with 
the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by an absence of 
information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give 
information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her 
recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees.
As with other human rights treaties, it limits the liability of individuals acting as
agents of the state (e.g. police officers) and ‘persons acting with the authorization,
support, or acquiescence of the state’ (e.g. paramilitary forces). Enforced
disappearance can be termed a ‘State crime’ that cannot be committed by non-State
actors (unless acting with ‘the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state’).
While this reflects the enormous power that the State has over the individual, it fails
to recognise that often guerrilla groups or other non-state actors (e.g. drug cartels)
control territory in much the same fashion as the state does. However, the liability of
non-state actors would be covered by the law of kidnap or false imprisonment under a
State’s domestic criminal law. The Convention reinforces the notion that only States
can violate human rights law. It has been noted by Vermeulen that for much of its first
50 years of life the ECtHR has been concerned on the whole with ‘minor’ violations
of domestic human rights law rather than gross, widespread and systematic violations
which has been the staple of the Inter-American Court.29 Huneeus has echoed this in
the context of remedies noting that unlike the ECtHR, ‘the Inter-American Court,
which came of age in a region of dictatorships, prefers to be less deferential.’30
28 ibid art 10.
29 Vermeulen (n 9) 196.
30 Alexandra Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to 
Enforce Human Rights’ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 493, 496.
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The IACHR has also seen several cases brought by victims’ families in 
instances of enforced disappearance. This is despite the IACHR lacking a specific 
right relating to enforced disappearance. Instead the Inter-American Court has relied 
upon existing provisions. These include the violation of the right to life under Article 
4, violation of the right to humane treatment under Article 5, the right to personal 
liberty under Article 7, and Article 25 concerning the right to judicial protection.
The Inter-American Court was one of the first international human rights 
courts to consider instances of disappearance in the 1989 case Velasquez Rodriguez-31 
This concerned the disappearance of Manfredo Velasquez in Honduras in 1981. He 
was illegally detained by members of the Honduran security forces.32 Soon after his 
detention he disappeared.33 The Court noted how during the period of 1981 and 1984 
between 100 and 150 people were subjected to enforced disappearances.34 
Furthermore, the disappearances all followed a similar pattern. The acts would be 
perpetrated by armed men who would kidnap the victim in broad daylight with 
apparent impunity.35 It was public knowledge the perpetrators worked for the 
Honduran police or military.36 The nature of the acts and the way in which they were 
perpetrated was described as ‘systematic’,37 committed in a methodical fashion.
The Court set down the context of disappearance as a human rights violation. 
Disappearances were not new in the history of human rights violations but, the court 
noted, the way in which they had come to be used to terrorise the population at large 
by spreading ‘anguish, insecurity and fear’ was a recent innovation. This had become
31 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
32 ibid para.3.
33 ibid.
34 ibid para. 147(a).
35 ibid para. 147(b).
36 ibid para. 147(c).
37 ibid para. 147(d).
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exceptionally intense in Latin America.38 It concluded disappearances represented a 
‘complex human rights violation’ which must be confronted and understood in an 
‘integral fashion’.39 The term ‘integral fashion’ reflects the composite nature of 
enforced disappearances as they are comprised of a number of individual violations.
The Velasquez Rodriguez judgment is indicative of a cautious and 
conservative approach to a novel human rights violation. Its approach to acts of 
disappearance is similarly novel, placing the violation under three main headings: a 
violation of the right to life (Article 4), the right to humane treatment (Article 5), and 
the right to personal liberty (Article 7). With regard to Article 4 the Court held 
disappearances often involve the secret extra-judicial execution of the individual 
followed by the concealment of the body so as to destroy evidence and ensure the 
perpetrators are not caught.40 Evidence also showed the disappeared were frequently 
subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, prohibited under Article 5.41 
Finally, on the matter of a violation of Article 7, the Court held that the ‘kidnapping 
of a person is an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, an infringement of a detainee's right 
to be taken without delay before a judge and to invoke the appropriate procedures to 
review the legality of the arrest, all in violation of Article 7 of the Convention which 
recognizes the right to personal liberty’.42 By examining the main elements of 
disappearance set down in Velasquez Rodriguez it is possible to conclude that at least 
three fundamental human rights are violated by such an act, namely the right to life, 
the right humane treatment and the right to liberty. The content of these violations has 
been further defined and developed by subsequent case law of the Inter-American 
Court.
38 ibid para. 149.
39 ibid para. 150.
40 ibid para. 157.
41 ibid para. 156.
42 ibid para. 155.
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Article 4 in relation to disappearances has not been developed much further in 
the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court since Velasquez Rodriguez. In Godinez 
Cruz the Court used the relevant paragraphs verbatim from Velasquez Rodriguez.43 In 
Blake the death of the victim was held to be the date formally recognised by the 
Guatemalan state on the victim’s death certificate.44 The case of Neira Alegria et al 
arises under slightly different circumstances to most disappearance cases in that it 
relates to the quelling of a prison riot where, the Court held, there was a 
disproportionate amount of force used by the authorities despite the lack of 
identifiable remains of the three individuals who effectively disappeared.45 This 
reflects a trend across the three regimes towards recognising that it is possible to for 
an enforced disappearance to have occurred even if it cannot be proven that the victim 
has died.
In Tiu Tojin the Court was asked to adjudicate upon the apparent enforced 
disappearance of a child and her mother. These acts, the Court concluded, occurred as 
‘part of a pattern of massive and systematic violations to human rights’ which 
occurred during the internal armed conflict in Guatemala.46 It further held that the 
whereabouts of the child was unknown and it was possible that she had either been 
killed or handed over to a third party.47 Lastly, in Gomez-Palomino the Court heard 
evidence that on
many occasions, the decision to eliminate the victim and to conceal of the victim’s
remains ensued. In order to destroy the evidence of such acts, the bodies of the
43 Godinez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 5 (1989) 
para. 165.
44 Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of January 24 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 36 (1998) 
para.83.
45 Neira Alegria et al v. Peru, Judgment of January 19 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 20, 
para.76; an almost identical ruling was handed down in the case of Durand y Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment 
of 16 August 2000 (Ser. C) No. 68 (2000), para.79.





victims were incinerated, mutilated, abandoned in inaccessible or isolated areas, 
were buried or parts of their remains were scattered in different places.48
Those detained by the security services entered into well-established clandestine
detention network, with the majority of those entering being killed.49 This emphasises
the totality of control exercised by state security forces over the disappeared and
serves to illustrate the extent to which disappearances can be classed a gross violation
of human rights and human dignity.
The Inter-American Court has been much more willing than the ECtHR to
classify acts of enforced disappearance as a violation of the right to humane
treatment. This highlights the differences that exist between the two regional systems.
It can therefore be viewed as an aspect of fragmentation in action, serving to
underscore the dangers of advocating a single, universalised definition of human
rights law.
In Godinez and Cruz the Court found that the circumstances of 
disappearances, often including extended periods of solitary confinement, can 
constitute ‘cruel and inhuman treatment, harmful to the psychological and moral 
integrity of the person and a violation of the right of any detainee to respect for his 
inherent dignity as a human being.’50 Such a principle is at the heart of several rulings 
for example in the Street Children Case, though not concerned with disappearances, 
the Court held that it was reasonable to infer that whilst isolated in detention the 
victims ‘experienced extreme psychological and moral suffering during those 
hours.’51 This can be used to illustrate the Inter-American Court’s concern about the
48 Gomez-Palomino Case v. Peru, Judgment of November 22 2005, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
136 (2005) para.54.2.
49 ibid para.54.3.
50 ibid para. 164.
51 Villagrdn Morales et al. Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of November 19 1999, Inter- 
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 63 (1999) para. 163; for the principle applied in the context of disappearance 




psychological suffering experienced by those detained at the hands of security 
services. In La Cantuta the Court ruled that ‘in light of the circumstances in which 
they were detained and taken to an indefinite place before being executed or 
vanished, the alleged victims were placed in a situation of vulnerability and lack of 
protection which affected their physical, mental and moral integrity.’52 Furthermore, 
the context and modus operandi of the security forces permitted the inference that the 
victims would have had ‘deep feelings of fear, anxiety and defenselessness.’ At the 
very least victims would watch others being tortured and executed, increasing a sense 
of fear.53 Consequently, the Court felt confident enough to describe the acts as 
violations of Article 5 of the IACHR.
The Inter-American Court has also considered the treatment of the relatives of 
victims and determined in several cases that such treatment constitutes a violation of 
a relative’s right to humane treatment. For example, in Goiburu54 it was held that the 
facts allowed the Court to conclude that there was a violation of the relatives’ rights 
owing to the disappearance of the victim. It further noted that this had had a negative 
impact upon the relatives’ social relations and employment in addition to altering the 
‘family dynamics’.55 In La Cantuta the Court placed emphasis on the treatment of the 
victims’ families noting that the violation of a relative’s right to mental and moral 
integrity is often violated in cases of disappearance. Furthermore, such a violation is 
exacerbated by the ‘continued refusal of state authorities to supply information on the 
victim’s whereabouts or to conduct an effective investigation to elucidate the facts’.56 
The Court also highlighted several instances where the state violated these rights
52 La Cantuta Case v. Peru, Judgment of November 29 2006, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 162 
(2006) para. 113.
53 ibid.
54 Goiburu et al. v. Paraguay, Judgment of September 22 2006, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 153 
(2006).
55 ibid para. 103.
56 La Cantuta (n 52), para. 123.
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including an instance where, after the discovery of a number of secret graves, the 
remains of some of the victims were returned to their families ‘in milk cartons’57 and 
cases where the families were threatened and branded as terrorists.58
The final substantive area to be examined is that of violations of Article 7 
which includes inter alia the right to liberty. In Ticona Estrada the Court found that 
the illegal detention of the victim by state agents violated Article 7, and because the 
victim subsequently disappeared it ‘constitutes an ongoing violation with legal 
consequences that extend until the present date.’59 This was similar to the ruling in 
Portugal where the violation of Article 7 existed from the date the victim was 
reported missing in 199060 to the date his remains were found in 2000. This is an 
important ruling because at the time of the victim’s disappearance the Court lacked 
competence to rule on his death or alleged torture. However, because ‘Article 7 of the 
Convention.. .was violated continuously until that date...owing to his forced 
disappearance’ it was still able to adjudicate on the matter and hold the Panamanian 
government to account for his disappearance.61
The fundamental nature of Article 7 was highlighted in Bamaca-Velasquez.61 
The Court noted that any individual deprived extra-judicially of his or her freedom 
should be freed or brought before a judge. This was vital in protecting the liberty of
57 ibid para. 125(a).
58 ibid para. 125(c) & (d).
59 Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia, Judgment of November 27 2008, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 191 
(2008) para.61.
60 Though disappeared in 1970, he was only reported missing to the authorities because under the 
military dictatorship which existed until 1990 it was impossible to seek remedies for such acts 
committed by the State, see Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Judgment of August 12 2008, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 186 (2008) para.4.
61 Portugal, ibid para. 113; this is similar to the idea of ‘continuous kidnap’ developed by Chilean 
Courts and cited in the case of Almonacid-Arellano to circumvent amnesty laws. Almonacid-Arellano 
v. Chile, Judgment of September 26 2006, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 154 (2006) para.72(c).




the individual against interference by the State.63 In the absence of such a right the 
potential for further and graver human rights abuses becomes more probable.64 
Furthermore, it was emphasized in this case that, though the victim was a guerilla 
engaged in an internal armed conflict, ‘the detainee should have been ensured the 
guarantees that exist under the rule of law, and been submitted to a legal proceeding’ 
and that while the state does indeed have an obligation to guarantee its security it 
must perform its actions subject to limitations and according to legal procedures that 
balance ‘public safety and the fundamental rights of the human person.’65 However, it 
is worth highlighting that despite the Court’s approach to the fundamental nature of 
Article 7, it is not a non-derogable right under the IACHR,66 which challenges the 
Court’s assertions in the above case.
The Inter-American Court has played an important role in the development of 
the international jurisprudence relating to enforced disappearances. As the IACHR 
does not explicitly afford individuals a right not to be subjected to enforced 
disappearances, the Court has had to develop the law under a number of pre-existing 
rights such as torture and the right to life. In doing this, the Court ensured that 
enforced disappearance victims receive justice while at the same time developing the 
law within established boundaries rather than creating new causes of action. It has 
placed emphasis on the inherent dignity of both the victim and their relatives. This 
was achieved by recognising the violation of a victim’s rights can also cause suffering 
to relatives, giving rise to a violation of the latter’s human rights.
63 ibid para. 140.
64 ibid para. 150.
65 ibid para. 143.
66 IACHR, Article 27 (2) provides a list of non-derogable rights.
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3.1.3 - Enforced disappearances and the ECHR
The ECHR, like the IACHR, contains no outright provisions relating to the enforced 
disappearance of individuals. This has not prevented the ECtHR from determining 
that the enforced disappearance of individuals constitutes a violation of the ECHR. 
The Court has relied upon Articles 2 (the right to life),67 3 (prohibition of torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment),68 5 (the right to liberty),69 6 (the right to a fair 
trial)70 and 13 (the right to an effective remedy).71 The condemnation of acts of 
enforced disappearance by the ECtHR underlines the serious nature of the acts and 
both the revulsion to such acts within the Council of Europe and generally in the 
international community.
The ECtHR has concerned itself with a whole range of human rights 
violations committed by member states from issues of privacy72 to the use of force by 
security or military forces.73 However, it was not until the 1998 Kurt judgment that 
the Court first considered the issue of enforced disappearance.74 The ECtHR turned to 
the matter of gross violations of human rights in the wake of Turkish security service 
activity against those suspected of being affiliated with Kurdish separatists. In 
addition to the seemingly widespread use of torture against such individuals as 
discussed in Chapter Two, Turkish security forces also engaged in acts of enforced 
disappearance.
67 Kurt v. Turkey (Application no. 24276/94) Judgment, 22 January 1998.
68 Luluyev and others v. Russia (Application no. 69480/01) Judgment, 9 November 2006.
69 ibid.
70 Umarov v. Russia (Application no. 12712/02) Judgment, 3 July 2008.
71 Orhan v. Turkey (Application no. 25656/94) Judgment, 18 June 2002.
72 Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493.
73 Nachova v. Bulgaria; McCann v. UK; Peter Cumper, When the State Kills (1995) 4 Nottingham Law 
Journal 207; Stephen Skinner, ‘The Right to Life, Democracy and State Responsibility in Urban 
Guerilla” Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber Judgment in Giuliani and 
Gaggio v. Italy.’ (2011)11 Hutnan Rights Law Review 567.
74 Kurt (n 67).
156
Chapter Three
As Kurt was the first case before the ECtHR to consider an enforced 
disappearance, it provides a framework for the analysis of future cases. The Court 
was asked to consider the disappearance of the applicant’s son, allegedly performed 
by Turkish security forces. She relied upon, inter alia, Articles 2, 3, 5 of the 
Convention. The Court relied heavily upon the violation of Article 5, noting that in 
relation to Article 2 the case was based ‘entirely on presumptions’ made from the 
detention of the applicant’s son in conjunction with analyses of allegedly tolerated 
practices including disappearance.75 As such, the evidence did not substantiate her 
claim and there was no violation of Article 2. The Court held likewise in its 
adjudication of the alleged violation of Article 3 towards the victim, noting the 
applicant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support her claim.76 Furthermore, her 
claim that the disappearance of her son ‘in a context devoid of the most basic judicial 
safeguards must have exposed him to acute psychological torture’77 was likewise 
dismissed by the Court.
The Court’s primary findings of a violation of the ECHR rested therefore on 
Article 5 which guarantees an individual’s right to liberty and freedom from arbitrary 
detention. The Court treated disappearance in Kurt as an aggravated violation of 
Article 5 noting that ‘[pjrompt judicial intervention may lead to the detection and 
prevention of life-threatening measures or serious ill-treatment which violate the 
fundamental guarantees contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention’.78 At stake 
was the protection of the liberty and personal security of individuals which could 
ultimately subvert the rule of law and, of importance for the individuals concerned,
75 ibid para. 108.
76 ibid para. 116.
77 ibid para.l 11.
78 ibid para. 123.
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place them beyond the reach of legal protection.79 The Court termed this 
‘unacknowledged detention’ amounting to a negation and grave violation of Article 5 
guarantees.80
The circumstances surrounding the enforced disappearance of an individual 
are frequently heinous and often result in the death of the individual detained by the 
state though in several cases no body has ever been recovered.81 In Bazorkina,82 the 
first of the cases concerning disappearances in Chechnya, the Court ruled that even 
without the body of the applicant’s son, Yandiyev, could be presumed dead given the 
length of time for which he had been missing. This was taken in conjunction with the 
order given by a Russian officer that Yandiyev be executed.83 However, the lack of a 
body, while evidence enough for the death of the applicant’s son, made it impossible 
for the Court to determine whether he had been subjected to torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.84
Proving that an individual has been abducted by agents of the State is 
fundamental to establishing a substantive breach of Article 2. In many of the Russian 
cases, victims are seen being bundled into vehicles as in Luluyev,85 captured on video 
surrounded by ‘hostile servicemen’,86 or by ‘federal officers’.87 Other cases simply 
state that the victim was abducted by ‘State servicemen’ and not seen since.88 In 
Khashiyev, the Court has held that the standard of proof required to prove an
79 ibid para. 123.
80 ibid.
81 e.g. Akhiyadova v. Russia (Application no. 32059/02) Judgment, 3 July 2008.
82 Bazorkina v. Russia (Application no. 69481/01) Judgment, 27 July 2006.
83 ibid paras. 110-111.
84 ibid para. 133.
85 Luluyev (n 68), para.80.
86 Baysayeva v. Russia (Application no.74237/01) Judgment, 5 April 2007, para. 141.
87 Musayeva and others v. Russia (Application no 74239/01) Judgment, 26 July 2007, para.75.
88 e.g. Alikhadzhiyeva v. Russia (Application no. 37193/07) Judgment, 24 May 2011, para.128; 
Ibragimov v. Russia (Application no. 34561/03) Judgment, 29 May 2008, para.93, Betayev and 
Betayeva v. Russia (Application no. 37315/03) Judgment, 29 May 2008, para.81.
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individual’s disappearance is that of ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’.89 Such a standard, 
used in criminal prosecutions, could be seen as out of place in a human rights court 
outside the criminal justice system. It places an onerous burden upon the applicants, 
one which in principle is hard for them to discharge especially in relation to 
disappearances.
The Court has taken steps to mitigate the harshness of this noting that such 
‘proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant 
inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.’90 Despite this, such an 
approach seems to be at variance with the overarching concern and purposes of the 
ECHR namely to protect human rights. It seems that, even with the safeguard 
developed in Khashiyev, the operation of the law in this regard remains unnecessarily 
harsh particularly in cases of disappearance.91 Further difficulties in proving enforced 
disappearance arise from States’ refusal to cooperate with the Court thus 
compounding the difficulties faced by the Court.92 Ultimately, this impacts upon the 
victims’ families who are left with a substantially high threshold to cross before the 
Court will entertain a violation of the ECHR. It is questionable as to whether this is in 
the best interests of justice and the protection of human rights.
With regard to disappearances in Turkey the Court’s approach has been 
marked by a degree of reluctance to attribute disappearances to State agents. In 
Osmanoglu the Court observed the manner of the victim’s abduction shared many 
similarities with the disappearances of other individuals in Turkey.93 However, there
89 Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia (Application no. 57945/00) Judgment, 24 February 2005, para. 134.
90 ibid para. 134.
91 This is an interesting point and merits further discussion but it is outside the scope of this thesis.
92 Joseph Barrett, ‘Chechnya’s Last Hope? Enforced Disappearances and the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2009) 22 Harvard Human Rights Journal 133, 138.
93 Osmanoglu v. Turkey (Application no. 48804/99) Judgment, 24 January 2008, para.58.
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was insufficient evidence to establish who was behind the victim’s disappearance.94 
Consequently, there was no violation of Article 2.95 Similarly, in the cases of Koku96 
and in Seker97 the Court has refused to recognise a violation of Article 2. In Seker the 
Court gave its reasons for refusing such a violation, noting that the circumstances of 
the victim’s disappearance was a matter of speculation and supposition due to the lack 
of sufficient evidence on which to determine that he had been abducted and killed by 
State agents.98 Unlike the ICTY and Inter-American Court, the ECtHR appears 
reluctant to take into account circumstantial evidence which would support an 
applicant’s claim if the standard of proof required was on the balance of probabilities. 
However, as previously mentioned, the ECtHR has adopted a beyond reasonable 
doubt approach that could be said to favour defendant States rather than the 
applicants.
In Ipek the applicant watched as his sons were taken away by Turkish soldiers 
before their disappearance.99 Coupled with the fact that the victims had been missing 
for nine years at the date of the ruling and because the state failed to provide any 
explanation for their detention the Court concluded that Turkey had violated Article 2. 
In the case of Tas the Court held that the applicant’s son must be ‘be presumed dead
following his detention by the security forces.’100 This finding took place in the
context of the situation in south-east Turkey in 1993 where unacknowledged 
detention of an individual would be life-threatening.101 Several other cases have 
attributed the disappearance of individuals to military or law enforcement agencies of
94 ibid para.63.
95 ibid para.64.
96 Koku v. Turkey (Application no. 27305/95) Judgment, 31 May 2005, para. 112.
97 Seker v. Turkey (Application no. 52390/99) Judgment, 21 February 2006.
98 ibid para.65.
99 Ipek v. Turkey (Application no. 25760/94) Judgment, 17 February 2004, para. 182.




the Turkish State.102 As with other human rights violations, in order to establish that a 
victim’s substantive right to life (as opposed to the procedural duty to investigate a 
death) must occur at the hands, or with the acquiescence, of State agents rather than 
non-State actors. This serves to restrict the application of Article 2 to cases in which 
the State is liable.
Article 2, the Court has ruled, is also capable of being breached by the state 
where it fails to investigate the disappearance and presumed death of a victim.103 This 
procedural violation of Article 2 has allowed the Court to find a violation even where 
it is unclear that the victim suffered at hands of agents of the state as happened in 
Osmanoglu and Koku. In Osmanoglu the Court held it could not be certain as to the 
identity of the perpetrators, but no investigation was launched into the disappearance 
of the victim.104 Furthermore, the State failed to take immediate measures which 
undermined the effectiveness of the protection afforded to the victim.105 The failure to 
take such ‘reasonable measures’ to ‘prevent a real and immediate risk to the life of 
Atilla Osmanoglu from materialising’ violated his right to life under Article 2.106 
Similar reasoning was used in Koku where it was held the defects in the criminal 
investigation system that removed the victim’s legal protection107 meant Turkey was 
in breach of Article 2.108 Similarly, most disappearance cases concerning Russia have 
found procedural violations of Article 2.109
102 See also Orhan (n71), para.359; and Akdeniz v. Turkey (Application no. 25165/94) Judgment, 31 
May 2005, para. 101.
103 This matter is only discussed in brief as it does not squarely fit with the current discussion as to how 
substantive, as opposed to procedural, breaches occur and are defined; See R (on the application o f Ali 
Zaki Mousa and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin).
104 Osmanoglu (n 93) para.78.
105 ibid para.83.
106 ibid.
107 Koku (n 96), para. 145.
108 ibid para. 146.
109 e.g. Imakayeva v. Russia (Application no. 7615/02) Judgment, 9 November 2006, para. 177.
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The ECtHR has also made substantial use of Article 3. In Akdeniz Article 3 
rights of the victim had been violated based on the evidence of several eyewitnesses 
detained alongside him.110 Further evidence was drawn to corroborate this from a 
report written by soldiers who were responsible for their detention. The report noted 
that the detained men had various injuries on their bodies caused during their attempts 
at escape and also as a result of the use of force.111 This report and the eyewitness 
statements were sufficient in the eyes of the Court to find that ‘the applicant’s son was 
subjected to ill-treatment, which, at the least, reaches the threshold of inhuman and 
degrading treatment and discloses in that respect a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention’.112
However, the Court has faced difficulties in determining that an individual had 
been tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment before his or her 
disappearance, a point similar to the evidential issues relating to Article 2 discussed 
above. In Lyanova it was impossible to determine both how the victims died and 
whether they were subjected to ill-treatment due to the fact that their remains had 
never been found.113 This was due to the ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ standard of 
proof used by the Court in its determinations.114 Similar rulings have been handed 
down by the Court in Tas, where the Court did not consider it appropriate to make any 
findings under Article 3 concerning the effect which the incommunicado detention 
might have had on the victim.115 The Court’s reticence in finding violations of Article 
3 in relation to the victims is seemingly due to the very high-level of proof (‘beyond 
all reasonable doubt’) apparently required in order to establish a violation of a
110 Akdeniz v. Turkey (Application no. 25165/94) Judgment, 31 May 2005, para. 118.
111 ibid.
112 ibid para. 119.
113 Lyanova and Aliyeva v. Russia (Application nos. 12713/02 & 28440/03) Judgment, 2 October 2008, 
para. 114.
114 ibid para.l 15.
115 Tas (n 100) para.76.
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Convention right. In cases involving the enforced disappearance of an individual it is 
questionable whether such a standard of proof is required given the nature of the 
proceedings (civil as opposed to criminal) and the ends sought i.e. the protection of 
human rights.
The Court has, however, been more receptive to holding that relatives’ Article 
3 rights have been violated from the outset.116 This has subsequently been applied in 
several cases.117 The requirements necessary for such a finding depend on several 
factors which distinguish such ill-treatment from ‘emotional distress’.118 These 
include the nature of the relationship, whether the family member witnessed the 
abduction, the family member’s attempt to discover information about the victim and, 
importantly, the way in which the authorities dealt with such inquiries.119 Often in 
such cases the applicants are close relations of the victim.120 Witnessing the 
abduction is a ground for holding a violation of Article 3,121 but such a requirement is 
not totally necessary as the Court found in Baysayeva where the applicant saw a video 
of the abduction122 and in Alikhadzhiyeva where the applicant had not witnessed the 
event live or by video.123
The actions of the applicant after the victim’s disappearance has been held as 
crucial to establishing whether the applicant has suffered a violation of his or her 
rights. There are several cases in which the applicants have done everything in their
116 Kurt (n 67) para. 134; For a comparison of the approaches of the ECtHR and Inter-American Court 
see Alexander Murray, ‘Enforced Disappearance and Relatives’ Rights before the Inter-American and 
European Human Rights Courts’ (2013) 2 International Human Rights Law Review 57.
117 e.g. Bazorkina (n 82) para.141; Ibragimov (n 88), para.107; Elmurzayev v. Russia (Application no. 
3019/04) Judgment, 12 June 2008, para. 120; Tas (n 100), para.80; Orhan (n71), para.360.
118 Bazorkina (n 82), para.l 11.
119 ibid.
120 Osmanoglu (n 93) para.97.
121 Umarov (n 70) para. 126.
122 Baysayeva (n 86) para.141.
123 Alikhadzhiyeva (n 88) para. 121.
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power to establish what happened to their loved ones. In Sangariyeva124 the Court 
heard how the Applicants had written to, and visited, various official bodies and 
despite their efforts had never ‘received any plausible explanation or information as 
to what became of their relative following his abduction.’125 The Court concluded 
that the ‘manner in which their complaints have been dealt with by the authorities 
must be considered inhuman treatment’.126 Thus it is a requirement that the State act 
in a manner that amounts to inhuman or degrading treatment vis-a-vis the relative.
However, there are cases in which the ECtHR has refused to acknowledge that 
an applicant’s Article 3 rights have been violated. For example in Togcu127 the Court 
held that while the investigation into the applicant’s son ‘may have caused the 
applicant feelings of anguish and mental suffering’ it was unable to establish that a 
violation of Article 3.128 The Court seemingly applied a remoteness test in the case of 
Koku129 noting that while the applicant was the brother of the victim, he was not 
present at the time of the disappearance as he was living in the United Kingdom. 
While he did report his brother’s disappearance to international organisations he did 
not ‘bear the brunt’ of making inquiries in Turkey.130 In the absence of aggravating 
features there had been no violation of Article 3.131 Lastly, although investigation of 
the victim’s death might have been inadequate to the point where it violated the 
procedural element of Article 2, the failings were not sufficiently serious to constitute
124 Sangariyeva and others v. Russia (Application no. 1839/04) Judgment, 29 May 2008.
125 ibid para.91; see also Ipek (n 99) paras. 182-183.
126 ibid para.92.
127 Togcu v. Turkey (Application no. 27601/95) Judgment, 31 May 2005.
128 ibid para. 128.
129 Koku (n 96).
130 ibid para.171.
131 ibid para. 172; a similar line of reasoning was used by the Court in Cakici to rebut the claims made 
by the applicant.’ Cakici v. Turkey (Application no. 23697/94) Judgment, 8 July 1999, para.99; see also 
I where the Court held that there was insufficient suffering on the part of the Applicant to constitute a 
violation of article 3, Celikbilek v. Turkey (Application no. 27693/95) para.98.
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a violation of the Article 3 rights of the applicant.132 This represents a conservative 
approach to the matter at hand, with the Court only recognising a violation of Article 
3 in the most egregious of circumstances and then only in respect of close family 
members.
Violation of the Article 5 right to liberty is the final breach of the ECHR to be 
considered. The basis for such claims is relatively straightforward with many of the 
Applicants arguing that their relatives were subjected to ‘unacknowledged detention’ 
and that this violated the rights guaranteed by Article 5. In Akhmadova the Court 
reiterated its finding that ‘unacknowledged detention is a complete negation of [such] 
guarantees and discloses a very grave violation of Article 5’.133 In Timurtas the 
safeguards guaranteed by Article 5 were deemed to have been totally negated by the 
victim’s unacknowledged detention.134 The Court has also shown itself to be willing 
to find that serious violations of Article 5 can be considered in lieu of a violation of 
Article 3 (in the absence of a body). For example, in Orhan the Court noted the ‘acute 
anxiety’ that individuals held incommunicado must experience is an aggravated 
aspect of a violation of Article 5 rather than a violation of Article 3.
Article 5 also imposes on States Parties certain duties. For example in 
Bazorkina the Court held that it was the responsibility of the state ‘to take effective 
measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt and 
effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into 
custody and has not been seen since’.135 The judgment in Alikhadzhiyeva notes that 
while the victim was abducted by state servicemen, his detention was not logged in
132 Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (Application no. 26307/95) Judgment, 8 April 2004, para.229.
133 Akhmadova and Akhmadov v. Russia (Application no. 20755/04) Judgment, 25 September 2008, 
para.95; Ipek (n 99) para. 191.
134 Timurtas v. Turkey (Application no. 23531/94) Judgment, 13 June 2000, para.106.
135 Bazorkina (n 82), para. 146.
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any custody records and there existed no official trace of him.136 It concluded that 
‘the absence of detention records, noting such matters as the date, time and location 
of detention and the name of the detainee, as well as the reasons for the detention and 
the name of the person effecting it, must be seen as incompatible with the very 
purpose of Article 5 of the Convention’.137 Lastly, the Court has also held that the 
difference between an Article 2 violation and an Article 5 violation is one of degree 
in that the longer an unacknowledged detention continues the more weight can be 
attached to this to determine that the victim is dead.138
Compared with the Inter-American Court, the ECtHR has adopted a 
fundamentally conservative approach to enforced disappearances. This can be seen in 
its requirement that violations be proven by the applicants to a beyond reasonable 
doubt standard of proof rather than on a balance of probabilities. This seems unduly 
harsh particularly in respect to serious violations of human rights such as enforced 
disappearances when, due to the very nature of the act, it is almost impossible to 
establish categorically that the victim was subjected to an enforced disappearance by 
State agents. This can be coupled with the more restrictive approach to the rights of 
relatives when compared with the Inter-American Court. It will be recalled that the 
latter considered impact of the disappearance on the ‘dynamics’ of the victims’ 
families, a methodology not adopted by the ECtHR. Despite these criticisms, the 
ECtHR has made a significant contribution to the law relating to enforced 
disappearances, particularly in respect of the procedural aspect of the right to life and 
the rights of victims’ relatives.
136 Alikhadzhiyeva (n 88) para. 128.
137 ibid.
138 Tanis and others v. Turkey (Application no. 65899/01) Judgment, 2 August 2005, para.201.
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3.1.4 - Conclusion on enforced disappearance within the IHRL regime 
Taken together the systems examined above offer a substantial contribution to the 
prohibition of enforced disappearance in the international legal system. Common to 
each sub-regime is the requirement that State agents be involved in acts of enforced 
disappearances. This condition highlights the State-centric nature of IHRL that 
effectively excludes acts of enforced disappearance perpetrated by non-State actors 
from consideration as a violation of IHRL. Despite this, it remains possible for the 
State to be held liable for enforced disappearances performed by non-State actors in a 
limited range of circumstances. First, it would be possible for a non-State actor to 
disappear an individual and the State refuse to investigate the circumstances of the 
disappearance. Under the ECHR this could amount to a violation of the procedural 
element of Article 2. Linked to this, the State could respond to a relative’s concerns 
about the victim in cruel or callous fashion, potentially giving rise to a violation of 
Article 3 in respect of the relative but not the victim. In this scenario, there might be 
no violation of the ECHR in respect of a victim but there could be a violation in 
respect of a victim’s relatives.
Other factors arise from the lack of a specific provision classifying enforced 
disappearance as a violation of human rights. Instead, the Inter-American Court and 
ECtHR have approached the matter cautiously by utilizing pre-existing provisions of 
their respective conventions. Both Courts have used rights that protect the right to 
life, the right to be free from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to 
liberty and security. By developing the law in this fashion, the Courts have ensured 
that new causes of action have not been created. In other ways the ECtHR in 
particular has demonstrated a marked reluctance to adopt a more flexible approach to 
the inclusion of circumstantial evidence in addition to failing to adopt a balance of
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probabilities stand of proof. In doing this, the ECtHR potentially excludes many 
legitimate claims brought by the relatives of the disappeared, ultimately to the 
detriment of greater human rights protection.
What is interesting about the IHRL approach to enforced disappearance is the 
emergence of a well-defined and developed human rights violation, albeit one that is 
derived from, and seemingly dependent on, other human rights. As with other areas 
examined in this thesis it is possible to identify the response of the IHRL regime as 
separate from those found in the IHL and ICL regimes. In respect of enforced 
disappearances, the IHRL regime has led the international response to prohibiting the 
acts, particularly through regional human rights courts. What the above section helps 
to establish in relation to the overall theme of this thesis is that the IHRL regime is 
not dependant upon the IHL and ICL regimes. In turn, this raises questions as to 
whether the concerns of those who see fragmentation as a danger to the operation and 
effectiveness of international law are perhaps misplaced. The fragmentation of 
international law has resulted in human rights protection that recognizes the anguish 
faced by the disappeared and their relatives, a protection that is not as strong under 
IHL and ICL.
3.2 - Enforced disappearance and IHL
The IHL regime, as with the IHRL regime, lacks specific provisions prohibiting 
instances of enforced disappearances. It is also possible to use existing rules to ensure 
that protection is afforded to victims of enforced disappearances in times of armed 
conflict. The IHRL regime specifically requires acts be committed by State agents (or 
with their involvement), in contrast the IHL regime is not as State-centric. However, it 
does have its own conditions on use, most notably the requirement that acts of 
enforced disappearance occur in the context of an international or non-intemational
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armed conflict. In this context, this requirement largely serves to distinguish 
violations of IHL from violations of IHRL. This chapter begins by examining the 
customary status of enforced disappearances under IHL, followed by an overview and 
analysis of the treaty provisions that could potentially allow for the creation of a 
composite prohibition of enforced disappearance. Lastly, the section concludes by 
considering some case law principally that which arose from the Nuremberg Trials 
deliberations over the Nacht und Nebel (night and fog) decree which saw thousands of 
enemies of the State disappearing without trace.
3.2.1 - Customary IHL and enforced disappearance
Unlike other areas of IHL, the customary element of IHL is considerably weaker. 
Some support for the idea that enforced disappearance is a violation of the customs of 
war is found in the Justice Case, a subsequent trial to the Nuremberg IMT.139 In this 
case the Tribunal held that the Nacht und Nebel decree under which thousands of 
people were subjected to acts of enforced disappeared led to violations of customary 
international law and therefore provided a customary basis for the offence for which 
the individuals in this case were prosecuted.140 However, despite this reference the 
customary international law relating to enforced disappearances is limited with 
preference being given to treaty law in the form of the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols.
3.2.2 - IHL treaty law and enforced disappearance
The IHL regime lacks a codified definition of disappearances, in much the same way 
as the ECHR and IACHR lack explicit provisions. Despite this, it is possible to
139 US V. Altstoetter et al. ‘The Justice Case\ Judgment of 3-4 December 1947, Trials of War Criminals 
before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. Ill, (United States Government Printing Office: 
Washington).
140 ibid p. 1032.
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identify treaty provisions that could be said to prohibit enforced disappearances. This 
section sketches out the provisions contained within these instruments before moving 
on to consider the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals.
The starting point for any discussion of the IHL provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions is Common Article 3, establishing an absolute minimum standard of 
protection applicable across the IHL regime. Particularly relevant to the construction 
of a definition of enforced disappearance are the prohibitions of murder, cruel 
treatment and torture; the commission of outrages against personal dignity including 
humiliating and degrading treatment; and the imposition of sentences and executions 
without judgment by a ‘regularly constituted court’ that affords judicial guarantees 
‘recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.’ While these prohibitions do not 
explicitly mention enforced disappearance, it is apparent that many instances of 
enforced disappearance encountered in the IHRL section concerned murder, torture 
and extra-judicial killing, all of which can be evidenced in the provisions of Common 
Article 3.
Other Articles in the Geneva Conventions also suggest that enforced 
disappearances are prohibited. For example, the First Geneva Convention requires 
belligerents to register PoWs ‘falling into their hands’.141 It is also a requirement to 
provide burials or cremation of the dead to determine the cause of death, establish the 
identity and facilitate the identification of the remains at a later date.142 Similar 
provisions are found in the Second,143 Third144 and Fourth145 Geneva Conventions. 
Although these provisions do not directly relate to enforced disappearances, they do 
address many of the concerns encountered under the IHRL regime. For example,
141 GC I, Article 16.
142 GC I, Article 17.
143 GC II, Articles 19-20.
144 GC III, Articles 120-122.
145 GC IV, Articles 136-139.
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denying knowledge of the detained individual as occurred in Kurt, or burying the 
victims in unmarked and concealed graves as in Bazorkina.146 The purpose of 
highlighting these provisions is to underscore the importance that IHL attaches to the 
proper treatment of the remains of the deceased, a factor often missing in instances of 
enforced disappearances.
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions also contribute to a 
definition of enforced disappearances under the IHL regime. Additional Protocol I, 
applying in instances of international armed conflict, contains fundamental guarantees 
prohibiting ‘violence to life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons’ 
including murder and torture,147 and ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent 
assault’.148 Article 75(3) requires that people arrested during an armed conflict should 
be informed of the reasons for their detention.149 Taken together these provisions add 
further strength to both defining and prohibiting enforced disappearances in times of 
international armed conflicts.
Additional Protocol II, although considered weaker in its protection because it 
applies to non-international armed conflicts, does offer a similar degree of protection 
to enforced disappearances even though such protection is not explicit. For example, 
Article 4 contains fundamental guarantees which prohibit ‘violence to the life, health 
and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel 
treatment such as torture’,150 and ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
146 Bazorkina (n 82) para. 110 -  in this case the victim’s body was never recovered, permitting the 
inference his grave was concealed.
147 AP I, Article 75(2)(a).
148 AP I, Article 75(2)(b).
149 AP I, Article 75(3).
150 AP II, Article 2(a).
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humiliating and degrading treatment’.151 An obligation is also imposed on the parties 
to a conflict to search for ‘persons who have been reported missing by an adverse 
party.’152 The provisions of both Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II 
underscore the importance of humane treatment of individuals, the prohibition of 
extra-judicial killing and the importance of ensuring that detainees and the missing are 
accounted for by the belligerents. These prohibitions could help to shape how the 
violation of IHL of enforced disappearances is defined.
3.2.3 - IHL case law of enforced disappearance
Much of the IHL jurisprudence can be examined through the lens of the ICL regime. 
However, as was the approach with torture in Chapter Two; this section concerns 
itself as far as is practicable with instances of enforced disappearance properly 
considered to be war crimes. Here, war crimes mean either the violation of the 
Geneva Conventions or the relevant war crimes provisions of the international 
criminal tribunals. This section begins by considering the prosecution of individuals at 
Nuremberg for the enforced disappearance of individuals. In approaching the matter 
in such a fashion, it is intended to demonstrate the historical background to the 
prohibition of enforced disappearances found in the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes.
At Nuremberg prosecutors asked the Tribunal to consider instances of 
enforced disappearance relating in particular to the Night and Fog Directive {‘Nacht 
und Nebel Erlass’) signed by Hitler in December 1941.153 At the heart of the directive 
was the idea that an individual was to be disappeared without a trace and no 
information would be given by authorities to the relatives.154 As such, Finucane has
151 AP n, Article 4(2)(e).
152 AP II, Article 33.
153 Brian Finucane, ‘Enforced Disappearance as a Crime Under International Law: A Neglected Origin 
in the Laws of War’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 171.
154 Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military’ Tribunal 1946(1941) 41 AJIL 172, 229.
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termed the Directive an attack on ‘familial integrity’,155 used to intimidate (and 
therefore pacify) the civilian populations of occupied territories.156 The ‘fundamental 
innovation’ of Nacht and Nebel was not the attack upon the victim but rather the harm 
it was intended to cause to their families.157 As such, it can be considered more 
egregious because it victimises the individual in addition to using the victim as 
method of intimidating the wider populace.
It was held Nacht und Nebel amounted to a violation of the laws and customs 
of war. The Judgment continued noting that under Article 46 of the Hague 
Convention,158 ‘Family honour and rights, the lives of persons and private 
property.. .must be respected.’ For the IMT, therefore, the disappearance of 
individuals violated Article 46 and thus constituted a violation of the laws or customs 
of war. The prohibition of enforced disappearances, as Finucane cogently argues, 
appears to have its origins in the laws of war.159 For Finucane, this is a condemnation 
by the IMT of Nacht und Nebel ‘as a form of mistreatment inflicted upon the missing 
persons and their families’ rather than murder or deportation.160 The implementation 
of Nacht und Nebel was regretted by one of the defendants, Keitel, who realised, 
perhaps too late, that the removal of individuals from the protection of the law and the 
use of the decree as a substitute for the death penalty was contrary to acceptable 
standards of behaviour expected of military officers.161
Subsequent trials at Nuremberg also considered the disappearance of 
individuals. In the Justice Case the Tribunal considered Nacht und Nebel in detail,
155 Finucane (n 153) 173.
156 ibid 176.
157 ibid 178.
*58 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, UKTS 9 (1910) 59 
(Eng. Fr.).
159 Finucane (n 153) 195.
160 ibid 178.
161 Eugene Davidson, The Trial o f the Germans (University of Missouri Press 1997) 338.
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identifying two elements relevant to the disappearance of individuals. These were that 
the victims were ‘spirited away for secret trial by special courts’ and that the victims’ 
whereabouts were to be kept completely secret.162 Such treatment either led to the 
immediate execution of the individual or to their being placed in ‘protective custody’, 
left to the mercy of the Gestapo.163 The Tribunal described Nacht und Nebel as an 
‘illegal, cruel, and inhumane plan or scheme’164 and that those planning and 
implementing it ‘knew that its enforcement violated international law of war’ as well 
as knowing that it was ‘intended to serve as a terroristic measure in aid of the military 
operations and the waging of war by the Nazi regime.’165 This formulation has been 
used approximately as a basis for future decisions on enforced disappearances in the 
IHL and IHRL regimes.
Further evidence to this end is cited by the Tribunal from the testimony of 
Lieutenant General Rudolf Lehmann, head of the legal division of the OKW 
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces).166 
In this he stated that he argued that Nacht und Nebel be rejected ‘for manifold 
reasons’ including ‘for reasons of international law, for reasons of justice, and policy 
of justice, and primarily, because [he] said the administration of justice should never 
do anything secretly.’ This opinion was shared by ‘the leading jurists of the armed 
forces.’167 Such a statement by a leading lawyer in the OKW provides evidence to 
suggest that those planning and implementing Nacht und Nebel knew of the illegality 
of their measures. The Tribunal commented on the legality of the decree later in the




166 Lehmann was prosecuted in the High Command Trial see: US v. Leeb et al The High Command 
Case’, Judgment of 27-28 October 1948, vols. X and XI, (United States Government Printing Office: 
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judgment where it was noted that it constituted a violation of ‘the international law of 
war and international common law relating to recognized human rights.’168 This latter 
comment is interesting because it highlights the acceptance by the Tribunal that 
individuals could be held responsible not only for the violation of the laws of war but 
also for the violation of human rights.
The Justice Case considered the conditions and treatment of those detained 
under Nacht und Nebel. In addition to being kept incommunicado, they were 
subjected to overcrowded prison conditions, ravaged by disease because of the poor 
provision of medical treatment and poorly fed.169 Detainees were to be treated with 
special precaution, not allowed any correspondence, ‘locked up hermitically from the 
outer world, and that care should be taken that their real names remain unknown to 
the lower prison personnel.’170 This serves to underscore the brutality with which the 
detainees were treated as well as the complete level of isolation to which they were 
subjected, factors common to contemporary instances of enforced disappearance.
Nacht und Nebel detainees at their trials were ‘occasionally denied the aid of 
any counsel’.171 Even if the detainee was afforded legal counsel, they were often 
represented by ‘those who were recognized as unconditionally reliable, pro-State and 
judicially efficient lawyers.’172 The sentences imposed ranged from death to 
internment in concentration camps. As part of the Nacht und NebeX programme 
revolved around secrecy, no criminal records were kept.173 If a detainee died, death 









Reich Minister of Justice.174 The bodies of those executed or who died during their 
detention were placed in unmarked graves. Their bodies to be used for teaching or 
research purposes, although this latter requirement was later relaxed and bodies turned 
over to institutes ‘for experimental purposes.’175 Just as the individuals detained were 
denied contact with the outside world so too were their bodies after death, their 
existence being removed from the face of the Earth. This is a common trait of modem 
enforced disappearances cases before the Inter-American Court and ECtHR.
Lastly, the Tribunal turned to examining the purpose of Nacht und Nebel 
noting the fundamental purpose of the decree would serve as a deterrent to the 
remainder of the population in the occupied territories.176 The policy became a means 
of instrumentality to control and coerce those in the occupied territories. It created an 
atmosphere of fear amongst the friends and relatives, leading to the meting out of 
inhumane treatment to the prisoners and their friends and relatives. Such distress was 
the direct purpose of Nacht und Nebel and consequently ‘cruel punishment was meted 
out to the families and friends without any charge or claim that they actually did 
anything in violation of any occupation mle of the army or any crime against the 
Reich.’177 The Tribunal here established that ‘mental cmelty may be inflicted as well 
as physical cmelty.’178 In this sense, the basis of the Inter-American and ECtHR 
rulings are discemable in the Nuremberg judgments.
In the RuSHA Case179 the Tribunal referred to a ‘special category of prisoners’ 
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German forces in the occupied countries.’180 These were the Nacht und Nebel inmates 
who were bound for execution without delay or, if this was not possible (the reasons 
for this are not clear in the judgment), were to be taken to Germany and handed over 
to the security services. The judgment concludes that ‘No word of the prisoners was 
permitted to reach their relatives or the country from which they came’. They 
therefore disappeared without a trace, used as instruments to cow the populations of 
the occupied territories. The Indictment in the Ministries Case refers to the purpose of 
Nacht und Nebel as the creation of a ‘judicial reign of terror in the occupied 
territories’,181 while in its judgment the Tribunal held that keeping those detained 
under perpetual sentence of death ‘is a trait typical of the sadism of the Nazi regime, 
and if anything could be considered a crime against humanity, such a practice is.’182 
The prosecution of individuals for acts of enforced disappearance under Nacht und 
Nebel represents an important development for the international legal system. It 
recognised that the detention of individuals and then acting as if they did not exist 
could be prosecuted as a crime under IHL.183
3.2.4 - Conclusion on IHL and enforced disappearance
The IHL regime now contains some of the weakest protection relevant to enforced 
disappearances. This stands in contrast to the fact that the IHL regime via the 
Nuremberg Tribunals conducted some of the first prosecutions relating to enforced 
disappearances that occurred under the Nacht und Nebel decree. As a result of this 
weakness, one possible method of addressing enforced disappearances that occur 
during armed conflict would be to treat instances of enforced disappearance as murder
180 ibid 221.
181 US v. Weizsaecker et al, ‘The Ministries Case', Judgment of 14 April 1949, Trials of War Criminals 
before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. XII (United States Government Printing Office) 46.
182 ibid 608.
183 Davidson (n 161) 338.
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contrary to established prohibitions of illegal killing during armed conflict. This 
would be permissible even if the victim’s body was never recovered. This could serve 
as evidence to suggest that despite the fragmentation demonstrated between the three 
regimes, the IHL regime will continue to function in respect of enforced 
disappearances.
Enforced disappearance in the IHL regime is primarily based on the existence 
of an armed conflict. This could be international or non-international but must, in any 
event, meet the minimum standard set out in Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions. If this is not met then IHL is not activated. Going beyond this criterion, 
it would appear that the physical act of subjecting an individual to enforced 
disappearance is broadly similar to that which is found in the IHRL regime. As with 
torture, the largest difference between IHL and IHRL, beyond the armed conflict 
criterion, is that IHL can be applied to non-State actors as well as State officials or its 
armed forces. This potentially widens the scope of protection to be afforded to 
individuals in times of armed conflict. Fragmentation of the international legal system 
can be seen as cause for the divergence between IHRL, IHL and ICL. However, each 
of the regimes remains able and committed to preventing acts of enforced 
disappearance albeit in differing fashions.
3.3 - Enforced disappearance and ICL
The prohibition of enforced disappearance under ICL has a chequered history. For 
example, the disappearance of individuals into Nazi concentration camps under the 
Nacht und Nebel decree was explicitly referred to at Nuremberg, albeit in the context 
of IHL. However, it then fell from the consciousness of ICL and was not included as a 
discrete offence in the ICTY, ICTR or SCSL Statutes. Despite this, the ICTY has
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given some limited consideration to the matter,184 subsequently developed by the 
Bosnian War Crimes Court.185 Enforced disappearance is now regarded as a crime 
against humanity under the ICC Statute.186 However, the requirements contained both 
in the Statute and the Elements of Crimes are particularly onerous and it remains to be 
seen whether this offence will be much used by the Prosecutor. For an instance of 
disappearance to constitute a crime against humanity it is necessary to demonstrate 
that the incident occurred within the context of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population, and that the perpetrator had knowledge of the attack.187 
This section does not consider the customary law of ICL because of the highly 
codified nature of the regime, it instead begins with the treaty provisions followed by 
an analysis of the relevant case law.
3.3.1 - ICL treaty law and enforced disappearance
The revulsion to the practice of enforced disappearance has led to the prosecution of 
several individuals for the act before the ICTY. The ICTY, lacking a specific offence 
of enforced disappearance in its statute had to rely upon Article 5(i) which prohibited 
‘other inhumane acts’. This is a broad category of offence and has elsewhere been 
held to include persecutory acts, the forcible transfer of person and enforced 
prostitution.188 The broad scope of Article 5(i) does however present problems 
especially concerning whether it violates the fair trial principles of nulla poena sine
184 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic (IT-95-16-T) TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para.563.
185 Prosecutor v. Damjanovic (No.X-KR-05/51) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 15 December 2006
186 ICC Statute, Article 7(1 )(i).
187 ICC Statute, Article 7(1).
188 Kupreskic (n 184) para.566.
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lege and lex stricta where criminal offences have to be strictly defined and not 
advanced by analogy.189
The evolution of enforced disappearance as a violation of international 
criminal law came in the drafting process of the ICC Statute which now classifies 
enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity.190 It is defined as the ‘arrest, 
detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization’.191 This conforms in broad terms 
with how the violation under IHRL has been defined both in the ICCPED and in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and Inter-American Court. Indeed Schabas has noted that 
the content of crimes against humanity found in the ICC Statute has been ‘enriched 
principally by developments in international human rights law.’192 The only element 
different here is the addition that the crime can be committed by a ‘political 
organisation’ in addition to being a crime committed only by a state. This conforms 
with the idea of broadening international criminal justice so as to include non-state 
actors many of which, be they armed groups or rebel governments, could not be 
defined per se as being a state.
Article 7(2)(i) continues that such acts of enforced disappearance are followed 
by ‘a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the 
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the 
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.’ This is reminiscent of the Nacht 
und Nebel order given by the Nazis, and also of practices held to amount to enforced
189 See Dana for a discussion of this in relation to modern international criminal law: Shahram Dana, 
‘Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory of the Principle of Legality in International 
Criminal Law Sentencing’ (2009) 99 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 857, 864; See also 
Hiromi Sato, ‘Modes of International Criminal Justice and General Principles of Criminal 
Responsibility’ 4 Gottingen Journal of International Law 765, 801.
190 ICC Statute, Article 7(1 )(i).
191 ICC Statute, Article 7(2)(i).
192 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court (CUP 2011) 115.
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disappearance by the ECtHR and Inter-American Court. The last element, that of 
intentionally removing the individual from the protection of the law ‘for a prolonged 
time’ protects the individual and recognises that often when a person is thus deprived 
of their freedom the potential for further violation of other rights, and the commission 
of other criminal offences by the perpetrators, is increased.
The ICC Elements of Crimes offers additional illumination on the definition of 
enforced disappearance. The Elements are not legally binding on the ICC but rather 
they serve as a tool for the interpretation of the crimes defined in the ICC Statute. The 
first element to be proven is that the perpetrator either ‘arrested, detained or abducted 
one or more persons’ or that he refused ‘to acknowledge the arrest, detention or 
abduction, or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or 
persons.’ This conforms to the crime as it is defined in its base definition in Article 
7(2)(i). There appears to be a two-stage test for each of the offences specified in the 
first two elements.
The first offence is either that the perpetrator detained a person (Elements 
1(a)) and then proceeded to refuse to acknowledge that person’s detention (Elements 
1(b)); or that the perpetrator refused to acknowledge a person’s detention which was 
preceded by or accompanied with the detention of the individual. The inclusion of 
these two types of enforced disappearance broadens the scope of the law relating to 
enforced disappearances. The first instance, detaining and then refusing to 
acknowledge the detention of the individual, is widely found in the IHRL 
jurisprudence. It could be termed as a ‘classical’ enforced disappearance where the 
person performing the detention subsequently proceeds to deny knowledge of the 
individual. The second type of enforced disappearance listed in the Elements permits 
the prosecution of an individual who refuses to acknowledge an individual s detention
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regardless of how that individual came to be in their custody. By constructing the 
definition of enforced disappearance in this manner, the Elements grant a much wider 
category of offence that can be used to hold a greater pool of individuals to account.
The third element specifies that the perpetrator was aware that the detention 
would be followed by the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or that 
such refusal was preceded by a deprivation of freedom. Fourth, is the requirement that 
the detention was carried out with the ‘authorization, support or acquiescence of, a 
State or a political organization.’ No guidance is given as to how a State, or political 
organisation, is to be defined. The former can be defined by recourse to other areas of 
international law,193 while the latter might raise questions as to exactly what is meant 
by a ‘political organisation’.
Next is the temporal element requiring that the detained individual be removed 
from the protection of the law for a ‘prolonged period of time’. There is no definition 
provided as to what would constitute a ‘prolonged period of time’ which could cause 
difficulties where an individual is detained for anything up to several days which 
might not be considered ‘prolonged’. It is submitted here that the death of an 
individual even if they were only detained for a few hours, as in many of the Chechen 
cases, before being summarily executed could constitute a prolonged period of time 
on the basis that the individual’s final hours were spent in unacknowledged and 
enforced detention.
The final two elements relate to the requirement common to all crimes against 
humanity, namely that the conduct ‘was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population ; and that the perpetrator knew 
that the enforced disappearance (or refusal to acknowledge detention) was part of a
193 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edition, OUP 2006).
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widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. These two 
elements impose on the prosecutor the additional actus reus and mens rea requirement 
that there is firstly a widespread or systematic attack (the actus reus) and that the 
perpetrator knew that it was part of a widespread or systematic attack (the mens rea). 
The additional requirement that these elements be proved does lead to a narrowing of 
the definition of enforced disappearance in that it would presumably exclude sporadic 
instances of disappearances.
In conclusion, the Elements create a lengthy definition of the crime against 
humanity of enforced disappearances. Some aspects of the Elements, such as the 
intention to remove the victim from the protection of the law ‘for a prolonged period 
of time’ could be difficult to prove especially in the context of wider civil unrest. The 
Elements also require that the detention be conducted with the authorization, support 
or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization.’ Interestingly, this makes the 
crime of enforced disappearance the only crime against humanity that requires the 
involvement of a State or political official. Although the term ‘political organization’ 
could include non-State actors it should be recognised that not all non-State actors 
could be said to be a ‘political organization’. This would mean either a liberal 
interpretation on the part of the Court in defining ‘political organization’ in order to 
convict some perpetrators or the possibility that enforced disappearances committed 
by non-State actors would not be classified as a crime against humanity. Such a state 
of affairs could compromise the desire of the ICC to provide justice both for the 
accused and for the victims.
3.3.2 - ICL case law and enforced disappearance
The driving force behind the development of the crime of enforced disappearance has 
been the ICTY that utilised the wide-ranging term ‘other inhumane acts’ of Article
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5(i) to criminalise such acts in Kupreskic. This section therefore begins by examining 
the definition of this category of crimes against humanity so as to provide a solid 
basis for the analysis of enforced disappearances in ICL. While the ICC Elements 
appear to offer a concise definition as to what constitutes an enforced disappearance 
there are instances in which the ICTY’s jurisprudence will be useful to clarify certain 
aspects of the offence, leaving such analysis far from redundant. This will be most 
noticeable when it comes to choosing between prosecuting an accused for enforced 
disappearance or simply for murder. The latter choice might prove to be a simpler 
method of ensuring that justice is administered rather than attempting to satisfy each 
criterion required to prove an enforced disappearance.
3.3.2(a) - Enforced disappearance at the ICTY
The ICTY in Kupreskic set about establishing the boundaries of enforced 
disappearance. The Trial Chamber noted that there was concern as to how the term 
was to be defined because of its lack of specificity.194 This was seen as contrary to the 
operation of criminal law which demands that criminal offences be strictly construed 
in order for an accused to know the exact charges made against him. The Court held 
that the term was included as a ‘residual category’ in much the same fashion as 
‘humane treatment’ contained in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was to 
be construed.195 In analysing the existing corpus of international law pertaining to this 
matter, the Trial Chamber made reference to Article 7(k) of the ICC Statute which 
states that it includes ‘causing great suffering, or serious injury to the body or to 
mental or physical health.’




Recourse was made to several international human rights treaties and having 
analysed a number of provisions of these treaties the Court concluded that ‘other 
inhumane acts’ must ‘be as serious as the other classes of crimes provided for in the 
other provisions of Article 5.’196 The Court also referred to definitions of ‘inhumane 
treatment’ decided under Article 2 (b) of the ICTY Statute, noting that in Delalic the 
Trial Chamber had ruled that such treatment was an intentional act or omission 
‘which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious 
attack on human dignity.’197 Having reviewed the law, Kupreskic held that ‘the 
expression at issue undoubtedly embraces... the enforced disappearance of 
persons.’198 The Kupreskic judgment did not however go on to establish how the 
enforced disappearance of persons was to be defined, merely that it constituted a 
crime against humanity under the ICTY Statute.
Further development came in the cases of Lukic, Kmojelac and Limaj 
although the crime was developed by reference to the crime of murder rather than 
explicitly to the crime of the enforced disappearance of individuals. However, there 
are several overlaps with this approach and the approach taken by the IHRL regime. 
Furthermore, the Court has made reference in several cases to the disappearance of 
individuals, including widespread and systematic instances of the practice but has 
failed to translate this into an indictable offence. For example, in Vasiljevic reference 
was made to instances concerning arbitrary killings and disappearance of civilians 
from the municipality of Visegrad. It was noted that the number of disappearances 
peaked in June and July 1992 and the Court referred to a pattern and intensity when 
describing the disappearances.199
196 ibid para.566.
197 Prosecutor v. Delalic (IT-96-21-T) TC, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para.543.
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Lukic referred to several instances of enforced disappearances including 
events at the Uzmanica concentration camp. However, these acts did not appear on 
the indictment, but were instead used by the Court to contextualise the indicted 
offences. Several instances of disappearances were cited, including the disappearance 
of 20 young detainees in July 1992, none of whom have been seen since.200 Similar 
instances were reported to have occurred in November 1992.201 Further in the 
judgment it is noted, in the context of a murder charge, there is no need to produce the 
deceased’s body in order to support a murder conviction. Death may be established by 
circumstantial evidence, ‘providing that the only reasonable inference available from 
the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber is that’ the victim is dead ‘as a result of 
acts or omissions of the accused’.202 The relevant factors to be taken into account 
with regard to circumstantial evidence includes proof of the mistreatment of the 
victim, ‘patterns of mistreatment and disappearances of other victims...and lack of 
contact by the victim with others whom the victim would have been expected to 
contact, such as his or her family.’203 The requirement of having to produce a body to 
prove death had been discounted as early as the Tadic judgment with the Court 
highlighting the practical difficulties connected with having to produce a body to 
prove that an individual has died during conflicts. It did however note that ‘there must 
be evidence to link injuries received to a resulting death.’204 This position can be 
contrasted with that adopted by the ECtHR which, it will be recalled, has been 
reluctant in many cases to establish the death of an individual without evidence that
200 Prosecutor v. Lukic (IT-98-32/1-T) TC, Judgment, 20 July 2009, para.797.
201 ibid para.798.
202 ibid para.904.
203 ibid para 904- this had previously been confirmed in Martic(YT-95-\ 1-T) TC Judgment, 12 June 
2007, para.59; and Prosecutor v. Halilovic (IT-01-48-T), TC, Judgment, 16 November 2005, para.37.
204 Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1-T) TC, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para.240.
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the individual has died. Furthermore, the ECtHR has been markedly more reluctant to 
take into account evidence of a circumstantial character.
In Limaj the Trial Chamber acquitted the defendants on the charge of murder 
because there was no evidence linking the defendants to the disappearance of the 
victims. 205 This was despite the victims’ disappearance and evidence suggesting 
disappearances had been conducted at the concentration camp.206 The Chamber 
concluded that ‘[having] regard to all the relevant circumstances the Chamber cannot 
be satisfied that the Prosecution has established that Milovan Krstic and Miodrag 
Krstic are in fact dead.’207 This is an evidential aspect of the offence because the 
Prosecution is required to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants 
caused the death of the victims, rather than relying on a balance of probabilities test. 
This was confirmed in Krnojelac where the Tribunal held that that proving that a 
person had been murdered beyond a reasonable doubt did not require proof that the 
victim’s body had been recovered,208 a point subsequently confirmed by the Appeals 
Chamber in Kvocka.209 Again, this is suggestive of a greater acceptance of the value 
of circumstantial evidence when compared with the ECtHR. One possible reason for 
this difference is that the ICTY was dealing with cases that took place in a widely 
recognised armed conflict whereas the ECtHR has not. However, the disparity 
between the approach taken by the ICTY and by the ECtHR again serves as evidence 
to suggest that the two regimes are more separate and independent than might be first 
thought.
205 prosecutor v. Limaj (IT-03-66-T) TC, Judgment, 30 November 2005, para.342.
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3.3.2(b) Enforced disappearance at the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber 
The Bosnian War Crimes Chamber (BWCC) was created to absorb some of the 
ICTY’s workload and to strengthen the justice system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.210 
It serves as a forum for the domestic prosecution of those accused of committing 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The BWCC began its life as a 
hybrid court with international judges and domestic judges sitting alongside each 
other.211 Overtime, the balance has shifted towards having more domestic judges and 
now only six international judges sit in the Court, a number likely to decrease further 
in years to come. While its jurisdiction is provided for under domestic law by means 
of the Bosnian and Herzegovina Criminal Code (‘the Bosnian Criminal Code’),212 
many of the provisions which grant the Court jurisdiction over international crimes 
are directly inspired by international criminal law and the jurisprudence of the ICTY, 
in addition to international human rights law.
Chapter XVII of the Criminal Code creates the criminal offences of, inter alia, 
genocide,213 crimes against humanity214 and war crimes.215 Of particular relevance to 
this chapter is the inclusion in Article 172(l)(i) of enforced disappearance as a crime 
against humanity. This replicates the provisions of the ICC Statute and copies 
verbatim the definition of enforced disappearance found in Article 7(2)(i) of the ICC 
Statute.216 Article 172(l)(i) and (2)(i) in addition to providing domestic criminal 
sanction for the enforced disappearance of individuals also fulfils the role of 
incorporating the ICC Statute into Bosnian law.
210 Janine Clark, ‘The State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina: a path to reconciliation?’ (2010) 13 
Contemporary Justice Review 371, 373.
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212 Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina ( ‘Bosnian Criminal Code’), 24 January 2003, available at
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/zakoni/en/krivicni_zakon_3_03_-_eng.pdf (accessed 26 March 
2012 ).
213 Bosnian Criminal Code, Article 171.
214 ibid Article 172.
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The Court has considered instances of enforced disappearance as a crime 
against humanity in several cases. In Damjanovic217 the BWCC considered the 
individual elements which the prosecutor would require to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt. These were the existence of the abduction or arrest of persons with the 
acquiescence and/or the support of a State or political organisation. The perpetrator 
must also refuse to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the persons taken 
away with the intent to remove that person or persons from the protection of the law 
for a prolonged period of time. This follows closely the wording of the Bosnian 
Criminal Code and ICC Statute but is worth repeating here because it demonstrates 
the use of the law by the Court. In addition to fulfilling the individual elements of the 
specific offence of enforced disappearance is the requirement that the umbrella 
elements of crimes against humanity be proven i.e. that the disappearance was part of 
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and the perpetrator 
knew this was the case.218
In the case of Damjanovic the Court heard how the accused, a member of the 
Bosnian Serb army, would arrest individuals without grounds and without giving 
information219 while dressed in the uniform ‘recognisable as that of a soldier of the 
RS [Republika Srpska] Army’.220 These victims were ‘neither accounted for nor 
found.221 Consequently, the Court was certain that the accused both carried out the 
physical act of disappearing people and that he did so with the support or 
acquiescence of the Republika Srpska. The Court also emphasised the notorious 
reputation of the accused for committing such acts and while such a reputation was
217 Damjanovic (n 185).
218 See ICC Statute Article 7(1).
219 Prosecutor v. Damjanovic (No. X-KR-05/51) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 





not considered in itself to be directly probative ‘it supported] the conclusion that the 
accused did not hesitate to commit such acts’.222 With regard to the umbrella offence 
of the attacks being widespread or systematic, the Court noted that the accused’s
‘presence and...reputation contributed to the systematic attack on the civilian 
population.’223 This latter statement is revealing because it shows understanding on 
the part of the Court that one individual with a reputation for committing crimes
against humanity can be used by a State or political organisation in its attack on
civilians. It further serves to recognise the fact that the individual was obviously
acting with impunity and thus gives rise to individual criminal responsibility which is 
a basic tenet of modem international criminal law.224
Following the judgment in Damjanovic the Court has considered several other 
cases involving the disappearance of individuals. For example, in Stevanovic225 the
court listed a case where hospital patients disappeared en route from a hospital to 
‘safe territory’, a journey made at the behest of the accused.226 While in Perkovic227 
the accused, a reserve military officer with the rank of major, was found to have both
perpetrated in and knew of the occurrence of the enforced disappearance of 
individuals ‘but neither prevented nor punished’228 such acts. This gave rise to his 
responsibility as a commander, a further basic tenet of international criminal law. In 
Bastah229 the Court identified objective and subjective elements of the crime noting 
that the fact that the accused were at the material time part of the armed forces of
222 ibid.
223 ibid.
224 This is now contained in Article 25, ICC Statute. See also Gerhard Werle, ‘Individual Criminal 
Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’ (2007) 5 JICJ 953.
225 Prosecutor v. Stevanovic (No. X-KR-05/24-2) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 29 July 2008.
226 ibid 75.
227 Prosecutor v. Perkovic (No. X-KR-09/662) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
24 December 2009.
228 ibid 11.




Republika Srpska and in that capacity apprehended persons who remain unaccounted 
for constitutes the objective element of the offence;230 while the subjective element 
was established when the accused refused to provide information about the fate of the 
person detained.231
However, there have been instances where the accused has been acquitted. For 
example in Savic232 the Court ruled that the elements of the offence were not proven 
even though the alleged victims were not seen again there was insufficient evidence to 
show that the accused knew what would happen to them once they were detained, nor 
was there evidence to suggest that he knew what the final outcome of their 
disappearance would be (the victims were allegedly executed).233 This last point 
seems strange because knowledge of the victims’ fate is not a required element of the 
offence. One possible reason for this is that it was made to underscore the accused’s 
lack of knowledge of the umbrella elements required for a crime against humanity i.e. 
that it was part of a widespread or systematic attack. Another acquittal came in the 
case of Mandic234 a former Deputy Minister of the Interior of Republika Srpska. The 
prosecution alleged that his command responsibility for such acts was engaged 
however the Court held that there was no evidence, to overcome the burden of 
reasonable doubt, that the accused committed or ordered such acts.235
The Court has reviewed the relevant international law concerning enforced 
disappearances in Bastah.236 In this case the Court noted that the ‘current sources of 
international law define the notion of enforced disappearance as a crime against
230 ibid 60.
231 ibid 61.
232 Prosecutor v. Savic (No. X-KR-07/478) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 
July 2009.
233 ibid 103.
234 Prosecutor v. Mandic (No. X-KRZ-05/58) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
1 September 2009.
235 ibid.
236 Bastah (n 229).
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humanity’. It also referred to the UN General Assembly resolution on enforced 
disappearances237 which the Court found had been adopted into national criminal 
legislation by Article 172(l)(i). However, it did not make reference to the ICC 
Statute, the international convention on enforced disappearances or to the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR or Inter-American Court. Another issue in this regard 
which lacks clarity is why the Court felt it needed to refer to international law at all 
when enforced disappearance, though based on international law, has clearly been 
transformed into domestic law by virtue of the Bosnian Criminal Code. This 
recognition of international law appears to be an attempt by the Court to provide 
justification for its decision even though the relevant law is domestic. The 
jurisprudence of the BWCC with regard to enforced disappearance can help to 
identify future trends in the field and suggest how the ICC might approach instances 
of enforced disappearance in the future. It also serves to illustrate the methodology of 
domestic courts concerned with international criminal law, and how they too may 
consider the matter in the future.
3.3.3 - Conclusion on the ICL regime and enforced disappearance 
The ICTY has adopted a largely cautious approach in instances of enforced 
disappearance. Instead of specifically stating that individuals have been forcibly 
disappeared the Court has relied upon the crime of murder with the requirement that a 
body need not be produced in order to prove the said murder. This is obviously 
similar in fact to instances of enforced disappearance adjudicated by the ECtHR and 
Inter-American Court. Such an approach is understandable if one considers the 
general reluctance on the part of the Tribunal to unnecessarily extend its jurisdiction 




state that enforced disappearance, as a crime against humanity, could be classified 
under Article 5(i) which relates to ‘other inhumane acts’.238 However the Court has up 
until now not found an accused guilty of such an act, this could be for example due to 
the unwillingness of the ICTY Prosecutor to try to extend the boundaries of this law 
and given the late stage in the proceedings it is unlikely that individuals will now be 
found guilty of the offence at the ICTY. However, this does not mean that all is lost 
because as has been seen the Bosnian War Crimes Court has successfully prosecuted 
individuals for the offence and it is now also a well-defined, if cumbersome, crime 
against humanity under the ICC Statute.
The ICC Elements of Crimes offers a comprehensive definition of enforced 
disappearance as a crime against humanity. It is comprised of eight elements, two of 
which are the ‘standard’ elements required for an individual to held liable for a crime 
against humanity, namely that the enforced disappearance was committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, and that the perpetrator 
knew the conduct was part of such an attack. The remaining six elements present a 
detailed description of enforced disappearance which, as discussed, could prove to be 
too complicated to be employed. Instead, prosecutors may very well prefer to 
prosecute an accused for murder.
Fragmentation therefore can be seen as offering not only solutions to complex 
problems but also additional complexity where it is not warranted. The Elements of 
Crimes at the ICC can be seen as helping to clarify the definition of the various 
criminal offences contained in the Statute. However, the definition of fragmentation 
contained therein can be seen as unnecessarily complicated. In one regard this reflects 
the complicated nature of the criminal offence of enforced disappearance. This can be
238 Kupreskic (n 184) para.566.
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compared with the comparatively simpler definition of enforced disappearance as a 
violation of IHRL. The difference could be because of the requirement that criminal 
offences be strictly construed under the Statute and thus a high-degree of legal 
certainty is required in order to hold an individual criminally liable for the crime 
against humanity of enforced disappearance.
Conclusion to Chapter Three
Throughout this chapter reference has been made to the fact that enforced 
disappearance is often treated as a composite violation of a regime’s rules rather than 
as an independently recognised legal provision. This is the case in the IHRL and IHL 
regimes and until the advent of the ICC Statute a feature too of the ICL regime. The 
composite nature of enforced disappearance stems from the various acts associated 
with it. For instance, in the IHRL regime there is the detention of the individual 
followed by a deprivation of liberty. Subsequent to this is perhaps torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment followed by an extrajudicial killing. Thus, in the context of the 
ECHR there is the potential for a violation of Articles 2, 3 and 5 in respect of the 
victim, plus the violation of relatives’ rights under Article 3 and a procedural violation 
of Article 2 should the State fail to investigate the disappearance. In the context of 
ICL, there is the additional burden of proving that an accused had the requisite mens 
rea when performing the acts. There has however been marked interest in the outright 
prohibition of enforced disappearances in both the IHRL and ICL regimes. This can 
be evidenced by the creation of the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance in the IHRL regime, and the inclusion of 




The approach to defining enforced disappearance as adopted by the three 
regimes differs, as it does with torture, in a number of fundamental ways. Firstly, the 
IHRL regime is primarily concerned with the regulation of State behaviour vis-a-vis 
individuals subject to its jurisdiction. As a result, the definition of enforced 
disappearance in the IHRL includes the requirement that such acts be performed by, 
or with the acquiescence or other knowledge of, State agents. Acts performed by non- 
State actors could not therefore be considered to be violations of human rights law. 
The IHL regime requires the existence of an international or non-international armed 
conflict. This means that acts performed by military, paramilitary or rebel groups in 
situations that do not amount to a recognisable armed conflict would not be 
considered a violation of IHL. Lastly, enforced disappearance under the ICC Statute 
requires that the acts be performed during a widespread or systematic attack by a State 
or political organisation. This would exclude two instances of enforced disappearance. 
The first being where enforced disappearances are sporadic and thus not categorised 
as ‘widespread or systematic’. The second being where such acts are performed by 
actors other than those affiliated with a State or political organisation. Thus, even 
though the three regimes agree that instances of enforced disappearance amount to a 
violation of their rules, situations could arise in which victims could be without 
redress.
The different approaches of the three regimes can be seen as evidence to 
support the assertion that the three regimes, though they share identical ends by 
prohibiting enforced disappearance, are recognisably separate. This could be seen as 
evidence of the fragmentation of the international legal system. However, it can also 
be seen as evidence to support the position advanced by this thesis that this 
fragmentation does not greatly affect the operation of the three regimes if they are
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viewed in isolation of one another. By viewing the regimes in this manner it is 
apparent that they are ‘special’ in the sense used by Ratner in that they each aim to 
regulate a certain type of conduct.239
For the purposes of prohibiting enforced disappearance the IHL regime is 
clearly the weakest of the three regimes, lacking a singular violation and potentially 
relying on several composite offences. However, this does not detract from the 
substantial improvements made in the IHRL and ICL regime. A similar difference 
between the regimes is discernible in the next chapter when the thesis considers 
sexual violence, although the difference in that case relates to the strong protection 
afforded by the IHL and ICL regimes and the comparatively weak protection found in 
the IHRL regime.
Fragmentation has resulted in different definitions of enforced disappearance 
depending on the regime in question. However, these should not be seen as 
necessarily conflicting with one another, but rather as existing separately from one 
another. Despite such differences there is evidence to suggest that the regimes can 
afford victims and their families with the necessary forms of redress or to punish 
those who commit acts of enforced disappearance. Fragmentation therefore does not 
necessarily affect the operation of the law within the legal regimes concerned or cause 
them to stop functioning in an efficient and effective manner.
239 Steven R. Ratner, ‘Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented 
International Law’ (2008) 102 AJIL 475,485.
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Chapter Four — Sexual Violence
*
Introduction
The issue of sexual violence has received increased attention over the past two 
decades, particularly with the advent of the international criminal tribunals for the 
former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Until this time women’s rights were barely 
considered by IHRL, IHL and ICL.1 One possible reason for the lack of international 
concern over sexual violence, a term including rape, sexual assault and forced 
prostitution,2 is the idea that such acts were traditionally seen as ‘private’ acts outside 
of public regulation.3 Accordingly, it is seen as ‘devoid’ of political context and thus 
not a matter for human rights.4 Even international conventions such as the Convention 
for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) have been dismissed 
as ‘window dressing’,5 failing to usher in promised ‘revolutionary changes’.6 The 
relative lack of concern demonstrated by the international legal community towards 
violence against women has led to some feminist writers to call for greater 
politicisation of the issue.7 Such a perspective has implications for the appeal to a 
more formal approach to international law advocated throughout this thesis.
1 Rhonda Copelon, ‘International Human Rights Dimensions of Intimate Violence: Another Strand in 
the Dialectic of Feminist Lawmaking’ (2002) 11 American University Journal o f Gender, Social Policy 
and Law 865, 866.
2 Inger Skjelsbaek, ‘Sexual Violence and War: Mapping Out a Complex Relationship’ (2001) 7 
European Journal of International Relations 211, 212-213.
3 Pamela Goldberg and Nancy Kelly, ‘International Human Rights and Violence against Women’
(1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 195.
4 ibid 196.
5 Copelon (n 1) 866.
6 Julie Minor, ‘An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (1994) 24 Georgia Journal o f International and 
Comparative Law 137, 143; see also Rebecca Cook, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’ (1990) 30 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 643.
7 Gillian Youngs, ‘Private Pain/Public Peace: Women’s Rights as Human Rights and Amnesty 
International’s Report on Violence against Women’ (2003) 28 Signs 1209, 1209.
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Apparent in the literature regarding sexual violence is the lack of certainty as 
to what conduct constitutes sexual violence, and how the international legal system 
should respond to such conduct. Even such egregious acts as rape have competing 
definitions, a point explored in more detail in this chapter. Nor is it clear whether 
sexual violence is sex with violence or violence with a sexual manifestation.8 While 
none of this seeks to undermine the suffering experienced by the victims it can cause 
problems when attempting to establish an accused’s liability for his acts.9 Such 
uncertainty again leaves the path clear for a less formalistic, more policy-orientated 
and instrumentalist approach to sexual violence which can in itself be seen as a 
symptom of the increased fragmentation of international law. Countering the policy- 
orientated approach whilst remaining sympathetic to victims by not descending into 
‘misogynistic formalism’10 is potentially a rather difficult task given the weight of 
feminist legal thought on the issue.
This chapter outlines the different approaches taken by each of the three legal 
regimes studied in defining rape and other forms of sexual violence against women. In 
contrast to other violations considered in this thesis, there is a relatively small amount 
of case law on this subject matter, a point which can be attributed to several factors. 
Some writers would argue that this reflects the way in which international law 
represents the interests of men or the way in which women’s rights are treated within 
the international legal system.11 Others signpost the creation of the UN international 
criminal tribunals, in particular the ICTR, and how this has led to a marked concern
8 Skjelsbaek (n 2) 212.
9 In cases of sexual violence studied here the perpetrator is usually male.
10 Adrienne Kalosieh, ‘Consent to Genocide?: The ICTY’s Improper Use of the Consent Paradigm to 
Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foca’ (2003) 24 Women s Rights Law Reporter 121, 134.
11 Hilary Charles worth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International 
Law’ (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 613.
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with prosecuting individuals for sanctionable conduct against women.12 Further 
reasons can be seen from the differences between the three regimes. While IHL and 
ICL expressly prohibit acts such as rape, the IHRL regime lacks such clarity. It relies 
upon classifying rape and similar acts as torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Another pertinent factor is the State-centric nature of the IHRL regime which 
primarily imposes obligations on States rather than individuals.13 One final point to 
highlight here is that while this chapter focuses on sexual violence committed against 
women, the international tribunals have held that acts of sexual violence can also be 
committed against men14 therefore much of the study below can be equally applied to 
men and women.15
This chapter serves to illustrate the way in which a formalised understanding 
of international law can address the needs of victims while providing a robust 
framework for a fair trial for an accused and for the creation of a more rigorous 
conception of international law. It begins by considering the response of the EHRL 
regime in particular the protection afforded under the UN, ECHR and Inter-American 
regimes. Unlike the law relating to torture and enforced disappearance, human rights 
law does not offer a great amount of protection to victims of sexual violence. The 
second substantive section examines the response of the IHL regime to sexual
12 Alex Obote-Odora, ‘Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution’ (2005) 12 
New England Journal of International and Comparative Law 135; Kelly Askin, ‘Gender Crimes 
Jurisprudence in the ICTR’ (2005) 3 JICJ 4.
13 For a discussion of horizontality and human rights see Gavin Phillipson and Alexander Williams 
‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74 MLR 878.
14 e.g. Prosecutor v. Cesic (IT-95-10/1) 11 March 2004, para. 13; see Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Sexual 
Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict’ (2007) 18 EJIL 253; R. Charli Carpenter, ‘Recognizing 
Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 37 Security 
Dialogue 83; Hilmi Zawati, ‘Impunity or Immunity: Wartime Male Rape and Sexual Torture as a 
Crime against Humanity’ (2007) 17 Torture 27; Nor is rape of men by men to be seen necessarily as 
evidence of homosexuality but instead an expression of power, control and the feminisation of the 
victim: Skjelsbaek (n 2) 224; sexual minorities can also be subjected to such acts: James Wilets, 
‘Conceptualizing Private Violence against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: an International 
and Comparative Law Perspective’ 60 Albany Law Review 989.
15 The obvious exception being forced pregnancy; Milan Markovic, ‘Vessels of Reproduction: Forced 
Pregnancy and the ICC’ (2007) 16 Michigan State Journal of International Law 439.
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violence committed during armed conflict, an issue that has historically been 
neglected by the regime.16 Lastly, the response of the ICL regime to sexual violence is 
analysed because this regime has been responsible for increased awareness of the 
issues addressed.
4.1 - Sexual violence and IHRL
Acts including rape and sexual violence would appear to be prima facie violations of 
human rights. Yet despite such an initial perspective, the reality is not necessarily as 
clear. One of the most obvious barriers when linking sexual violence to human rights 
violations is the fact that many human rights instruments, including the three major 
systems studied in the present chapter, do not explicitly specify a right not to be raped 
or subjected to sexual violence. Instead, there is an assumption that such acts would 
amount to a violation of the right to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment. A further problem occurs because most acts of violence committed against 
women take place in the private sphere, committed by their families or 
communities.17 This has led some commentators, for example Youngs, to regard all 
violent acts against women as torture, regardless of the context, i.e. whether it occurs 
in public or in private. By addressing the matter in this fashion they seek to ‘add 
force’ to arguments that are, on their own admission, ‘political’.18
The public-private dichotomy raises difficulties because traditionally the 
IHRL regime is concerned with the limitation of State power vis-a-vis the individual 
rather than between private citizens.19 Indeed, one commentator has highlighted that
16 For a history of sexual violence see Myriam Denov, ‘Wartime Sexual Violence: Assessing a Human 
Security Response to War-Affected Girls in Sierra Leone’ (2006) 37 Security Dialogue 319, 320.
17 Christine Chinkin, ‘Violence against Women: the International Legal Response’ (1995) 3 Gender 
and Development 23, 24.
18 Youngs (n 7) 1209.
19 Catherine Moore, ‘Women and Domestic Violence: the Public/Private Dichotomy in International 
Law’ (2003) 7 International Journal of Human Rights 93.
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so-called ‘intimate violence’, (for instance between husband and wife) can occur 
because of the restriction of State power: the ‘protection of the private sphere from the 
intrusion of public (state) interference has historically worked against women exposed 
to the excesses of unfettered male dominance and violence.’20 According to this 
critique the State has to balance the limitation of its own power with the protection of 
women from violence, a problem reflected in the State’s position as both being 
‘representative of institutionalized inequalities between men and women and a 
powerful site of actual or potential change’.21 The locus of the problem is therefore 
the distinction between the public and private spheres. On the one hand, if a State 
adequately protects women from domestic violence through the criminal law, 
recourse to human rights law might be lessened while providing arguably greater 
protection to women.
Due to the State-centric nature of human rights law and the fact that it is 
recognised that the majority of acts of violence against women are committed in the 
‘private’ sphere, a limit is placed on the effectiveness of the IHRL regime. The 
following section examines the limited protection afforded under this regime 
beginning with some UN instruments before moving on to consider the ECHR and 
Inter-American systems. The position advocated in this section is that the traditional 
conception of IHRL should remain, with only acts committed by State officials 
constituting human rights violations. In part this is due to a concern over the blurring 
of the traditional formal distinctions between legal regimes. More importantly from a 
practical perspective, often criminal law is better positioned to provide protection to 
women not only from domestic violence but from acts of serious violence. Despite




these concerns, IHRL remains an important tool for guiding domestic authorities 
towards outlawing acts of violence against women.22
4.1.1 - Sexual violence and the UN system
The UDHR offers some initial guidance and framing of the issues when it states that 
‘All human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights’.23 Article 2 continues 
stating everyone ‘is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in [the UDHR], 
without distinction of any kind’ including sex. It is apparent from this that the 
international community was minded to eliminate sex-specific rights violations. 
However, as shall be seen, this intention fell considerably short when it came to the 
practical implementation of these rights and the protection of women.
In 1993 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 48/104 which is 
comprised of several articles condemning ‘gender-based’ violence. Article 1 states 
that such violence is ‘likely to result in...physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
suffering to women’ which can include ‘threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty.’ Other articles provide a definition of such conduct which 
includes, inter alia, ‘battering...marital rape [and] female genital mutilation’24 in 
addition to other ‘traditional practices harmful to women’25 which takes place in all 
walks of life including the workplace and in education.26 Such behaviour is not 
permissible when perpetrated or condoned by the State.27 Article 3 offers a 
restatement of the principle that women are entitled to equal enjoyment of human 
rights including the right to life and the right not to be subjected to acts of torture.
22 Bonita Meyersfeld, ‘Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in International Law’ (2003) 67 Albany 
Law Review 371.
23 UDHR, art 1.
24 UNGA Res 48/104 (20 Dec 1993) UN Doc A/Res48/104, art 2.
25 ibid art 2(a).
26 ibid art 2(b).
27 ibid art 2(c).
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In the UN System, the principal treaty is the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which aims 
to eliminate discrimination against women. Given the importance of CEDAW to 
IHRL relating to women’s rights,28 it is important to mention it here even though it 
does not explicitly deal with the issue of sexual violence. Article 1 defines 
discrimination against women widely and can be stated as being the inability to 
participate in society on an equal basis to, and receive the same rights as, men. Article 
2 lists several measures that States Parties must take to conform to CEDAW including 
‘the legal protection of the rights of women’.29 One important component of ensuring 
equality and eliminating discrimination of women must be the recognition that sexual 
violence against women is a serious violation of the non-discrimination principle 
enshrined in CEDAW.
The anti-discrimination element of CEDAW is an important aspect of 
preventing acts of sexual violence being committed against women. Despite this 
political ambition, CEDAW has been criticised because it permits reservations. In 
particular, reservations are permitted even if they ‘appear to conflict with the object 
and purpose of the treaty. The purpose of the Convention is the elimination of 
discrimination, and all of these reservations clearly hinder that objective. In essence, 
they permit discrimination.’30 According to this, the condemnation of discrimination 
against women is severely undermined because the permissible reservations work to 
nullify the intended effects of the treaty. However, as Meron notes the reservations
28 See Sally Merry, ‘Gender Justice and CEDAW: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women’ (2011) 9 Hawa 49; Lisa Baldez, ‘The UN Convention to Eliminate 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): A New Way to Measure Women’s Interests’ 
(2011)7 Politics and Gender 419.
29 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’), 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, art 2(c).
30 Minor (n 6).
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prevent the treaty from becoming too broad,31 thereby ensuring as wide a body of 
States Parties as possible. Balancing between effective protection and having 
sufficiently large number of States Parties for the treaty to have legitimacy thus 
becomes an important aspect of treaty politics.
4.1.2 - Sexual violence in the EC HR
A new treaty aimed at the prevention of violence against women has been drafted 
within the Council of Europe.32 Article 1 specifies that the Convention is to ‘protect 
women against all forms of violence, and prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence 
against women and domestic violence’33 as well as contributing ‘to the elimination of 
all forms of discrimination against women and promote substantive equality between 
women and men, including by empowering women’.34 Interestingly, in a move away 
from the lex specialis nature of IHL, the Convention specifies categorically that the 
Convention ‘shall apply in times of peace and in situations of armed conflict.’35 This 
is important as it extends the protection of a human rights convention to situations of 
armed conflict indicating a shift back towards universal application of human rights, 
albeit in the narrow field of women’s rights. The Convention defines ‘violence against
women’ as being a violation of:
human rights and a form of discrimination against women and shall mean all acts 
of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, 
psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life.36
31 Theodor Meron, Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations (OUP 1986) 60.
32 Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210; This is a new treaty and as such the literature on it is 
patchy but see Ronagh J.A. McQuigg, ‘What Potential Does the Council of Europe Convention on 
Violence against Women Hold as Regards Domestic Violence?’ (2012) 16 International Journal of 
Human Rights 947.
33 (n32) art l(l)(a).
34 ibid art l(l)(b).
35 ibid art 2(3).
36 ibid art 3(a).
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The treaty also obliges States Parties to enact legislation to ensure women live free 
from violence,37 as well as prohibiting State agents from engaging in violence against 
women.38 As with the Belem do Para Convention,39 the Council of Europe’s 
Convention, when it enters into force, will represent a trend in international law 
towards the creation of formal rules through which the human rights of women can be 
protected.
One of the most notable cases before the ECtHR concerning sexual violence 
was that of Ay din v Turkey.40 In this case the applicant alleged that she had been 
raped while detained by members of the Turkish security services. The Court heard 
how she had been ‘subjected to a series of particularly terrifying and humiliating 
experiences while in custody’. 41 Such treatment had to be placed in the context of her 
sex and age ‘and the circumstances under which she was held’.42 She was detained 
for three days, much of which time was spent blindfolded and paraded naked, adding 
‘to her overall sense of vulnerability.’43 In terms of the acts of rape, the Court noted 
that she suffered ‘the acute physical pain of forced penetration, which must have left 
her feeling debased and violated both physically and emotionally.’44 Furthermore, 
rape causes deep psychological scars ‘which do not respond to the passage of time as 
quickly as other forms of physical and mental violence.’45 The Court held that the 
rape ‘of a detainee by an official of the State must be considered to be an especially 
grave and abhorrent form of ill-treatment given the ease with which the offender can
37 ibid art 4(1).
38 ibid art 5(1).
39 A similar convention in the Inter-American System: Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women ( ‘Convention of Belem do Para ), 9 June 
1994, entered into force 5 March 1995, ILM 33 (1994).








exploit the vulnerability and weakened resistance of his victim.’46 Lastly, the Court 
turned to the cumulative nature of the ill-treatment, noting that both the physical and 
mental violence and the rape of the applicant would each have been capable of 
amounting to torture contrary to Article 3 even if the other act had not occurred.47
The principle in Aydin was confirmed in Maslova, a case in which one of the 
applicants was raped repeatedly by state officials.48 In another case the Court heard 
how both applicants had been subjected to ‘virginity tests’ when they were detained, 
even though there was no medical or legal necessity to justify such intrusive 
examination.49 In addition to such treatment, both applicants alleged they were raped 
and were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.50 The Court 
found that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3, even though it was 
‘unable to establish the complete picture of the severity of the applicants’ ill- 
treatment due to the failure of the national authorities to ensure the effectiveness and 
reliability of the applicants’ earlier medical examinations.’51 This ruling underscores 
the psychological effects that torture can have on an individual, and the duty of the 
State to conduct an effective investigation in instances where allegations are made by 
the applicant of sexual violence. The Court has also held that not only do actual 
incidents of rape by state officials amount to torture but also that threats of rape and 
of sexual assault might also constitute a violation of Article 3.52
The ECtHR has also moved against gaps in the criminal law which prevent 
victims from obtaining redress for sexual violence. This engages a State’s
46 ibid para.83.
47 For further discussion of Aydin see Clare McGlynn, ‘Rape, Torture and the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2009) 5 8 ICLQ 565, 567-569.
48 Maslova & Nalbandov v. Russia (Application no. 839/02) Judgment, para. 108.
49 Salmanoglu & Polattas v. Turkey (Application no. 15828/03) Judgment, para.88.
50 ibid para.96.
51 ibid para.97.
52 Bati and Others v. Turkey (Application nos. 33097/96; 57834/00) Judgment, paras. 110-124.
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responsibility to protect the rights of individuals from violation by others, not just 
agents of the State. This gives rise to the concept of horizontal human rights and 
raises questions as to whether private citizens can violate the human rights of 
others.53 However, the idea of horizontal human rights still engages a state’s 
responsibility for its failure to act and does not, in itself, lend itself to the creation of a 
human rights violation by a private actor. This can be illustrated through the case of X  
and Y.54 The applicants sought to challenge the lack of criminal sanction for those 
who committed sexual offences against the mentally handicapped, with the law only 
providing a remedy at civil law. The Court held that this was a case where 
‘fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective 
deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law 
provisions; indeed, it is by such provisions that the matter is normally regulated.’55 In 
this case it can be seen that the human rights violation was committed by the State in 
the form of a lack of effective criminal sanction while the original perpetrator 
committed a criminal offence.
Other cases before the ECtHR have focused on the issue of domestic violence. 
In Bevacqua the Court held that states had a duty to protect individuals and that it was 
not acceptable to class domestic violence as a trivial incident as it involved only ‘light 
bodily injury’.56 Likewise in Opuz, after analysing several elements of international 
law, the Court held that a ‘State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence 
breaches their right to equal protection of the law and this failure does not need to be 
intentional.’57 This led the Court to conclude that ‘the violence suffered by the 
applicant and her mother may be regarded as gender-based violence which is a form
53 See Phillipson (n 13).
54 X & Y v. Netherlands (Application no. 8978/80) Judgment, 26 March 1985.
55 ibid para.27.
56 Bevacqua &Sv .  Bulgaria (Application no. 71127/01) Judgment, 12 June 2008, para.63.
57 Opuz v. Turkey (Application no. 33401/02) Judgment, 9 June 2009, para. 191.
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of discrimination against women.’58 Furthermore, the passivity of the State and 
‘impunity enjoyed by the aggressors...indicated that there was insufficient 
commitment to take appropriate action to address domestic violence.’59
4.1.3 - Sexual violence in the Inter-American system
In the Inter-American system, the 1994 Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence against Women, also known as the Convention of Belem 
do Para, is aimed at the ‘prevention, punishment and eradication of violence against 
women’.60 This treaty defines violence against women as being ‘any act or conduct, 
based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere.’61 These acts can 
include domestic violence including spousal rape and sexual assault,62 community- 
based violence which also includes rape and sexual abuse in addition to trafficking, 
forced prostitution and sexual harassment in the workplace.63 Lastly, it includes 
conduct ‘perpetrated or condoned by the state or its agents regardless of where it 
occurs.’64
Article 3 states that basic human rights of women are to be respected, 
including the right to life,65 the right not to be subjected to torture66 and the ‘right to 
equal protection before the law and of the law’.67 As well as these definitions the 
Convention also imposes on States Parties certain duties including to enact domestic
58 ibid para.200.
59 ibid para.200.
60 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women; see Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, ‘Law, Culture and Equality -  Human Rights’ 
Influence on Domestic Norms: The Case of Women in the Americas’ (2000) 13 Florida Journal of 
International Law 33.
61 CEDAW (n29) art 1.
62 ibid art 2(a).
63 ibid art 2(b).
64 ibid art 2(c).
65 ibid art 3(a).
66 ibid art 3(d).
67 ibid art 3(f).
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legislation to ‘prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women’,68 and to 
‘establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to 
violence which include, among others, protective measures, a timely hearing and 
effective access to such procedures’.69 The content of the Convention is largely 
reflective of UN General Assembly Resolution 48/100 and as such can be seen as part 
of the increased trend towards the establishment of formal rules in the form of a treaty 
instead of an over-reliance on deformalised rules of international law.
The Inter-American Court has also considered sexual violence to be a human 
rights violation.70 This is despite recognition by the Court in the Cotton Field case 
that ‘it is evident that a State cannot be held responsible for every human rights 
violation committed between private individuals within its jurisdiction’.71 Despite 
this, it does not mean that the State is not under an obligation to adopt reasonable 
measures to find the victims alive after the victims had been kidnapped and subjected 
to sexual violence by private individuals.72 Furthermore, the Court stressed that it was 
the:
duty of the States to organize the entire government apparatus and, in general, all 
the structures through which public authority is exercised, so that they are able to 
ensure by law the free and full exercise of human rights.73
Evidently, the Court’s holding on this aspect underscores the belief that human rights 
violations should be prohibited by the State as far as possible, reflecting the positive
68 ibid art 7(c).
69 ibid art 7(f).
70 Rosa Celorio, ‘The Rights of Women in the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Current 
Opportunities and Challenges in Standard-Setting’ (2010) 65 University of Miami Law Review 819.
71 Case of Gonzalez et al ( ‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico, Judgment of 16 November 2009 (Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparation and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights, para.280; See Katrin 
Tiroch, ‘Violence against Women by Private Actors: The Inter-American Court’s Judgment in the Case 
of Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico (2010)’ 14 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
371.
72 ibid para.284.
73 ibid para.236; see also Kawas-Fernandez v. Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Judgment of 
3 April 2009, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 196 (2009) para. 137; Anzualdo Castro v. Peru 
(Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Judgment of 22 September 2009, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 202 (2009) para.62.
209
Chapter Four
duty to uphold human rights often imposed on States Parties.74 In Cotton Field the 
Inter-American Court condemned the response of the authorities to the attempts made 
by the relatives of the victims to discover their whereabouts and what happened to 
them. In particular it noted that certain comments made by State officials in relation 
to one missing young woman that she was ‘surely with her boyfriend, because girls 
were very flighty and threw themselves at men’75 underscored a culture of impunity 
for such crimes, and sent ‘the message that violence against women is tolerated’. This 
leads to further perpetration ‘together with social acceptance of the phenomenon.’76 
The Court is therefore underscoring the idea that such acts, in addition to direct 
violence against women, is discriminatory.77
The Inter-American Court has made reference to the ECtHR case of Aydin7S 
in Miguel Castro Castro Prison brought against the backdrop of a prison 
disturbance.79 Amongst other serious human rights violations, for instance the use of 
live ammunition and white phosphorous grenades, were cases of sexual violence 
committed against female inmates by prison officers. This included subjecting six 
female inmates to forced nudity which not only violated their dignity, but made them 
the ‘victims of sexual violence, since they were naked and covered only with a sheet, 
while armed men [members of the State police force] surrounded them.’80 This 
behaviour was classified as sexual violence because the ‘men constantly observed the
74 Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart 2004).
75 Cotton Field (n 71) para. 199.
76 ibid para.400.
77 ibid para.402; For further analysis of this case see Ruth Rubio-Marin and Clara Sandoval, 
‘Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The 
Promise of the Cotton Field Judgment’ (2011) 33 HRQ 1062.
78 Aydin (n 40).
79 Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Judgment of 25 




women.’81 The Court also examined the definition of rape after it emerged one inmate 
had been subjected to a forced vaginal search by a male officer (the Court in its 
judgment did not consider any other definition of this than ‘rape’ suggesting that the 
actions of the officer could not be justified).82 It continued to define rape, noting that 
it ‘must be.. .understood as act [sic] of vaginal or anal penetration without the 
victim’s consent, through the use of other parts of the aggressor’s body [the Court had 
earlier considered penile penetration] or objects, as well as oral penetration’.83 The 
Court here made reference to the jurisprudence of the ICTR, in particular the Akayesu 
judgment, suggesting that it sought to confirm its position by reference to the practice 
of the international criminal tribunals.84 To an extent, this demonstrates the way in 
which the various regimes of the international legal system inter-link and share 
common virtues and values.
4.1.4 - Conclusion on sexual violence in the IHRL system
Sexual violence is more often seen as a criminal offence as opposed to an act 
committed by a State as illustrated in X & F.85 Caution needs to be exercised against 
the expansion of human rights violations to incorporate acts of private citizens which 
are often best addressed either through the criminal or the civil law. However, where 
state agents commit acts of sexual violence this is sufficient to give rise to a violation 
of human rights for example under Article 3 of the ECHR, as was seen in Aydin 
where rape was said to amount to torture.86 As will be seen in the remainder of this 





85 See also Livio Zilli, ‘The Crime of Rape in the Case Law of the Strasbourg Institutions’ (2002) 13 
Criminal Law Forum 245.
86 Aydin (n 40).
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violence against women, in large part because IHRL is concerned with the violation 
of individuals rights in the state-citizen context while IHL and ICL are focused on 
individual accountability for violations.
Inevitably, the deficiencies of the IHRL regime in addressing the inter-linked 
issues of sexual and domestic violence have drawn fire from scholars concerned about 
the commission of such acts against women. However, as has been noted, sexual 
‘violence is viewed as inherently discriminatory in that it both reflects inequality and 
perpetuates it.’87 Such discrimination in itself could amount to a violation of human 
rights by the State. This position would, however, simply amount to another indirect 
method of ensuring the protection of women’s rights by IHRL (the other being the use 
of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment provisions). Instead, the IHRL regime 
could be better used to encourage State protection of women’s rights via domestic 
criminal and civil law. As some feminist scholars note, no law will fully prevent 
violence against women but they will raise awareness of the issue and ensure that 
victims have some measure of redress.88
Definitions of sexual violence in IHRL have largely drawn from the 
jurisprudence relating to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. This can, at least 
in part, be ascribed to the fact that both the ECHR and IACHR lack specific 
provisions relating to sexual violence and discrimination against women.89 Such a 
lack of provision has not prevented the Courts from adjudicating these matters. In 
Aydin, the ECtHR emphasised the physical and psychological aspects of rape as
87 Copelon (n 1) 869.
88 Nancy Farwell, ‘War Rapei New Conceptualizations and Responses (2004) 19 Affilia 389, 393, 
Barbara Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez, ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the 
International Criminal Court’ (1999) 6 Brown Journal of World Affairs 65, 80.
89 Measures have been taken within both of these regimes to increase awareness of sexual violence 
through the creation of new treaties such as the Convention of Belem do Para.
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amounting to torture for the purposes of Article 3.90 Similarly, in Miguel Castro 
Castro Prison the Inter-American Court determined that forced vaginal searches of 
female prisoners by male guards amounted to rape. The Courts have also imposed 
positive obligations on States Parties to prevent acts of sexual violence, suggesting a 
State can be liable for private acts of sexual violence if the State in question fails to 
take adequate steps to protect women.91
4.2 - Sexual violence and IHL
The IHL regime has been criticised for being ‘minimal and weak’ and failing to 
protect women in times of armed conflict.92 Even the ‘traditional’ view that regards 
rape as a natural consequence of war, and thus inevitable,93 can lead to condoning it.94 
Rape has long been used as a weapon of war as a means of intimidating and subduing 
the local populace.95 The use of such a weapon is an ‘asymmetric strategy’ of war, the 
aim of which ‘to inflict trauma and thus to destroy family ties and group solidarity 
within the enemy camp.’96 Often such rapes are performed to ‘humiliate, or destroy, 
the identity of a victim.’97
Steps were taken in the 19th Century when rape was prohibited by the Lieber 
Code,98 widely seen as one of the first codifications of IHL.99 However, this did little
90 Aydin (n 40).
91 As seen in the Cotton Fields Case before the Inter-American Court (n 71).
92 Kelly Askin, ‘International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’ (2003) 21 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 288, 294.
93 Bedont (n 88) 65.
94 Farwell (n 88) 389.
95 ibid 390.
96 Bulent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, ‘Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War’ (2005) 11 
Body and Society 111, 111.
97 Karmen Erjavec and Zala Volcic, ‘“Target”, “cancer” and “warrior”: Exploring painful metaphors of 
self-presentation used by girls bom of war rape’ (2010) 21 Discourse Society 524, 525.
98 Lieber Code 1863, art 44; Available at
http://www.icrc.Org/aDp1ic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/QpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/A25A 
A 5871A 04919BC 12563CD002D65C5/FULLTEXT/IHL-L-Code-EN.pdf 
art 47 provides that rape and other crimes shall be punishable by death or severe punishment.




to protect women from sexual violence in future conflicts. Since 1945 there has been 
greater awareness of the need to protect women in particular and also to punish 
perpetrators of crimes against women. Developments in the law of armed conflict 
have been advanced through customary international law, treaties and the 
jurisprudence of various international criminal tribunals. As in previous chapters, care 
has been taken to distinguish, as far as is possible, between IHL and ICL.
Despite the advances made in ‘formal’ law, it remains that rape and other acts 
of sexual violence continue to be committed in times of armed conflict. The reasons 
behind this are several but they can be broken down into three main groups as 
identified by Skjelsbaek. The first is the essentialist approach that sees women as 
victims ‘in order to assert militaristic masculinity’; the second is a structuralist 
approach that holds women are targeted so as to attack the ethnic, religious or 
political group; the third is ‘social constructionism’, holding women are targeted to 
‘masculinize the identity of the perpetrator and feminize the identity of the victim’.100 
In the essentialist approach sexual violence is the manifestation of the perception that 
women are possessed by men in times of peace, with rape in wartime being seen as 
the taking of another man’s property.101 Indeed, it is often seen as a ‘stamp of total 
conquest’,102 and consequently about ‘power and control’ derived from notions of 
‘masculine privilege’.103 The links between the political (the ‘power and control’) and 
the demand that it be regulated could be said to lead to a policy-orientated approach to 
IHL overtaking the stricter and inherently more conservative formal notions of the 
law.
100 Skjelsbaek (2) 215.
101 ibid 217.
102 Diken (n 96) 118.




4.2.1 - Customary IHL and sexual violence
Customary law remains a valuable element of IHL. Rule 93 of the ICRC Study 
concerns rape and other sexual violence. It examines military manuals, domestic 
legislation and the practice of the UN Security Council. This does not offer much in 
the way of definitions but, as with torture and enforced disappearance, it does help to 
establish a framework within which more formal rules can be developed which 
provide a clearer definition of the relevant acts.
The military manuals of several States prohibit rape in times of armed conflict. 
For example the UK’s Law of Armed Conflict Manual states that women are to be 
protected from rape, forced prostitution and indecent assault.104 This applies equally 
in non-intemational armed conflicts as it does in international armed conflicts.105 The 
military manuals of several States prohibit rape in international106 and non- 
intemational armed conflicts,107 with both provisions referring to ‘outrages upon 
personal dignity’. The Israeli military manual goes further noting that ‘Even if it 
appears that in war everything is permissible and there is no differentiating between a 
moral and an immoral act, even in the heat of battle there are actions that are 
considered unacceptable’ including acts of rape.108 From these three examples it is 
apparent that rape in times of armed conflict is prohibited by the military law of 
many, if not all, States.109
Other examples of customary IHL can be identified through State practice 
such as domestic legislation, court judgments and statements made by government
104 UK Ministry of Defence, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (OUP 2004) 218.
105 ibid 400.
106 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary> International Humanitarian Law 
(vol 1 CUP 2005) 323-326.
107 ibid.
108 Available at http://www.icrc.org/customarv-ihl/eng/docs/v2 cou il_rule93 (Accessed 17 March 
2014).
109 See Rule 93 in the ICRC Customary International Law Study for further examples of military 
manuals. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (vol 2 CUP 2005) 2193-2197.
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ministers. Legislation often provides detailed guidance as to the definition of offences 
such as rape. For example, the Australian Criminal Code Act 1995 defines a rape 
committed in the course of an international armed conflict as being when ‘the 
perpetrator sexually penetrates another person without the consent of that person’ 
with the knowledge of, or is reckless to, the lack of consent, and that the conduct is 
associated with and takes place in the context of an international armed conflict.110 
The term ‘sexually penetrate’ is defined as being the penetration of the genitalia or 
anus with a body part or ‘by any object manipulated by [a] person’111 or the 
penetration of the mouth with the penis.112 This is largely reflective of Australian laws 
which define rape in the domestic context; a similar example to this can be seen also 
in England’s Sexual Offences Act 2003.113 Such legislation can be seen as illustrative 
of the prohibition of rape and other sexual offences in domestic criminal legislation.
The UN Security Council has been particularly active with regard to 
establishing that sexual violence is a violation of IHL. In addition to the Statutes of 
the ICTY/R (which were created by UN Security Council resolutions) it has also 
issued several resolutions condemning acts of rape and sexual violence. In Resolution 
1743 concerning Haiti, the Security Council condemned ‘the grave violations against 
children affected by armed violence, as well as the widespread rape and other sexual 
abuse of girls.’114 Resolution 1034, concerning Bosnia, expressed the Council’s 
concern over evidence which demonstrated ‘a consistent pattern of rape’.115 Similar 
condemnations can be found in Resolution 1493 which referred to ‘acts of violence 
systematically perpetrated against civilians’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo
110 Australian Criminal Code Act 1995, Schedule 1, section 268.59.
111 ibid schedule 1, section 268.59(4)(a).
112 ibid schedule 1, section 268.59(4)(b).
113 Sexual Offences Act 2003, c.42, s. 1(1).
114 UNSC Res 1743, 15 February 2007, UN Doc S/RES/1743, para. 17.
115 UNSC Res 1034, 21 December 1995, UN Doc S/RES/1034, para.2 of the preamble.
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including ‘sexual violence against women and girls’;116 and in Resolution 1539 on 
children and armed conflict the Council condemned ‘sexual violence mostly 
committed against girls’.117 While these do not define rape or other acts of sexual 
violence they do provide a framework within which definitions can be developed by 
other international actors.
4.2.2 - IHL Treaty law and sexual violence
There is no explicit reference to sexual crimes in the IMT Statute, leading to criticism 
that the Nuremberg trials did not adequately punish those who committed sexual 
crimes against women.118 Though the wording of Article 6(b) states that the list of 
crimes is ‘not be limited to’ those enumerated there was no attempt to prosecute 
individuals for sexual crimes.119 This is more surprising given that ‘ill-treatment’ is 
specified as being a war crime in Article 6(b)&(c) relating to crimes against humanity. 
These provide that ‘other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population’ 
were crimes capable of prosecution under the IMT Statute.
After Nuremberg there came the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols prohibiting rape and other forms of sexual violence in the context of both 
international and non-intemational armed conflicts. The starting point is Common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions offering a basic minimum standard of treatment 
in non-intemational armed conflicts. While there is no specific prohibition of rape or 
other acts of sexual violence, there are two provisions worth mentioning. Article 
3(l)(a) prohibits ‘violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
116 UNSC Res 1493. 28 July 2003, UN Doc S/RES/1493.
1,7 UNSC Res 1539. 22 April 2004, UN Doc S/RES/1539.
118 Richard Goldstone, ‘Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime’ (2002) 34 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 277, 279; Catherine Niarchos, ‘Women, War and Rape: Challenges Facings the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1995) 17 HRQ 649, 651-652.
119 Niamh Hayes, ‘Creating a Definition of Rape in International Law: the Contribution of the
International Criminal Tribunals’ in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds) Judicial Creativity’ the 
International Criminal Tribunals (OUP 2010) 129-130.
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mutilation, cruel treatment and torture’; the second is Article 3(1 )(c) prohibiting 
‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’. 
Both of these provisions could be invoked to cover sexual crimes which would 
undoubtedly qualify as ‘cruel treatment’ and ‘humiliating and degrading treatment’.
The Fourth Geneva Convention, regarding the protection of civilians, makes 
explicit reference to the protection of women: ‘Women shall be especially protected 
against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or 
any form of indecent assault’.120 More widely, protected persons ‘are entitled, in all 
circumstances, to respect for their persons [and] their honour’,121 a provision which 
again emphasises the need to protect women from sexual violence. Copelon notes that 
while rape is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions it is regarded as an attack against 
‘honour’ and ‘dignity’, not as a separate offence like torture. This is problematic for 
her because it implies that raped women have been dishonoured, reinforcing the social 
view that the victims of rape are viewed in negative terms.122
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions make additional 
references to the protection of women in times of international armed conflict (AP I) 
and non-intemational armed conflict (AP II). AP I forbids the ‘rape, forced 
prostitution and any other form of indecent assault’ and notes that ‘Women shall be 
the object of special respect’.123 Likewise, the fundamental guarantees, indicative of a 
minimum level of protection, of AP II prohibit ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any 
form or indecent assault’124 and ‘slavery and the slave trade in all their forms’.125
120 GC IV, art 27.
121 ibid.
122 Rhonda Copelon, ‘Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in Humanitarian Law’
(1994) 5 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 243, 249.
123 API, art 76(1).
124 AP II, art 4(2)(e).
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Though the reception of AP II by the international community has been mixed,126 the 
provisions it contains regarding rape and sexual violence represent an important 
statement that such acts are not tolerated under international law.
The ICTY Statute makes no explicit reference to rape and sexual violence in 
their provisions relating to war crimes (though reference is made to such acts being 
crimes against humanity). Article 2 of the ICTY Statute extends the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to acts of ‘torture or inhuman treatment’127 and ‘wilfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health’.128 These are similar to the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions, and wide enough to cover acts of rape. The ICTR Statute 
goes further and explicitly criminalises ‘rape, enforced prostitution and any form of 
indecent assault’ as war crimes.129 The ICTR Statute was drafted after the ICTY so it 
is possible that the UN Security Council was conscious of the criticism levelled at the 
ICTY for not including rape as a war crime in its Statute.130
The experiences of the international criminal tribunals led to a greater focus on 
sexual war crimes when the ICC Statute was drafted in 1998. Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) 
(relating to international armed conflicts) criminalises ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy’.131 The latter is defined by the provisions relating to 
crimes against humanity in Article 7(2)(f). Article 8(2)(e) applies in non-intemational 
armed conflicts and criminalises sexual violence including rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and ‘any other form of 
sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four
125 AP II, art 4(2)(f).
126 For instance, the United States and India, amongst others, have yet to ratify AP II. The United 
Kingdom only ratified AP II in 1998.
127 ICTY Statute, art 2(b).
128 ICTY Statute, art 2(c).
129 ICTR Statute, art 4(e).
130 See Rhonda Copelon, ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into 
International Criminal Law’ (2000) 46 McGill Law Journal 217, 229.
131 On Sexual slavery see Valerie Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: 
Advancing International Law’ (2003) 25 Michigan Journal o f International Law 605.
219
Chapter Four
Geneva Conventions’.132 The provisions in the ICC Statute relating to rape as a war 
crime thus represent a marked awareness of rape and sexual violence on the part of 
the international community, in addition to the creation of formalised laws which can 
assist the application of IHL.
Greater clarification of the matter can be found in the Elements of Crimes to 
the ICC Statute. Although the Elements do not form part of the law binding on the 
ICC, they nevertheless remain persuasive. The Elements define the war crime of rape, 
committed in an international armed conflict, as being the invasion of ‘the body of a 
person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of 
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ’. It is also a requirement that the 
‘invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power’, or that the perpetrator took ‘advantage of a coercive environment’, or that 
‘the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent’.133 
Additionally, it is necessary to show that the conduct took place in the context of an 
international armed conflict and that the perpetrator was aware of this fact.
Several other sections of the Elements are concerned with crimes of a sexual 
nature, for example sexual slavery134 and enforced prostitution.135 There is also a 
provision relating to the war crime of sexual violence that is worth exploring in more 
detail. Sexual violence in this context is much broader than rape or the other 
enumerated sexual crimes as it requires only that ‘an act of a sexual nature is 
performed against one or more persons subject to the requirements that, as with rape,
132 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(e)(vi).
133 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 8(2)(b)(xxii)-l(2).
134 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2.
135 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 8(2)(b)(xxii)-3.
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the victim was coerced or incapable of giving consent.136 It is also a requirement that 
the conduct meets the threshold for it to be a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions 
and that the perpetrator was aware of the ‘factual circumstances that established the 
gravity of the conduct.’137 Lastly, the proscribed conduct must be committed in the 
context of an international armed conflict, the existence of which was known to the 
perpetrator.138
4.2.3 - IHL case law of sexual violence
Several international courts and tribunals have addressed the issue of rape and other 
acts of sexual violence. In contrast to Nuremberg, the ICTY and ICTR have done 
much to advance the definition of rape. The difficulties and successes they 
experienced contributed to the development of the laws concerning rape and sexual 
violence during the drafting of the ICC Statute. However, much of this case law has 
developed alongside, and often overlaps with, the case law concerning rape as a crime 
against humanity and as an act of genocide.139 There are nevertheless certain aspects 
of the jurisprudence that are clearly particular to the context of an armed conflict.
At the ICTR several cases have dealt with the issue of rape as a crime against 
humanity and as genocide.140 It was for this reason rape as a war crime has been 
considered to a much lesser extent. The ICTR has itself noted that, in regard to rape as 
a violation of Common Article 3 and APII, the prosecution ‘[relied] upon the same 
underlying conduct and evidence that it led in relation to the allegations of genocide
136 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6(l).
137 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6(2)&(3).
138 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6(4)&(5).
139 The relevant jurisprudence is to be discussed below in relation to these acts.
140 e.g. Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4) TC, Judgment 2 September 1998, para.508; Prosecutor v. 




and rape as a crime against humanity.’141 The only difference between rape as a war 
crime and rape as genocide or a crime against humanity was the requirement that the 
former had a ‘nexus to the non-intemational armed conflict between the Rwandan 
government and the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front].’142 This highlights a common 
approach to defining rape shared by IHL and ICL.
In Mucic, the ICTY held ‘There can be no doubt that rape and other forms of 
sexual assault are expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law’143 
despite recognising that there is no definition of rape in IHL provided by statutes.144 
The Trial Chamber proceeded to consider the definition of rape provided in Akayesu, 
albeit in the context of genocide, and noted that rape constitutes ‘a physical invasion 
of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances that are coercive.’145 
Furthermore, the ‘Trial Chamber [considered] the rape of any person to be a 
despicable act which strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical 
integrity.’146 It recognised the ‘severe pain and suffering, both physical and 
psychological’ that rape can cause, and emphasised the ‘psychological suffering of 
persons upon whom rape is inflicted may be exacerbated by social and cultural 
conditions and can be particularly acute and long lasting.’147
4.2.4 - Conclusion on sexual violence and IHL
There are several elements comprising the definition of sexual violence under IHL, 
with the aspect most considered being rape. It is pmdent to begin by noting that rape 
and sexual violence is prohibited under customary IHL and by treaty law, whether
141 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu (ICTR-00-56) TC, Judgment, 17 May 2011, para. 1907.
142 ibid para.2160.
143 Mucic et al (IT-96-21) TC, Judgment, 9 October 2001, para.476.
144 ibid para.476 & para.478.
145 ibid para.479.




such acts occur in an international or non-intemational armed conflict. Defining the 
physical acts of sexual violence can be discerned from the case law regarding 
genocide and crimes against humanity.148 Such a shared definition is similar to how 
torture is defined across the three regimes of IHRL, IHL and ICL. The issue of 
coercion rather than a victim’s lack of consent has been considered in Mucic (drawing 
on Akayesu). This is an area that has been considered in several cases by the ICL 
regime and there is little evidence to suggest that the IHL regime has diverged from 
this element of the definition.
The IHL regime has stmggled against the historic background that saw sexual 
violence as a by-product and inevitable feature of armed conflict.149 Despite such 
historical inevitability, women in particular were almost routinely targeted with it 
being seen by some as a ‘fundamental and accepted military tactic.’150 Even when 
rape is not used a weapon of war it can be used to terrorise the populace.151 None of 
this detracts from the suffering that sexual violence inflicts on the victims of such 
acts.152 The suffering does not necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities, with 
the harm continuing during post-conflict reconstruction.153 Further damage occurs 
post-conflict due to such acts sometimes being committed to dissolve the social 
structure of the attacked group.154
Despite this historical background the IHL regime has taken steps to increase 
the protection afforded to women during times of armed conflict. One of the ways in
148 Considered in the next section, Part 4.3.1.
149 Bedont (n 88) 65.
150 Brook Moshan, ‘Women, War and Words: The Gender Component in the Permanent International 
Criminal Court’s Definition of Crimes against Humanity (1998) 22 Fordham International Law 
Journal 154, 157.
151 ibid 159.
152 Susan McKay, ‘The effects of armed conflict on girls and women’ (1998) 4 Peace and Conflict: 
Journal o f  Peace Psychology 381.
153 Lori Handrahan, ‘Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction’ (2004) 35 Security 
Dialogue 429.
154 Bulent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, ‘Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War’ (2005)
11 Body and Society 111, 117.
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which this has occurred is by the greater use of formally recognised laws that 
explicitly prohibit rape and sexual violence. By moving towards such a system it is 
possible to combine the desires of feminist writers who believe that ‘the oppression of 
women is a systemic condition, and it comes in a range of individualized and 
institutionalized forms that affect women’s life opportunities, or lack of them’155 with 
a formal understanding of international law as advocated by scholars such as 
d’Aspremont. Nevertheless, the fact remains that ‘No treaty or court judgment can 
remedy the suffering of wartime victims of rape’ but the inclusion of sexual crimes 
can help to curb impunity and to a cessation of the idea that rape is an ‘inevitable’ by­
product of war.156
4.3 - Sexual Violence and ICL
Many, if not all, domestic legal systems criminalise rape and sexual violence 
committed against women.157 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, ICL also prohibits sexual 
violence.158 As with the inclusion of such offences in IHL, the ICL regime has for 
many years struggled to criminalise sexual violence. At the ICTY and ICTR this was 
perhaps due to the uncertainty faced over the content of ICL. Even now, with the 
inclusion of several sexual offences as crimes against humanity in the ICC, 
commentators such as Moshan remain sceptical as to the efficacy of the Statute’s 
provisions.159 Despite such scepticism, the effectiveness of the ICL regime in 
addressing sexual violence remains to be thoroughly tested. The following section 
examines these prohibitions and the definitions of such offences as they relate to
155 Gillian Youngs, ‘Private Pain/Public Peace: Women’s Rights as Human Rights and Amnesty 
International’s Report on Violence against Women’ (2003) 28 Signs 1209, 1218.
156 Bedont (n 88) 80.
157 See generally Clare McGlynn and Vanessa E. Munro ‘Rethinking rape law: an introduction’ in 
Clare McGlynn and Vanessa E. Munro (eds.), Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative 
Perspectives (Routledge 2011) 1-2.
158 ICC Statute, art 7(1 )(g).
159 Moshan (n 150) 155 and 179.
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genocide and crimes against humanity. Care has been taken to distinguish between 
war crimes on the one hand, and genocide and crimes against humanity on the other.
4.3.1 - ICL treaty law and sexual violence
The IMT Statute provided that ‘inhumane acts’ were to be classed as crimes against 
humanity though no further definition was given.160 Meron has highlighted that, 
despite the use of rape and forced prostitution, rape was not specifically mentioned in 
the IMT Statute.161 Control Order No. 10, forming the basis of subsequent Nuremberg 
Trials, made reference to acts of rape as crimes against humanity but there is no 
evidence that individuals were ever prosecuted for such acts.162
The classification of sexual violence as genocide has been advanced under 
Article 2(b) of the Genocide Convention, namely that the perpetrator intended to 
destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such by 
‘Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’.163 This point has 
subsequently been clarified by case law that ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ does 
include rape and sexual violence.164 As the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR both 
incorporate Article 2 of the Genocide Convention in an unmodified form neither 
makes specific mention to rape as an act of genocide. The wording of the Genocide 
Convention is also included in the Statute of the ICC,165 and expanded further in the 
Elements of Crimes.166 Neither provision adds much to what has already been 
considered, although the Elements recognise that ‘causing serious bodily or mental 
harm’ ‘may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual
160 IMT Statute, art 6(c).
161 Theodor Meron, ‘Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL 424,425.
162 Hayes (n 119) 134.
163 See Akayesu (140) para.508.
164 Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44) TC, Judgment, 1 December 2003, paras.815-816; Prosecutor 
v. Stakic (IT-97-24) TC, Judgment, 31 Jul 2003, para.516; Prosecutor v. Krstic (IT-98-33) TC, 
Judgment, 2 August 2001, para.513.
165 ICC Statute, art 6(b).
166 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 6(b).
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violence or inhuman or degrading treatment.’167 The inclusion of rape as an act of 
genocide is part of the structuralist account of sexual violence meaning that the 
victims are targeted because of their membership of an ethnic or racial group rather 
than because they are women.168
The Statutes of the ICTY/R reflect international condemnation of acts of rape 
as crimes against humanity,169 while the SCSL Statute widens the category further by 
including ‘Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any 
other form of sexual violence’.170 This latter court, created by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1315 (2000),171 reflects the developments of international criminal law 
caused by creation of the ICC Statute in 1998. The negotiation of the ICC Statute was 
seen as an ‘historic opportunity’ to correct the deficiencies of the international legal 
system’s response to sexual violence.172 This has been attributed to a large degree 
because of the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Rwanda had brought sexual 
violence during conflict into the open, ensuring that by the time of the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference (at which the ICC Statute was negotiated) such conduct had 
received much attention in the media.173 Despite the achievement of the drafters by 
including several sexual crimes in the ICC Statute, some commentators have noted 
that the Statute fails to meet the expectations of women’s rights advocates.174 One 
problem identified is the requirement that an accused commit an offence with intent 
‘because intent is often particularly difficult to prove in cases of sexual violence’.175 
However, such an approach would see the creation of strict liability offences for
167 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 6(b), fn.3.
168 Skjelsbaek (n 2) 221.
169 ICTY Statute, art 5(g); ICTR Statute, art 3(g).
170 S ta tu te  art
171 UNSC Res 1315, 14 August 2000, UN Doc S/RES/1315.
172 Bedont (n 88) 66.
173 ibid 67.




sexual crimes under international law, an idea that would deny the offender basic fair 
trial rights.
There is wide recognition in the ICC Statute that sexual violence can amount
to a crime against humanity. Article 7(1 )(g) prohibits ‘Rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity’. Only ‘forced pregnancy’ receives statutory
clarification in Article 7(2)(f):
the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of 
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave 
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as 
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.
The Elements offer further clarification of the acts prohibited by Article 7(l)(g). On
the whole, the Elements relating to sexual crimes as crimes against humanity closely
follow those relating to war crimes. Rape is defined as when the perpetrator invades
‘the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part
of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ’ or ‘of the anal or
genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body’.176 The
other requirements are a lack of consent, and the common crimes against humanity
requirement that the conduct was part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population and that the perpetrator knew that his conduct was part of
such an attack.177 This, except for the requirement that the conduct is part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, is identical to the
provisions relating to rape as a war crime.
Other Elements define acts such as ‘sexual slavery’,178 ‘enforced
prostitution’179 and more broadly ‘sexual violence’.180 This latter category is worth
176 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 7(l)(g)-l.
177 ibid.
178 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 7(l)(g)-2.
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further exploration as it serves as broad type of criminal offence, defined as being the 
commission of an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caus[ing] 
such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of 
force or coercion’ providing that such acts are ‘of a gravity comparable to the other 
offences in Article 7(1 )(g) of the Statute. It is necessary under this provision for the 
perpetrator to know that such acts were sufficiently grave, and that the conduct was 
part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. While this does 
appear to grant the judiciary of the ICC a wide discretionary power, the inclusion of 
the phrase ‘of a gravity comparable to the other offences’ offers a degree of 
demarcation but, as with other broadly worded provisions of the ICC Statute e.g. 
‘other inhumane acts’ as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1 )(k), is open to a 
degree of criticism especially that it allows for the introduction of ex post facto law 
into international criminal law.181
4.3.2 - ICL case law of sexual violence
The international criminal tribunals have been responsible for some of the greatest 
developments in the prosecution of individuals for violence against women. In turn 
this has prompted greater awareness of the violence suffered by women in times of 
armed conflict as well as during genocides and the commission of crimes against 
humanity. Given the lack of definition provided by the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, there 
was a need to develop and clarify definitions of rape and other acts of sexual violence. 
Several different Trial and Appeal Chambers at both tribunals have approached this 
task with varying degrees of success and criticism in the literature. This section
179 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 7(l)(g)-3.
180 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 7(1 )(g)-6.
181 This point was considered in the Kupreskic case before the ICTY: Prosecutor v. Kupreskic (IT-95- 
16-T) TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para.563; see also Beth van Schaack, ‘Crimen Sine Lege: 
Judicial Law Making at the Intersection of Law and Morals’ (2008) 97 The Georgetown Law Journal 
119; George A. Finch, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and International Law’ (1947) 41 AJIL 20, 24.
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therefore traces these developments in the law of rape and other acts of sexual 
violence beginning with the Akayesu case before the ICTR.
The original indictment in Akayesu failed to make reference to rape as either 
an act of genocide or as a crime against humanity.182 It was only with the intervention 
of one of the judges that the prosecution amended the indictment so as to include acts 
of rape.183 Due to the lack of a definition of rape in international law at the time, a 
point recognised by the ICTR,184 the Court was left with no choice but to engage in an 
‘innovative progressive interpretation’ of international law.185 This has been described 
as an ‘archetypal example of judicial creativity’.186 While the judgment has been 
criticised by scholars,187 the ICTY188 and, impliedly, an ICTR Trial Chamber,189 it 
remains the starting point for any analysis concerning the definition of rape in ICL. It 
was the first judgment to engage with the issues and recognise the necessity to 
provide a definition of rape. Furthermore, it also discusses rape and sexual violence as 
genocide and a crime against humanity.190
The Trial Chamber began by noting ‘rape is a form of aggression’ and a 
‘violation of personal dignity’,191 while at the same time stating ‘the central elements 
of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and 
body parts.’192 The Court did, however, attempt to give a superficial definition of
182 Catherine MacKinnon, ‘Rape, Genocide and Women’s Human Rights’ (1994) 17 Harvard Women’s 
Law Journal 6, 9.
183 ibid.
184 Akayesu (n 140); see also Navanethem Pillay, ‘Equal Justice for Women: A Personal Journey’ 50 
Arizona Law Review  657, 666; and Wolfgang Schomberg and Ines Peterson, ‘Genuine Consent to 
Sexual Violence under International Criminal Law’ (2007) 101 AJIL 121, 123.
185 Hayes (n 119) 134.
186 ibid.
187 William Schabas, ‘Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (1999) 6 ILSA Journal o f  International and 
Comparative Law 375.
188 Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1) TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para.177.
189 Prosecutor v. Semanza (ICTR-97-20) TC, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para.345.
190 Discussed below, 230.




rape. It was described as a ‘physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a 
person under circumstances which are coercive.’193 For Schomberg and Peterson, 
Akayesu not only represents the criminalisation of rape but also of sexualised violence 
as it is more broadly conceived,194 including penetration by means of an instrument or 
object.195
The Akayesu judgment was a pivotal case for rape as an act of genocide,196 
with the Court noting that rape ‘can be a measure intended to prevent births when the 
person raped refuses subsequently to procreate.’197 Such acts therefore are aimed at 
the long-term destruction of a given Convention Group because they are prevented 
from procreating by the psychological and physical effects of rape. However, as rape 
is not a specifically enumerated act of genocide,198 the Court had to include it as an 
act which caused ‘serious bodily or mental harm’.199 In itself this is not problematic 
given the serious harm that acts of rape have on the victims, even if the Tribunal’s 
findings of genocide are open to doubt.200 As with other acts of genocide, care must 
be taken in ensuring that the necessary elements of the offence specified in Article 1 
of the Genocide Convention are present, namely the intent to destroy in whole or in 
part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. MacKinnon makes such a mistake 
when she mischaracterises acts of rape as genocide because ‘rape [is] directed toward 
women because they are Muslim or Croatian.’201 While such a definition meets the 
standard of persecutory acts as crimes against humanity, simply targeting individuals
193 ibid.
194 Schomberg (n 184) 127.
195 Akayesu (n 140) para.686.
196 Askin (n 12); Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment’ (1998) 5 ILSA Journal o f  
International and Comparative Law 359.
197 Akayesu (n 140) para.508.
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because they are Muslim or Croatian is not in itself sufficient for a finding of 
genocide, what is required is the intent to destroy a Convention Group.
It is not, however, the ‘mechanical definition’ of rape,202 or its inclusion as an 
act of genocide that has proved to be problematic but rather the issue of consent and 
coercion. As the Akayesu judgment noted, ‘sexual violence which includes rape, is 
considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive.’203 It developed this point further by stating there 
was no need for coercive circumstances to be evidenced by a show of physical force. 
Rather, intimidation, threats and duress preying on the victim’s fear could constitute 
coercion, which itself could be ‘inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed 
conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe [Hutu militia] among refugee Tutsi 
women’.204 Reference was made to other acts such as where a female student was 
forced to dance naked before a crowd which, the Court concluded, constituted an act 
of sexual violence, in coercive circumstances.205 Before examining this issue further it 
is necessary to introduce additional cases from the ICTY that adopted a different 
approach to defining rape.
The cases of Furundzija, Kunarac and Kvocka at the ICTY stand out in their 
contribution to defining sexual crimes and how their differences to the ICTR’s 
jurisprudence point to a tension within the ICL regime itself. The Furundzija case is 
seminal to the jurisprudence of torture and makes an important contribution to sexual 
violence. The Trial Chamber heard from a witness how she was forced to undress
202 yj-jg ‘mechanical definition’ is adopted by a UN Report which states: Rape should be understood 
to be the insertion, under conditions of force, coercion, or duress, of any object, including but not 
limited to a penis, into a victim’s vagina or anus; or the insertion, under conditions of force, coercion, 
or duress, of a penis into the mouth of the victim.’ Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the 
Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like 
practices during armed conflict, UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998, para.24; see also 
Far well (n88) 392.





before a group of forty soldiers and sit naked while she was interrogated and 
subsequently raped multiple times.206 Further evidence included a soldier known as 
‘Accused B’ telling another soldier not to hit female detainees as he had ‘other 
methods’ for women including rape and sexual assault.207 A substantial amount of 
evidence was also heard by the Court detailing the psychiatric harm suffered by the 
victims including post-traumatic stress disorder and suicidal thoughts.208
The Trial Chamber turned to the legal definition of rape and, after considering 
the definition of rape provided in Akayesu,109 implied the definition in that case 
lacked specifity to the extent that it does not conform to the principle of certainty 
required by the criminal law.210 It was noted where international law does not define a 
notion of criminal law, recourse to domestic legal provisions is acceptable providing 
that such reference does not draw from just one jurisdiction and that general 
principles and concepts can be discerned.211 On this basis, there exists a general trend 
in national legislation towards a broadening of the definition of rape to include acts 
previously considered less serious provided that they meet minimum requirements 
particularly that of forced penetration.212 This broadening includes anal and vaginal 
rape, though it was recognised that forced oral penetration is rape in some national 
criminal codes while in others it is not.213 In response, the Trial Chamber held 
international law safeguards human dignity, and because forced oral penetration is a
206 Furundzija (n 188) paras.80-83.
207 ibid para.87.
208 ibid para.96-106; on the harm caused by such acts see Susan McKay, ‘The effects of armed conflict 
on girls and women’ (1998) 4 Peace and Conflict: Journal o f Peace Psychology 381.
209 Akayesu (nl40) para.597-598.
210 Furundzija (nl 88) para. 177.
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‘most humiliating and degrading attack’ on dignity it was bound to find that such 
forcible oral sex constitute rape.214
A definition of the actus reus of rape was given by the Trial Chamber which 
was broken down into two elements with the first being the sexual penetration, 
however slight, of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or 
by any other object, or the penetration of the victim’s mouth by the perpetrator’s 
penis. The second element was that the penetration occurs by coercion, force or the 
threat of force against the victim or third party.215 Curiously, despite the Court’s 
requirement for the strict definition of crimes, the judgment does not identify the 
necessary mental elements of rape that are required to be proven against an accused, a 
point subsequently correct in the Kunarac judgment.216
In Kunarac, although essentially in agreement with the Furundzija definition 
of rape, the Trial Chamber considered it necessary to develop the element of coercion 
because the definition given was ‘more narrowly stated than is required by 
international law.’217 This was chiefly because it does make reference to the issue of 
conduct which would render the act non-consensual.218 The principal issue was the 
existence of detention centres run by the defendants operating essentially as rape 
camps.219 As a result there was a question mark as to whether one of the defendants, 
Dragoljub Kunarac, had forced a victim to have sexual intercourse with him. Kunarac 
maintained he believed the victim had freely consented to sex even though she had 
previously been threatened by another soldier who said he would kill her if she did
214 ibid para. 183.
215 ibid para. 185.
2,6 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al (IT-96-23 & 23/1) TC, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para.460.
217 ibid para.438.
218 ibid para.438.
219 ibid para.30; see also para.35 where soldiers and policemen would call at the camps and select 
female victims to rape.
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not have sex with Kunarac.220 Other evidence relating to the operation of ‘rape 
camps’ suggests such camps allowed the accused to ‘act out their sexual fantasies’.221 
Some victims were repeatedly raped until they became pregnant, suggesting the aim 
of the sexual violence was to ensure victims would give birth to the perpetrators’ 
children.222
In determining the definition of rape the Court engaged in an analysis of the 
issue of the consent in rape legislation of several domestic jurisdictions around the 
world.223 It was concluded a principle common to these jurisdictions was that serious 
violations of sexual autonomy were to be regarded as rape, including acts where the 
victim does not freely agree to sexual acts. Consequently the Court modified the 
definition of rape to be:
the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the 
penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the 
mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration 
occurs without the consent of the victim.224
Consent in such cases is to be given voluntarily as a consequence of the victim’s own
freewill, assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances.225 Consequently,
Kunarac’s belief that the victim had consensually engaged in sexual intercourse with
him was no defence to the charge of rape. The Court stressed that the fact the victim
was being held in captivity and acting under duress rendered her acts non-consensual
and therefore Kunarac was guilty of rape.226
220 ibid para.645.








In Kvocka the Court heard evidence of sexual violence committed against the 
36 detainees at the Omarska concentration camp.227 These included acts of rape, 
including gang rape or multiple rapes,228 sexual violence such as sexual mutilation,229 
and sexual assault.230 The Court also heard evidence of the effects such violence had 
on the victims, how they would appear ‘absent-minded’ and ‘withdrawn’, and how 
they would return from interrogations showing signs of ‘physical abuse’.231 The 
sexual violence was evidently an important component in the ‘standard operating 
procedure’ in place at Omarska where the operators made ‘extensive efforts to ensure 
that the detainees were tormented relentlessly.’232 Having considered the evidence, 
the Court turned to the legal basis of the indictments. The judgment largely conforms 
to the definitions set down in Kunarac, holding rape to be a violation of sexual 
autonomy.233 It emphasises the mens rea of rape is the intent to sexually penetrate the 
victim in the knowledge that the victim does not consent.234
Subsequent cases at the ICTR remained largely faithful to the definitions 
provided by the Akayesu judgment, while the ICTY made substantial changes to the 
definition of rape and sexual violence. The ICTR Trial Chamber in Musema heard 
evidence of horrific sexual violence including sexual mutilation235 and rape.236 It 
made reference to Furundzija237 but declined to follow the definition, noting the 
‘essence of rape is not the particular details of the body parts and objects involved, but
227 Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al (IT-98-30/1) TC, Judgment, 2 November 2001, paras.98-109; See 
Richard Barrett and Laura Little, ‘Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy Law in 
International Tribunals’ (2003) 88 Minnesota Law Review 30.
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rather the aggression that is expressed in a sexual manner under conditions of 
coercion.’238 The Court continued that it took a ‘conceptual definition’ of rape rather 
than what it describes as a ‘mechanical definition’ of rape.239 It concludes that the 
conceptual definition will ‘better accommodate evolving norms of criminal justice.’240
The ICTR, in the later case of Semanza, categorically rejected the Akayesu 
definition of rape in favour of that laid down by the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac.241 
Semanza also shed light on the expansive styling of the definition adopted by Akayesu 
when it noted that acts of sexual violence that do not meet the narrow definition 
provided by the Kunarac definition could still be prosecuted, inter alia, as other 
inhumane acts.242 Gacumbitsi seemed to approve both Akayesu and the Kunarac 
judgments;243 however it is the latter approach to defining rape that has prevailed in 
subsequent judgments.
In later cases such as in Stakic, the Trial Chamber relied upon the definition of 
rape provided by the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac.244 In Krstic, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber noted that the accused was responsible for acts which included rape which 
were deemed by the Court to be a ‘natural and foreseeable consequence’ of ethnic 
cleansing operations which he oversaw.245 Other cases have held that the age and 
vulnerability246 of the victims are aggravating factors relevant to sentencing, which 
while not strictly relevant to the actual definition of the offence serve to illustrate the 
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As with enforced disappearance, the BWCC has made reference to the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, serving to illustrate how the definitions established by the 
ICTY have come to be used in a wider context. For example, both the cases of Pincic 
and Novalic utilise the definition of rape that emerged from the ICTY.247 They define 
the actus reus of rape as being the penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth of the 
victim with the perpetrator’s penis or as the penetration of the victim’s vagina or anus 
with another object.248 Furthermore, the Pincic judgment makes reference to the 
forced nature of the act of rape, thereby underlining the link between the Bosnian 
Court’s jurisprudence and the case law of the ICTY concerning the violation of the 
victim’s sexual autonomy.249 Additionally, the Court made reference to the ICC 
Elements of Crimes, in particular when defining rape and indeed it has been indicated 
that this is the preferred definition because the definition of rape at the ICTY/R is a 
‘more restrictive and less accurate description of the actus reus of the crime’.250 The 
final point linking the two jurisdictions is that rape and other serious sexual assaults 
are both prohibited conduct and the main distinction between the two lies at the 
sentencing phase.251
Having now considered the case law it would appear that there is a degree of 
disagreement as to how rape and other acts of sexual violence are to be defined. This 
disagreement appears to stem from the coercive or consensual elements of the 
offence, and to what extent they ought to be applied in cases of rape committed in the 
context of an armed conflict, genocide or crimes against humanity. Relevant to the
247 Kvocka (n 227); Kunarac (n 216); Kupreskic (n 181).
248 Prosecutor v Pincic (No. X-KR-08/502) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
28 November 2008, p.30; Prosecutor v. Novalic (No. X-KR-09/847) Trial Judgment of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 May 2010, p.24. (although the latter case makes the definition in the 
context of war crimes, the definition of the substantive elements of the actus reus do not vary).
249 Kunarac (n 216).
250 Prosecutor v. Nikacevic (No. X-KR—08/500) Trial Judgment of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 19 February 2009) at fn.15.
251 Novalic (n248) p.25.
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issue of consent is whether it should be seen as an element of the crime itself, or if the 
victim’s consent should be a defence. Schomberg and Peterson highlight this problem 
when they note that the difference is the difference between the prosecution having to 
prove non-consent beyond reasonable doubt (if non-consent is an element of the 
offence) and the defendant having to prove consent on the balance of probabilities (if 
it is to be regarded as a defence).252 Given the wording of the ICC Elements of 
Crimes, it is apparent that coercion or non-consent is indeed an element of the offence 
rather than being considered a defence to an allegation of rape.253
Pillay has acknowledged that the definition of rape adopted by the ICTR in 
Akayesu was a ‘conceptual definition’ which was ‘broadly formulated’ and not 
limited to ‘conventional’ notions of rape.254 Continuing with a liberal approach to 
interpretation, she noted that a lack of consent was not required; instead, the Akayesu 
judgment defined rape as acts of sexual violence taking place in coercive 
circumstances.255 These ‘coercive circumstances’ could include instances where the 
victim has been detained in a prison camp,256 paraded in front of a group of soldiers 
or where the victim has been otherwise threatened. The Akayesu judgment relied 
solely on the concept of coercion rather than the consent ‘paradigm’.257 However, 
Akayesu does not actually exclude consent as a requirement. Instead, on the facts of 
the case and the overwhelming evidence present, it is apparent that the sexual acts 
performed could not be construed as being consensual sexual acts.258 Kalosieh 
recognises that the consent defence was never raised in Akayesu because the acts of
252 Schomberg (n 184) 124.
253 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 7(l)(g)-l.
254 Pillay (nl84) 666.
255 ibid 666.
256 Prosecutor v. Mucic et al (IT-96-21) TC, Judgment, 9 October 2001.




sexual violence were ‘so egregious as to nullify [its] availability’.259 As such, it can be 
suggested that the ICTR ought to have made reference to the issue of consent instead 
of relying on the lack of consent being implicit in its judgment. Expressed another 
way, the failure of the ICTR to mention consent does not automatically mean coercion 
rather than consent is a relevant factor.
Consent and coercion in rape cases has been the subject of much academic 
debate both at the international260 and domestic level.261 From this it emerges that one 
of the fundamental principles at stake is sexual autonomy. This was recognised in 
Kunarac262 and Kvocka.26?> The prohibition of rape is itself intrinsically bound to the 
preservation of a woman’s sexual autonomy264 and where a woman is ‘forced to 
engage in sexual or reproductive acts, their autonomy is circumscribed [emphasis 
added].’265 Boon discusses the nature of another sexual crime, that of forced 
pregnancy, and makes reference to the way in which the commission of such a crime 
both violates a woman’s sexual autonomy in addition to her reproductive freedom.266 
Sexual autonomy becomes, therefore, an element of a woman’s right to self- 
determination. A woman can consent to engage in sexual activity, and it is the 
consensual nature of such acts that renders it an act of her own will. Conversely, a 
woman’s lack of consent to sexual activity is a violation of her autonomy.
259 ibid 126.
260 g g j)ianiie Lupig, 'Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes before the 
International Criminal Court’ (2009) 17 American University Journal o f  Gender, Social Policy and the 
Law  431; Kalosieh ibid.
261 Donald A. Dripps, ‘Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference between the Presence of Force and 
the Absence of Consent’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review  7.
262 Kunarac (n 216) 440 .
263 Kvocka (n 227) 176-7.
264 Kristen Boon, ‘Rape and Forced Pregnancy under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and 





Coercion is one way in which a woman’s ability to consent is removed,267 and 
a means by which a woman’s sexual autonomy can be violated. Coercion can take 
place, for example, by means of the use of force against a woman or third party, the 
threat of force either against the woman herself or a third party, or by a pervasive 
atmosphere of violence short of threats.268 Other means by which a woman’s consent 
can be violated include intoxication by alcohol or drugs,269 and fraud or deceit.270 A 
further issue is whether the woman is actually capable of consenting. For instance she 
may have a mental or physical incapacity which renders her unable to consent, or 
indeed she may be deemed too young, in the eyes of the relevant law, to be able to 
exercise her sexual autonomy and thus consent to the sexual acts.271 If this is 
accepted, then the judgment in Furundzija which lists the use of force, threat, 
coercion or the lack of consent as a prerequisite of rape272 appears to be incorrect. 
Instead, force, threat and coercion are means by which a sexual act becomes non- 
consensual. Consent itself can be seen as the medium through which a woman’s 
sexual autonomy is exercised.
267 Lucy Reed Harris, ‘Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape’ (1976) 43 The University o f  
Chicago Law Review  613.
268 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 96; ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 96 ; 
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 70.
269 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 70(b) provides that consent cannot be given where a 
victim is ‘incapable of giving genuine consent’. Interestingly, the ICTY RPE does not mention such 
‘incapacity’ but rather the defendant’s belief that the victim ‘did not submit’ which could be construed 
as permitting an incapacity provision, although the express lack of such a provision is regrettable.
270 As example of this at the international level the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence relating to 
consent relating to ‘genuine consent’ (rule 70(b)) could be construed as including consent obtained by 
fraud or deceit which by its very nature is not ‘genuine’.
271 Although, at what age a female (to distinguish between woman/girl) gains her sexual autonomy is 
itself a thorny question and not one to be answered here. For an introduction to this matter see Kate 
Sutherland, ‘From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage 
Sexualities’ (2003) 9 William and Mary Journal o f Women and the Law 313. Curiously, an age of 
consent is not specified in the ICC Statute, its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, or the Elements of 
Crimes. One reason for this might be that the age of consent varies from State to State and differs 
depending on cultural context. However, it appears to be a strange omission because the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence refer to a victim ‘being incapable of giving genuine consent which on the 
face of it would appear to include a minor. One solution could be to base the age of consent on the 
given local practices. Of course, this would not matter if one believes that consent is an irrelevant 
element of sexual violence.
272 Furundzija (n 188) para. 174.
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Other writers have criticised the requirement that consent be an element of the 
offence of rape, particularly in the context of armed conflict or other atrocities.273 
This can be seen as a ‘contextual’ approach to sexual violence. For instance, Pillay, in 
her discussion of rape, describes acts of sexual violence taking place in 
‘circumstances which are coercive’.274 In Akayesu, a case in which Pillay was a judge, 
the ICTR indictment specified how victims lived in a constant state of fear.275 
Kalosieh notes the context can ‘drain all meaning from the term “consent”’.276 
Meanwhile, Schomberg and Peterson comment that often the ‘international’ nature of 
the alleged offences is enough to establish circumstances that are ‘intrinsically 
coercive.’277 They highlight the case of Gacumbitsi in which non-consent was 
established by proving coercive circumstances without having to introduce evidence 
of the victim’s non-consent.278 For Boon, the fundamental question is how sexual 
autonomy and the issue of consent are addressed in the context of armed conflict or 
other atrocity.279 Kalosieh answers this by suggesting that the idea of consent is 
‘inappropriate’ where rape is used as a weapon of war.280 As a consequence of this the 
Kunarac judgment which centred upon the issue of a victim’s consent, or lack thereof, 
can be criticised because ‘it fail[ed] to recognise the factual predicate of violence and 
torture that is its context.’281 The issue of consent remains controversial in domestic 
law, for example over whether drunken consent to sexual intercourse can be sufficient 
for consent.282 In contrast, cases concerning international criminal law more
273 Kalosieh (n 10) 121.
274 Pillay (n 184) 666.
275 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Indictment (Amended) ICTR-96-4-I, 12A.
276 Kalosieh (n 10) 129.
277 Schomberg (n 184) 138.
278 ibid.
279 Boon (n 264) 655.
280 Kalosieh (nlO) 121.
281 ibid 131.
282 See Georgina Firth, ‘Not an Invitation to Rape: The Sexual Offences Act 2003, Consent and the 
Case of the “Drunken” Victim’ (2011) 62 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 99.
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frequently involve instances of rape where the victim’s consent is prima facie 
absent.283
The contextual element is indeed important when prosecuting an individual for 
alleged crimes before international criminal courts. MacKinnon notes that basing 
definitions of rape on ‘body parts and consent’ results in ‘rape definitions being 
utterly decontextualized’.284 Likewise, Kalosieh calls for a contextual element to rape 
and sexual violence stating that while domestic laws do not have the need for a 
contextual element for rape, such an element is required at the international level to 
‘account for the types of atrocities committed as [for example] part of an ethnic 
cleansing campaign’.285 However, the contextual element is already present, albeit at 
a higher level of operation; it is automatically implied by the crime being prosecuted 
as an act of genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime. Thus, the additional 
requirement advocated by writers such as MacKinnon appears to be superfluous and 
redundant from the perspective of the law.
Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and command responsibility have played an 
important role in the prosecutions of several individuals before the ICTY and 
ICTR.286 For example, there was no evidence offered against Jean-Paul Akayesu to 
suggest that he had personally committed acts of rape or other acts of sexual 
violence.287 While a full discussion of the nature of joint criminal enterprise is outside 
the scope of this present study it is necessary briefly to examine JCE as it relates to
283 e.g. where a victim is held in a concentration camp.
284 Catherine MacKinnon, ‘Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu’ (2006) 44 
Columbia Journal o f  Transnational Law 940, 955.
285 Kalosieh (n 10) 135. . . .
286 See Verena Haan ‘The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the
International Criminal’Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia’ (2005) 5 International Criminal Law 
Review  167.
287 Akayesu, Indictment (Amended) ICTR-96-4-I.
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rape and sexual violence. As has been noted high-level prosecutions, particularly in 
Rwanda, have been problematic because of a lack of evidence linking the accused to 
the immediate perpetrators of the acts.289 An additional burden in proving JCE is 
proving that the accused and the perpetrator shared a common intent. For example, in 
Kajelijeli the prosecution failed to prove that there was the necessary connection 
between the accused, Juvenal Kajelijeli, and acts of the Interahamwe in his district.290
The ‘mechanical definition’ of rape has been adopted in the ICC Elements of 
Crimes,291 albeit combined by the conceptual definition which suggests the two 
approaches are not in fact mutually exclusive. The mechanical definition centres upon 
the word penetration, while the conceptual definition prefers the word invasion. The 
ICC Elements of Crimes defines rape as being where the perpetrator ‘invaded the 
body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight’.292 The term 
‘invasion’ was preferred because it was seen as ‘neutral’ and ‘de-emphasizes’ the 
precise physical act.293 However, this in itself raises questions as to how precise 
international criminal law should be and to what extent precision is necessary or 
desirable. The idea of de-emphasising the precise physical act appears on the face of it 
designed to retain a broad-based definition that can better accommodate emerging 
norms of criminal justice, as highlighted in Musema.294 Yet, it is difficult to imagine 
how a mechanical definition of rape may change in the future. It appears that in their 
attempt to be ‘neutral’ the drafters of the Elements of Crimes missed an opportunity to
288 For further discussion of JCE see Kai Ambos, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command 
Responsibility’ (2007) 5 JICJ 159; Stefano Manacorda and Chantal Meloni, ‘Indirect Perpetration 
versus Joint Criminal Enterprise’ (2011) 9 JICJ 159; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Proper Limits of 
Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise (2007) 5 JICJ 109.
289 Rebecca L. Haffajee, ‘Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: The 
Application of Joint Enterprise Theory’ (2007) 29 Harvard Journal o f Law and Gender 201, 202.
290 Kajelijeli (n 164).
291 ICC Elements of Crimes.
292 ICC Elements of Crimes, art 7(l)(g)-2 (1).
293 Boon (n 264) 649.
294 Musema (n 235) para.228.
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ensure that there is sufficient clarity in the law relating to a serious category of
295crime.
As noted above, the ICTR led the way in its approach to defining rape, 
amongst other international crimes,296 with Niamh Hayes commenting that the ‘range 
and breadth of sexual violence case law which has been articulated by the judges of 
[the ICTY/R] is a tremendous achievement in and of itself.’297 One cause of this 
achievement is the fact that the Akayesu judgment is an ‘archetypal example of 
judicial creativity’ which can in part be explained by the almost total lack of 
established case law relevant to this area of ICL.298 However, Hayes also believes that 
the Akayesu judgment also demonstrates an ‘innovative progressive interpretation’ of 
international law,299 a statement indicative of an instrumentalist approach to 
international law.
Criticism has been levelled at the decision by the ICTY in Kunarac where the 
Tribunal apparently failed to follow a ‘liberal and broad’ interpretation of the ICTY 
Statute in relation to sexual crimes.300 Indeed, a seemingly strictly legal approach to 
this field of law appears beyond the comprehension of writers such as Kalosieh who 
has described the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence on consent as 
‘misogynistic formalism’.301 However, Kalosieh’s criticism fails to take into account 
the requirement that certainty based upon a degree of formalism is required for the 
fair and effective operation of criminal law. Her views are also reminiscent of the 
policy-orientated approaches to law, examined in Chapter 1, where formal approaches
295 How this will play out in practice is uncertain, and it is unlikely that having such a wide definition 
of rape in this context will prove to be problematic. However, from the more abstract perspective of 
demanding clarity in the law the definition offered is far from ideal.
296 It was also instrumental in challenging formally defined concepts of genocide, although that is 
outside the bounds of the present inquiry.
297 Hayes (n 119) 132.
298 ibid 134.
299 ibid.




to the law are to be replaced with a more flexible policy-focused approach to legal 
interpretation in order to achieve certain specified ends. To counter such an approach, 
the ICC Statute provides The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and 
shall not be extended by analogy’ and, importantly, ‘In case of ambiguity, the 
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted 
or convicted.’302 The adoption of such an approach in the ICC Statute suggests that 
the policy-approach has been abandoned in favour of a formalistic approach to ICL.
4.3.3 - Conclusion on ICL and sexual violence
International criminal law has been responsible for some of the greatest advances in 
the protection of women in international law. As with other substantive areas studied, 
the creation of the ICC Statute (alongside its supporting Elements of Crimes and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence) has provided new, formally identified, definitions 
of international criminal offences. While the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR 
may appear to contradict the provisions of the ICC Statute, leading to an assumption 
that this is evidence of conflict, it is important to remember the three courts within the 
ICL regime are functionally and jurisdictionally separate. The ICTY was established 
to prosecute individuals for crimes committed in the former-Yugoslavia and thus its 
jurisdiction is limited to these events. The ICTR was created to prosecute those who 
committed atrocities during 1994 in Rwanda.303 Meanwhile, the ICC Statute is 
potentially wide-ranging though its limitations have been widely discussed in the 
preceding section. Therefore, it would seem that even within a legal regime there is 
separation enough to give the appearance of conflict yet on closer inspection from the 
perspective of jurisdiction it is readily apparent that any conflict can be resolved by
302 ICC Statute, art 22(2).
303 ICTR Statute, art 1 specifies the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to between acts 
committed between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
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examining the jurisdiction of a particular sub-regime.304 However, only time will tell 
if the ICC Statute will be effective in prosecuting the perpetrators of sexual 
violence.305
As was noted at the beginning of this section, the ICL regime has had to 
overcome some initial hurdles when criminalising acts of sexual violence. The 
drafting of the ICC Statute was based on the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR in 
prosecuting heinous acts of sexual violence, in addition to being informed by the lack 
of an adequate response by the IHRL regime.306 Chinkin has condemned the 
international legal system for its failure to address violence against women, attributing 
this, at least in part, to the state-centric nature of the international legal system.307 
However, the ICL regime contains provisions to attribute responsibility to individuals 
not States. Another advance in this area is the inclusion of separate offences of sexual 
violence, meaning that prosecutors and judges are not forced to stretch pre-existing 
law concerning torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.308 It has been previously 
mentioned that no law will completely prevent acts such as rape but the formal 
criminalisation of such acts by the ICL regime represents an important step towards 
ensuring victims receive a measure of justice.
Sexual violence is an emotive issue and discussions about the definition of 
sexual violence tend to pale into insignificance when compared to the harm caused by 
such acts. However, the ICTY, ICTR and ICC Statute and Elements of Crimes have 
devoted considerable space to discussing how such acts are to be defined. The first
304 This point applies equally to the workings of the Inter-American Court and ECtHR which exist in 
the broad regime of international human rights law but have quite separate jurisdictions.
305 Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, ‘One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court’ (2001) 19 BYU Journal of Public Law 317.
306 See generally Sally Merry, ‘Rights, Religion, and Community: Approaches to Violence against 
Women in the Context of Globalization’ (2001) 35 Law and Society Review 39; Sally Merry, 
‘Constructing a Global Law - Violence against Women and the Human Rights System (2003) 28 Law 
and Social Inquiry 941.
307 Chinkin (n 17) 24.
308 Moshan (n 150) 181.
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part of the definition is contextual. The acts must take place either in the context of 
genocide or amount to a crime against humanity.309 The next stage is the level of 
harm caused to the victim. The law surveyed makes it clear that rape and sexual 
violence are capable of causing serious physical or mental harm to the victim. 
Developing this from the jurisprudence of torture it would appear that the standard of 
harm is identical between it and sexual violence. Rape can be viewed as a form of 
torture.310
Much of the difficulty regarding the definition of sexual violence in ICL 
revolves around the debate concerning the ‘mechanical’ versus ‘conceptual’ 
approaches to rape. The mechanical version of rape can be found in several places 
throughout the jurisprudence and related law. For example, in Furundzija the ICTY 
outlined the definition of rape as being the penetration of the victim’s vagina, anus or 
mouth with the perpetrator’s penis.311 In response, the ICTR declined to follow this 
noting that rape was more than a description of the body parts involved.312 Thus, the 
conceptual understanding of rape is broader in scope and seemingly permits a wider 
range of conduct to be considered rape. This echoes the definition of torture given in 
UNCAT which is noticeably wide so as to encompass a broad range of conduct. It is 
notable that while rape is not defined in the ICC Statute, a definition is presented in 
the Elements of Crimes. This appears to follow a mechanical, albeit broad, definition 
of rape, suggesting that the ICC favours a mechanical understanding of rape.313
Fragmentation has caused a degree of consternation in the international 
community but its effects on the actual operation of international law studied in this
309 Of course, war crimes can also be a violation of ICL but these have been considered in this thesis as 
violations of IHL.
310 Ay din (n 40).
311 Furundzija (n 188) para. 185.
312 Musema (n 235) para.226.
313 This could be due to several reasons, chiefly so as to ensure that crimes are sufficiently precise for 
the successful prosecution of perpetrators.
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thesis can be viewed as marginal. The ICL regime itself is placed in a difficult 
position regarding rape and sexual violence. On the one hand it has to be seen to 
provide justice both to the victims and more generally to the international community. 
On the other, is the strict requirement that an accused receives a fair trial. Balancing 
the two can prove to be difficult. The adoption of formally recognised rules as 
opposed to drawing from a wide-range of sources is important for ICL in order for an 
accused to receive a fair trial. In a sense, this requirement can counter some of the 
negative effects of fragmentation.
Conclusion to Chapter Four
This chapter has considered the prohibition of sexual violence by the three regimes 
studied throughout this thesis. It is worth noting that each does in fact prohibit acts 
such as rape and sexual assault but in very different ways. Of the three, the IHRL 
regime now has, perhaps surprisingly, the weakest provisions relating to sexual 
violence. In part this is because of the almost total lack of specific elements that 
prohibit sexual violence, leading the courts to develop the law within the framework 
of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. In contrast, the IHL and ICL regimes now 
contain specific provisions relating to the criminalisation of acts of sexual violence 
coupled with the punishment of those found guilty of such offences. These formalised 
aspects of the IHL and ICL regimes have not pleased some commentators who, as 
was seen, believe that they do not go far enough towards preventing sexual violence. 
However, such critics could be said to be unrealistic, or too idealistic, in their aims. 
IHL and ICL, like most legal systems, are imperfect but have to be made to work in 
the real world.
The close nature of the relationship between torture and sexual violence is 
readily apparent, and indeed often rape and other forms of sexual violence have been
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considered to be acts of torture under IHRL, IHL and ICL. As with torture, rape is 
universally condemned and prohibited by each of the three regimes studied yet 
differences between the regimes remain. These are most apparent when considering 
the definition of rape and sexual violence as a crime against humanity, as genocide 
and as a war crime. For example the definition of rape and other acts of sexual 
violence necessarily includes as part of the actus reus of the offence the requirement 
that the acts be perpetrated in a widespread or systematic fashion as part of an attack 
against a civilian population, while the mens rea of the offence includes the 
requirement that an accused be aware of this contextual element. Rape as an act of 
genocide can only be committed if the intention of the perpetrator is to destroy in 
whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. In similar fashion, rape 
or sexual violence can only constitute a war crime if the acts were committed in the 
course of an international or non-international armed conflict.
Though it might be possible to establish a core definition of rape across each 
of the three regimes for example the penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth of the 
victim with the perpetrator’s penis, each definition also includes the elements listed 
above with the contextual elements being highly relevant to any given definition. 
Likewise, rape as a violation of international human rights law might share the core 
definition but given the nature of the IHRL regime it can only apply if the 
perpetrator’s actions are attributable to the State concerned or if the State is somehow 
negligent in providing criminal sanction for acts of rape as seen in X&Y v. 
Netherlands.314
Ultimately, while the section above on ICL highlighted the difficulties that 
have existed between the various judicial bodies operating within that regime, the
314 X&Y (n 54).
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important point for the purposes of this thesis is that there exist differences in how 
sexual violence is defined between the regimes. The difference between IHL and ICL 
is relatively minor and hinges largely upon the context in which the offence takes 
place. Yet, as with other substantive violations such as torture and enforced 
disappearance, it is apparent that despite the differences in definition each of the legal 
regimes does indeed function despite the differences, a fact which suggests that much 
hinges on the jurisdiction of a given regime. This serves to support the idea that while 
fragmentation is indeed real its effects can possibly be mitigated by the use of 
formally established rules inherent to each given regime.
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Chapter Five -  The Destruction of Property
*
Introduction
The destruction of property in its widest sense can potentially take many forms, 
ranging from destroying buildings outright to the looting or pillage of goods. It can 
affect all types of property: public, cultural and private. The purpose of this chapter is 
to examine how the three regimes define the destruction of property and locate within 
the framework of the thesis. In doing this it is possible to identify how the regimes of 
IHRL, IHL and ICL consider the protection of property and afford a measure of 
justice to the owners. The three regimes are markedly different in their approaches but 
retain an attachment to formally identifiable rules of law. In this sense, the regimes do 
offer some protection; albeit to a lesser extent than torture, enforced disappearance 
and sexual violence. In part this is because of the qualified nature of the right which 
can be violated in certain instances if it is necessary and proportionate to do so. 
Despite such qualifications it is important to recognise that the protections afforded 
can be applied by each of the regimes.
The protection of property is intrinsically linked to the right to property and its 
definition. The first step is to consider what the term property means in this context. 
Defining property has proven to be a difficult task to undertake. While the idea of 
property is a fundamental concept to law and politics, there is marked uncertainty as 
to what property can be said to be.1 In the first instance, property can be broadly 
classified as ‘real’ or ‘personal’ with the former relating to land and buildings, and the 
latter other items such as vehicles, goods, etc.2 Property can also be said to include 
intellectual property such as patents. It can be held by private individuals, public
1 Laura Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (OUP 2003) 1-4.
2 Charles Harpum et al, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (Sweet Maxwell 2012) 7.
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bodies or viewed as cultural property. This tripartite view of property adds a further 
layer of complexity when defining property.
Cultural property fits into neither the public nor the private category of 
property. Whereas public property could be defined as ownership by the State or sub- 
State authority, and private property by the ownership of the property by a private 
individual, organisation or corporation, the definition of cultural property appears to 
be different. Rather than focusing on the owner of the property, definitions found in 
international law concern themselves with the intrinsic value such property has to be 
of ‘great importance’ to the ‘national cultural heritage’ of a given people.3 This could 
include museums, art galleries and libraries in addition to their contents.4 A wider 
definition of cultural property includes items of ‘artistic, archaeological, ethnological 
or historical interest’.5 Problems also emerge when differentiating between cultural 
property on the one hand and cultural heritage on the other. Cultural property can be 
briefly described as being tangible, while cultural heritage can be described as being 
intangible.6 Such a definition is far from perfect as many tangible items of culture 
might also have an intangible element to them. Cultural property and heritage also 
have an important role in the formation of a culturally diverse international society, 
something which the international community has been keen to protect and promote.7 
Damage to cultural property has been described as ‘cultural aggression’, the aim of
3 Roger O’Keefe, ‘Protection of Cultural Property’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook o f International 
Humanitarian Law {OUP 2008) 437.
4 ibid 438; The contents of such buildings is probably more important that the buildings themselves and 
quite rightly receives protection.
5 John Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property’ (1986) 80 AJIL 831, 831.
6 Peter Stone, ‘Human rights and cultural property protection in times of conflict 18 International 
Journal o f  Heritage Studies 271,281.
7 William Logan, ‘Cultural diversity, cultural heritage and human rights: towards heritage management 
as human rights-based cultural practice’ 18 International Journal o f Heritage Studies 231, 234-235.
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which is to ‘erase the manifestation of the adversary’s identity.’8 This chapter focuses 
mostly on the protection of property as a tangible object but some overlap with 
cultural heritage is inevitable.
The idea of property itself has become loaded down with political and 
ideological baggage.9 This could suggest that any attempt to define ‘property’ will 
inevitably have to discuss the political and ideological aspects of the term. The three 
regimes do manage to adjudicate violations concerning property although in different 
ways. In part this is due to the distinctions between the three regimes. The IHRL 
regime, and particularly the ECHR, takes a wide and expansive definition of property 
including inter alia real property, and non-tangible items such as intellectual property 
and shares.10 In contrast, the IHL and ICL regimes, perhaps because of their nature 
and the limits of their law, are restricted to real and personal property. In this way, the 
definition of property is dependant on the regime in which it is found.
Similar to the multiple definition of property, the right to property can be 
viewed not as a singular right but rather as a ‘bundle of rights’.11 It has been noted 
that contemporary conceptions of property rights rest on the political works of writers 
such as John Locke, Adam Smith and Karl Marx.12 Thomas Hobbes saw property as 
the consequence of a sovereign power when, in a famous passage in Leviathan, he 
notes that in the state of nature there is ‘no place for industry; because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth , nor buildings or
8 Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The Practice of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia’ (2001) 14 Harvard Human Rights Journal
9 Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al, The Properties of Property’ in Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al 
(eds) Changing Properties o f Property (Berghahn Books 2009) 3.
10 This will be examined in more detail below, 230 (n 32).
11 James Penner, The Idea o f Property in Law (OUP 1997) 1.
12 Benda-Beckmann (n 9) 4.
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commodities. For Hobbes, the right to private property becomes a cooperative 
practice dependant on community norms respectful of the sovereign power.14 Hobbes’ 
position can be contrasted with that of Locke who believed it was ‘labour, in the 
beginning, [that] gave a right of property wherever anyone was pleased to employ it 
upon what was common’.15 For Locke, sovereign power is instituted for ‘the 
preservation of the property of all the members of...society’.16 Thus the position of 
Hobbes and Locke stand in contrast to each other. For Hobbes, sovereign power 
permits the creation of property while for Locke that same power is created because 
of private property.
Other theories of the right to property are based around several rights such as 
the right to possess, the right to use and the right to exclude.17 The latter concept of 
exclusion has been described by Penner as a ‘gate not a wall’ suggesting that the 
possessor of the property can exclude some and include others as he or she wishes.18 
Thus there is a ‘social use’19 of property reminiscent of Hobbes’ sense of property 
being a cooperative practice: the respect for the gate is underpinned by community 
norms backed by sovereign power. Linked to this is the idea that the right to property 
is a negative right meaning that it is not a right dependent on State action but rather a 
right dependent on the State refraining from exercising its power. In this sense, the 
right to property is similar to the other rights examined in this thesis, the right not to 
be tortured, the right not to be forcibly disappeared and the right not to be subjected to 
sexual violence.
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Penguin 1985) 186. inoON ~Art
4 Jean Hampton, Thomas Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (CUP 1988) 240-243.
5 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (Norton 2005) 36.
6 ibid 54.





In this chapter the term destruction of property’ is given the widest possible 
meaning so as to include both the outright destruction of property and its unlawful 
appropriation. The reason for the adoption of this approach is because both actions 
deprive the lawful right holder to the property of its use or benefit. Both involve the 
assumption by the perpetrator of some or all of the rights normally conferred upon the 
lawful owner. Care should be taken to distinguish between the destruction of property 
on the one hand and looting and pillage on the other. The latter acts are prohibited 
outright under IHL and in certain IHRL regimes as amounting to a violation of the 
right to enjoy property. The ICL regime is weaker with regard to outright prohibition 
but the widespread or systematic deprivation of property could amount to a 
persecutory act under the ICC Statute. In contrast, the destruction of property is 
permitted in certain instances under the IHL and IHRL regimes albeit in limited 
circumstances. IHL recognises that in certain circumstances it might be necessary and 
proportionate to destroy property in order to accomplish a military objective. 
Likewise, the IHRL regime, and in particular the ECHR,20 recognises that the right to 
property is not an absolute right unlike the right not to be tortured. Such qualifications 
to the rights differentiate the destruction of property (but not looting which is always 
forbidden) from the other rights studied in this thesis.
In this chapter the relevant provisions of the three regimes (IHRL, IHL and 
ICL) are studied and placed into the context of the overall thesis. In the first section it 
looks at the protection of property under the IHRL regime with particular reference to 
the UN system, the ECHR and the Inter-American system. The second section on IHL 
examines the restrictions placed on belligerents in the course of an armed conflict 
(international and non-intemational). It does this by first examining the relevant
20 ECHR, Protocol 1, art 1.
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customary provisions, followed by treaty law and the case law of international courts 
and tribunals. The third section considers the ICL provisions relating to the protection 
of property. As in other chapters this section focuses on crimes against humanity and 
genocide rather than war crimes provisions that are considered in the IHL section.
The protection of property is approached differently by the three regimes but a 
number of similarities remain, particularly with regard to IHRL and IHL. 
Fragmentation however provides sufficient differences between the regimes to allow 
for the emergence of identifiable and formally ascertainable rules. Therefore, the 
effects of fragmentation can be mitigated by their existence.
5.1 - Destruction of property and IHRL
Protection of property in the IHRL regime is, in places, limited. The relative lack of 
measures in the UN human rights system is largely reflective of the political struggles 
that took place in the second half of the 20th Century. In the ECHR system the 
protection of property is not to be found in the text of the original Convention but 
rather in Additional Protocol 1. Of the IHRL sub-regimes studied, only the Inter- 
American system provides a specific measure in the original text of the Convention. 
However, as will be seen, the actual use of Article 21 of the LACHR has been limited.
Several difficulties arise when considering the right to property as a human 
right. The first two relate to the contested notions of the meaning of property and of 
property rights. The UN and Inter-American systems have not been as active in this 
area as the ECHR. This latter system has made the largest contribution of the three 
towards the development of the notion of a human right to property. In part this could 
be attributed to the strong notions of property ownership prevalent in the Western 
States Parties to the Council of Europe coupled with the rapid privatisation that has 
taken place in Eastern Europe. Despite such advancement in the ECHR, the IHRL
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regime remains wedded to the idea of limiting State power vis-a-vis the individual 
rather than the regulation of conduct between individuals. As such acts of theft by 
private citizens would not in themselves amount to a violation of Protocol 1, Article 1 
of the ECHR. The potential for State liability would be limited to the State’s failure to 
ensure the protection of property rather than for the deprivation itself. In this sense, 
there are clear parallels to the other acts examined in this thesis. For example, acts of 
physical cruelty committed by a private citizen would not amount to torture.
The protection of private property by the IHRL regime is comparatively 
limited and does not receive as much attention from human rights scholars as torture, 
sexual violence and enforced disappearance. Despite this, there remain formally 
enumerated rules that protect property from the exercise of arbitrary State power, 
particularly in the ECHR and Inter-American system. These rules assist the courts by 
establishing a framework within which they can develop their jurisprudence. The 
ECHR and Inter-American provisions are noticeably vague but this allows the courts 
to develop the law in light of changing of circumstances; for instance, intangible 
electronic property was inconceivable when the ECHR was first established.
5.1.1 - Destruction of property and the UN system
The right to property is listed as a human right in Article 17 of the UDHR. It provides 
‘Everyone has the right to property alone as well as in association with others ;21 and 
‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property’.22 The purpose of Article 17 is, 
according to Jacobs, unclear because of different conceptions of property and property 
rights.23 This is echoed by Golay and Cismas who note that the definition of property 
differs between the different legal instruments leaving no ‘clear-cut’ definition of
21 UDHR, art 17(1).
23 Harvey Jacobs, ‘Private Property and Human Rights: a Mismatch in the 21st Century?’ (2013) 22 
International Journal of Social Welfare 85, 97.
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property.24 However, such concerns are reminiscent of the desire to establish unified 
definitions that fail to take into account the subtleties and context of the regime in 
which they are found. Instead, the formalised account of international law could take 
into account such differences, tailoring the legal definition to a particular regime.
In comparison to the UDHR, neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR explicitly 
protect an individual’s right to property. The lack of specific provisions relating to the 
protection of private property in these treaties substantially limits the contribution UN 
law makes to the protection of the right to property. One final point to make with 
respect to international treaties concluded under the auspices of the UN is that 
CEDAW grants women the right to conclude contracts and to administer property, 
tacitly recognising a woman’s right to own property.25 This potentially strengthens the 
protection of property, at least for women.
The lack of recognition afforded to the right to private property, and the 
prohibition of its arbitrary destruction, under the UN human rights instruments stems 
in large part from the historical and ideological context in which the ICCPR and 
ICESCR are rooted. Both Covenants were adopted during the Cold War in 1966. For 
the communist members of the UN the protection of private property was inevitably 
anathema to the very basis of their governments. Private property in Marxist thought 
is seen as the axiomatic foundation of the capitalist system.26 Consequently, it would 
be contrary to the ideological beliefs of communists to enshrine in international law a 
right for an individual to own private property. The exclusion of the right to property
24 Christophe Golay and Ioana Cismas, ‘Legal Opinion on the Right to Property from a Human Rights’ 
Perspective’. Available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf
(lastaccessed 15thJuly2013) 11. . . .  . . . . .
25 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ( CEDAW ), 18
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, art 15(1).
26 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Penguin 1985) 84-85.
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from the ICCPR or ICESCR can be seen as an example of how international 
instruments are frequently the product of political compromise.
5.1.2 - Destruction of property and the ECHR system
In the ECHR regime such protection is primarily to be found under Protocol 1, Article 
l .27 It provides:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject 
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international 
law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.
Of particular relevance to this section is the first paragraph of Protocol 1, Article 1. It 
affords an individual the right to both own and enjoy his or her possession, in addition 
to protecting those possessions from state-sanctioned deprivation, except ‘where 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’28 Also of note 
is Article 15 of the ECHR which does not include Protocol 1, Article 1 in the list of 
non-derogable rights.29 Consequently, rights guaranteed under Protocol 1, Article 1 
are not absolute because a State Party may derogate from it in times of war or other 
public emergency.30 Such derogation from the ECHR would not, however, 
automatically affect any other relevant provisions of international humanitarian law or 
international criminal law as they are entirely separate legal instruments.
Several cases concerning the destruction of property have been heard by the 
ECtHR in recent years. The Court’s approach has focused upon the idea that an
27 Protocol 1, art 1.
28 Protocol 1, art 1.




individual has been deprived of a right to possession.31 Therefore, the appropriate 
starting point is to consider in brief the definitions of possession and deprivation. In 
successive cases, the Court has provided a very broad definition of the word 
‘possession’. In addition to protecting what one may classify as being ‘traditional’ 
items of property, for example personal or real property, the Court has also deemed 
several other rights and interests that have economic value to be protected by Protocol 
1, Article 1, for instance intellectual property.32 These have been said to include 
internet domain names,33 company shares34 and patents.35 ‘Deprivation’ covers a 
range of actions where an individual’s right of ownership is extinguished.36 This can 
include not only the destruction of a person’s property but also cases in which 
property has been transferred from one party to another such as an expropriation,37 or 
where control of property is subject to undue interference.38
The area of specific concern in this chapter is the destruction of property by 
State security forces or in the context of a conflict.39 The majority of such cases 
concern the use of force by Russian and Turkish security and military forces 
respectively in Chechnya and Eastern Turkey. In Sadykov40 the ECtHR heard 
complaints that the applicant’s property had been looted and destroyed by State agents
31 Robin White and Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2010) 477; see also 
the wording of ECHR Protocol 1, art 1.
32 Laurence Heifer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 1.
33 Paeffgen GmbH v. Germany (Application nos. 25379/02, 21688/05, 21722/05, 21770/05) Judgment, 
18 September 2007.
34 Bramelid v. Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 249.
35 Smith Kline and French Laboratories v. Netherlands (Application no. 12633/87) Judgment, 4 October 
1990.
36 White (n 31) 488.
37 Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden (Application nos. 7151/75 and 7152/75) Judgment, 23 September 
1982.
38 Ghigo v. Malta (Application no. 31122/05) Judgment, 26 September 2006.
39 In this context ‘conflict’ is used in its widest possible sense and does not imply that particular acts 
were committed during an armed conflict as understood by IHL or ICL.
40 Sadykov v. Russia (Application no. 41840/02) Judgment. 7 October 2010.
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while he was detained, and that two of his vehicles had been stolen by State agents.41 
In its judgment, the Court noted the existence of what it termed a ‘violent 
confrontation between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and rebel 
fighters.42 The Court commented on the violence, noted its two-sided nature, and 
concluded it cannot be said that the State may or should be presumed responsible for 
any damage inflicted during military attacks, or that the State’s responsibility is 
engaged by the mere fact that the applicant’s property was destroyed.’43 Thus, it was 
not possible for the Court to find that there had been a violation of the applicant’s 
Protocol 1, Article 1 rights with respect to the property,44 although it did find that the 
two vehicles taken by State agents amounted to such a violation of the applicant’s 
rights because their actions were not justified.45
There exists a string of further cases where the ECtHR has been unable to 
determine that there had been a violation of Protocol 1, Article 1. For example, in 
Akkum the Court heard allegations concerning how the applicants’ livestock had been 
destroyed by Turkish soldiers.46 Without evidence of their loss, the Court was unable 
to sustain the applicants’ allegations.47 The bar was apparently raised further in Soylu 
where the Court determined that the correct evidential standard of proof was ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’.48 A further factor in the Court’s judgment was that the applicants 





45 ibid para.266-7. , ,  ,
46 Akkum and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 21894/93) Judgment, 24 March 2005, paras.274-276.
47 ibid para.277.
48 Soylu v Turkey (Application no. 43854/98) Judgment, 15 February 2007, para.42; see also Mentese 
v. Turkey (Application no. 36217/97) Judgment, 18 January 2005, para.72; Sirin Yilmaz v. Turkey
(Application no. 35875/97) Judgment, 29 July 2004, para.99.




reluctance on the part of the Court to recognise serious property rights violations in 
situations where the State uses force.
In contrast with the above cases, there are several cases in which the Court has 
found that the applicants’ Protocol 1, Article 1 rights have been violated. For instance, 
in Isayeva the applicants were fleeing heavy fighting in Chechnya by driving their 
vehicles through a ‘safe exit’ created by Russian forces for civilian use. In the course 
of their escape they were attacked by Russian military aircraft, and their vehicles 
destroyed.50 Russia argued that the destruction of the applicants’ property was ‘in the 
public interest’.51 The Court disagreed, concluding ‘There is no doubt that these 
acts...constituted grave and unjustified interferences with the [third] applicant’s 
peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.’52 However, as Kaye notes, the Court did hold 
that an air strike could be a legitimate response to certain acts by the Chechen 
rebels.53 In doing this the Court recognises that in some circumstances, particularly in 
situations amounting to armed conflict, the destruction of property might be 
permissible and indeed proportionate. Lastly, in Bilgin the applicant’s house was 
destroyed by Turkish security forces, alongside possessions necessary for his 
livelihood. This destruction amounted to a ‘grave and unjustified interference’ with 
the applicant’s Protocol 1, Article 1 rights.54 The introduction of terms such as 
‘deliberate destruction’ and ‘unjustified interference’ in the above cases suggests, to a 
greater or lesser extent, that in certain instances destruction of property and 
interference with property rights could be permissible.
50 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (Application nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00) 
Judgment, 24 February 2005; see David Kaye, ‘Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia; Isayeva, Yusupova & 
Basayeva v. Russia; Isayeva v. Russia’ (2005) 99 AJIL 873.
51 Isayeva ibid para.232.
52 ibid para.233.
53 Kaye (n 50) 876. 0
54 Bilgin v. Turkey (Application no. 23819) Judgment, 16 November 2000, para.108.
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5.1.3 - Destruction of property and the Inter-American system 
Protection of the right to property can be found in Article 21 of the IACHR. It is 
drafted along similar, though not identical, lines to the Protocol 1, Article 1 of the 
ECHR. It provides that everyone ‘has the right to the use and enjoyment of his 
property though it recognises that the law ‘may subordinate such use and enjoyment 
to the interest of society’.55 Depriving a person of his or her property is prohibited 
‘except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social 
interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.’56 The right 
to privacy protected under Article 11 may also provide a degree of protection for a 
person’s property, particularly: ‘No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive 
interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence’.57 
While this provision offers little more protection than Article 21 it does establish that, 
in principle at least, the destruction of a person’s home may be construed as ‘arbitrary 
or abusive’ and thus constitute a violation of Article 11 in addition to Article 21.
The Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence, unlike that of the ECtHR, has paid 
little attention to the destruction of an individual’s property. Instead, the Court has 
focused more on the rights of indigenous people’s rights to property, particularly their 
right to land.58 In the Awas Tingni case, the Nicaraguan government had granted a 
logging concession to a company without the consent of the Awas Tingni
55 IACHR, art 21(1).
56 IACHR, art 21(2).
57 IACHR, art 11(2).
58 Gillian Triggs, ‘The Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Participate in Resource Development: An 
International Legal Perspective’ in Donald Zillman et al (eds) Human Rights in Natural Resource 
Development (OUP 2002); and Lila Barrea-Hernandez, ‘The Legal Framework for Indigenous Peoples’ 
and Other Public’s Participation in Latin America: the Cases of Argentina, Colombia and Peru’ in 
Donald Zillman et al (eds) Human Rights in Natural Resource Development (OUP 2002); Alexandra 
Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments
(2009) 10 Melbourne Journal o f International Law 27; S. James Anaya and Robert Williams, The 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands and Natural Resources under the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’ (2001) 14 Harvard Human Rights Journal 33.
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community. The Court held Article 21 upholds the right of a person to use and enjoy 
his or her property including movable and immovable property, corporeal and 
incorporeal elements and any other intangible object capable of having value’.6^  The 
communitarian nature of indigenous societies was highlighted,61 and, because of the 
concept of title to property was lacking in their culture, it was possible to say that 
possession of the land by the Awas Tingni was sufficient for them to obtain official 
and legal recognition of that property.62 Consequently, by granting a concession to a 
logging company, the Nicaraguan State had violated the Article 21 rights of the Awas 
Tingni. Furthermore, Nicaragua should have taken precautions to delimit, demarcate 
and title the Awas Tingni community’s land.63
There have been several other cases before the Court concerning the property 
rights of indigenous people. In Yakye Axa it was recognised that indigenous people 
had a close relationship with the land, a relationship that is fundamental for their 
‘culture, spiritual life, wholeness, economic survival, and preservation and 
transmission to future generations.’64 Consequently, the rights of indigenous people to 
maintain close ties with the land and the natural resources found therein must be 
protected by Article 21.65 In Moiwana Village,66 the Court assessed whether the
59 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2001, Inter- 
Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001); see Leonardo Alvarado, ‘Prospects and Challenges in the 
Implementation of Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in International Law: Lessons from the Case of 
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua’ (2007) 24 Arizona Journal o f International and Comparative Law 609, 
Jonathan Vuotto, ‘Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: International Precedent for Indigenous Land Rights
(2004) 22 Boston University International Law Journal 219.
60 Awas Tingni, ibid para. 143.
61 ibid para. 149.
62 ibid para. 151.
63 ibid para. 153.
64 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community o f  the Enxet-Lengua People v. Paraguay, Case 12.313,
Report No. 2/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 387 (2002), para. 131.
65 ibid para. 137. A „  XT
66 Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Judgment of June 15, 2005, Inter-Am Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 145
(2005)’ see Pablo Ormachea, ‘Moiwana Village: The Inter-American Court and the Continuing 
Violation” Doctrine’ (2006) 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal 283; Claudia Martin, 
‘The Moiwana Village Case: A New Trend in Approaching the Rights of Ethnic Groups in the Inter- 
American System’ (2006) 19L7/L491.
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village belonged to the Moiwana community given their lack of formal legal title.67 
The Court concluded, affirming the Awas Tingni judgment, the Moiwana community 
had an all-encompassing relationship’ to the land they traditionally inhabited.68 
Importantly, it was emphasised that the ownership of the land did not lie with 
individuals but instead with the community as a whole.69 Consequently, the Suriname 
government had violated the Moiwana community’s rights guaranteed under Article 
21. Although these cases do not correspond to the destruction of property, they do 
serve to illustrate how the Inter-American Court has concerned itself with property 
rights guaranteed under Article 21.
5.1.4 - Conclusion on the destruction of property in IHRL
The right to property in IHRL has proven to be a contested concept. In part this is 
because of uncertainty surrounding the very idea of property itself and the content of 
the rights to property. Such issues have been evident in the cases of the ECHR where 
the Court has taken an expansive definition of property. The case law from the Inter- 
American Court has focused predominantly on the property rights of indigenous 
people, a fact that reflects growing concern with the possible exploitation of 
indigenous communities by both corporations and governments.
A further problem arises from the qualified nature of the right to property. 
Unlike the other substantive areas considered in this thesis it is not an absolute right. 
The State retains power to curtail an individual’s right to property for instance 
through the levying of taxes or lawful expropriation. Of particular note is the 
qualification that the right may be violated in ‘the public interest’ or under ‘the
67 ibid para. 130.




general principles of international law.’70 From the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, it is 
unclear as to what this latter provision in particular means. For instance, it could be an 
implicit recognition of the specialised nature of the IHL regime in situations where 
property is destroyed in the context of an armed conflict.71 However, it is apparent 
from the evidence provided above that in certain situations, particularly where the 
destruction of property can be deemed ‘wanton’ or where its removal by state agents 
amounts to ‘pillage’, the violation of property rights can amount to a violation of the 
ECHR.
Defining the protection of property in IHRL is framed by reference to the 
relevant provisions of human rights conventions. This largely takes place at the 
regional rather than international level due to the latter’s relative lack of provisions. 
As with other human rights considered in this thesis, the violation of property rights 
under IHRL can be committed only by State officials. This is evident from the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR which has considered the destruction of property by 
Russian and Turkish security forces. A wide-range of private property is protected 
under IHRL from real property to personal property and intangible property such as 
trademarks and patents.72 Due to the nature of IHRL it is unlikely that the protection 
of property would extend to publically owned property, but it would apply to cultural 
or indigenous property as evidenced by the Inter-American Court.7 Proportionality is 
a major component in the protection of property in IHRL, with the extent to which 
property destruction is permitted being an important consideration. The ECtHR did
70 Protocol 1 cirt 1
71 Thereby m a k in g  Protocol 1, art 1 one instance where the lex specialis nature of the IH L  regime is 
recognised.
72 E.g. Smith Kline (n 35).
73 E.g. Yakye Axa (n 64).
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recognise that, in certain cases, the destruction of property could be proportionate to 
the threat faced by security forces.74
Fragmentation can potentially pose a number of challenges to international 
law and the adjudication of disputes. However, the emergence of formally recognised 
rules unique to each regime could assist in limiting its effects. This can be seen with 
the IHRL regime wherein certain human rights systems, notably the ECHR, have 
developed their own conceptions of both property and how rights to it can be violated.
5.2 - Destruction of property and IHL
In contrast to IHRL, IHL contains several prohibitions related to the destruction of 
property. IHL is particularly concerned with the unjustified destruction of property by 
excessive or disproportionate force. This section draws from custom, treaty law (such 
as the Geneva Conventions) and case law -  particularly that which emerged from the 
Nuremberg IMT and ICTY/R. It will be seen that the destruction of property under 
IHL is prohibited in a different fashion than it is prohibited under IHRL. While both 
regimes start at the same point in recognising that the destruction of civilian property 
is prima facie unlawful, the IHL regime goes further and adds several qualifiers which 
can legitimise acts which would otherwise be unlawful. As in other chapters, this 
section considers first customary law, followed by treaty law and then an examination 
of the relevant case law.
Two major issues surrounding the destruction of property under IHL are 
proportionality and the principle of distinction between civilian and combatant 
objects. Proportionality is not a concept unique to IHL and can be found in many 
other areas of law.76 A distinction is made between proportionality as ius ad bellutn
74 Isayeva (n 50) para.232. . . ,
75 Eric Engle, ‘The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview (2012) 
Dartmouth Law Journal 1, 10; Kai Moller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’ 10 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 709, 710; Steven Greer, “‘Balancing” and the European Court of Human 
Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate’ 63 (2004) Cambridge Law Journal 412,416.
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(wherein the use of force should be proportionate to the perceived threat) and 
proportionality as ius in bello. This latter category is the subject of the present section 
and broadly refers to the balance between achieving an objective and the cost of 
achieving it. In practice this means collateral damage to civilians and civilian 
objects is to be minimised relative to the military advantage gained.77 Excessive 
civilian casualties are prohibited regardless of the military advantage gained.78 
Despite this, the issue of proportionality in attack can be seen as a subjective standard, 
leaving the exact point at which an attack becomes disproportionate dependent on the 
context and circumstances.79
The principle of distinction is the concept whereby civilian objects and 
military objectives are to be distinguished from one another. The purpose of this is to 
protect the civilian populace from attack by enemy forces. Attacks which fail to 
distinguish between civilian and military targets, such as the carpet bombing of a 
town, are considered indiscriminate and thus prohibited.80 In contrast to the protection 
civilians receive, military forces are considered legitimate targets and can be 
subjected to attack.81 This can be viewed as a principle of customary IHL.82
5.2.1 - Customary IHL and the destruction of property
The first point to note with regard to customary law relating to the destruction of 
property is that the prohibition is spread across several different rules. The starting
76 Judith Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’ 87 AJIL 391,391.
77 william J. Fenrick, ‘The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare (1982) 98
Military Law Review  91, 94.
78 ibid 126.
79 ibid
80 Lesley C. Green, The Contemporary’ Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester University Press 2008) 
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81 Mark D Maxwell & Richard V. Meyer, ‘The Principle of Distinction: Probing the Limits of its 
Customariness’ (2007) A m y  Lawyer 1; Asa Kasher, ‘The Principle of Distinction’ (2007) 6 Journal o f
Military Ethics 152, 153. .
82 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary’ International Humanitarian Law
(vol 1 CUP 2005) 3.
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point is the principle known as ‘the principle of distinction’ between civilian and 
military objects. This principle means that only military targets may be attacked, 
thereby sparing civilian objects from attack.83 The rule applies in non-international 
armed conflicts as does in international armed conflicts although the exact legal 
framework does appear to differ.84 The content of the rule is further explained in Rule 
9 where the definition of ‘civilian object’ is considered. All objects that are not 
military objects are to be deemed ‘civilian’.85 State practice identifies several objects 
that are considered to be, prima facie, civilian objects, including residential areas, 
houses, schools, hospitals, monuments and places of worship.86 Such objects may 
become military in nature, and thus subject to attack, if they are used for a military 
purpose.87
None of these totally prevent the use of force against civilian objects. Instead, 
Rule 14 is formulated so as to prohibit the launching of attacks ‘which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof that ‘would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated’.88 The conduct of military operations must 
be conducted with ‘constant care...to spare the civilian population’ and that all 
feasible precautions must be taken to avoid and minimise incidental loss of civilian 
life and damage to civilian objects.89 More specific rules relating to the destruction of 
property are also considered in the ICRC Study. Rule 50 prohibits the destruction of
83 Henckaerts (n 82) 28.
84 ibid 26-27.
85 ibid 32; This is part of the principle of distinction, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 1996 ICJ Rep 1996, p. 226, para.78.
86 ibid 34.
87 ibid.
88 Henckaerts (n 82) Rule 14.
89 Henckaerts (n82) 51; Schmitt suggests that such consequences can be minimised by the increased 
use of precision munitions: Michael Schmitt, ‘Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law’
(2010) 87 ICRC 445,453.
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the adversary s property unless required by imperative military necessity.90 Private 
property must be respected and may not be confiscated except where the destruction 
or seizure of property is required by ‘imperative military necessity’.91 Furthermore, 
the property rights of displaced persons are to be respected.92 Rules 14 and 50 
highlight the prohibition of the use of force leading to the unnecessary destruction of 
property.
A relevant provision relating to the destruction of property is the customary 
prohibition of pillage and looting.93 Several international instruments have prohibited 
pillage. For example, the Lieber Code, Oxford Manual and the Hague Regulations all 
outlaw pillage. A definition of pillage is provided in the Australian Commanders’
Guide which defines the act as being the ‘violent acquisition of property for private 
purposes’.94 The Canadian Code of Conduct for its military states although a 
‘battlefield and destroyed civilian areas offer attractive objects for the curiosity 
seeker’ the taking of souvenirs is prohibited because looting is theft.95 The duty to 
prevent pillage could also extend to the forces of an occupying power. For instance, 
following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 there was widespread looting by Iraqi 
nationals. This was linked to a more widespread breakdown in civil order following 
the invasion.96
90 Henckaerts (n82) 176.
91 ibid .
92 ibid 473; see Loizidou v. Turkey (Application no. 15318/89) Judgment, 18 December 1998, para.64
93 Henckaerts (n 82) 182.
94 Australian Commanders’ Guide available at http://www.icrc.org/customary- 
ihl/eng/docs/v2 cou au rule52 (Accessed 17 March 2014).
95 Canadian Code of Conduct available at http://www.icrc.org/customary- 
ihl/eng/docs/v2 cou ca rule52 (Accessed 17 March 2014).
96 Knut Dormann and Laurent Colassis, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the Iraq Conflict’ (2004) 
47 German Yearbook of International Law 293, 308; Matthew Thurlow, ‘Protecting Cultural Property 
in Iraq: How American Military Policy Comports with International Law (2005) 8 Yale Human Rights 
and Development Law Journal 153, 153.
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5.2.2 - IHL treaty law and the destruction of property
Since the Hague Convention 1907, there has been a trend towards prohibiting the 
wanton destruction of civilian property. Article 25 of the Hague Convention prohibits 
attacks against undefended towns. Brilmayer and Chepiga explain such a prohibition 
as being to counter scorched earth tactics adopted by armies throughout history.97 AP 
I offers the most detailed provisions relating to the destruction of property. Article 48 
of AP I codifies the principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
(e.g. civilians and combatants hors de combat). Under this provision, military 
operations are to be only directed against military objectives.98
The principle of distinction and the related concept of causing unnecessary 
suffering is discussed in the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons. The ICJ held that IHL has long prohibited certain types of weapons because 
of their discriminatory effects of the amount of suffering they caused.99 The Court 
also noted that the principle of distinction has broad acceptance amongst States and 
thus would bind even non-States Parties.100 Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited by 
Article 51(4) and (5). Article 51(4)(a-c) defines an indiscriminate attack as being 
attacks not directed against a military objective; an attack conducted by a method or 
means of attack which cannot be directed at a military objective; or by using a method 
or means of attack whose effect cannot be limited. The lack of limitations on the 
effects increases the likelihood that the attack will affect objects without distinction.
Articles 50 and 51 clarify the protection afforded to civilians and the civilian 
population in general. Articles 52-54 protect civilian objects. Article 52(2) specifies
97 Lea Brilmayer and Geoffrey Chepiga, ‘Ownership or Use? Civilian Property Interests in 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 413,414.
98 AP I, art 48.
99 Legality’ o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons (n 85) para.78.
100 ibid para 79' see David Kretzmer, ‘The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2005) 99 AJIL 88, 93-94; Ardi Imseis, ‘Critical Reflections on the International 
Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion (2005) 99 AJIL 102.
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that attacks shall be limited to military objectives, namely objects ‘which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action’. 
Article 53 protects cultural objects and places of worship, and Article 54 protects 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population’. Taken as a whole, 
the above provisions of AP I offer a clear exposition of the law surrounding the 
targeting, and destruction, of property.
A further issue relating to the destruction of property is that of the 
proportionality of an attack.101 It has been noted that proportionality is not in itself a 
rule of conduct but rather a rule requiring the balancing of ‘antagonistic values’.102 
Article 51(5)(b) prohibits attacks which, inter alia, may be expected to damage 
civilian objects where the damage ‘would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.’103 The significance of Article 51(5)(b) is that it 
recognises harm to civilians and damage to civilian property is frequently an 
unavoidable consequence of military attacks.104 Schmitt concludes his analysis by 
noting that the rule imposes an objective and subjective standard on military 
commanders. It is objective because a commander ‘will be charged with the 
knowledge that he should have possessed had he taken reasonable steps’ to make an 
assessment of the situation. On the other hand, it is subjective because it is conducted 
in light of the information available. In essence, the working standard is ‘more likely 
than not’.105 IHL therefore recognises that civilian casualties and the destruction of 
civilian property is unavoidable in times of armed conflict, be the conflict 
international or non-intemational in nature.
101 Gardem (n 76) 404.
102 Enzo Cannizzaro ‘Contextualizing proportionality: jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Lebanese 
War’ (2000) 864 IRRC 779 (2000) 787.
103 API, art 51(5)(b). . .
104 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Targeting in Operational Law’ in Dieter Fleck and Terry D. Gill (eds) The




Article 50 of GC I specifies that the ‘extensive destruction and appropriation 
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly’ is to be considered a grave breach. Those who violate Article 50 are liable 
to arrest, trial and imprisonment.106 GC IV prohibits the destruction of real or 
personal property belonging, inter alia, to private persons unless the destruction is 
absolutely necessary for the conduct of military operations.107 It makes the ‘extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly’ a grave breach and thus a serious criminal 
offence.108
The Statutes of the international criminal tribunals and courts offer some 
further guidance on the prohibition of the destruction of property in treaty law. The 
Nuremberg IMT Statute criminalised as war crimes acts of plunder and ‘wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity.’109 In similar fashion, Allied Control Council Law no. 10 copied the 
wording of Article 6(b) of the IMT Statute, making such acts an offence at the 
subsequent Nuremberg tribunals. Nuremberg also considered the plunder of works of 
art and other cultural property. The targeting of cultural property has been a feature of 
many historical invasions. This has been attributed to a desire for wealth and 
dominance of the populace.110 By condemning such acts of looting the international 
community effectively recognised the cultural value of items such as works of art.
The ICTY Statute recognises the destruction of property in Article 2. This 
criminalises grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and thus prohibits extensive
106 see GC I, art 49.
107 GC IV, art 53.
108 GC IV, art 147.
109 IMT Statute, art 6(b). .
110 Matthew Lippman, ‘Art and Ideology in the Third Reich: The Protection of Cultural Property and 
Humanitarian Law of War’ (1998) 17 D i c k i n s o n  Journal of International Law 1,1.
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destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly’,111 and Article 3(e) prohibits plunder and pillage 
of property. The ICTR Statute criminalises pillage (as a violation of common Article 
3 to the Geneva Conventions)112 but does not criminalise the destruction of property 
recognised as a grave breach or as in Article 2 of the ICTY Statute. The Statute of the 
ICC criminalises grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,113 ‘intentionally 
directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military 
objectives’114 and pillage.115 Protection is extended to non-international armed 
conflicts in Article 8 by the prohibition of pillage,116 although the protection 
otherwise afforded to civilian property is limited more than if the acts took place in 
the context of an international armed conflict.117
5.2.3 - IHL case law and the destruction of property
The international tribunals have been particularly active when discussing whether a 
given instance of property destruction was proportionate in the circumstances and 
whether or not it conformed to the principle of distinction as provided for in the 
relevant international instruments. Similarly, the courts have paid some attention to 
the crimes of pillage and the taking of plunder by soldiers or paramilitaries. The 
various courts have developed the statutory prohibitions against property contained in
111 ICTY Statute, art 2(d).
112 ICTR Statute, art 4(f).
113 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(a)(iv).
114 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(b)(ii).
115 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(b)(xvi); see Yaron Gottlieb, ‘Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A 
Proposal for Defining New Crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC’ (2004) 23 Penn State 
International Law Review 857, 874.
116 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(e)(v). _
117 The protection afforded by common art 3 concerning the wanton destruction of property has been 
removed from the relevant provisions of the ICC Statute. However, art 8(2)(e)(xii) does prohibit the 
‘Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of the conflict .
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the treaties. The ICTY has also considered instances in which cultural property was 
damaged during armed conflict.118
At Nuremberg, the behaviour of the Nazis towards the plundering and looting 
of property was described by the prosecution as ‘premeditated and systematic’.119 The 
Tribunal noted private art collections were robbed, libraries emptied of valuable stock 
and private houses were pillaged by elements of the Nazi German State.120 Attempts 
to prosecute Nazis for the extensive destruction of civilian property were abandoned 
because the Allies had themselves undertaken policies that led to the widespread 
destruction of Axis property.121
Subsequent tribunals at Nuremberg also considered property damage and 
pillage as war crimes. In Pohl et al the defendants were charged with looting and 
plunder. The Court noted the ‘ruthless depravity’ of such actions was not confined to 
individuals or isolated units but used as part of a ‘general military policy’.122 This 
general policy was ultimately focused on winning the war at whatever cost to the 
civilian populations of occupied Europe as was deemed expedient and necessary. In 
Von Leeb, the destruction of property and pillage were examined in greater detail. In 
this case, all the defendants were charged with unjustified devastation, wanton 
destruction and plunder of both public and private property. The Court reaffirmed the 
point made in Pohl and at Nuremberg that-such measures took place ‘pursuant to a 
deliberate design and policy of the German Armed Forces.’123 Evidence was cited to 
demonstrate the effects of such policy. When Russia was invaded by the Germans, an
118 See Hirad Abtahi (n 8) 1.
119 Judgment o f  the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946 (1947) 41 AJIL 172,237.
120 ibid 238.
121 Richard Overy, The Nuremberg trials: international law in the making’ in Philippe Sands (ed) From 
Nuremberg to the Hague: The Future o f International Criminal Justice (CUP 2003).
122 US v. Pohl et al, Judgment of 3 November 1947, vol. V (United States Government Printing Office:
Washington) 976. .
123US v. Leeb et al The High Command Case’, Judgment of 27-28 October 1948, vol. X (United
States Government Printing Office: Washington) 39.
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order was promulgated permitting the pillage of any goods that could not be supplied 
by the Wehrmacht without regard for the local population’.124 The implementation of 
such a policy would inevitably lead to the unnecessary suffering of the civilian 
population particularly in the Russian winter. Further military orders included that 
issued by Manstein that provided, inter alia, any land to be surrendered to the enemy 
was to be rendered unusable.125 Likewise, any village was to be destroyed without 
regard for the civilian population.126 Similar orders related to the destruction of 
livestock and crops. For instance, one order saw the seizure of 40,000 tons of com, a 
tenth of which was destroyed by throwing it into the Dnepr River.127 Orders 
destroying such foodstuffs could potentially be viewed as justified if the destruction 
would impact on the ability of the military to wage war. However, if it was to affect 
the civilian population it could lead to increased suffering of civilians. Thus the 
proportionality and effect of such actions would have to be considered.
Several cases before the ICTY have considered the destruction of civilian 
property and its definition. These have taken place within the framework provided by 
either Article 2(d) or Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.128 This section begins by firstly 
examining the actus reus of the offence. It is thus necessary to consider how the term 
‘civilian’ has been constmed by the Court, followed by ‘destruction’ and the 
‘property’. Further elements considered will be those of proportionality and the 
principle of distinction. Secondly, the two elements of mens rea are considered, 






128 As discussed above, 274.
276
Chapter Five
Fundamental to any discussion of the relevant law relating to the destruction 
of property is the definition of property itself. In Kordic and Cerkez, the Court 
adopted a wide definition of property stating that it included both public and private 
property. Thus, the destruction of an individual’s house would be seen as comparable 
to the destruction of a publicly owned building, for example a school.129 In addition to 
recognising a distinction between public and private property, IHL acknowledges that 
real property and personal property can be destroyed. For instance, destroying a house 
may amount to unlawful destruction but so might the destruction of farm machinery 
or vehicles.130 By drawing the law as wide as possible, IHL provides the greatest 
range of protection that can be offered within the existing framework. An additional 
point to highlight here is the role civilian property plays in IHL. Given the focus of 
IHL on the protection of civilians from acts such as torture, enforced disappearance 
and sexual violence, the protection of property might seem trivial. However, in 
Strugar the ICTY noted that the protection of civilian objects is a necessary 
complement to the protection of the civilian population.131
In Galic, the Trial Chamber examined the definition of a ‘civilian’ as set out in 
several international instruments such as Additional Protocol I and the Third Geneva 
Convention. It held a civilian is any individual not a member of the armed forces or 
an organised military group party to the conflict.132 This is an important definition 
because it serves to distinguish one category of people (civilians) from another 
(military), and while the latter may be directly targeted, the former cannot. The 
judgment contains several caveats to this prohibition, recognising that in certain 
situations civilians might themselves be the victims of an attack for which the attacker
129 Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez (IT-95-14/2) TC, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para.331.
130 ibid para.331.
131 Prosecutor v. Strugar (IT-01-40) TC, Judgment, 31 January 2005, para.225.
132 Prosecutor v. Galic (IT-98-29) TC, Judgment, 5 December 2003, para.47.
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may not be held liable.133 For example, if civilians take up arms against the opposing 
military force he loses his protection because it is deemed he abused his rights and 
thus can be considered legitimate military targets.134 Other circumstances in which 
civilians may lose their protection under IHL are set out in Kupreskic. These include 
when they are victims of collateral damage and when they are subjected to 
reprisals.135 On this point, the Court was far from certain as to whether this 
constituted a valid ground.136 However, the idea that reprisals are now an historic 
curiosity remains questionable. The British military manual published after Kupreskic 
states that reprisals are permissible in certain circumstances.137 The idea that reprisals 
are prohibited under customary IHL is also questionable.138
The second ground of Kupreskic concerns collateral damage. This is important 
because it recognises the principle that in certain situations the destruction of civilian 
property and civilian casualties are unavoidable, even if the attacking party takes the 
utmost care. Such collateral damage should be distinguished from deliberate attacks 
against civilians which the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion deemed 
were absolutely prohibited by IHL.139 In Blaskic, the ICTY stressed that an offence is 
committed when civilians or civilian property are targeted when such targeting is not 
justified by military necessity.140 In Martic, the Court again recognised that civilian 
casualties ‘incidental to an attack aimed at military targets’ may be unavoidable in the
133 Worth highlighting the point that an ‘attack is defined in Additional Protocol 1 51(2).
134 Galic (n 132) para.48.
135 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic (IT-95-16-T) TC, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para.522.
136 Instead it was added for completeness. Given incidental nature of this point to the present inquiry it 
will not be considered further. Kupreskic ibid paras.527-536.
137 UK Ministry of Defence, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (OUP 2004) 421.
138 Michael Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law (2010) 50 
Virginia Journal o f International Law 795, 820-821.
139 Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons (n85) para.78.
140 Prosecutor v. Blaskic (IT-95-14) TC, Judgment, 3 March 2002, para. 180.
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circumstances. However, these must not be disproportionate to the ends sought, that is 
to say they must be deemed necessary to the ends.141
Two closely related concepts requiring further explanation are ‘military 
necessity and wanton destruction’. In Naletilic and Martinovic, the actus reus of 
wanton destruction was determined to be the large scale destruction of property not 
justified by military necessity.142 This affirmed the previously established criteria set 
out in Kordic and Cerkez.143 However, there exists a distinction between wanton 
destruction as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions incorporated in Article 2 of 
the ICTY Statute and wanton destmction as a ‘violation of the laws or customs of 
war’ as it is included in Article 3 of the Statute. The second of these relates to the 
customary norms of IHL rather than the formally enumerated elements of the Geneva 
Conventions. Despite this difference, the inclusion of the two offences can be seen as 
evidence for the acceptance of both treaty and customary law as sources for IHL and 
their equal validity for the prosecution of individuals who violate the norms. The 
differences between Article 2 and 3 will now be examined in more detail.
The definition of ‘military necessity’ has not been considered by the ICTY.144 
Hayashi believes the terms ‘wanton destruction’ and ‘not justified by military 
necessity’ are functionally synonymous.145 There is evidence to support such an 
assertion. For example, the ICTY has held that the destmction of houses belonging to 
a particular ethnic or national group for no reason other than to prevent habitation by 
the target group can never be justified by military necessity.1  ^Furthermore, Hayashi
141 Prosecutor v. Martic (IT-95-11-T) TC Judgment, 12 June 2007, para.69.
142 Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic (IT-98-34) TC, Judgment, 31 March 2003, para.578.
143 Kordic (n 129) para.330. . .
144 Nobuo Hayashi, ‘Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and
International Criminal Law’ (2010) 28 Boston University International Law Journal 39, 101.
145 ibid 106.
146 Kordic (n 129) para.332.
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notes that the jurisprudence of the ICTY and customary IHL demonstrate that large- 
scale and unnecessary property destruction amounts to a war crime.147
In Naletilic and Martinovic the Court identified two types of property 
protected by the grave breaches regime. The first was property that carried a general 
protection under the Geneva Conventions for instance hospitals, medical aircraft and 
ambulances.148 The second is found in Article 53 of GC IV, namely property located 
in occupied territory whose destruction is not absolutely necessary for the conduct of 
military operations.149 This approach limits the protection of property to either vital 
buildings such as hospitals (limb one of the above test), or to property located in 
occupied territory (limb two of the above test). The result of this approach is that the 
destruction of property which is located in territory not occupied by the attacker does 
not amount to a grave breach as per Article 2. ‘Occupation’ has been defined as being 
in administrative control of the relevant area.150 In situations where fighting was 
continuing in an area, it was not possible to say that the attacker was in sufficient 
control of the territory to engage Article 2 of the Statute. This was held to include 
‘mopping up’ operations, in the course of which property was destroyed or damage as 
forces conducted house clearing operations and searches for enemy combatants.151
In contrast, Article 3 of the ICTY Statute is drawn in a wider and more 
expansive fashion than Article 2. To engage responsibility under Article 3, no proof 
of occupation of territory is required.152 Furthermore, Article 3 operates even when 
the property destroyed is located within enemy territory and thus not under the
147 Hayashi (n 144) 106-7.







effective occupation of the attacking force.153 This follows the reasoning of the 
Appeal Chamber in Hadzihasonovic where it was held that the protection of civilians 
and civilian property during armed conflict are not to be deemed contingent on the 
location of the objects. As such, their location was not to deprive them of 
protection. The Tribunal s reasoning here was based on the criteria set down in 
Tadic where it was held that Article 3 of the Statute confers jurisdiction over any 
serious offence committed in either an international or non-intemational armed 
conflict that is not covered by Articles 2, 4 or 5 of the Statute.155
Indiscriminate attacks can themselves amount to a direct attack on civilians.156 
Indiscriminate attacks, by definition, fail to distinguish between military and non­
military (i.e. civilian) targets. Such attacks fail to spare civilians ‘as much as 
possible’.157 The Galic judgment highlights the fact that certain, apparently 
disproportionate, attacks may themselves give rise to the inference that civilians were 
themselves the actual object attack.158 When sentencing Jokic for his part in the 
shelling of Dubrovnik, the Court underscored the ‘grave and lasting consequences’ 
that would flow from shelling a populated town.159 This was seen as an aggravating 
factor.160 Other examples of indiscriminate attacks could include attacks against 
military targets located within civilian areas with so-called ‘dumb munitions’ e.g. an
153 ibid para.580.
154 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasonovic & Kubura (IT-01-47) AC, Decision on Joint Defence Interlocutory 
Appeal of Trial Chamber Decision on Rule 98bis Motions for Acquittal, 11 March 2005, para.27.
155 Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1) AC, Decision on the Defence Motion fo r  Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction , 2 October 1995, para.87: ‘Article 3 may be taken to cover all violations of international 
humanitarian law other than the “grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions falling under art 2 
(or, for that matter, the violations covered by arts 4 and 5, to the extent that arts 3 ,4  and 5 overlap).
156 Prosecutor v. Perisic (IT-04-81) TC, Judgment, 6 September 2011, para.97.
157 Galic (n 132) para.58; See Robert Cryer, ‘Prosecutor v. Galic and the War Crime of Terror 
Bombing’ (2005) 2 IDF Law Review 75; Daniela Kravertz, ‘The Protection of Civilians in War: The 
ICTY’s Galic Case’ (2004) 17 U IL  521.
158 Galic ibid para.60.




unguided bomb. For instance, carpet-bombing a town because a military 
headquarters is located in the central business district would be indiscriminate. 
Furthermore, the failure of the opposition to avoid citing military objectives within or 
proximate to civilian areas does not relieve the attacker from the duty to abide by 
principles of distinction and proportionality.162
The mental element of the targeting of civilians and their property can be 
fulfilled in one of two ways: either direct intent or recklessness. First, the deliberate 
and intentional targeting of civilians and property can give rise to liability in the same 
way that deliberately and intentionally killing a person amounts to murder or wilful 
killing. The second mental element causes greater, but not insurmountable, problems. 
In Kordic and Cerkez the Trial Chamber analysed the requirements of reckless and 
held that it amounts to an ‘extreme indifference to the substantial likelihood of 
destruction of protected property’ resulting from the conduct in question.163 The 
targeting of civilians was a central element in Galic. In this case the ICTY found that 
the grave breach of targeting civilians must be done wilfully, a concept which 
includes recklessness beyond ‘mere negligence’.164 It would be sufficient for the 
prosecution to demonstrate that an accused was aware or should have been aware of 
the civilian status of the persons attacked.165 Such a reading by the Court introduces a 
pragmatic element to its decision making, recognising, for example, an accused 
should realise shelling a city centre would likely result in civilian deaths. Thus, 
judicial organs have been willing to condemn the wanton destruction of property.
161 See William Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (OUP 2009) Chapter 6.
162 Galic (nl32), para.61.
163 Kordic (n 129) para.332.




5,2.4 - Pillage, plunder and looting under IHL at the ICTY
The terms pillage, plunder and looting have been described as ‘war crimes as the 
more traditional type’.166 Precisely what this means is unclear but it could suggest 
recognition by the Trial Chamber that such offences are well-founded in the history of 
IHL. In Simic the court examined the linguistic differences between the terms 
‘plunder’ and ‘looting’ concluding that they are often as synonyms for the same 
offence.167 The differences were also discussed in Mucic where the Court held that the 
term ‘plunder’ embraced ‘all forms of unlawful appropriation of property’ committed 
during an armed conflict, including ‘acts traditionally described as pillage’.168 In 
Jelisic a further definition of plunder, relating to money, was offered where it was 
defined as ‘the fraudulent appropriation of public or private funds belonging to the 
enemy or opposing party’.169 Despite the connotations such terms have with the use of 
violence to expropriate property, the use of violence is not a necessary component 
although it may be present.170 In the language of domestic law, it can include acts 
amounting to both theft and robbery. Plunder is an offence whether it takes place 
during an international or non-intemational armed conflict.171 This section considers 
the necessary physical elements of the offence before introducing the requisite mental 
element.
The lawfulness of taking certain items of property has been recognised by the 
ICTY. For instance, in Martic the Court held that one party to the conflict is able to 
seize battlefield equipment as ‘war booty’.172 Such equipment amounts to materiel
166 Prosecutor v. Mucic et al (IT-96-21) TC, Judgment, 9 October 2001, para.590.
167 Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic (IT-95-9) TC, Judgment, 17 October 2003 , para.98
168 Mucic (n 166) para.590-1.
169 Prosecutor v. Jelisic (IT-95-10-T) TC, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para.48.
170 Mucic (n 166) para.591.
171 Hadzihasonovid (n 154) para. 125.
172 Martic (n 141), para. 102.
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such as weapons, vehicles and artillery pieces.173 The ICTY has however highlighted 
the point that in a non-intemational armed conflict the war booty principle is not 
regulated by IHL but rather by domestic law.174 In contrast to the legitimacy of the 
war booty principle is the criminalisation of the illegal acquisition of private property. 
Such acquisition can be committed either by soldiers acting in a private capacity or by 
an organised and directed seizure of property.175 This latter point may amount to ‘a 
systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory.’176 For example, by allowing 
State sponsored companies or individuals to extract minerals or energy resources from 
a territory for the benefit of the occupying power.
Not every act of theft or robbery by a soldier automatically amounts to pillage 
or plunder. In Martic, it was held items taken must be of a sufficiently high monetary 
value so that its removal will result in ‘grave consequences’ for the victim.177 This 
provision is derived from the principle outlined in Mucic where the Court held that for 
a violation of IHL to be considered ‘serious’ it must conform to two criteria. First, the 
alleged offence is one that constitutes a breach of a rule protecting important values. 
Second, the breach of that rule has grave consequences for the victim.178 In 
determining the harm caused the Court should take into account the overall effect 
such acts have had on civilians and the multitude of offences committed.179 This latter 
element restricts the application of the law to widespread acts of plunder rather than 
isolated and sporadic incidents. The mental element of the offence is relatively 
simple. All that is required is either that the perpetrator acted with the knowledge and 
intent to acquire property unlawfully, or that the consequences of his actions were
173 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasonovic & Kubura (IT-01-47) TC, Judgment, 15 March 2006, para.52.
174 ibid •
175 Hadzihasonovic Decision on Motions for Acquittal (n 154) para. 127.
176 ibid.
177 Martic (n 141) para.103.
178 Mucic (n 166) TC, Judgment, 9 October 2001, para. 1154.
179 Martic (n 141) TC Judgment, 12 June 2007, para.103.
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foreseeable. The qualification of only acts resulting in ‘grave consequences’ for the 
victim is ambiguous. For instance, ‘grave consequences’ could result in a purely 
financial loss to the victim e.g. where the perpetrator steals goods of monetary value; 
or a more immediate loss that threatens the victim’s survival such as food.
5.2.5 - Conclusion on IHL and the destruction of property
The violation of property during an armed conflict can be divided into two broad 
categories of offence: the destruction of property and looting, pillage or plunder. The 
consequences of such acts for the victim are similar in that they will be prohibited 
from using the item of property in question. One possible distinction between the two 
is that looting, pillaging and plundering could affect movable items of property while 
destroying property could equally affect both movable and immovable property such 
as buildings.
That the IHL regime recognises the value of protecting property serves as a 
reminder that destroying an individual’s means of existence can have the same effects 
as directly killing him or her. This can be seen in the Nineteenth Century prohibitions 
against plunder and looting, although such prohibitions could equally be seen as 
ensuring that military discipline in the attacking force was maintained. The Hague 
Convention 1907 recognised that reparations would be payable to individuals whose 
property was damaged during an armed conflict. This could have been intended to 
have the dual effect of curtailing property damage by ensuring belligerents refrained 
from targeting civilian property and of providing compensation if property was
damaged. This is linked to wider recognition in international law that the damage of
181property by States grants its owner a right to compensation.
The destruction of property under the IHL regime rests on the principle that 
the destruction of property is permissible if that property amounts to a military 
objective. If the object is civilian in nature then it is protected. However, this broad- 
based principle belies the intricacies explored above. For instance, collateral damage 
of civilian property is permissible in certain situations providing the amount of force
:»” “ r d : f S PW a . i o n  and International L a V (1 925) 6 BYIL ,59; John Fischer
Williams, ‘International Law and the Property of Aliens (1928) 9 BYIL .
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is proportionate and necessary. In this sense, the provisions relating to the destruction 
of property under the IHL are a lot more flexible than those found under the ECHR 
regime. 82 This is reflective of the idea that IHL recognises that armed conflict is 
inevitable and thus seeks to regulate that conflict, whereas IHRL aims to ensure rights 
at all times.
Identifying a definition of the protection of property in IHL is firstly 
dependent on the existence of an armed conflict of sufficient intensity to at least 
trigger the operation of Common Article 3. Protection is afforded in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts. Two aspects relevant to the protection of 
property are those of proportionality and the principle of distinction. Both of these 
concepts operate to protect property to a greater or lesser extent. The principle of 
distinction firstly requires attacking forces to distinguish between military objectives 
and civilian objectives. Proportionality operates to ensure that collateral damage is to 
be expected when attacking military objectives and that these are proportionate to the 
ends sought. Should the damage outweigh the objective then the acts could be 
disproportionate. Further considerations concern the applicability of the law to both 
State and non-State actors. It would appear to be in accordance with other rules of 
IHL that property be protected from the actions of State forces and non-State actors 
such as guerrillas. The range of protected property also appears wider than that which 
is protected under IHRL. Public, private and cultural property receive at least some 
measure of protection. The emergence of a distinct body of rules within the IHL 
regime could be seen as evidence for greater formal recognition of law. In turn this 
can counter the effects of the fragmentation of international law by the establishment 
of a core set of rules applicable to the IHL regime.
5.3 - Destruction of property and the ICL regime
The ICL regime generally lacks specifically defined crimes relating to property. In 
part this could be because it is focused largely on immediate threats to human dignity 
such as torture, enforced disappearance and rape. It can also be said to reflect the 
concern the ICL regime has with the prosecution of individuals for serious acts of 
criminal violence rather than the protection and restitution of property. The regime 
also offers only limited protection of property during widespread or systematic attacks
182 The ECHR is referred to here because it is the only IHRL regime that offers a developed definition 
of the destruction of property.
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against a civilian population or throughout acts of genocide. The ICL regime is 
comparatively lacking in provisions relating to the protection of property. However, 
as will be seen in the following section certain provisions could be used to ensure that 
property is protected by the ICL regime.
5.3.1 - ICL treaties and the destruction of property
Despite the recent growth of ICL, the regime’s protection of property is minimal. 
There are however a number of crimes which could possibly encompass the 
destruction of property, pillage and plunder. Article 6(c) of the ICC Statute 
criminalises acts of genocide which deliberately inflict ‘on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’. The ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes contain identical provisions,183 as does the Genocide Convention 1948 
on which the provision is originally based.184 It would be possible to envisage a 
scenario in which houses were destroyed with the intent to deprive the targeted 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group of shelter thereby imposing on them 
conditions calculated to destroy the group.185
The laws concerning crimes against humanity that could be utilised to 
prosecute individuals are the either the umbrella offence of persecution or the ‘other 
inhumane acts’ category of crimes. Both offences have been incorporated into the 
Statutes of the international tribunals and the ICC.186 Of particular use to any 
prosecution of an accused under the ICC Statute is the crime of persecution contrary 
to Article 7(1 )(h). Under this Article, persecution can be committed against ‘any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law’. Any act which the Statute 
criminalises can be committed with persecutory intent.187 The Statutes of the ICTY 
and ICTR are not as widely drawn as this provision, they merely state that it is an 
offence to conduct persecutions based on political, racial or religious grounds.188 Such
183 ICTY Statute, art 4(2)(c); ICTR Statute, art 2(2)(c).
184 Convention on the Prevention and Prohibition of Genocide, 9 December 1948, A/RES/260, art 2(c).
185 A similar line of reasoning has been used at the ICTY with regard to persecution as a crime against 
humanity, as discussed below. See Kordic (n 129) para.205.
186 ICTY Statute, arts 5(h) and (i); ICTR Statute, arts 3(h) and (i); ICC Statute, art 7(1 )(h) and (k).
187 ICC Statute, art 7(1 )(h).
188 ICTY Statute, art 5(h); ICTR Statute, art 3(h).
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prohibitions do not explicitly make reference to property meaning that should mass 
appropriation or destruction of property occur the ICC would have to adopt a more 
creative interpretation of the law if it was to find an accused guilty.
5.3.2 - Case law
The destruction of property within the context of genocide and crimes against 
humanity has received little judicial attention. However, there are a handful cases 
which provide some illumination of pertinent legal principles. Firstly, Kupreskic 
established that persecution can be committed through discriminatory attacks against 
political, social and economic rights.189 This would include, for example, the 
appropriation of property belonging to a targeted group. Such a condition could be 
wide enough to include attacks against the property belonging to a particular group. In 
Blaskic, the Trial Chamber held that for plunder to be considered persecutory it would 
be necessary for the property to belong to a particular section of the population.190 
Having considered the law surrounding persecution and the destruction or pillage of 
property, the Court concluded that ‘persecution’ can relate not only to attacks that 
result in physical or mental harm to the victims, but also acts which ‘appear less 
serious’ such as the targeting of property.191 Consequently, persecution could occur 
providing ‘the victimised persons were specially selected on grounds linked to their 
belonging to a particular community.’192
In Kordic and Cerkez the Trial Chamber outlined a number of acts that could 
amount to constitute acts of persecution. In addition to murder, deportation and 
imprisonment, the ICTY recognised ‘such attacks on property as would constitute “a 
destruction of the livelihood of a certain population.’193 Also included in this list was 
the plunder of property.194 Attacking civilian towns and villages would provide the 
‘factual matrix’ for most other acts of persecution because it serves as a precursor to 
attacks against civilians themselves.195 Acts of plunder are also recognised as 
persecution by the Kordic and Cerkez case. The Court here held that the provisions









under crimes against humanity were essentially the same as those recognised under 
the violations of the laws of customs of war’ category enumerated in Article 3 of the 
ICTY Statute.196 Plunder and the destruction of property can be used to ‘coerce, 
intimidate, terrorise and forcibly transfer’ civilians from their homes as part of a 
campaign of ethnic cleansing.197 Similar reasoning was used in Simic where the Court 
noted that acts of plunder were not charged as violations of IHL but rather as 
‘underlying acts of persecution’.198
5.3.3 - Conclusion on ICL and the destruction of property
The protection of property in ICL is limited and relatively weak if viewed in 
comparison to the prohibitions of torture, enforced disappearance and sexual violence. 
In part, this could be with the concern of ICL with the immediate protection of human 
dignity such as through the criminalisation of torture and rape. The effects of 
destroying property might not have such an immediate impact on the individual. 
However, the destruction of property belonging to ‘any identifiable group or 
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender...or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law’ 
could be evidence of persecution.199 It is doubtful whether ‘other inhumane acts’ 
under Article 7(1 )(k) of the ICC Statute could be used to prosecute the destruction of 
property due to the requirement that such acts cause ‘great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health’. ICL appears therefore to lack specific 
provisions relating to the destruction of property, although such acts could amount to 
evidence of other criminals acts being committed.
Conclusion to Chanter Five
The destruction of property can amount to a violation of each of the three regimes 
examined in this chapter. Unlike torture, enforced disappearance and sexual violence 
which are always prohibited, an individual’s right to enjoy property can be limited in 
certain circumstances. For instance, while the wanton destruction of property is 
absolutely prohibited in IHL, collateral damage to civilian property is permissible 
providing that the destruction was proportional and was necessary for the
196 ibid para.205.
197 ibid.
198 Simic (161) para. 102.
199 ICC Statute, art 7(1 )(h).
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achievement of a military objective. The IHRL regime offers varied protection 
depending on the sub-regime. The Inter-American regime does contain provisions to 
protect property but until now this has been used mostly to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples rather than to advance an individual’s property rights. Contrast 
this with the use of ECHR Protocol 1, Article 1 that has been used in an expansive 
fashion to protect a range of rights from ‘traditional’ real property to newer issues 
such as intellectual property. Of the three regimes, the ICL regime presents the 
weakest protection of property. Any protection it affords would have to come from a 
wide reading of crimes against humanity and genocide laws, although the confiscation 
or destruction of a given group’s property could be seen evidence of persecution or 
imposing on members of the group conditions intended to destroy the group.
The argument advanced through this thesis is that although the three regimes 
do prohibit the acts they do so by very different means. This reflects the differences 
between the three regimes with the IHRL regime primarily intended to protect the 
individual from the actions of States. In contrast, the IHL regime is focused more on 
the duties of belligerents rather than the rights of individuals but there are provisions 
for reparations for those whose property is damaged. The ICL regime is particularly 
concerned with punishing individuals thereby attempting to deter similar conduct in 
the future.
This chapter has broadly considered two violations of property rights. The first 
was the outright destruction of the property in question by whatever means. The 
second, the deprivation of property caused by looting, pillage or plunder (terms used 
interchangeably throughout both this chapter and the case law of the ICTY). 
Noticeable is the way in which each regime approaches the destruction of property in 
a different fashion. The human rights regime offers scant protection at the 
international level but greater, though not great, protection at the regional level 
(notably within the ECHR). In contrast, the IHL regime contains several well-defined 
provisions relating to the destruction of property and when such destruction can be 
considered legal. The ICL regime is closer to the IHRL regime in that provisions 
relating to the destruction of property are undeveloped or non-existent. The important 
point to note from the above chapter is that each regime follows its own legal rules 
and jurisprudence. This further supports the arguments advanced in this thesis that 
each regime can and should be viewed as functionally separate, able to exist without
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reference to other regimes and, importantly, highlights the idea that the law of each 
regime is enforceable only within the relevant legal context of that regime.
Considering the definitions of the destruction of property under the three 
regimes reveals a number of substantial differences. The IHRL regime, as with other 
violations, is primarily concerned with preventing the violation of human rights 
relating to the property by the State or its agents. In contrast, the IHL and ICL regimes 
have been more willing to find that violations can be committed by non-State actors 
as well as those with a closer connection to the State. The IHL and IHRL regimes 
both appear to rely on the concept of proportionality in deciding if the destruction of 
property is lawful. The idea that plunder and pillage is prohibited appears to be 
common to the IHRL and IHL regimes with the relevant courts finding violations 
have occurred.
The fragmentation of international law can often lead to the emergence of 
stronger bodies of law. This has been seen in the law relating to torture, enforced 
disappearance and sexual violence. The protection of property does not receive 
comparable consideration across the three regimes. These differences could be taken 
as evidence that the fragmentation of international law is real, and that the formally 
recognised distinctions between the regimes maintain a degree of separation between 
them. However, as the three regimes are concerned with three different areas of law, 
the potential harm caused by fragmentation can be minimised by referring to the 





The fragmentation of international law undoubtedly presents several theoretical 
problems to the international legal system. The purpose of this thesis has been to 
examine how the theoretical elements relate to the practical aspects of international 
law, with regard to four substantive issues of torture, enforced disappearance, sexual 
violence and the destruction of property. These four violations were then examined 
from the perspective of the three regimes of international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law. The violations were 
chosen because each finds condemnation and prohibition by each of the three 
regimes. Each regime also has a different approach to how these violations are 
defined. Such divergence between the regimes could be seen as prima facie evidence 
for the effects of fragmentation and the shift towards a more heterogeneous 
international legal system. It could then be suggested that this would lead to 
competition between the three definitions, leading to a loss of legal certainty and 
confusion as to which definition ought to be applied. However, these concerns do not 
consider the functional differences of the three regimes nor the fact that, while they 
ought not to be regarded as ‘self-contained’, they can and do operate independently 
from one another.
The aim of this final chapter is to draw together the arguments advanced in 
this thesis, summarise its analysis and state how the thesis contributes to advancing 
understanding of the fragmentation of international law and its effects. It begins by 
summarising the position adopted in Chapter One of the thesis alongside the content 
of the substantive chapters (Two to Five). It then proceeds to review the implications 
of fragmentation for international law, followed by consideration of some alternative
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approaches to that adopted in this thesis. The final section considers the future 
implications for international law caused by fragmentation and the contribution this 
thesis makes to the field of study.
The thesis in summary
The fragmentation of international law covers a wide-range of issues from 
international trade law to international environmental law. The areas chosen for study 
in this thesis were international human rights law, international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law. These were chosen because each addresses the substantive 
issues of torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence and the destruction of 
property. Before considering the focus of Chapters Two to Five, it is necessary to first 
reflect on the fragmentation of international law itself which was the subject of the 
first chapter.
Fragmentation has emerged, according to one account, to address particular 
areas problematic to the operation of general international law.1 Thus one definition 
of fragmentation could be that it means the emergence of various regimes, termed 
‘exotic’ by the International Law Commission,2 aimed at addressing different issues. 
This can be seen, for example, in the existence of the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes 
despite apparent prima facie similarities such as the protection of human dignity. 
These separately functional regimes inevitably lead to divergence but such divergence 
does not necessarily lead to a conflict between them.3 However, in certain instances 
the potential exists for the separate regimes to address the same similar fact conduct, 
leading to concern that the international legal system is being weakened by the
1 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge 
Review o f International Affairs 197,205.
2 Fragmentation o f International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion o f  
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized Martti 
Koskenniemi, 13April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (‘ILC Report on Fragmentation') para.8.
3 Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 BYIL 425, 425.
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proliferation of regimes. Such concern sees the debate on fragmentation being 
framed in the language of conflict and collision, reinforcing the notion that the 
fragmentation of international law is inherently negative and to be avoided at all costs. 
Despite such views being prevalent it is possible to speculate that they are driven by a 
desire to fashion a concept of international law with universal definitions. This view is 
recognisable in the attempts to ‘constitutionalise’ international law, an issue which is 
beyond the scope of the present enquiry but reveals the trend towards the 
universilisation of international law.
One possible response to fragmentation is to adopt a more formalised account 
of international law. This can be said to combat the vagueness and uncertainty 
promoted by a policy-orientated approach to international law. In the policy- 
orientated approach ‘law’ and ‘non-law’ are seen as identical, with no formal 
distinction between legal instruments and policy instruments; in essence, law becomes 
‘everything’.5 Accordingly, there is scope for the inclusion of contradictory positions 
to be adopted in the same body of law, a point akin to the conflict of legal regimes 
postulated because of fragmentation. However, the policy-orientated approach, 
despite its ‘societal goals’,6 potentially exacerbates the effects of fragmentation by 
permitting the free-exchange of definitions between legally discrete regimes without 
recognition of each regime’s legal traditions, procedure and rules. Such 
instrumentalism, it has been argued, leads to legal uncertainty because the formal 
existence of legal rules becomes nebulous, preventing those rules from giving 
meaningful commands.7 Consequently, the fragmentation of international law has the
4 Gerhard Hafner, ‘Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’ (2003) 25 
Michigan Journal o f International Law 849, 856.
5 Anthony D ’Amato, ‘Is International Law Really “Law”?’ (1984) 79 North Western University Law 
Review  1293, 1302.




potential to lead to a loss of clarity because of the sheer number of possible 
definitions available to any given regime. This point can be seen in reference to 
torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence and the destruction of property in the 
IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes. These were chosen to highlight the different approaches 
of the three regimes.
The IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes conform to Ratner’s definition of a regime in 
that they aim to regulate certain types of conduct, albeit by different methods.8 For 
example, the IHRL regime is primarily focused on State liability for human rights 
violations,9 while the IHL and ICL regime consider individual culpability for 
violations of their rules. The IHL regime can engage both individual and State 
liability for violations as can be seen through the case law of the ICTY in respect of 
the former and the ICJ in the case of the latter.10 Individual responsibility in the IHL 
regime has led to some of the greatest advancements in the field of sexual violence 
and command responsibility for instance. The ICL regime is particularly focused on 
individual criminal responsibility, a factor underscored in the Nuremberg judgment in 
which the IMT held that crimes against international law are committed by 
individuals and not the abstract entity of the State or other political organisations.11
The substantive chapters (Two to Five) provide evidence to support the 
assertion that the three regimes are different from one another. While there are
8 Steven R. Ratner, ‘Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented 
International Law’ (2008) 102 AJIL 475, 485.
9 This can be seen through the state-centric nature of various human rights mechanisms such as the UN 
Human Rights Council, ECHR and Inter-American system.
10 e.g. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States o f  
America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1986] ICJ Rep 392 (27 June) para. 115; Draft Articles on 
Responsibility o f  States fo r  Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, (A/56/10) art 8; In a 
different context see also Markus Rau, ‘State Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law - The Distomo Case Before the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2005) 7 German Law 
JournallOX.
11 Trial o f  the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nurnberg, 14 
November 1945-1 October 1946, published at Niimberg, Germany, 1947, p. 223, ; see also Andre 
Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International 
Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 615, 619.
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similarities between them, such as the definition of the physical act of torture, there 
are also sufficient differences to support Koskenniemi’s view that several institutional 
projects are being carved out within the international legal system.12 Thus differences 
between these can, to an extent, be overcome by reference to law rather than policy.13
Torture was chosen as the subject of the second chapter because it helps to 
clarify the differences between the three regimes. These differences lend themselves 
as support for the idea that a formal approach to international law can help relieve 
some of the tensions between the three regimes. The IHRL regime is focused on the 
protection of the individual from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment committed 
by State officials or with the complicity of State officials. Over time, the IHRL regime 
has expanded the definition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. This is 
particularly noticeable at the ECtHR which has termed the ECHR a ‘living 
instrument’.14 As a consequence, the ECHR can be interpreted so as to reflect the 
changing needs of society.
The IHL and ICL regimes have both drawn from the jurisprudence of the 
IHRL regime with regard to the definition of torture. This has been particularly 
noticeable in respect of defining the physical acts of torture as in Aleksovski where 
reference was made to the definition given in Selmouni at the ECtHR.15 Such 
interaction between the regimes could be viewed as evidence for the idea that they are 
slowly fusing together, a position advocated by some who believe this is the best 
means of ensuring the continued protection of individuals in times of armed conflict
12 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law -  20 Years Later’ (2009) 20 EJIL7, 9.
13ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 2) para.487.
14 Tyrer v.UK (Application no. 5856/77) Judgment, 25 April 1978, para.31; Selmouni v.France
(Application no. 25803/94) Judgment, 28 July 1999, para.101.




or mass atrocity. Importantly, however, the IHL and ICL regimes have not felt 
obliged to remain rigidly wedded to the definitions of the IHLR regime. For instance, 
in Kunarac the ICTY concluded that acts of torture could be committed by non-State 
actors thereby deviating from the IHRL definition of torture.17 While this small 
change might appear insignificant, it can be viewed as evidence for the recognition of 
the IHL and ICL regimes that they are formally distinct from the IHRL regime and 
not bound by the latter regime’s rules or definitions.
The third chapter examined the contemporary issue of enforced disappearance. 
This offence has a long history in international law stretching back to the Nuremberg 
IMT with the prosecution of individuals for the Nacht und Nebel decree that saw 
thousands of people disappear without a trace or recognition by the authorities. Since 
1945 enforced disappearances have been used by regimes across the world from 
Argentina to contemporary Syria.18 The regimes have had different responses to such 
acts. The IHRL regime has perhaps been most active in this regard, particularly in the 
Inter-American and ECHR sub-regimes. This has led to the creation of a substantial 
body of jurisprudence concerning such acts. The Inter-American and ECHR regimes 
have also recognised that the rights of relatives can also be violated in certain 
circumstances meaning that they themselves are indirect victims of human rights 
atrocities. Such jurisprudence has emerged despite the fact that the ECHR and Inter- 
American regimes both lack specific human rights violations of enforced 
disappearance. Instead, the Courts have approached the matter via a range of existing
16 Francoise Hampson and Ibrahim Salama (2005) ‘Working paper by Ms Hampson and Mr Salama on 
the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law’ UN Doc: 
E/CN.4/sub.2/2005/l 4, para.31.
17 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al (IT-96-23 & 23/1) TC, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para.496.
18 On Syria see Human Rights Watch, ‘We’ve Never Seen Such Horror: Crimes against Humanity by 
Syrian Security Forces’ (2011) Available at:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/svria0611 webwcover..Bdf (Last accessed 20 July 2013).
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measures, for instance the right to life, the right not to suffer torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and the right not to be arbitrarily detained.
In contrast to the IHRL regime, the IHL and ICL regimes have been slower to 
respond to instances of enforced disappearance even though such acts are now 
prohibited by each of the regimes.19 This disparity is noticeable because many acts of 
enforced disappearance occur in situations that could amount to armed conflict, for 
instance in Chechnya and Turkey. In these situations the victims’ families have only 
had recourse to redress via IHRL. In part this could be because the acts of 
disappearance are committed by State agents and therefore military justice (one of the 
key methods of enforcing IHL rules) is potentially unavailable. Likewise, the ICL 
regime lacks the temporal jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for such offences, 
although in respect to new incidents the ICC could be able to prosecute an accused for 
the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance contrary to the ICC Statute. 
However, the definition of the offence given in both the Statute and the Elements of 
Crimes is incredibly complicated and rests upon the presence of several elements plus 
the requirement that such acts be committed within the context of a widespread or 
systematic attack on a civilian population. Together, these problems are not 
insurmountable but stand in contrast to the relatively easy approach taken by the 
IHRL regime even though it has in several cases declined to find that rights have been 
violated.
Sexual violence was chosen as the subject of the fourth chapter because of its 
importance in current international law and the wide-range of academic and judicial 
discourse related to it. As with enforced disappearance, the IHRL regime by and large 
lacks specific provisions relating to sexual violence. Instead, the ECHR and Inter-
19 e.g. ICC Statute, Article 8(1 )(k).
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American regimes have developed their provisions through the lens of torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment. In effect this has little practical consequence for the 
application of the law because rape and other acts of sexual violence would almost 
certainly meet the threshold for torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Difficulties 
arise however when considering whether the acts of private individuals constitute 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. As was seen in Chapter Four, numerous 
writers view the lack of human rights protection afforded to women in the private 
sphere as deplorable.20 They see all such acts as human rights violations because such 
acts understandably violate the victim’s dignity. However, this viewpoint does not 
take into account the idea of human rights regulating the State-citizen relationship 
rather than the citizen-citizen relationship. Furthermore, in many States sexual 
violence is prohibited by the criminal law which can offer greater penalties and 
deterrent effect than can human rights law. That the criminal law is frequently found 
to be inadequate does not automatically mean that the best solution is to resort to 
human rights. Rather a stronger framework of protection could be developed by 
utilising domestic criminal law.
In contrast to the IHRL regime, the IHL and ICL regimes both contain much 
stronger overt prohibitions against sexual violence. While the wording of the Geneva 
Conventions has been criticised for referring to the ‘dignity’ of women rather than 
explicitly prohibiting sexual violence, 21 such wording could arguably be said to 
reflect the language prevalent at the time the Conventions were drafted. Additional 
evidence for the prohibition of sexual violence during armed conflict comes from 
customary IHL, particularly States’ military manuals. In addition, cases before the
20 Pamela Goldberg and Nancy Kelly, ‘International Human Rights and Violence against Women’
(1993) 6 H a r v a r d  Human Rights Journal 195, 195-196.  ^ . _ _ . . _ .
21 Rhonda Copelon, ‘Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women m Humanitarian Law
(1994) 5 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 243, 249.
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ICTY and ICTR have seen individuals prosecuted for rape,22 sexual violence23 and 
other sexualised crimes.24 The ICTY Statute did not explicitly criminalise acts of 
sexual violence as violations of IHL, but instead as a crime against humanity.25 Since 
the intervention of the judges in Akayesu there has arguably been greater awareness of 
sexual violence in both IHL and ICL. It will be recalled that it was a judicial 
intervention which led to the inclusion of rape on the indictment of Jean-Paul 
Akayesu. His subsequent conviction confirmed the notion that rape could amount to 
an act of genocide. The experiences of the ICTR have now been reflected in the ICC 
Statute which contains several provisions relating to sexual violence committed in 
times of armed conflict and as a crime against humanity. Similarly, genocide can be 
committed by acts of rape and other acts of sexual violence.26 Taken together, this 
suggests that the IHL and ICL regimes recognise sexual violence as legitimate 
offences and, importantly, have taken considerable measures to make formal changes 
to the law.
The final chapter examined the means by which property is protected by the 
three regimes. There is a noticeable difference in the approaches of the three regimes 
to this subject when compared with the other three substantive areas studied. In the 
first instance, the right to property is a qualified right meaning that in certain 
circumstances it can be violated. This contrasts with acts of torture, enforced 
disappearance and sexual violence which are absolutely prohibited in all 
circumstances. The only aspect similar to this is the prohibition of looting and pillage 
under IHL which absolutely prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property; arguably
22 Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4) TC, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para.696.
23 Akayesu ibid para.686.
24 Including the use of 'rape camps’ as in Kunarac (n 17) para.30.
25 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc S/RES/827, UN 
Security Council, 1994, art 5(g).
26 Akayesu (n 22), para.696.
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this extends to the IHRL regime when property is looted by State agents as evidenced 
in Sadykov21 at the ECtHR. IHRL provisions, where they exist, are widely drafted and 
protect a broad-range of property interests going beyond mere destruction. This can 
be seen from the ECHR case law protecting intellectual property28 and corporate 
assets. The IACtHR has been largely concerned with another type of property rights 
namely the destruction or deprivation of community interests in property particularly 
the rights of indigenous people. Such jurisprudence can be seen as a demonstration of 
the versatility of human rights law when compared with the IHL and ICL regimes.
In times of armed conflict property is frequently destroyed by belligerents. 
This fact is recognised in the Geneva Conventions. Thus it is permissible to destroy 
property in certain circumstances where such acts are justified by military necessity 
and are proportional.30 Certain classifications of property, for instance hospitals and 
places of worship are protected at all times.31 In contrast, the ICL regime affords an 
individual’s right to property relatively little protection. Seemingly the only protection 
available would come from either the IHL aspects of ICL or through a wide-reading 
of ‘other inhumane acts’,32 persecution33 or, in the case of genocide, the imposition of 
measures calculated to destroy a convention group.34 The differences between the 
IHL and IHRL regimes on the one hand and ICL on the other could be explained by 
the fact that the latter is focused more on the need to ensure that individuals are 
prosecuted for heinous violations such as torture, sexual violence and enforced
27 Sadykov v. Russia (Application no. 41840/02) Judgment, 7 October 2010.
Smith Kline and French Laboratories v. Netherlands (Application no. 12633/87) Judgment, 4 October 
1990.
29 Bramelid v. Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 249.
30 See Chapter Five, 267.
31 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Custoinary International Humanitarian Law
(vol 1 CUP 2005) 34. . , ^ ^
32 e.g ICTY Statute (n25) Article 5(i); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ( ICC
Statute’) (17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9, entered into force 1 July 2002, Article 8(1 )(k).
33 e.g. ICC Statute ibid Article 8(1 )(h). .
34 e.g. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78
UNTS 227, entered into force 12 January 1951, art 2(c).
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disappearance rather than protecting an individual’s property. However, on the face of 
it, there would be little difference between killing an individual outright and burning 
his or her house down so that they and their family died of exposure. Indeed, the 
destruction of a house in such circumstances could constitute the deliberate 
imposition of conditions calculated to destroy a protected group under the Genocide 
Convention.35
An examination of the definitions peculiar to each regime reveals shared 
similarities but also differences between the regimes. Each regime appears to 
demonstrate awareness of the context in which it operates. This could itself be viewed 
as adherence to formally established rules rather than the adoption of a wider policy- 
orientated approach to the law. Approaching the law in this restricted fashion could be 
cited as evidence for the continuing relevance of formally identifiable and applicable 
rules.
Implications for the fragmentation of international law
Unchecked, fragmentation undoubtedly has the potential to harm international law 
and the international legal system as a whole. In part this is due to how international 
law comes to be seen and used by practitioners, academics and activists.36 One 
potential means of mitigating such fragmentation is the adoption of more formal and 
legally rigorous definitions of substantive violations amounting to similar fact conduct 
such as torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence and the destruction of 
property. Having considered the definitions and their application by the three regimes, 
a number of implications emerge as to how international law operates in an era of 
fragmentation. These include the idea that fragmentation is not damaging per se.
36 This could include, for instance, judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers and NGO staff.
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Furthermore, despite the apparent multiplicity of definitions each is clearly 
identifiable and capable of being applied by the regime in which it is found; and, 
importantly, each regime continues to operate and function without there being much 
evidence of regime conflict as postulated by some commentators.
In respect of the areas covered by this thesis, fragmentation appears to have 
created three separate definitions of each violation. Each of these is peculiar to the 
regime in which it is found. Fragmentation therefore could be seen as actually 
strengthening the international legal system because it creates clearly identifiable 
definitions that are applicable in a clearly identifiable regime. For example, the 
definition of torture in the IHRL regime is applicable only in that regime. This is 
because the definition of torture in the IHRL regime contains, inter alia, the physical 
act of torture and the involvement in the commission of those acts of State officials. In 
contrast, the IHL and ICL regimes do not require that the acts be committed by State 
officials, thereby extending their law to include the acts of non-State actors.
The existence of multiple, or sometimes overlapping, regimes (as found in the 
fragmented international legal system) has been referred to as causing 
inconsistencies,37 invalidity38 and incoherence.39 In essence, the rules of one regime 
are at variance with the rules of another, leading to ‘contradiction, collision and 
competition’.40 This is reflective of Kelsen’s view of normative conflict where norm 
is contrary to norm.4 * In such a situation, conformity with one norm leads inevitably
37 Jaap Haag, ‘Rule Consistency’ (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 369, 371-372.
38 Hans Kelsen, General Theory o f  Law and the State (The Lawbook Exchange 1999) 410.
39 Ole Fauchald and Andre Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ in Ole Fauchald and Andre Nollkaemper (eds), 
The Practice o f International and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation o f International Law
40 H. Hamner Hill, ‘A Functional Taxonomy of Normative Conflict’ (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 227, 
229
41 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems o f Legal Theory [The Pure Theory of Law or Reine 
Rechtslehre] (Clarendon Press 1992) 71.
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to the violation of another.42 This potentially places a judge in an invidious position 
where she has to choose between applying norm x  and norm y. The creation of this 
type of scenario could be avoided by the position advocated by this thesis. Rather than 
viewing the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes as competing or conflicting with one 
another, it is instead possible for each regime to be viewed as functionally separate, 
with each having its own formally identifiable rules. The analysis of each regime’s 
approach to the four substantive topics of torture, enforced disappearance, sexual 
violence and destruction of property lends some support to this idea.
Keeping the regimes functionally separate can potentially help to minimise 
conflict and tension between them because the norms and rules of each regime are 
restricted to that particular regime. Thus, the emergence of separate functional 
regimes each with its own formally identifiable rules can assist in overcoming the 
difficulties posed by and associated with the fragmentation of international law. The 
ICTY’s position in Tadic and the ICJ’s position in Nicaragua can both help to 
demonstrate this viewpoint. Both courts devised different interpretations of ‘control’ 
for the purpose of attributing liability. The ICTY’s standard was that of ‘overall 
control’ while the ICJ’s was that of ‘effective control’.43 Both the ICJ and ICTY 
Appeal Chamber can be regarded as presiding over functionally separate legal 
regimes, each with its own formally ascertainable rules. Such a position is reflected in 
the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes’ approaches to torture, enforced disappearance, 
sexual violence and the destruction of property. In these, although the regimes 
consider acts which are privna facie similar to the idea of control in Tadic and 
Nicaragua, they each adopt functionally separate definitions.
42 Stephen Munzer, ‘Validity and Legal Conflicts’ (1972) 82 Yale Law Journal 1140, 1151.
43 See Chapter One, § 1.1.2, 34. .
44 Prosecutor v Tadic (IT-94-1) AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
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Alternative approaches to a formal approach to international law 
There are several theoretical approaches to the study of law generally and to 
international law in particular. Indeed, the peculiar characteristics of the international 
legal system such as the lack of a defined legislative body and executive leads 
potentially to an even greater number of possible interpretations. The approach 
adopted in this thesis has focused on a formal, positivistic approach to international 
law. It has argued that the increased use of the policy-orientated approach is too 
political and can exacerbate the negative features of fragmentation by failing to regard 
the differences between the individual regimes. Despite this, it remains that there are 
drawbacks to an overly positivistic and formalist approach to international law. A 
rigid application of the law allows for no discretion on the part of the judges with the 
potential consequence that law becomes detached from reality. An element of judicial 
discretion and even creativity is to be welcomed in any legal system. Evidence for this 
in the arena of international law is plentiful. The inclusion of sexual violence in 
genocide indictments before the ICTR could be said to be largely due to the exercise 
of judicial discretion.45 So too could the ICTY’s approach in Tadic where the judges 
refused to follow the interpretation of control established by the ICJ in Nicaragua. 
The approach adopted in this thesis has been to balance rigid positivism with the 
overly broad policy-orientated approach to international law.
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27. 
1986.
45 Chapter Four, 229.
46 See Chapter One, §1.1.2
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A policy-focused methodology to international law has been said to place 
human dignity at the forefront of its analysis,47 a position undermined by ‘arbitrary 
formalism . As the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes are variously concerned with the 
protection of human dignity, the policy-orientated approach would appear, prima 
facie, to be the ideal method of analysing the regimes. This would allow the law to 
move away from the ‘shackles of traditionalism’49 and embrace a human rather than a 
legal understanding of international law. Such an approach would find encouragement 
from some feminist scholars who, writing about sexual violence, have complained of 
the ‘misogynistic formalism’ inherent in the current international legal system.50 
These criticisms were perhaps justified at the time ICL re-emerged into the 
international legal system in the early 1990s. As noted above, it was a judicial 
intervention which led to the expansion of genocide so that it included acts of rape.
Perhaps inevitably, the approach advocated and taken in this thesis has drawn 
from relatively narrow sources of international law. These could be termed as 
‘traditional sources’ of international law: or ; namely treaties, customary international 
law and judicial case law. A wider study of potential, non-traditional, sources such as 
policy documents and a greater emphasis on practice of international courts and 
tribunals could have resulted in different conclusions being reached. For instance an 
empirical study involving interviews with major actors such as judges and lawyers 
appearing before the various international tribunals could possibly have led to a 
different outcome than the doctrinal approach adopted.
47 Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems 
of Public Order’ (1959) 53 AJIL 1, 1.
48 Myres S. McDougal et al, The Interpretation o f International Agreements and World Public Order. 
Principles o f  Content and Procedure (Martinus Nijhoff 1994) xvii.
49 Douglas M. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) xxv.
50 Adrienne Kalosieh, ‘Consent to Genocide?: The ICTY’s Improper Use of the Consent Paradigm to 
Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foca’ (2003) 24 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 121, 134.
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Linked to a concern over the narrowness of the sources adopted is the use of 
only four substantive issues namely torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence 
and the destruction of property. A wider body of law could have revealed different 
outcomes or given greater strength to the advanced thesis. Further relevant bodies of 
law could have included the treatment of detainees, the killing of individuals and the 
denial of fair trial rights. These may have revealed outcomes different to those found 
in this thesis. However, the present study began by identifying conduct that was 
conclusively prohibited by all three regimes studied. Many other aspects of IHRL, for 
example freedom of speech and the right to privacy, are not found in the IHL or ICL 
regimes, or at least are not specifically mentioned. This effectively limited the 
potential pool of issues to study.
Similarly, the thesis draws on the law relating to just three regimes of 
international law, namely IHRL, IHL and ICL. This could be considered too narrow a 
basis for the drawing of conclusions concerning fragmentation and its impact more 
generally on the operation of international law. For instance, studying the 
international trade and international environmental law regimes could lead to different 
outcomes whereby a less formalistic and more policy-orientated approach to sources 
could be welcomed.
The role of a formal approach to international law and fragmentation 
In Chapter One and subsequent chapters, the role of formal rule ascertainment was 
analysed and applied in the context of the IHRL, IHL and ICL regimes. This was 
contrasted with the more open-faced, policy-orientated approach to rule ascertainment 
in which ‘everything is law’.51 One difficulty associated with such an approach in the 
era of fragmentation is that the legal distinctions between the three regimes melt away
51 Chapter One, §1.2.
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giving rise to the potential for inter-regime conflict. This would see, for example, IHL 
norms used to interpret those of IHRL and vice versa. The extra-legal use of norms in 
this way could result in the application of norms ‘without reference to the legal 
system they originally set out to interpret.’52 Consequently there is the possibility that 
the law ceases to exist as a normative order and instead becomes an issue of politics.53
One potential benefit of a formal approach to international law in the era of 
fragmentation is that it moves the law away from being simply a ‘comprehensive 
process of decision making’ to a distinct body of law with defined legal rules as one 
would expect to find in any developed legal system.54 The existence of a distinct body 
of law can help to guide certainty and grants to judges and other decision-making 
actors in the international legal system a methodology for differentiating between 
what is law and what is extra-legal.55 In turn this can help to steer the decision-makers 
away from the possible perils of a fragmented international legal system. A result of 
such an approach would be that decision-makers and academics would have to ask 
themselves ‘why bother with mles and forms’ approach criticised by Koskenniemi is 
deemed valid.56
The shift towards a formal approach could also limit the ability to construct 
law from various sources, some of which might be deemed extra-legal. This could, 
consequently, avoid the ‘fact x policy = law’ approach to international law. It could 
also signify that the international legal system is reaching maturity with the creation 
of multiple regimes each of which is becoming increasingly well-established with its 
own body of procedures, case law and academic commentary. It could be seen as
52 Stanley V. Anderson, ‘A Critique of Professor Myres S. McDougal s Doctrine of Interpretation by
Major Purposes’ (1963) 57 AJIL 378, 380.
54 Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources o f International Law (OUP 2012) 105
55 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution o f Liberty (Routledge 1990) 148.
56 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer o f Nations (CUP 2002) 496.
57 Philip Allott, ‘Language, Method and the Nature of International Law (1971) 45 BYIL 79, 121.
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evidence of a natural, rather than intentional, counterbalance to the potential problems 
posed by the fragmentation of international law.
The future of fragmentation
Fragmentation will inevitably remain a feature of the international legal system and 
the subject of future academic commentary and debate. The process might increase 
further as the individual regimes grow in confidence and become more willing to 
assert that their own interpretation of a given legal concept is the most appropriate in 
the circumstances. The prospect of competing, and perhaps contradictory, definitions 
will unavoidably raise further questions of the unified nature of international law and 
how such divergences can be remedied. The idea of constitutionalising the 
international legal system to rectify such problems will continue to be advocated by 
academics. Despite such concerns and calls for greater centralisation of the 
international legal system, it remains that at the functional, operational level, the 
regimes of IHRL, IHL and ICL appear to operate relatively autonomously from one 
another. It is true that the regimes have borrowed terminology and legal principles 
from one another. For example, the IHL and ICL regimes share common definitions 
of the physical act of torture with the IHRL regime. However, the IHRL, IHL and ICL 
regimes appear to remain wedded to the law peculiar to their own legal systems. One 
particular manifestation of this is the emergence of formally ascertainable rules.
These formally ascertainable rules can be seen as a means of clearly 
demarcating the boundaries of any given regime. They specify the limits of each 
particular legal regime. This often involves the participation of those responsible for 
determining the content of a given legal rule. Such formal rules therefore permit, for 
example, the relevant judicial authority to determine whether or not any particular 
situation can be governed by the regimes’ own rules. To take the example of IHL, it is
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possible and indeed necessary for a court to establish that there existed an armed 
conflict of some description (either international or non-international). Without such a 
condition the regime is unable to operate and unable to adjudicate such matters. Thus, 
in the instance of torture, acts committed would have to have occurred during an 
armed conflict. The absence of an armed conflict in a given scenario would mean that 
the IHL regime would be unable to operate.
Fragmentation has the potential to strengthen international law through the 
greater use of formally ascertainable rules. Such rules could help to create and 
develop international legal regimes that are better able to function autonomously of 
one another while at the same time minimising the potential for inter-regime conflict. 
Emphasising the formal rules of each regime, including the legal circumstances in 
which a regime will operate, could avoid the creation of a new internationalised 
constitutional order aimed at regulating inter-regime conflict.
Fragmentation does undoubtedly pose challenges to the international legal 
system. This could include situations where those applying the law of one regime are 
unable to differentiate between their regime and the law of another. Each of the three 
regimes of IHRL, IHL and ICL in the areas of torture, enforced disappearance, sexual 
violence and the destruction of property has developed its own interpretations of the 
four violations studied based on the rules peculiar to the respective regime. This has 
ensured that despite fragmentation each regime continues to function, and the efficacy 
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